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SUMMARY
Within this thesis we ask: How can one account for the
perennial appearance of apparently we 1 I-reasoned, mutually incompatible
ontologies. A preliminary discussion clarifies the meaning of 'incom¬
patible' and shows that a distinction can be drawn between predicative
and existential uses of 'exist'. Only these latter concern us
["preface - Ch. Q.
We proceed to study different explanations for the appearance
of incompatible ontologies [[chs. 11-tlQ. Among these we select a
classical £ch. IQ and a Iinguistic approach f[ph I IQ for further
analysis We show that a necessary condition for the assertion of the
former is the categorical provability of the existence-statements con¬
tained within an ontology {jOh. II #3, Gh. V #5 — fTj. Similarly a necessary
condition for the assertion of the strong linguistic approach —which we
analyze— is that the rules for the use of 'exist' be fel icitous Qch. I 11-IV-,
esp. I V
Our purpose in analyzing these approaches is to argue that their
presuppositions are not generally satisfiable Thus in Chapter VI we
develop a theory of concepts and then apply this to show that the pre¬
suppositions of the classical explanation and of weaker but related
approaches, in respect to proof and the unicity of truth, are not
sati sf ied [[chs. VI l-ix[[). Since this analysis is somewhat complex we
introduce an unusually detailed summary of this in Ch. X #1. As for
the linguistic approach, we argue that the strong thesis — that all
philosophic problems are due to a misuse of language — introduces
conditions that few if any natural languages can satisfy [[ch. XII 7-9]].
But if one cannot show , cs fhe former approach claims, that
ther© ar® Jneon'trovertlbly true statements of sufficient generality
to establish o a uni que body of s®if-conslstent oxIstance-statements,
than some propositions contained within an ontology — if significant —
are merely unfalsifiabie. And if ail philosophic problems ara not due
to a misuse of language, then issues concerning existence may arise in a
stratum of language in which the rules, say for the use of 'exist', are
incomplete, i.e. defective. Thus inasmuch as some ax!stance-statements
are, at best unfa Isifiable, issues concerning the truth or falsity of
exists,ice claims can develop when language is correctly used if one
accents this alternative approach, which we can the 'theory of penal selves',
it follows that there can ha mutually incompatible severally viable
ontologies [jCh. IX #4-9, esp #7-9; Ch. X #2-3; Ch XII #5-12]].
An analysis of historically Important ontologies confirms
the first tenet of this approach: there ar© some propositions in each
theory studied that are merely unfa! sif iabl© Qf>. XII #!~4J. Similarly
a study of the language forms employed in the expression of an ontology
partially confirms the second tenet: with the exception of 'exist'
(which is still unonalyzed), the other terms appearing in this sub-section
of language are not definite but schematic, and as such can be used in
different ways j]ch Xi],
It remains to be shown that the ruies for the us© of 'exist'
are also indefinite and thus sanction the development of mutual y in¬
compatible, severally tenable ontologies — and lastly that the existence-
statements contained within them are significant To do this we introduce
a theory of units [__Ch XI i #1-12] and then def ine 'exist' as a binary
predicate-term for the relation that obtains between © unit and a
universe of which it is an element or constituent. 'Exist' in terms
of this definit ion-schema is multiply ambiguous. It follows from
this that there are no theory-free existence-statements, and further —
the assertion of a possible ontology does not depend upon what is the
case, but the converse [^Ch. XIV #I-9J. We show too that existence-
statements, when fully specified, are meaningful £ch, XIV #2, ff-3
A general summary of the argument appears in Chapter XIV #11.
That these latter conclusions are relative to the use of a
particular definition-schema of 'exist' is in no way a defect otthis
analysis. For we argue throughout £esP- Ch VIII #8-9[3 that all
demonstration of this kind is conditional.
Finally we wish to bring the reader's attention to the
distinction we establish between 'sanction' and 'warrant' in[___Ch. IV #6^];
and to our use of 'predicate' as a generic term for properties and
relations, and to the use of 'p only if q" as truth-functionally identical
to 'if p then q'.
PREFACE
#1. A thesis in philosophy may often prove difficult reading.
This present study of existenee-statements, I fear is no exception.
Perhaps then some remarks about the perennial issues of philosophy may
prove helpful For certain general features of these recurrent problems
provide the point of departure for this study.
» fc • •
#2. By 'perennial issues of philosophy1 I refer, for instance,
to problems concerning the onto logical status of abstract entities,
or the notion of seIf-identity, or the warrantabiIity of values, or of
the relationship of our knowledge to whatever is the case, etc. And
cerfainly one feature common to all the above is that although their guise
may change from age to age, like old soldiers these issues never die.
Let us consider this matter further. If 'C' is the name of
some subject or concept in need of explanation (e.g., 'C' could denote
Existence) it frequently appears simpler to inquire not what C is, but
what 'C' means. But the mere transference of a problem concerning C to
the linguistic plane does not so much remove the offending issue, as
scotch it. For if the initial difficulty is genuinely perplexing, 'C'
surely does not wear its meaning on its sleeve either The initial
question: What is C? is now joined by: What is the meaning of 'C'? And
soon a whole brood of further problems appears: What do we mean by
'meaning'?, What is a word?, What is predication?, etc. Nor can one
wholly avoid this difficulty by pointing out the presence of linguistic
errors allegedly responsible for the initial issue. For a maneuvre of
this kind soon pro es in itself a fertile ground of fresh disputes.
-i-
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Among others, these concern the concepts, expressions, and methods em¬
ployed In such analyses: concepts such as that of Logical Grammar, ex¬
pressions such as 'rule for the use of 'C", and methods such as that of
dissolving philosophic issues. And thus we start again with a fresh set
of concepts In need of explanation. Or alternatively, we continue developing
the spiral of questions upon a higher level.
The above process of inquiry may be considered typical. It
seems that whenever the nerve of certain issues is touched at any point,
conceptual tensions proliferate throughout a vast area. It is not just one
question which must be answered, or dismantled. But on the contrary —
since the soundness of any solution concerning C depends upon the sound¬
ness of one's analysis of each premise and concept employed in such a
solution — all the truth values and inference-warrants in an entire
network of propositions come under fire.
Thus, as in mathematics, the appearance of a fundamental problem
in philosophy heralds the discovery of further problems. But in the latter,
unlike mathematics, a peculiar air of insolubility hovers about philosophic
issues. It would be instructive to consider the differences between the
disciplines in this respect. A problem in mathematics, i.e., a fundamental
issue, generally appears whenever the conceptual structure of mathematics,
and its associated language, is rich enough to express some proposition,
but too weak to assign a definite truth value to it. In other words the
mathematical system at that time is incomplete. (For instance, the ex¬
pression V~- I is not>and not<than 5' was formulable within the language
of sixteenth century mathematics, but its truth or falsity could not be
decided in terms of existing theories.) As we know, the typical method
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of solving a problem of this sort is to introduce a generalized theory
which successfully assigns a definite truth value to the perplexing
expression and at the same time includes the previous tneories as parts
of the new theory. In this way the scope of mathematics, and the class of
provable theorems contained within it,is enlarged. Mathematics thrives on
the blood of its own problems.
Contrast this with the history of philosophy. Fundamental
philosophic issues appear when conflicting truth values can be assigned to
the same proposition and apparently good reasons can be adduced to support
each such assignment. (Were this latter not the case, the issue would no
longer trouble one.) Thus truly recalcitrant problems develop in philosophy
whenever the totality of propositions and inference-warrants accepted at
apparently
a time is not so much incomplete, as/inconsistent. (Or perhaps it would be
better to say — in view of the presumed logical looseness of naturaI
language — that in such a case the totality of propositions and inference-
warrants displays features analogous to those of an inconsistent formal
system.) This, of course, is occasionally also true in mathematics. But
nevertheless a prima facie legitimate assertion of mutually incompatible
propositions is exceptional in marhematics. In philosophy, it is often
the rule.
The completion of a hitherto defective theory, as in the case of
mathematics, strengthens the entire discipline, but the presence of a
contradiction in a body of propositions is quite anorher matter. For then
any or all of the statements hitherto accepted as true may be false. The
ferreting out of such a contradiction is in many respects like the un¬
ravelling of a sweater. Given sufficient time, we either ravel back
until we reach some incontrovertibly true premise, or the structure
disappears. Perhaps someone might object that neither of these two out¬
comes seems to be the case in philosophy. But I propose — if this is so
that it is probably due only to a lack of patience. And I suspect if we
were to unravel with sufficient diligence, we would reach not the Form of
the Good, but the end of the yarn.
If some incontrovertible warrant exists which assigns truth to
some premises, then the "task of discovering the offending proposition (s)
among the remainder is simplified. But if any such warrant is not forth¬
coming, the initial perplexity and/or its progeny in the history of ideas
remain unsolved. For then no assignment of a truth value to any self-
consistent statement can be unconditionally certain.
With this in rnind, one task of any investigation such as this —
which is concerned with what may be the oldest issue of philosophy — is
either to discover such incontrovertibIes, or to alter our conceptual set
in such a way that the viciousness of this unravelling regress is vitiated
Since it is unlikely that we can accomplish the former, we shall attempt
the latter.
■ • * •
#3. But now to return to C and 'C'. If a satisfactory analysis
of C, or of the meaning of 'C', continues to escape us (as elude us it
may, for by hypothesis this is as evasive as truth in the mouth of an
automobile salesman) a second strategy suggests itself. Namely to
declare the whole of the expression containing 'C exponible. In this way
some philosophers may then claim that utterances of this kind (one of
which we shall symbolize as '...C...') are pseudo-statements, and as such
are nonsense; or what when 1...C.is rewritten in a logically acceptabl
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manner, *C* disappear as a component of the expression — and our prob¬
lem with it; or that the rules of the language-game in which '—C.
appears, have been broken.
Although we are now concerned with whole sentences (and
questions too) in which *C' appears, there is still one feature common
to a Ii the above approaches It is the assumption that somehow it is our
understanding specifically of 'C', or of the use of the concept, C. or
of expressions involving *C1 that is at fault. For what else could it
be? The answer is obvious, The fault does not lie in C, 'C', or
*. . C. etc. but in something else. Let us now go back to view this
problem from another angle
I mentioned, apropos of mathematics that the introduction of
progressiveIy more general theories enables the discipline to develop.
This, of course, is not an exclusive feature of mathematics. For instance
Wittgenstein's discussion of philosophic problems in "Philosophical
Investigations" begins with an analysis of the specific misuses of language —
such as those concerning the word 'simple' and the proposition 'This is
the way things must be' — which had led him astray in his "Tractatus".
And yet both his language and his work suggest that the theory of philo¬
sophic problems which he develops in dismantling the "Tractatus" is
applicable to a I I phiIosophic issues. In this way this development is
similar to the above noted feature of mathematics. However, although he
describes a general cause of philosophic problems, Wittgenstein makes it
clear that the only way to show the correctness of this genera Iization is
to apply it in the analysis of particular issues For instance within
"Philosophical Investigations'*, which we shall abbreviate (INV), he writes:
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Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a
s i nqIe problem.
Es werden Probieme gelost ..nicht ein Problem" (!NV) - 133
This latter feature, for those who regard simplicity and
logical power as virtues, may be seen as a defect. For in contrast to
this, it is possible to conceive of a theory along the same lines, but one
in which phiIosophic issues as a type can be shown to be der ived from one
common error Such a theory might question whether we do in fact understand
the manner in which extensive sectors of our language actually work, and
particularly the stratum of language in which philosophic trouble-makers
appear. To put it another way, might there not be a language-game in which
these other particular language-games of 'exist', of 'good', of "-now',
etc are played? If this is so, and we were to overlook certain general
features of the former, it little matters how astute our studies of
specific issues might be (If we are convinced that spaghetti is to be
cooked in cold water, it profits us little to discuss whether one should
have added the salt.) Thus, according to this hypothesis, failure to
appraise the overall logical characteristies of the contexts in which
philosophic words appear — words among which 'existence' certainly has a
place — may distort all subsequent studies of the particular language-games
contained within them.
i n
It is for this reason, that/this study of the logic of existence-
statements, our first question concerns neither existence nor 'existence',
but the appearance of philosophic problems in general. This is the sub¬
ject matter of Part One, the introduction to this thesis.
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#4. Part Two is devoted to a study of certain assumptions con¬
cerning the general features of existenee-statements, particularly the
belief that such statements are in some sense provable. We ask in par¬
ticular: Are existence-statements unconditionally provable? Our study
suggests a (generally) negative answer. If this is so, it seems then
reasonable to ask: What, if any, is the general role of such propositions
within our discourse?
It is obvious — along the lines we have indicated — that if
existence-statements and other rsources of philosophical perolexity, all
play some general role within a Ianguage-stratum, then any failure to
take this into account may itself be responsible for the continued
presence of problems associated with these words But equally obvious,
such characteristics (if there were such) would have to be sly and
queer to have escaped notice. We argue this: the appearance of mutually
incompatible existence-statements need not indicate in themselves that
one at least of these assertions must be considered false.
Actually this conclusion is far less audacious than it seems
But to make this credible, we must establish the fundamental premise of the
theory which supports it. This latter involves what we call 'logical
permissives': propositions with the peculiar feature of being neither
demonstrably true nor false, but merely unfa I sifiable in terms of an
accepted body of statements. Most of Part Three is devoted to a study
of such propositions and their use in theories of existence. We then
establish a definition of 'exist'. (A definition which I learn now, may
have been known to Abelard.) Although simple, the substance and
import of this we will leave to a fuller discussion within the body
of the text.. We do however include further details within the summary.
PART ONE
I NTROOUCT I ON
CHAPTER ONE
Phiiosophic Problems and Incompatible OntoIoqies
. This thesis begins in discontent. i am not satisfied when I
hear assertions of The form: Everybody knows that such and such exist1.
Although I have only intuition as an initial guide, a strong impression
remains that the arguments advanced to support such claims serve more to
rationalize pre-existing beliefs than to justify them.
This impression is further enhanced when I weigh within my
mind what other thinkers have written, namely that the entities (whatever
they may be) that are mentioned by the speaker do not exist, at least not
in the intended manner For I am loathe to think that apparently reason¬
able men should have made such counter claims, and disputed with each
other, unless they saw good reason for this. For just as the past has no
monopoly on fools, we of the present cannot expect sole proprietorship of
truths.
'But our beliefs' the speaker replies 'are based on common
sense'. Or are they? And is this a justification? For me it also stands
to reason that it is the worst of sense to consider any belief, inasmuch
as it is deviant from common sense, necessarily aberrant. In this I do
not wish to condemn either common sense nor the intuitions upon which it
is based. But I wish to hobbie this dull steed, lest it track up all the
demesnes of philosophy.
It is possible that philosophers — and particularly meta¬
physicians— err as it were by definition; that their recurrent and often
acrimonious strife is fundamentally of no more lasting concern than is
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the despicable sequence of battles and meaningless wars which have dis¬
figured our planet. But it is also possible that there are good and
lasting reasons for philosophic disagrements, and that these reflect
bu i 11 i n features of the way we must both think and taIk at certain times.
By this ! mean to suggest that the current explanation — that philosophic
problems are due to a misuse of language — may be a half-truth that casts
into obscurity an essential characteristic of philosophic activity. For
how can we be certa i r., a. pr i or i , that two apparent I y i ncompati bi e ex i stence-
assertions may not both be tenabIe?
(if by 'tenable' we mean that such existence-statements, together
with others associated with them, are true, it is clear — if the principle
of contradiction can be said to apply here — that any two such mutually
incompatible propositions cannot both be true. I am afraid I do not
share my colleague's general faith in the unrestricted vigor of this
principle. Although I admit that any limitation imposed upon its scope
has awkward consequences. This is however a matter for another time.
For the present, let me cover my flanks by insisting on the prima facie
incompatibility of these propositions.)
For what I am suggesting is that it may indeed be worthwhile
to pay attention to the pal tern of claim and counter-claim which philo¬
sophers, and other thinkers, make in their discussions of the most general
features of what there is. For who can know without investigation whether
the appearance of these differences is due to error? Perhaps our rejection
of ail but one of the opposing claims as impossible, because incompatible,
is itself an error?
To investigate this further, it would be well to introduce various
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examples of claims and counter-claims. It is of course not the content
of these positions which interest us, but the schematic form of the
opposition which they express. Accordingly we shall not be troubled,
as an investigator of a particular philosophy might be, with whether
or not some of the statements within the examples may be due to a misuse
of language, or to a failure to discern the relevant distinctions, etc.
The basic point which these will serve to illustrate is clear: irrespective
of their aetiology, There are certain types of issues in philosophy for
which each conceivable answer that can be advanced, is asserted. And
further, the occupancy of any position — provided it is not manifestly
seIf-ineonsistent — seems to be strangely invulnerable to attacks launched
up n it by advocates of other positions incompatible with it. And this
seems to be true whether an issue is discussed in the archaic vocabulary
of the Pre-Socratics, or at the latest meeting of the Aristotelean Society.
But let the reader take note, this observation is not introduced to condemn
philosophic activity. Rather we note it, are puzzled, and wonder.
#2. So much in the way of generalities. Let us now consider two
examples of philosophic issues. The first is an old one and may weiI
strike the reader as more aged than venerable But I have chosen it
specifically because the perspective which time affords, permits one
within it
to observe/the structure of the eternal clang between opposing positions
more clearly than if one immersed one's mind in a hotly debated con¬
temporary issue. So let us turn first to this aged question: What is?
i.e., what can be truly said to exist? Of what in the most fundamental
sense is the universe constituted?
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We shall, happily, refrain from investigating all answers
to this question Those which concern us will employ the expressions,
'one', 'corporeal', and their respective negations, i.e., 'many', and
'incorporeal'. We shall see that different philosophers have expressed
(and we assume have argued for) positions in which ail (or nearly aii)
possible combinations of these terms have been employed. Let us start
with Parmenides.
i) Parmenides, we know, asserts that the One Being is motionless,
that it rests in one place, that it is stabie, and that it
is equally poised (KR) - 350, 351. Terms such as 'motion¬
less', 'in one place', etc. are of course adjectives one
normally ascribes only to physical objects or structures.
As J. E. Raven writes:
Che Eleatica) thanks merely to the date at which they
lived, were so subject to the universal preconception
that 'Being is just so much as is sensible1 that they end
in a corporeaIism hardly less total...than that of the
Mi lesians" (KR) p. 216.
Whether or not Raven's knowledge of the archaic mind is correct or not,
the use of physical terms by Parmenides to describe Being is indubitable.
Further, if (as Plato suggests) Zeno's arguments are introduced to refute
the position of Parmenides' critics, by reducing the iatter's assumptions
to absurdities, it is curious that ail of Zeno's arguments, in one way or
another are refutations of the assumption that things are many. If
Parmenides also advocated an incorporeal Being, why should no arguments of
Zeno be known which prove the impossibility of the One's being corporeal?
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Thus it is certain that for Parmenides, Being is one; and it seems quite
likely that he asserted that it was at the same time corporeal.
Meiissus is a dissident follower of Parmenides. In one account of his
philosophy, we learn:
ii) Meiissus makes it clear that what exists is incorporeal.
For he writes that if there is Being, it must be one and —
since bodily objects are divisible — it can ha e no body.
(The above citation is based upon KR - 391, which I have paraphrased.)
Thus, whate er Being may be, Meiissus claims that it is one and incorporeal.
We have seen in the above how the term 'one' is used in com¬
bination respectively with 'corporeal' and 'incorporeaI 1. Let us now con¬
sider the term 'many', i.e., 'not-one' And let me stress again that these
are all answers to the same general question: Of what is the universe
constituted? To this question, Democritus replies, in an account about
his thought:
iii) ...the elements are the full (material atoms} and the void
Cin which they move}... The two together are the material
causes of existing things" (KR) - 554.
...the first principles (are) infinite in number" (KR) - 556.
Being is thus many and corporeaI.
The fourth combination is reported by Plato to have been asserted
by philosophers whom he calls 'Friends of the Forms'. Whether these
philosophers were early followers of Plato, perhaps the early Plato him¬
self, or followers of Pythagoras — for whom the universe was made up of
numbers-or perhaps even imaginary philosophers in a sort of Platonic
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language-game, we do not know. But in any case their position is clear:
iv) CThe opponents of the mater iaI istsj) cautiously defend themselves
from above, out of an unseen world, mightily contending that
true reality consists of certain intelligible and incorporeaI
Forms; the bodies of the MateriaIists...they affirm to be not
being, but generation and motion" Plato (I) 246 b~c,
For these mysterious thinkers Being then is many and incorporeal.
We have now exhausted the possible binary combinations of 'one',
'corporeal' and their respective negations. One can, of course, also con¬
ceive certain trinary combinations of the above. Two at least are employed
by important thinkers.
v) For Spinoza, as we know, Substance is one and unique, but it
is at the same time both corporeal and incorporeal. For matter
and thought (or spirit) are co-extensive throughout.
Within the loose terminology we have been employing, we can say that the
universe of Spinoza is both one and at the same time corporeal and incor¬
porea I .
Now let us turn to Plato:
vi) There is one kind of being — that of the Forms — which is
imperceptible to any sense and the contemplation of this is
granted to intelligence alone... CEveryday objects!) which
are patterned after them....exist as fleeting shadows of the
former" Plato (2) - 52.
If we consider everyday objects to be corporeal, and objects imperceptible
to sense to be immaterial, then Being is many and both corporeal and in-
corporeaI.
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Accordingly, give or take some for the inevitable differences
in terminology, all (or nearly all) conceptually possible combinations of
'one', 'corporeal', 'many* and 'incorporeaI' are employed by some philosopher
of note in his reply to roughly the same initial question. Let us show
this result thus:
One Many Corporeal 1ncorporea1
Parmen ides X X
Me 1issus X X
Democritus X X
Friends of Forms X X
Spinoza X X X
PI ato X X X
If we use the following symbolism, the logical relationships between
positions can be seen more clearly. Where 1s' stands for 'the stuff or
stuffs out of which the universe is constituted' '0' stands for 'one', and
'C' for 'corporeal', the first four positions can be written;
I ) s is 0 and C
i i ) s is 0 and not-C
iit) sis not-0 and C
iv) s is not-0 and not-C
Each of these positions is such that is any one is true, ail the others
are false. Further if we assume that the universe is constituted out of
some stuff or stuffs then one and only one of these positions must be true.
(I shall not attempt to symbolize the positions of Spinoza and Plato, but
it is clear under the same assumptions as abov9 that the two positions
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are mutually exclusive )
• # • •
#3 But perhaps the above positions and the claim: made within them
may appear quaint or ,ta-e, based on premises and grounded in patterns
of thought which strike one as museum pieces today? if this is so, let
u then turn to the question of the existeice of abstract entities.
One ari-wer, that of Frege, may (in part) be stated thus:
I count as objects. . for example numbers, truth value.,,
and the courses of values to be introduced beiow" frege (I) p.35.
These latter are analogous to classes Ail these objects (Gegenstand)
are:
..neither spatial nor physical., but non-sensible and ob¬
jective' Frege (2) #26.
By 'objective' Frege means 'non-subjective' Classes, numbers, truth
.aiues are then non-sensible entitities which, in contradistinction to
everyday objects, are neither in space nor in tim^ further these do
not depend upon us for their existence. Neither physica: nor mental,
they help constitute what Frege, in another passage, calls 'The Third
Reaim'.
Now let us contrast this with the position of Russell. Russell
states the development of his own beliefs thus:
I shared with Frege a belief in the Platonic reality of
numbers, which in my imagination, peopled the timeless
realm of Being. It was a comforting faith which I iater
abandoned with regret...!n the end, it seemed to result that
none of the raw materials of the world ha. smooth logical
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properties, but that whatever appears to have such
properties Is constructed artificially in order to have
them... CTechnicaI advances in mathematical logiqj have
swept away many apparent entities such as classes, points,
and instants... How far it is possible to go in the direction
of nominalism remains, to my mind, an unsolved question"
RusselI (I) X, X!, XIV.
Russell, accordingly, denies Frege's claim that numbers and classes have
(or must have?) an objective existence. And moreover he grounds this de¬
nial in terms of a logic to which Frege, himself, had so enormously con¬
tributed. Goodman and Quineiake an even stronger position:
We do not believe in abstract entities. No one supposes
that abstract entities — classes, relations, properties,
etc.— exist in space-time; but we mean more than this.
We renounce them altogether" Goodman (2) p. 105
One would think that this strong espousal of a nominalist
position would represent the end of the line— and the end of the issue.
But this is not the case. For despite these assert ions,as respected a
mathematical logician as Godel continues to reaffirm a realist position.
In criticizing the intuitionists (who as Quine suggests represent a
modern parallel to the conventionalists of medieval philosophy), Godel
states his own belief that there is an objective reality, which mathe¬
maticians discover:
Only someone who (like the intuition1st) denies that the
concepts and axioms of classical set theory have any meaning
(or any well defined meaning) could be satisfied with such a
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solution Cwhich wou1d permit the formulation of alter¬
native set theories} not someone who be Iieves them to
describe some weiI-determined rea1ity" Kneebone (i)
p. 306» i +aI <cs m'n®•
The grounds, i.e., the technical advances in mathematical
logic, that led Russeil to abandon his faith in the Platonic reality
of numbers, that permitted Quine and Goodman to propose a language in
which even the names of classes were not to appear, have left Godel's
beliefs unaffected. We might also mention in this respect the basically
"pi atonic" treatment of logic in Church's "Introduction to Mathematical
Logic" and "The Need for Abstract Entities in Semantic Analysis".
But commentators on Church, although no+ Church himself, might view
this merely as a notational convenience, without onto logical commitment.
Further an issue of this kind permits disagreement not only in
relation to content, but also in respect to the significance of any prima facie
statements which assert such claims. Carnap, for instance, writes:
D"he Vienna circle rejected}...the case for both the
thesis of the reality of universale (abstract entities,
in our present "term i no I ogy) and the nominalist thesis that
they are not real" Carnap (I) Section 3.
And finally — in this discussion of dissent — even the
choice of method employed in defending and criticizing such statements,
is open to dispute. Quine, in a discussion with Geach, says:
I think this question (pn what there is} like any
question concerning the broadest features of our
scientific schematism, has to be settled pragmatically.
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1 gather from Mr. Geach's concluding remarks that he
thinks it is to be settled dialectically"
Quine here refers to the earlier remarks of Geach:
What you must do, as Aquinas pointed out, is to pick
holes in Cyour opponent'sj arguments'1 Quine-Geach (I) p. 159.
To summarize. We have noted the assertion by Frege that
classes exist; Russell's statement that the belief in the existence of
such abstract entities is unfounded, i.e., that there is no evidence for
Frege's claim; Goodman and Quine's renunciation of any use of classes,
i.e., that there is no need to consider any abstract entities as components
in our logical structures; then Godei's counter assertion that the axioms
of class theory do inaeed describe some weil-determined reality; and
Church's argument for the introduction of abstract entities into a
semantic system. We then have the positivist doctrine that any assertion,
either of the existence or non-existence of classes is meaningless, and
finally a difference of opinion, between Quine and Geach, about the very
method of deciding onto logical issues.
"Philosophy", we are told in an eariy commentary, "is the
mother of arguments Aristotle (I) p.28 . Whether she has blushed to
acknowledge this or not, it is evident that she is far from barren in
this respect.
• • • •
#4 If the reader still has reservations, if for instance he
suspects that the issues mentioned above are atypical, let him consider
the following tangle of queries:
the truth of
Does God exist? Does God not exist? Or is/'God exists'
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unknowable? Or, is 'God exists' provable? disprovable?
Is it meaningful? Or is the initial question itself
nonsensicaI?
One can, of course, find some philosophers who will argue for and
answer yes (respectively) to any of these questions.
Or consider the disagreement, among philosophers of science
(and scientists), concer ing the interpretation of theories, and of the
ontological status of the theoretical entities referred to within them
The electron or the psi-function for one thinker might be mereiy a
theoretical construct— In Einstein's phrase "a hook upon which we hang
reality". But to another these same constructs might represent funda¬
mental elements of the universe; while to a third 'electron' arid'psi-
JL
function' might designate nothing at all, and be mereiy syncategorimatic
parts of a theoretical language.
One can still remain unimpressed and say: But these issues —
upon which you have neatly pinned the philosophers — are there because
most of the thinkers concerned have made mistakes or the very questions
at the heart of the problems are nonsensical'. But this is an inter-
pretation of the facts Remove this interpretation, i e., take off the
spectacles with which one habitually views this subject and all that
remains to be seen — is disagreement Or better yet: what one does be¬
come aware of is how broad a spectrum philosophers occupy through the
range of all possible positions.
In view of this, it would seem that if the field of philosophy
in which such questions develop is concerned with genuine issues then
another answer to swell the lists is not in order Rather what seems
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to be requisite is a second-order investigation of these issues.
For, faced as we are with a prima facie failure on the part of
philosophy to establish any lasting answers to questions in which the
term 'exist' plays a prominent role, it is natural to suspect the
activity itself. If existence-statements purport to be concerned with
the same universe, how can it be possible for philosophers to assert
such an enormous array of prima facie incompatible ontological positions?
In other words, what I propose as necessary is not a study
in philosophy, about existence-statements, but about the philosopher's
use of existence-statements. In such a study cur chief concern will
not be with particular philosophical positions or issues, but with
philosophical issues — and philosophy itself -- as a subject matter.
More specifically, this study will become a second-order investigation,
which takes as object that part of philosophy which discusses existence,
and whose most characteristic features are existence-statements.
• • • •
#5 g iven this perspective, it will be easier to understand the
preceding section, ahd the omissions the reader may have sensed within
it. One might feel, nevertheless, that I) the brief mention of examples
and issues has not been detailed enough to show the nature of +he prob¬
lem, or 2) that any second-order discussion might be arid and pointless.
Let us consider these objections.
I) Were this a study of particular philosophies, it would be
necessary here to investigate each example thoroughly. Only then could
we hope to show that the appearance of mutual incompatibility among
different positions was indeed well founded, that the alleged differences
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were legitimate and essential features of the different philosophies,
(in particular we would have to show the self-consistency of each
position and the comparability of its terms with those appearing in
the statements of other positions allegedly incompatible with it. And
we would also have to show that the positions as stated, as well as the
initial question, were all free of overt or hidden nonsense. Only then
could we say: This is really an issue worth investigating''. )
But our study is not upon this level, and accordingly we
have cited the above examples most briefly, dragging them out hastily,
as in their night clothes. Perhaps we could just as well have said:
Let Tj and be two theories containing existence-statements,
employing ' and 'T 1 in this way as otherwise unspecified names.
For our interest is in the generality of the incompatibility, and not in
the features of a particular issue The examples appear as mental
crutches.
One might still object that the examples may still be atypical,
or that each must be investigated in its own right before one puts any
weight upon it. Yes. But let me answer with another image. Consider
an architect who has completed the plans of a tower and delivered them
to a construction company. The architect then leaves with the understanding
that work is to start immediately. And the work does start forthwith,
and continues uninterruptedIy. The architect returns the following year.
To say the least, he is amazed. For he sees hordes of men at work — but
no building. A few sticks here, some wires there, but not even the out¬
line of the foundation. He does notice everybody is very busy putting
up a wall, demolishing another, and that from time to time a giant scoop
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picks up nearly everything already constructed and drops it someplace
else. He notices too several places that have been fenced off and
posted: Do not enter'.
The architect, in such a situation, would not start off by
asking each man: Why are you doing this?', but would go to the construction
company and get to the source of the difficulty... There is no architect
of philosophy, and probably no one construction company. But this image
nevertheless corresponds to what seems to be the case in philosophy:
there is much work and little progress. The big signs mark the zones
of little progress, i.e., those regions which have been discovered to be
impossible. But the rest appears to be une qrande meiee. With this
background of apparently inconelusive labors in mind, I do not consider
it necessary to study any one issue in particular. For something seems
to be wrong in general.
2) As for the more general question of the importance of
this procedure, it seems evident that any reworking of the notion of a
philosophic problem must inevitably alter both one's general notion of
philosophy, and in particular one's understanding of the function of
existence-statements in a conceptual scheme. But this is to anticipate
#6. To return now. if we are to investigate existence-statements
as they appear in the works of phi!osophers, we might study representative
positions, such as those cited above, and analyze them in terms of their
completeness, consistency, verifiabiiity, etc. Were such a study to be
performed, it might permit us to characterize the subject of existence
"as a Whole", (in using this expression, I echo the thought of Waismann,
1-6 17
in his essay "Language Stratain which he proposes that one study
the general characteristics of the stratum of language in which par¬
ticular words and statements typically appear, and investigate a sub¬
ject in this manner from without rather than in terms of its specific
content.)
If such an investigation were performed, one might be able to
establish genera rules which hold for all objects in a particular lan¬
guage stratum. These would be rules to which all uses of existence-
statements, say, would have to conform These would among others be
rules governing demonstration, the acceptability of evidence, and of ex¬
planations^ rules which could be used by all thinkers, however
dissimilar their outlook. And in so doing, one might replace what appears
to be a philosophic free-for-all, with a disciplined study.
Although I am in favor of such a goal, how could this be
accomplished along such lines? On what neutral grounds could one possibly
claim: This is a representative ontology' that one might analyze it on
this basis? ! can say that Angus Campbell is Scottish, knowing only
that he is a Scotsman; but cannot say he is a typical Scotsman, un¬
less I aiso know the characteristics which all members of his nation have
in common. Similarly — unless one has a pretty fair notion of what
ontology is like to start with — how could one select one or several
sets of exisJence-statements and consider them as typical? And were we
to, this would cook one's data from the very start
It seems to me that much of the strength and weakness of
Wittgenstein's theory of philosophic problems, as stated in "Philosophical
Investigations", comes from his having followed an approach along these
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lines. We remember that within the early numbers of this work he
analyzes certain key concepts of his "Tractatus", such as that of
being simple, and argues that he had been misled by language into be¬
lieving that the questions which he set out to answer were meaningful
questions A few analyses of this kind suggest the generalization that
(all) philosophic problems have a similar aetiology in a misuse of lan¬
guage. (We will investigate this matter more thoroughly within a subse¬
quent chapter ) But despite the o erwhelming influence of his work, his
thesis about philosophic problems has been accepted — in its full
generality — by very few. even amongst the philosophers closest to
him. I think Quinton states this general attitude fairly when he notes
that the issues which Wittgenstein set out to remove have "refused to
stay dead". (Quinton (i) p.543.)
if Wittgenstein's theory stated in its full generality fails
to convince most philosophers, I suggest that at least one ground for
this misfire can be found in the fact that most philosophers —both
before and after Wittgenstein— are not ciear about just what is a
typical philosophic problem. And ! for one then would shy away from
any frontal attack along the lines proposed earlier in which one would
take (so-cailed) representative ontologies for study.
Nor, to take another tack, could one rely exclusively upon the
sanction of ordinary usage. For although we do talk about the existence
of life, of hope, of problems, of corporations, of revolutionary tendencies,
and even of the Dodo, to apply the logic underlying these usages to
questions concerning the existence of numbers, theoretical entities in
nuclear physics, or to non-euclidean spaces, classes, instances of
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time, and the like, demands an extraordinary measure of confidence
both in ordinary language and the reliability of an extrapolatory pro¬
cedure based upon it. Further an analysis of this kind would tend to be
conducted from within, in terms of the "logic" of the ianguage-games in
which existence-statements are used — and not in terms of the properties
of this logic.
ffl. But, as an alternative approach, might not some question about
ontoiogical discussions in general permit us, as it were by assays and
bias, to find the matter out? Certainly the most conspicuous feature
of ontology is the disagreement which it breeds. Admittedly, in a
field such as philosophy in which everything (or nearly everything) can
be held open to doubt, It offers scant comfort to consider that there
are philosophic problems such as those we have noted, and that they are
particularly tenacious. And yet if we look at philosophy as an ob.iect,
it isspecificaI Iy the presence of issues such as these — ones which
philosophic analysis can at best suppress but seldom eliminate — which
strikes us an an inescapable feature of philosophy. This has become
so commonplace, we overlook all too readily how anomalous it is. Were
the same to occur in any other intellectual discipline, it would be a
scandal.
As we have noted, those issues which deal with existence are
particularly conspicuous in this respect. And, as this author has become
painfully aware, any common ground of agreement within the tangle of its
intertwining problems, seems as unobtainable as the prospect of an en¬
during peace in this sorry world. The question: What is?, or its modern
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analogues, may Indeed be the paradigm of philosophic perplexity.
Einstein has remarked that it is through questioning the
commonplace, through demanding of the familiar to explain itself, that
thought advances Faced as we are with the enormous difficulty of
finding some bedrock level in any study of existence it would be wise
for us not to ignore this characteristic recurrence of issues concerning
it For this latter feature might indeed provide a clue to rid us of
our perplexity At the very least few philosophers would doubt this
type of evidence.
Or, to put it positively — if the peculiar irresolvabiIity
of certain philosophic issues and in particular the development of
mutually incompatible positions, seems to be a feature generally assoc¬
iated with these problems might this not indicate an intrinsic connection
between 'philosophic issue' and 'irresolvable'? In view of this, we can
very we I I ask: How can one explain the appearance of prima facie incom-
patlble ontological positions?
And let us note that a study of this kind has two evident
virtues. It starts with what may be the one statement to which all, or
nearly all, philosophers would concur: namely that they do disagree and
that this disagreement certainly concerns expressions using and men¬
tioning 'exist', 'existence', and similar words. And secondly a study
of this kind — a id upon this level — can consider representative
answers to this question without distorting its findings. For here the
subject is not well-trodden. As we shall see the number of significantly
different explanations for the appearance of prima facie mutually in-
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compatible ontoiogicai positions, is rather restricted
We can (and shall) analyze the presuppositions of such
theories, i.e., the conditions which existence-statements and the lan¬
guage which contains them must satisfy for these explanations to be
generally applicable. In this way, posing this specific question, we
do find a Iine to follow which pursued far enough will permit us to
establish (I hope beyond cavil) certain general logical properties of
existence-statements, of existence-questions, and of the systems or
fragments of systems in which they are embedded.
This thesis then will be a second-order analysis of existence-
statements, and the point of attack will be the query: How can one ex¬
plain the appearance of apparently weiI-reasoned but prima facie mutually
incompatible ontoiogicai positions?
But let us bear in mind as noted above that our interest lies
in an investigation of the general logical properties of existence-state¬
ments , together with the systems and fragments of systems in which they
appear. The initial question, concerning incompatible ontologies, serves
as the opening wedge.
« •
^8 Conspicuous within the above question is the key expression
'mutually incompatible ontoiogicai positions'. Before proceeding to the
thesis proper, it would be well to devote some sections to a preliminary
clarification of the meaning of this expression.
Two statements are incompatible if both cannot be true at the
same time. For instance 'This stone is painted black' and 'This stone
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is painted a color which is not black1 are incompatible. If the
former is true the latter cannot be true, and the converse. At the
same time, it is also possible that neither of these statements is
true: the stone may not be painted at all. We can define incompatibiIity
as foilows:
Where 'p' and 'q' are statements,
'p' and 'q' are incompatible = DEF the class containing only
'p' and 'q1 contains at most one true statement.
(For those who have a predilection for the terminology of
traditional logic, let us note that incompatible statements are like
contraries in that both cannot be true at the same time, but both can
be false. However 'incompatible' and 'contrary' are not strictly
synonymous if 'contrary' is considered applicable only to universally
quantified statements. The use of 'incompatible' is not restricted thus.
For example, 'All x are F' and 'There is an x which is not -F' are not
contraries, according to the Aristoteiean account, but are nevertheless
incompatible in a non-empty universe.)
We aiso employ the expression 'mutually incompatible1. By this
we mearf a conjunction of statements (which forms one position) is in¬
compatible with a conjunction of statements (which forms another?.
For instance, the positions of Democritus, and Parmenides as
Raven interprets the latter, are mutually incompatible It is impossible
for the world to be composed of an exclusively material stuff, as they
both claim, and for the world at the same time to be composed of many
units, as Democritus asserts, and of only one unit, as Parmenides claims.
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At the same time it is possible that both positions are false: matter may
have no monopoly upon the constitution of the universe.
i trust that the above definition and examples are clear
It would be well at this stage to discuss a few related terms Where
'p' and 'q' are any two meaningful statements, we shall say that 'p' and
'q ' are mutually contradictory when it is impossible for both of them to
be true at the same time, or for both of them to be false. For instance
(pro iding the terms are used in the same way) Frege's assertion that
numbers exist, and the nominalist denial of this: It is not the case
that numbers exist1, are mutually contradictory. For if Frege is correct,
the nominalist thesis is false, and the con erse.
On the other hand, two positions may be expressed in terms of
a language which makes them appear to be incompatible or mutually con¬
tradictory, when in actual fact a more careful analysis shows these
positions to be consistent one with another. We shall call any two such
positions 'vacuous Iy r i vaI ' And as a linguistic convenience we shall
empioy 'riva I 1 as a generic term for 'vacuously rival', 'incompatible',
etc., and 'mutually contradictory' Similarly we shall use 'incompatibIe'
as a generic term for all but 'vacuously rival'.
♦ • » • •
#10. This is not the place to give specific technical meanings to
other terms, such a 'ontology', 'existence-claims', etc which we have
used, and will use. But to avoid possible confusion, let me say that I
use 'ontology' to refer to a philosophic position which describes the
universe — generally in the most embracive manner — in terms of its
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constituents, their general characteristics, and their interrelation¬
ships I assume that the above rough delineation of the subject of
ontology indicates enough to avoid gross failures in communication. It
may include too much, but we can exclude these when the time comes We
can also include amongst onto logical issues questions of the form: What
do we mean by 'exist1, or 'existence', or 'existent'? etc., when these
queries are related to a clarification of the terms which one might use
in the expression of an ontology.
«■»
It will be shown that the form of any onto logical position can
be expressed in a language which contains only 'exist' amongst extra-
logical expressions. And we shall in time introduce a definitional
schema also of 'exist'. But as we have suggested above, not ail sentences
containing 'exist' are used to establish an ontology. It will be the
task of this section to weed out the undesirables
Consider for instance:
(1) 'Exist' has five letters.
(2) 'Exist' rhymes with 'desist'.
The above two expressions are of little or no concern in a study of
existence For although we might be interested in that which all
appearances of 'exist' and cognate terms in other languages have in
common, this is obviously not the number of letters they contain, nor
their sound patterns. Thus we can rule out from consideration as
existence-statements, within this thesis, any such appearances of 'exist'
i e , where 'exist' (or 'existence', etc.) is mentioned in respect to
its morphological or phonemic properties.
We can in a similar fashion exclude from consideration state-
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men+s such as:
(3) 'Exist' is a verb.
(4) 'Existence' is a noun.
which refer to gross syntactic features of the term they mention.
For, despite their grammatical differences, the logical structure of
'I beliee that numbers exist' and 'I believe in the existence of
numbers' is similar or identical. So that whether 'exist' is used as a
verb., or 'existence' as a substantive is unimportant for our purposes
We will in time be interested in some statements of the type:
(5) 'Exist' means ..... '
But for the present let us pass these by until we select just those uses
of 'exist', 'existence', etc. which do concern us The apposite defining
phrases will apply only to these.
Exclusions of the above kind are each in their own way evident
enough But let us now consider the following:
(6) Living creatures do not exist on Mars
(7) Madame Curie discovered the existence of the element, radium
(8) Hope for a reprieve no longer exists.
(9) No proof exists for Fermat's last theorem.
(10) The Dodo does not exist.
(11) The universal class exists.
(12) Numbers exist.
Certainly some of these must be included among the existence-statements
which concern us. But which and why?
As a preliminary exercise, let us attempt to rewrite the above
in such a manner that 'exist', or a morphemic variant of 'exist' (such
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as 'existence') no longer appears in the transformed expression. We can
rephrase many of the above along the following lines:
(6) There are no living creatures on Mars
(or) Mars is not inhabited by living creatures
(or) Mars has no living creatures.
The third form avoids even the minimal ontologica! commitment of 'is'
and 'are' above. i propose that these transforrnations of "Living creatures
do not exist on Mars' convey ail and only all the information contained
in the origina1. Similarly (7) can be rewritten so that the transformations:
(7) Madame Curie discovered that there is an element, radium.
(or) Madame Curie discovered the element, radium.
are nearly or totally equi-informative with (7). There may, perhaps be
a shade of difference. In Writing 'discovered the existence of radium'
we may wish to stress the discovery of not just one more element, but
of a new kind of element. (As if Madame Curie enlarged our knowledge of
the universe in some fundamental way.) We will return to this in dis¬
cussing the proposition that numbers exist.
We may in a similar way rephrase (8) and (9). But what about
(10) and its Dodo? If we mean by (10) that there are no longer any birds
which are Dodos, the way there are no longer any long skirts, we accomplish
our purpose thus:
(10) There are no dodos any more.
(or) The earth no longer has dodos.
If , on the other hand, we mean that the class of Dodo's has no present
members, we can say:
(10) The class Dodo is empty now
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(or) The species Docio has the property: Extinct.
Again, we lose nothing in eliminating 'exist1. But what about
{iI)? When we say 'The universal class exists'is this on a par with the
Dodo? Or does (il) introduce subtle distinctions of its own? This is
hardly the place to tackle the problem of mathematical existence (although
we do return to this in Part Three). But in a preliminary way we can
observe that for any mathematical entity to exist, in the mathematical
sense of 'exist', it is only necessary that it satisfy certain conditions
of membership or elementhood. And these, we know, vary according to the
system under discussion. And further someone can very well say —
shifting from one sense of 'exist' to another — that he has proved that
a universal class exists, in terms of a particular set of axioms, but
that classes do not exist. Thus the minimal interpretation of (II) can
be rephrased, say, along the following lines:
(M) The universal class has at least one member
And according to one sense of 'exist', i.e., 'a class exists if it is
non-empty', this is all we need say concerning the "existence" of the
universal class.
Something, of course, may be left out in the above transformation
In such a case the intended sense of 'exist' is not merely the mathematical
one. but is similar to that embodied in propositions such as 'Classes
exist', 'Numbers exist', 'God exists'. To see this let us attempt to
transform 'Numbers exist' as above. The result:
(12) Numbers are.
is disappointing. For in this case, unlike the earlier examples, 'are'
cannot be readily eliminated. We cannot for instance say 'Numbers have...'
or 'Numbers have the property that...'
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and make much sense, the way we ta!ked about Mars having no inhabitants.
For what do numbers have in the above except the property of existing?
We can of course pontificate and say that numbers have the property of
being a constituent of the universe, or simply:
(12) Numbers are constituents of the universe.
But this again says nothing more or less than that they exist
Let us stop here and note that the expressions containing
'exist' or 'existence1, etc. which concern us (unlike those about the
existence of life on Mars, or of the Dodo, or of hope, etc.) are such
that 'exist' or a term roughly synonymous with it, appears and is used
in such a manner that it or a synonym is irreplaceable within the ex¬
pression. Let us call this an 'essential occurrence of 'exist".
Thus the existence-statements which will concern us in this
thesis are those in which the intended use of 'exist' is in an essential
occurrence This stipulation excludes not only sentences such as 'The
Dodo does not exist', but also "Exist' has five letters and is a verb'.
(For in this latter case 'Exist' is mentioned and not used.) But let us
note that the above formulation does not provide a mechanical procedure
for determining whether or not an expression containing 'exist' is an
existence-statement. For it also refers to the intended use. And only
knowledge of the intention, as in the example of the statement about
the existence of radium or of the universal class can determine this
• « * *
*11. Asa final note on terminology: although the contexts may
vary, I generally use 'existence-claims', 'existence-assertions',
'existence-ascriptions', etc. as stylistic variants for 'existence-
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statements'. There i s , however, in ' ex istence-ascripti ons 1, th i s f i ner
sens©. By to 'ascribe existence to a1, I mean 'to conjoin 'exist', to¬
gether with the name of some entity or class of entities,in a statement
of the form '... exist(s)". i might have also chosen to employ 'predicate
existence of a', in this way. But I have purposely avoided this latter
expression because the weight of philosophic history has borne so heavily
upon this poor term, 'predicate1, I am not certain if ail sense has not
been flattened out long ago. Further, we shall find it convenient to employ
'predicate' as a generic term for property, relations, etc.; and 'predicate-
term' similarly for 'property-term' and 're I at ion-term'. But our use of
'predicate', in this way, is only a linguistic expedient: we intend to
pour no fresh on+ological commitments into this old b0++le.
CHAPTER TWO
Theories of PhiIosophic Problems
Classical - Critical - Logical Positi\*st
#1. Philosophy is accommodating in this: although there is much
to doubt, at least there is one point about which most philosophers
would agree, namely there are philosophic problems and a group of these,
which can be considered fundamental, are peculiarly recalcitrant to
lasting solution And certainly discussions concerning existece are
not the least amongst these. So characteristic is this irresoivabiIity,
that the otherwise singular presence in philosophy of apparently well-
reasoned but mutually incompatible solutions comes to be accepted as
commonpI ace.
We consider this a clue worth investigating. For if philosophic
issues generally display these peculiar characteristies, is it not
reasonable to suspect one common cause? Such a feature might of course
lie in the character of the particular philosophic subjects which one
discusses. But in view of the diversity of subject matter it is more
reasonable to suspect that the source of these differences Iies someplace
either in the language, methods, attitudes or presuppositions which
enter into the formulation or putative solution of any philosophic problem
And it is clear that if there were such a common feature, or set of
features, then failure to account for this would distort any detailed
analysis of specific issues. To focus uniquely on the characteristies
of the particular issue and to disregard the larger context would be as
absurd as trying to study the structure of a snowflake from inside a hot oven
!!-I 31
I find no grounds to indicate that this assumption of a
common aetiology is impossible. (On the contrary much in the sequel
will show it to be most plausible.) We are then free to introduce some
such proposition as a hypothesis, and to investigate its consequence.
More specifically, let us assume that there is a feature (or a set of
features) common to all or most of the perennial problems of philosophy;
and whatever form this factor takes, given sufficient time its presence
is sufficient to account (at least in part) for the appearance throughout
philosophy of apparently well-reasoned but mutually incompatible posi¬
tions... It follows, according to this hypothesis, before we can be
clear about existence or the uses of 'exist', we must try to ferret out
this presumed general feature (or features).
One might object: Your question, Why are there philosophic
problems? is itself philosophic. And whatever solution you propose may
be a$ contention-breeding as any you have illustrated above. So where do
you get off this merry-go-round?'
I am not unaware of this difficulty. One has every right to
consider the presence of philosophic issues itself a philosophic problem
And thus any statement about the former may aiso be viewed as a state¬
ment in one of the latter. In other words, a statement about philosophic
problems must also apply to itself as a statement in a philosophic prob-
lemn. ^This of course is not the only type of statement which applies to
itself. Any theory about all theories is also self-applicable.^ It
will be a virtue of any such theory, if it provides a place for the
appearance of controversy concerning itself.
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#2. So much by way of introduction. Let us now, as a first step
in our study, look at what other philosophers have said concerning the
presence of philosophic issues. Since our intention is to discover
some general factor responsible for these, if there is such a factor,
we shall not restrict ourselves at this stage merely to discussions
concerning the issue of existence. Rather we shall single out representa¬
tive answers to the general questions: What constitutes a recurrent
philosophic issue, and why are these so peculiarly resistent to adequate
solution? We shall also analyze the logical conditions which must hold
if any particular explanation of the above is to be considered tenable
Still, to keep a check rein on these wide-swinging queries, we shall
wherever possible illustrate our study specifically in terms of dis¬
cussions of issues concerning existence.
* * » t
#3, We first consider the classical approach. By 'classical',
in this sense, I refer to that attitude of mind in respect to the state¬
ments of metaphysics and their degree of warrant which is exemplified
by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza. This
attitude is to be contrasted with that of the critical approach, par¬
ticularly of Kant. In a word, the difference between philosophers who.
in one way or another, view metaphysical statements as both true and
discoverable by the light of reason, and those for whom such statements
are, at best, postulates, or their consequences. And by 'classical
approach' or 'critical approach', etc. I refer to the explanation which
typical philosophers in the group will offer concerning the presence of
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enduring philosophical issues.
These two approaches are, in turn, distinguishable from
others which we may cali 'language-oriented' Within this rubric we
include the position of logical positivists for whom metaphysical pro¬
positions are nonsensical, and that of linguistic philosophers for whom
such utterances, if inconclusive'are due to a misuse of language. There
are of course other approaches. But those which we have mentioned will
provide sufficient grist for the mill.
We shall consider Aristotle as a typical exponent of the
classical approach. (With only some modification, his general methodo¬
logical beiiefs are shared by Plato and the other philosophers bracketed
together in this classification. And, although less documented, we
assume this similarity in their attitudes also applies to their explanation
for philosophic issues.)
Foremost in any discussion of Aristotle's explanation is his
concept of scientific truth?- Whether these be self-evident first
principles or their demonstrable consequences, the discovery of any
such truth — once it is correctly grasped — produces an unshakeabie
conviction in the mind:
If a mart sets out to acquire the scientific knowledge that
comes through demonstration, he must...have a better know¬
ledge of the basic truths and a firmer conviction of them
than of the connexion which is being demonstrated...nothing
must be more certain or better known to him than these
basic truths. .For indeed the conviction of pure science
must be unshakeabie' (POST AN) 1-2 72a^7ffJ5e abbreviate
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Aristotle's "Posterior Analytics", (POST AN)3
We assume this means that the axioms of any science — using 'axiom'
in a contemporary sense — together with their logical consequences, are
both true and of the highest warrant. By this latter I mean that no
conceivable experience — at least no conceivable experience in the
world as it is — could possibly alter the belief in their certairly.
Once grasped in this way, it is indubitably clear that these propositions
cannot possibly be otherwise (For additional quotations concerning
this and the following, see section 5 , Chapter Five.)
The first principles of logic and their consequences,
although applicable to particular sciences, are not contained within
these sciences. They provide that in terms of which one reasons But
with the possible exception of logical truths it seems that the dichotomy
of self-evident first principles or their derivable consequences, is
considered to exhaust the class of scientific truths. For apparently
Aristotle in no place considers that there may be extra-IogicaI state¬
ments which are true but in principle neither provable nor
discoverable. Thus all such scientific statements are true, of highest
certainty, and are either self-evident first principles or provable.
And each particular science is the body of statements containing the
axioms specific to that science, together with all their consequences.
Judging by the same negative evidence, each such science is
in principle complete. (I am using 'complete' here in the sense in
which a theory is said to be 'complete' if it contains no undecidable
propositions.) For if it were not complete, it would contain unprovable
truths. Further, since the principle of contradiction applies to all
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entities, and aii statements about them, ail statements within each
science must be mutually consistent. For if this were not the case, two
contradictory statements might describe the same object. And this would be
impossible, by hypothesis Each science is then self-consistent, and
(in principle) all the statements of each science form a complete
deductive theory, whose premises are self-evident truths.
It might be objected that I am ill-advised in applying con¬
temporary concepts, e.g. that of completeness, to Aristotelean logic Un¬
less this is intended as a s ur on Aristotle, an objection of this kind
could only mean that one cannot apply these terms to his logic. But if this
is so, then there must be truly alternative logics, since these terms are
essentia! in any description of forma, systems as we know them. Thus, un¬
less the objector is ready to show that there are genuinely alternative
logics, I cannot see the force of any such objection.
To continue. Among the sciences, is the science of existence:
And it will belong to this Cfirst phiiosophy3 to consider
being qua being — both what it is and the attributes which
belong to it qua being" (META) E-I i026a 31 . [vfe abbreviate
"Metaphysics", (META).]
Further, as far as the objects of any particular science are concerned:
...We assume also the fact of their existence" (POST AN)
I- 1076a 33.
Accordingly propositions describing or ascribing existence are statements,
and as such are true or false. Under the strong conditions noted above, it
is obviously impossible for any two mutually incompatible statements, con¬
cerning existence or anything ese, to appear within any one science For
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if two such rival claims are made, i e. , if a issue develops, then the
advocacy of one or both of these positions must be in error Some errors
may be due to ambiguity. As Aristotle observes 'Being'' ' 9 'esti'
can be used in many ways. (META) E-2 1026a 33ff. But philosophic issues
continue even after the senses of a word are sifted out. For instance the
sharp conflict between Aristot'e and the Academy, concerning the existence
of Platonic Forms, was based upon more than a confusion in words.
Aristotle must then explain why this occurs To do this he
introduces the distinction between the familiar and the intelligible.
Our natural tendency, he observes, is to consider that which is familiar
and close to us as true, and to reject that which we find strange, however
intelligible it may be in its own right. If we apply this observation to
philosophy, we can say that it is our reliance upon iIi-considered opinions,
or upon bad reasoning, which leads one to assert as true propositions which
are incompatible with scientific truths. From a logical point of view,
this is a purely prima facie incompatibility The relationship of truths
to empty claims is like that, we might say, of men to straw men. Presumably
— given sufficient time — the mistake car, be pointed out, and the correct
answer will be accepted by ail. The presence of philosophic issues, at
least recurrent ones, is then due to human error; errors in reasoning, in
the use of language, in understanding, in the grasping of the first prin¬
ciples* in the improper clarification of underlying issues, etc. As with
Descartes, all that is knowafcie is illuminable, but someplace, within the
outfields of the mind, a fumble can be made.
By way of illustration, observe how Aristotle in the following
refers to the whole truth, its being there like a door to be hit, and
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the diffictM+y which vie may have in gaining know1 edge of specific truths,
because of human weakness:
Truth seems to be like the proverbial door, which no one can
fail to hit, in this respect it C+he investigation of trutfj}
must be easy, but the fact that we can have a whole truth
and not the particular part we aim at shows the difficulty of
it Perhaps, too, as difficulties are of two kinds, the
cause of the present difficulty is not in the facts but in
us. For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so Is
the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most
evident of all" Aristote (META) alpha 993b 5 ff.
■M. I have called this the 'classical approach' inasmuch as I suggest
that this is the representative attitude of typical classical metaphysicians.
Although few contemporary philosophers in the English-speaking world would
seriously consider the contents of any such classical system, I have not
introduced this approach in order to joust at windmills. For even if one
rejects the strongest presupposi+ion of the classical approach, i.e., the
deductive completeness of each discipIine,does not any philosopher who
argues to a categorical conclusion, or who justifies a statement, employ
at least informally a fragment of a deductive theory? I mean by this,
does he not introduce certain premises — whatever their nature — and show
that his conclusion follows logically from these? And if, on the basis
of this argument, he insists on the truth of his conclusion, does this
not commit him to maintain that his premises are true? Perhaps not
necessarily true, nor necessarily necessarily true, but true nevertheless.
And if further he maintains, as modest philosophers generally do, that
his is the solution, are not his premises then expected to be of the
highest warrant? And if further he attacks another philosopher who dis¬
agrees with him (attacks him verbally I mean, not in the manner of the
French Assembly ,with swords) does he not assume that the assertion of a
rival position on the part of his opponent is due to error? Thus does not
thought make classicists of us all? Does not the classical approach or some
weakened form of it provide the intellectual bed rock upon which most
philosophic arguments are based?
Before criticizing Aristotle, let us note that his conditions
are not completely unrealistic. Some bodies of knowledge do form complete
deductive systems E g. the theory of Abelian (i.e. commutative) groups
is complete. So are certain theories of elementary geometry. So for that
matter is the elementary algebra of real numbers. That is to say. all of
these form demonstrably consistent, complete, deductive theories. It is
interesting to note also, if Tarski's analysis of what he calls 'the
classical notion of truth' is relevant, that on the basis of the corres¬
ponding definition of 'truth' it can be shown that all true statements in
many types of formal systems constitute a consistent, complete, deductive
theory. But, as we know, following GCJdei , many theories of sufficient
complexity are demonstrably incomplete. Thus one of Aristotle's pre¬
suppositions is not generally satisfiable.
Further (excluding definitions from consideration) it is customary
today to doubt the timeless self-evidence of nearly any extra-IogicaI
proposition And this suspicion may be more than fashion. For although
we are to a great extent weighed down by philosophic history, this surfeit
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has i+s uses. We can see how most (if not all) of those propositions
which some past age considered to be undeniably true, have been deflated
by a subsequent age. Thus the belief that philosophic truths are of the
highest warrant, and either self-evident or provable seems to offend the
facts. And if this is so, any general explanation for the continued
appearance of philosophic issues, based upon the above must be inadequate.
Further, the logical form of Aristotle's explanation
makes it nearly a tautology —
and as such uninteresting. To explain this last remark, let us observe
that according to the classical approach — baldly stated — y can be
a philosophic issue only if the correct solution to the question concerning
y is not known, or it is known but at the same time others have not heard
about this, or have not been conyineed... Now, if the issue continues,
there must be some philosophic cross-talk, so let us exclude the possibility
that other philosophers have not heard about it- The thesis now becomes,
and I will introduce logical punctuation to make this clearer:
y is an enduring philosophic issue 3 (the correct solution
to y is unknown V it is
known and all thinkers to
whom it is known have not
been convinced).
If I have stated this thesis fairly, it is obvious that it can be shown to
be false only under one set of conditions Name Iy when at the same time
there is an enduring philosophic issue, y, the correct solution to y is
known, and all who know the solution have been conv i need.' There is no
other way to directly falsify this thesis as it stands. But what sort of
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refuting conditions are these? If thinkers are to some extent reasonable,
how can one expect them to know the correct solution, be convinced, and at
the same time still maintain the issue? This seems particularly incredible
when we remember how unshakeable is the conviction of truth associated
with first principles and their necessary consequences. And yet these are
the only conditions under which the above expression can be directly
falsified. And by a similar argument it can be shown that it is equally
difficult to disprove the negation of this thesis. If so, if this thesis
car, be shown to be wrong only under such highly unrealistic conditions,
then it is as I remarked earlier nearly a tautology. Or perhaps I should
say, it is nearly undisprovab!e
We have then three counts already to mark against the classical
approach. The first is its over-strong assumption concerning the theoretical
completeness of all sciences — a completeness which if realizable would
guarantee the absence of any intrinsically undecidable propositions. But
this is a completeness which cannot be a genera! property of all theories
Secondly it seems that the conditions for falsifying the classical approach
are so improbable* this thesis becomes nearly incapable of disproof.
Lastly, and equally dubitable is the assumption that its first principles
are self-evident and of the highest warrant.
♦ '• • *
#5. For a theory to be non-fa Isifiable is one thing, but to be
tenable is another. If wq cannot judge its truth or falsity, we still
can ask: How correct, i.e., how applicable the above may be as an ex¬
planation? If we look now at the record of philosophy, philosophers
have been investigating issues for instance questions concerning existence,
for a considerable length of time: about two thousand five hundred or so
years. And yet with the exception of positions which are manifestly self-
inconsistent, few ontologies have been shown to be irredeemably false;
and fewer (if any) true. The issues which they attempt to solve, remain
stubbornly there in one form or another. For, although they may change
their color and their context, older problems, e.g the ontological
status of universale, the adequacy of a uniquely materialistic explanation,
the analysis of predication, the meaning of 'existence', etc. reappear
afresh in the morning mail. Thus, a fundamental notion of the classical
approach — namely that if a philosophic issue is correctly solved, the
issue will in time disappear — is either incorrect, or few if any issues
have been correctly solved.
But perhaps this latter is the case, the method which the
classical approach demands has never been correctly, or sufficiently,
applied. (And this is a fair defense: Plato in his less sanguine moments,
seems to suggest that even a dialectician is not up to the task of
dialectics.) But if this is so, the value of the classical explanation
for the continuance of philosophic issues becomes a function of the faith
one holds in it. 11 i s to be applied not to what is actually accomplished,
but to what is hoped for. Alas when one has gone this far, it seems
equally plausible to question the plausibility of the explanation. For —
given sufficient time — we consider men sufficiently rational to at least
stumble upon the truth, if there is a truth. And if this is so, the above
way out for the classical approach is effectively barred. It seems then
that the classical approach, however likely it may seem, explains very
Iittle.ynless, of course, philosophic issues are intrinsically incapable
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of being solved by philosophers.
To sum up, if a field of philosophic inquiry cannot be expressed
in terms of a deductive theory, or even in a fragment of one, or if this
theory is incomplete, then some of its truths (if we may use this term)
are not provable. As we have seen there is no reason to expect that most
theories of sufficient complexity are complete. Or, if such a theory is
not consistent, then all of its provable theorems are not true. (This
latter point we shall discuss in further detail in respect to the critical
approach.) Or, if the premises of a theory are not all self-evident, or
alI undeniably true then its conclusions — if unconditional — however
valid they may be, cannot be of the highest warrant. For we could, in
such a case, conceive of a system containing premises incompatible with the
first.
In view of this we may well doubt whether the classical approach
is applicable to any important philosophic issue. I think it is evident
that if we abandon any of its presuppositions, the assumptions of deductive
completeness, seIf-evidentness, consistency, we must abandon the approach.
For if a theory is incomplete, then an issue may very easily develop con¬
cerning the truth or falsity of a proposition which is undecidable within
it Similarly if all premises are not self-evident, or undeniable to a
rational man, the possibility of rival positions is built into the very
foundations of the study. And lastly, if one does not assume that all
true statements do form a consistent whole, then the possibility of such
an inconsistency developing in the statements one makes, is sufficient
to explain the appearance of any issue, concerning anything.
But we must investigate whether these doubts are well-founded.
This we shall do in Chapters . For the present though we would be well-
advised to cast about for another explanation.
»■ • • *
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#6. Fundamental to the classical approach are the natural enough
presuppositions that there is a unique answer to he questions which
philosophers ask and that, with the exception of first principles, all
these answers which are bathed in the light of truth are provable. Kant,
as we know, challenges the generality of these assumptions, and in so doing
suggests another and more compelling explanation for the enduring presence
of some philosophic problems. We of course refer to his discussion of
the four antinomies, in which he writes:
Here is the most singular phenomenon of human reason...an
unexpected conflict which never can be removed in the common
dogmatic way; because the thesis (e.g. that the world has a
beginning in time and soace3 as well as the antithesis, can
be shown (fo be true3 by equally clear, evident, and ir¬
resistible proofs" Kant (I) 52a
Kant's analysis of this singular phenomenon falls into two parts.
i) Some questions which "dogmatic" metaphysicians ask, contain
self-contradictory concepts. For instance, the query: Does the world have
a beginning in time? presupposes that time can exist in itself. But time,
Kant argues, is in itself only a mode of representation. Thus:
It is palpably contradictory to say, that a mere mode
of representation exists without our representation"
Kant (I ) 52c.
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(Similarly,, another seIf-con+radictory concept, in this case that of
objective appearances, is present in the query which leads to the second
antinomy: Does the world consist of simple elements?) Both of these an¬
tinomies develop because questions are posed in such a way that con¬
cepts contained within them are seIf-contradictory. Any time such a con¬
cept is applied we can expect to find contradictory assertions. For
if, e.g. I unwittingly employ a seIf-contradictory concept, say that of
a round-square, I can be guided by this concept and with apparent legitimacy
introduce a statement of the form 'x is round' in one argument and 'x is
square1 in another. From which, given the platitude that for ail x, x is
round if and only if it is not-square, a contradiction develops.
ii) Contradictions can also appear in a second way. Here we
refer to the discussion of the third and fourth antinomies in which Kant
shows that the proposition 'There is freedom1 and 'There is some necessary
being' together with their respective negations are all provable. His
explanation of this follows:
The incompatibility of these propositions Ci.e. 'There
is a necessary being', 'There is no necessary being'3
rests entirely upon the mistake of extending what is
valid merely of appearances to things in themselves and
in generally confusing both in one concept." Kant (I) 53
Kant here is referring to the concept of Cause, which when it is applied
to the phenomenal world, i e , to experience, is different from the
concept of Cause applicable to the world of things in themselves. The
antinomy develops when that concept, applicable to one system, is illegi¬
timately applied to the other. Or more genera!ly, we can say that concepts
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(or elements within a family of concepts) have each a limited range of
significance. Any application of specific concepts to elements outside
their range is inappropriate. In this latter case, it is not the questions
which introduce the contradiction into the dicuss ion but the careless use
of otherwise legitimate concepts.
Thus what I have called the 'critical approach', in contrast to
the classical, maintains that there are some questions which philosophers
habitually ask, for which a solution is not forthcoming, and that any
attempt to prove the correctness of a putative solution in the normal manner
is illusory. One might object that Kant's demonstration of the antinomies
proves only that careless reasoning is the mother of contention; that the
arguments, if carefully stated, could be shown to be invalid, or self-
inconsistent, irrespective of any appeal to the distinctions which Kant
introduces. But this would miss the larger point. For Kant's innovation,
in tiiis respect, is his insistence that there are questions unanswerable
in the classical sense. These are unanswerable either because of the
conceptual inaoproprlateness of the initial question, or of the covert
ambiguities contained within them. And this observation is certainly
v
broader based that the particular system in terms of which it is
expressed. For Instance in the following debate between F.C. Copleston
and Bertrand Russell, consider Russell's use of a similar insight:
COPLESTON: I can't see how you can rule out the legitimacy
of asking the question how the total, or anything at a I I
comes to be there. Why something rather than nothing, that
is the question?... DO it could be shown that Kant's view
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of the matter Is correct, the question would be illegitimate,
I agree; but — I don't suppose you are a Kantian."
RUSSELL: I can illustrate what seems to be your fallacy
Cin asking that the universe have a cause}. Every man who
exists has a mother, and it seems to me your argument is that
therefore the human race must have a mother, but obviously the
human race hasn't a mother — that's a different logical
sphere" Russell (2) p. 479.
The concept of cause, applicable to individuals, is not necessarily
applicable to the totality of individuals. Thus the use of what I have
called the 'critical approach' is not limited to strict Kantians
But it is important, from our point of view: that we note that
this approach — as stated by Kant — does not embody a general theory of
philosophical problems. His theory purports to explain how some prima
facie legitimate philosophic problems are in fact nonsense, and how some
answers to other queries are conceptually inappropriate It does not assert
that all attempts to answer philosophic issues are illusory, but only
some. (For if all philosophic issues were illusory, no philosophic position
would be significant. And this conclusion would overstep the canons of
the criticaI position.)
» • *
^7 It is of course possible that one might establish a disjunction
of different approaches and claim that the cause of any recalcitrant
philosophic issue can be described in terms of some approach included
within the disjunction. Thus the expression 'recalcitrant philosophic
issue' would like 'game' be applicable to a whole range of entities with
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only a ioose f ami 1y resemblance one to another and no one common character¬
istic, But this offends against simplicity and — except as a last re¬
sort — jjg. shouid avoid this For our purpose in studying the various
approaches is to find some feature or features which will provide a
starting point for the study of existence-statements Inteliecfua economy
suggests the fewer starting points, the better If we must have a dis¬
junction of approaches, iet us find the disjunction which contains the fewest.
Thus St would be apposite, from our point of view if we were to
consider some non-classical theory of philosophic problems which iike the
ctassica approach purports to be of general scope. For if it were truly
general it would, in one way or another, also cover the issues discussed
by the critical approach, We shall accordingly ot consider the critical
approach further. But this is not a criticism of its aptness, but a
recognition of its s©>'f-Imposed limitations.
0**4
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#8. There are at least two non-c assica! approaches which claim to
be applicable to all philosophic issues The first is that of iogtca;
positivism As we know, the positivist argues that the usual propositions
of philosophy (if synthetic) seem to b© neither verifiable, nor confirmab e
nor testable, etc, in terms of any conceivable experiment. And, with very
few exceptions, i suppose the record of philosophic history can be shown to
bear this out But given this as a premise, and some variety of the
principle of verification, the positivist can then prove his contention
that all apparent y informative philosophic propositions —at least those
concerning metaphysics and ethics — are meaningless. For if one accepts
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a principle that 'p' is meaningful only if 'p1 is verifiable, or confirmable,
etc., then by the above if 'p' is a philosophic proposition, then 'p' is
meaningless. The proposition, "p", is a mere pseudo-statement. Similarly
the question which 'p1 purports to answer is a pseudo-question.
But for those of us who wish to separate the epistemic from the
alethic, there is an evident distinction to be made between "p' is provable'
and "p1 is true'. And since the relevant property of statements is to be
true or false, the unverifiabiIity of 'p' need be no biemish upon its
statement-hood.
Still, if the positivist argument is not conclusive, all other
things being equal, it might still provide a possible approach However,
I do not think that all other things are equal. We are, for instance,
well aware of how difficult it has been for the positivists to express the
verification principle, or its latter day variants, in a logically acceptable
manner sufficiently general for their purpose.
I think this difficulty lies in the nature of the beast, that
any consistent, general statement of the position is impossible, or self-
refuting. It is not my task here to enter into this discussion I wish
merely to point out my reasons for not considering the positivist approach
an adequate one. I argue thus. Whatever form the principle of verifica¬
tion, etc. takes, if it is a statement, it is either analytic or synthetic
in some sense of these terms as employed by the positivists. (And I think
the feasibility of a distinction of this kind must be assumed by any
straight-Iine positivist. For otherwise he must then consider the propo¬
sitions of mathematics, even the theory of transfinite numbers, to be con-
firmable in experience , if meaningfuI. ) I am wiI Iing to admit that a
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statement of the principles of verification, etc, might be said to be
true, analytically true — in respect to a certain body of statements
which may be called 'scientific1 But if such a principle is applicable
to al i proposi+1ons, I cannot see how It could be considered 3-iaiytic under
such conditions For certainly it is of in the meaning of the term
'significant philosophic proposition' that it be verifiable or confirmabie
in experience On the other hand, if the statement of the principle is
synthetic it must be appiicabie to all propositions (For otherwise it
would not serve its intended purpose of distinguishing between scientific
propositions as cognitive!y significant and philosophic utterances as,
nonsensical.) If it is synthetic, then it is either self-applicab.e or
it is not. Let us assume that it is. But then the statement of the
principle must itself be verifiable, or confirmabie, in respect to al
propositions, and not merely to therestricted set of statements in the
language of science.
But how couid this be done, unless we already knew in some
certain and unambiguous manner — independent of this principle — just
those propositions which were meaningful? Aias, if this were the case,
the principle would be unnecessary, even pointless. And if we nad no
independent method of determining those statements which were meaningful,
the principle itself (if it purported to be meaningful, i.e., confirmabie
or verifiable) eou'd never be stated in full genera ity. For it could
then only be confirmed in respect to those statements which were know to
be meaningfui.
if, on the other hand, the statement of this principle is not
self-reflexive, then it cannot apply to all propositions, and as such is
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inadequate. For under such conditions, how can one be certain that there
are not other significant and equally unconfirmabIe propositions? Even if
one were to introduce an additional provision, that the statement of this
principle was meaningful although unconf irrnable, what would prevent one
from also tacking on a second, or a third, or a n'th exception? In such
a way one might then include all the statements, say, of Aristotle's
"Metaphysics" as cognitiveiy significant and the positivist would then have
to countenance a discussion of the unmoved mover within the language of
science Certainly one could not argue that the verification, etc.
principle was the sole exception to itself. For by the above line of
reasoning, any statement claiming this would run the same open-ended
gamut of objections as the statement of the principle itself.
One might try to argue that such a principle is neither true nor
false, but a canon, or a rule covering the ascription of 'meaningful' to
'synthetic proposition'. But, as rioted above, I cannot see that there
is a general relation of analyticity between statements about meaningful
propositions and statements about confirmable or verifiable ones As
such, the principle if it is to be formulated as a canon, might also be
formulated in some other manner. I mean there might be alternative
canons for the ascription of 'meaningful'. As such one could not show
that the principle is correct because it represents a unique possibility.
Rather one would be forced to argue that the principle is correct or
warranted inasmuch as it most fully satisfies certain criteria in terms
of which we judge such principles; i.e., it is a good principle. And
this might provide a feasible line of defense. But when one has reached
this stage, one is evidently deep, deep in philosophy. So how could the
11-3,9 5!
principle be defended in this way? You cannot dec'are an area Out of
Bounds — e.g. that 'good' is not a cognitively significant term — when
you are right in the middle of it. It is like painting 'Stay Off' on
the floor and then being forced to walk upon the sign to get out
Someone pondering upon this might reflect that the peculiar
property of the principle of verificat ion, and its progeny, is that
although not statements themselves, they make other statements possible
(E.g If we accept the principle, then the statement: This 1p' is mean¬
ingless, because unconfirmable1 is true.) For what the principle does
accomplish is, as it were, to introduce a new mental set or sanction an
attitude. Once this is set, it is then possible to ascribe 'meaningful'
to other propositions in terms of it. It is in its way. similar to
the standard meter bar which permits us to make statements about other
bars that they are one meter long. See Wittgenstein (!NV) - 50
But if the above analysis were accepted might one not be
forced to include in the same manner a whole class of philosophical propo¬
sitions of this type? Why stop at this one concerning the ascription of
'meaningfuI'?
it seems then, that no matter how the positivist approach is
viewed, the statement of this approach becomes either redundant or en¬
tangled in just those philosophic propositions which it purports to re¬
move. So I cannot consider this approach a consistent answer to our
question
* • • ♦
jfg Let us note, if we compare the classical and the pcsitivist
approach, that the latter negates one set of presuppositions of the former
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The classicist is committed to the belief that there are some metaphysical
propositions which are meaningful and either provable or disprovabie,
as the case may be. The positivist contends that there are none which
can be considered as either provable or disprovabie., because al ! are
meaningless. If the results of our subsequent analysis show that the
propositions of philosophers are not provable or disprovabie in the
classical sense, the positivist's excursion into the field of 'meaningful'
becomes unnecessary in this respect.
Let us note too that as a matter of convenience we have
broadened the use of 'proposition' to include apparently weii-formed
meaningful utterances of any kind. These are to be distinguished from
the smaller class of utterances that are, or can be considered to be
true or false. We shall call these latter 'statements'. Ail statements,
in this usage, are propositions; but not the converse. For Epimenides the
Cretan to say; AM Cretans are liars' is to utter a proposition. But it
is not clear if this is a statement.
CHAPTER THREE
The Linquistic Approach
iff I. Within this and the following chapter we consider the linguistic
explanation for the appearance of philosophic problems By the 'linguis¬
tic thesis' or 'linguistic approach', we refer specifically to the
strong interpretation of the theory of philosophic problems stated in
Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations", i.e. —baldly stated —
the claim that alI philosophic problems are due to a misuse of language
(We also use 'linguistic approach' in a secondary sense to refer to the
application of this thesis by Wittgenstein and other adherents of this
view ) Since we shall refer to the above-mentioned work rather
frequently we shall abbreviate it "Investigations" or (INV), as the
case may be.
The strong linguistic approach, like the classical, claims full
generality. But unlike the classical theory, the presuppositions of this
position — as contrasted with its pronouncements — are peculiarly
difficult to ferret out. This may account for the length of the present
discussion.
Our first task is to state this thesis To do this we trace
Wittgenstein's self-criticism of his earlier philosophic attitude and the
development of the linguistic thesis out of this critical reappraisal.
We then observe that this thesis is peculiarly invulnerable to effective
refutation, and that its general claim does not seem to be borne out
in actual phi Iosophic practise. (We recalI the same features hold
true also of the classical approach.) We then proceed to the heart
of the chapter and ask whether or not the approach can be grounded
in more fundamental terms Vie do find a weaker thesis — that philosophic
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problems may be due to a misuse of language — can be shown to follow as
a consequence of certain relatively non-tendentious assumptions one might
make about language and language-use But the strong thesis, couched
in full generality and applicable to all philosophic problems, cannot be
proved on this basis. We show that the assumptions required to establish
the stronger thesis must be of correspondingIy greater power. We epitomize
these latter in the notion of what we calI a 'felicitous', t e. , a fully
successful, form of life. If the language of any such form of life is
fully felicitous — the way for example a game is whose rules cover all
situations that develop in the course of play — it is impossible for in¬
compatible statements to be legitimately formed in such a language.
If then some prima facie meaningful question appears, within this
language, to which either no ciear cut answer or equally plausible
but incompatible rep Iies can be given — i.e., if a philosophic issue
develops — at least one rule of language has been misused. Thus, if
we assume that certain conditions are satisfied in the language or languages
which philosophers employ, the linguistic thesis follows as a logical
consequence of these assumptions.
The notion of a felicitious form of life plays a central role
within any description of these assumptions. 'Form of life' is of course
Wittgenstein's expression, and 'felicity' is due to Austin. However, my
use of this latter term, it seems to me, is sanctioned by Wittgenstein's
suggestion that language is like an engine which works. Although the
combination of these two expressions is our own, the concept to which they
refer is not my invention For it can be shown that if certain conditions
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associated with felicity are not satisfied in a given ianguage, it is
impossible to claim that alt philosophic problems expressed within it are
due to a misuse of this language. Thus this use of 'felicity' de otes a
necessary condition for the assertion of the genera I Iinguistic thesis
So important is this notion of felicity, that most of Chapter
Four is devoted to it Following this, we compare the form of the
classical and linguistic approaches and note that the structure of both
is similar in given respects. The key concept in the former is that of
provability, as felicity is for the latter. It follows from this that if
existence-statements were not fully provable, in the classical sense, and
if the language with which we discuss existence is not fully felicitous
in the linguistic sense, then neither of these approaches in themselves
are adequate as general explanations for the appearance of enduring
philosophic issues. For instance, if the language under study is not
felicitious, incompatible existence-statements can appear even when its
rules are correctly used.
• * a •
&2. We begin now with a brief outline of Wittgenstein's theory of
philosophic problems and the role of rules of language within this
theory. Although it may seem a bizarre point of departure, let us start by
considering the argument-form of a typical classical metaphysician Such a
thinker wiiI generally employ both statements which refer to the data of
experience and others of a more theoretical nature. It is thus that
Aquinas takes the proposition that some things are in motion and combines
this with a theoretical premise, based upo , the concept of motion, to argue
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that an unmoved mover must exist. Aquinas (I) 1.2.3. And in a similar
fashion, Wittgenstein within his "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus",
combines the proposition that sentences which contain
names(When correctly usee) have sense, with theoretical premises, based
e.g. upon the concepts of naming and of meaning, to conclude thai" logical
simples — eternal objects — must exist.
In fact in many ways the following lines of Wittgenstein, in
which — long afterwards — he reflects upon the attitude of mind in which
his "Tractatus" was written, can be viewed as a summary of the classical
attitude:
"But this is how it is" — I say to myself over and over again.
I feel as though, if only I could fix my gaze absolutely sharply
on this fact, get it in focus, I must grasp the essence of the
matter..."This is how things are" — That is the kind of propo¬
sition that one repeats to oneself countless times" (INV) -113, 114.
But then he continues, to criticize the above:
One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's
nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round
the frame through which we look at it...A picture held us
captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our
language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably"
(INV) -I 14, I 15.
If a picture holds him captive the philosopher must liberate himself from
the beguilement of language. But there is no getting out of language; one
must free oneself from it in terms of itself. For Wittgenstein this means
that one must return to the ordinary use of the words in question;
I I 1-2 57
When philosophers use a word — '"knowledge", "being'',
"object", "I", "proposition", "name" — and try to grasp
the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is
ever
the word/actuaI!y used this way in the ianguage-game which is
its original home? — What we do Ci.e. , what Wittgenstein of
the "Investigations" doesj) is to bring words back from their
metaphysical to their everyday use" (INV) -116.
For example, Wittgenstein asks:
What lies behind the idea that names really signify simples? —
£He then quotes a passage from the "Theaetetus" in which Soc¬
rates says everything which exists as a fundamental element
can only be named, cannot be further determined, and that in
consequence it is impossible to give an account of a primary
element .J
He then observes:
Both Russell's 'individuals' and my 'objects' ...were such
primary ©laments.
But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality
is composed? — What are the simple constituent parts of
a chair? — The bits of wood of which it is made? Or the
molecules, or the atoms? — "Simple" means: not composite.
And here the point is: in what sense 'composite'? It
makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the 'simple'
parts of a chair' " (INV) -46, 47
And thus he concludes it is nonsense to talk — simpliciter — about the
simple constituent parts of reality. Further:
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We use the word "composite" (and therefore the word "simple")
in an enormous number of different and differently related
ways...
For instance:
To the philosophical question "Is the visual image of this
tree composite, and what are its component parts?" the
correct answer is: "That depends on what you understand by
'composite' (And that is of course not an answer but a
rejection of the question.)" (INV) -47.
Or consider another similar question: What are the significant elements of
a sentence, the types of letters, or the letters?:
Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid misunder¬
standings in any particular case?" (INV) -48.
Thus particular questions, when specified, are meaningful and can be an¬
swered. But the philosophical question for Wittgenstein is unanswerable
precisely because it has no sense:
Our investigation is therefore (not about things butj a
grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our
problems by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings
concerning the use of words, caused,among other things, by
certain analogies between the forms of expression in different
regions of language...The confusions which occupy us arise when
language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work"
(INV) -90, 132.
Philosophic problems develop when we have misused the forms of our lan¬
guage. This adds a specious depth to the whole procedure:
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The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our
forms of language have the character of depth. They are
deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep as the forms of
our language. — Let us ask ourselves: Why do we feel a
grammatical joke to be deep? (Arid that is what the depth of
philosophy is.)" (INV) -III.
This observation prepares the ground for the removal of philosophy. If we
can make clear the inner workings of our language in such a manner that
the misuse becomes evident, why then we rid ourselves of this disquietude.
The questions which initially trouble us, are seen to be devoid of sense:
CPhiIosophicaI problems are solved} by looking into the
workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make
us recognize those workings: in despire of an urge to misunder¬
stand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new informa¬
tion, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is
a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means
of language.. The resuits of philosophy are the uncovering of
one or another pieces of plain nonsense and of bumps that the
understanding has got by running its head against the limits
of language These bumps make us see the value of this dis-
covery...For the ciarity that we are aiming at is indeed compIete
clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical should
Thus for the later Wittgenstein, in contrast to the classical philosopher,
to philosophize now means that one is to turn one's back upon the perplexing
questions. I instead the philosopher is to investigate the misuse of
disappear" (INV) -109, 133, 119.
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language — the plain nonsense — out of which the issue has arisen.
But there is a curious parallel between the two approaches even here.
Aristotle, in explaining the appearance of enduring philosophic problems,
introduces the distinction between the famiIiar-to-us and the intelligible.
Wittgenstein mansuvres in the same vein. It is the surface of language which
mis leads us, the inner working of language is on the side of the angels
Let us rehearse these differences in respect to language:
Language, on its surface, presents us with analogies which
lead one astray (INV) -90.
In the best of cases the forms of ordinary language are often
like the narrow winding streets of an old city (INV) -IS.
At the worst they entangle us in our own rules (INV) -125
It is"a labyrintH'(INV) -203.
On the other hand:
Once we become aware of the way language functions in its
everyday role, once we study the rules of its working,
we develop a perspicuous understanding which fends off and
removes such entanglements (See "Investigations" 122, 125,
130-131).
In such a case we need no longer say , ; as is characteristic
of one caught in a philosophic problem., _ ► "I don't know my
way about" (INV) -123.
Through a study of these rules, the philosopher is ready and
prepared to apply them whenever perplexities about the conduct
of language arise. He assembles "reminders" for a particular
purpose, (INV) -128.
I I 1-2 61
The philosopher is I ike a referee in that his task is not to play the
game, but knowing its rules, to use them in the appropriate situations.
If correctly done, there is nothing further to explain. For:
If I have exhausted the justification Cfor my following a
ruIe) I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then
I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do." (INV) -217.
It might be well to assemble additional phrases in respect to this
latter point. They form as it were a litany for rules, and show the
fundamental importance of this notion of rules to the linguistic approach:
When I obey a rule, ! do not choose, I obey the rule
blindiy" (INV) -219.
We are not on tenterhooks about what it tells us next, but
it always tells us the same, and we do what it tells us"
(INV) -223
The rule provides the court of last appeal:
,rFhe line Ci.e., the ruleO intimates which way I am to
go" is only a paraphrase of: it is my Iast arbiter for the
way I am to go" (INV) -230.
("Letze Instanz" as employed in the German original means 'court of last
appeaI ')
And finaI Iy:
But sure Iy you can see ..?" That is just the characteris¬
tic expression of someone who is under the compulsion of
a rule" (INV) -231,
If one is aware of the rules one is free of past philosophic disquietude.
Guided by the rules-one sees „ And were perfect clarity of this sort to be
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achieved, "the ph i I osoph ica I " would comp! ete I y disappear
• • • •
#3 The linguistic approach, then, like the classical, purports to
establish a general explanation for the presence of philosophical issues.
How else can we interpret Wittgenstein's claim that were perfect clarity
to be achieved, there would be no problems? Or, in other words, if there
is no misuse of language, there cannot be any lasting philosopher problems.
Granted that the approach purports to apply to a I I philosophic
problems But how well does it apply? Curiously, just as in the case of
the classical approach, this thesis is peculiarly invulnerable to disproof.
For what conditions would make it false? If I have stated this approach
correctly, it can be falsified in only two ways. I) One can show that the
statement of the position is inconsistent, either with itself, or with sane
other statements independently known to be true. Or 2) one can show that
rules of language have not been broken and at the same time some lasting
philosophic problem is present.
The question of inconsistency will occupy us in a following
chapter. But at the onset, we can look most dimly upon the project of
clearly proving the loosely knit statements of the "Investigations" to be
either consistent or inconsistent. However this may be, let us investigate
now the second method of disproof. To invalidate the linguistic thesis
along such lines we would have to introduce some important counter-instance
in which i: some linguistic form z, is employed in conformity with all
rules applicable to z, and ii: at the same time a very live philosophic
issue, concerning the subject of z, is an enduring part of the philosophic
Iandscape
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But here is the crucial point. Assume that such an instance
is introduced, and assume, too, that z (together with all the other sent¬
ences and questions concerning the subject) appear to be flawless pieces
of language. Even then, the advocate of the linguistic approach can still
claim that some rule must have been broken.. And — in view of the enormous
number and variety of rules applicable to any linguistic act — who is to
say him iay?
The situation here (the difficulty of demonstrating that a I 1
the rules have been complied with) is the reverse of that confronting a
logician who wishes to prove that a given formula is net a theorem in a
logical system. For the logician's rules of proof are set up to demon¬
strate that a given proposition is true, not that it is false. On the
other hand, the linguistic philosophurcan easily point out if a rule has
been broken. But unless one could enumerate all the rules applicable to a
given expression, neither he nor his opponent could ever fully demonstrate
that §11 miss had been complied with.
It follows that in any but an artificial situation, as e.g.
in a formal language, one could never fully establish that an apparent
counter-example to the linguistic thesis was a genuinely refuting in¬
stance. Thus the approach could never be conclusively shown to be false
in its application to issue® expressed in natural language. (And it is
these which concern most philosophers.) It will be important in the sequei
to remember this: that the linguistic approach Is not readily disprovable.
We have seen the same is true of the classical approach
#4. So. as with the classical approach, one cannot easily dIsprove
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the position. StiiI we can inquire to what extent it does provide an
acceptable explanation for the appearance of incompatible ontologies.
We can also ask, and will: Can the claims of the linguistic thesis be
justified on theoretical grounds? — Is this thesis a provable consequence
of some more general assumptions? An answer to this latter query is of
particular importance in that it will bring out the presuppositions of
this position and it is these foundations which interest us. We show
indeed that they are remarkably close knit.
Let us consider, briefly, the applicability of the linguistic
approach. If it is applicable, then we would expect some evidence for
it in the number of philosophic issues which have been successfully re¬
moved from the intellectual scene. (The proof of the therapy lies in
its dissolutions.) But alas this does not seem to be the case. For
when it comes down to brass tacks, philosophic problems are not dis¬
appearing. On the contrary, have they not proliferated and the types of
philosophers with them? We certainly have philosophers today who still
pursue the old questions, albeit with a greater awareness of the possible
nonsense in the language-pile. Then there are philosophers in the
linguistic tradition. Thirdly, thinkers who argue with these latter
concerning the appropriate analysis of a suspected misuse of language.
Then there are philosophers concerned with the notion of Rules and of
other keyconcepts employed in linguistic analyses, etc. No, we are far
from perfectly clear. If the range of present activity is a fair index,
philosophy still torments.
For instance, consider how philosophers of mathematics still
disagree about the ontological status of numbers, of classes, and of
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mathematical truths. And how philosophers of science are still at logger¬
heads about the existence of theoretical entities, and the status of laws
And similarly for other phiIosophers, the older questions — are there
meanings? facts? propositions? is there a God?, etc. — are still
queries which have not lost their sting. (It is curious how the fly loves
the bottie.) Questions which have occupied the minds of philosophers for
many years now, although seen in a new light, seem to resist linguistic
dissolution as stubbornly as the classless state refuses to wither. As
Quinton remarks: The problems CWittgenstei if) aimed to dissolve have
obdurately refused to stay dead" Ouinton (I) p. 543.
Admittedly the linguistic approach has been applied much less
than its classical predecessor. (We have, after all, little more than one
generation of linguistic philosophers to consider.) And we might try to
argue on this basis that no full and correct analysis has been achieved.
But is this a tenable defense? Philosophers before this have criticized
the foundations of their predecessors, and shown the positions they
attacked to be truiy houses of cards. Berkeley's criticism of Locke's
notion of abstract ideas, and Hume's criticism of his contemporar ies' view
of causality cane readily to mind. It would indeed be a devastating
criticism of Wittgenstein's approach of it were shown applicable only to
his "Tractatus".
And yet as outstanding a philosopher as Wittgenstein did not
stake undefended claims. His analyses in the "Investigations" are there
to vindicate the correctness of his approach, if it is correct, and the
fruitfulness of his method, if it is successful.
But it is such an enormous leap from the demonstration of
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plain or covert nonsense here and there, to the generalization that a I I
philosophic problems are the result of such a misuse For the steps along
the way to this generalization as stated in the "Investigations" are not
clear. The thesis, as we have noted, is not universally vindicated in its
results Then is it not plausible to suspect that the first word on the
signpost : All philosophic problems are the result of a misuse of
language' is one word too many?
• • • •
• • » •
#5. perhaps we have misunderstood the purpose of Wittgenstein's re¬
marks in the "Investigations". Perhaps these are to be read as recommenda¬
tions for the use of the term 'philosophic problem' and not as statements
which can be said to be true or false. They certainly must be at least
this former if we are to take at face value the doctrine that the task of
philosophy is to uncover the misuse of language responsible for a philoso¬
phic problem and thereby to dissolve it.
But if the above propositions are intended to be more than mere
linguistic conventions, then Wittgenstein must show their applicability
to all or nearly all accepted uses of the term in question. For if not,
what has been accomplished? So again the question poses itself: How can
one justify the claims of the linguistic thesis in their full generality?
They are certainly not self-evident. Wei! then, might they be
introduced as an inductive generalization? But hardly this! For the
discussion of specimen philosophic problems contained within the "Investi¬
gations" is too iimited for this purpose. Although the dissolution-analyses
which it does contain can suggest a way, they are insufficient to warrant
the ciaim that aii philosophic issues are due to a misuse of language.
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Can this thesis then be argued for in some other manner? In
asking this question we may well be departing from the position of Wittgen¬
stein. For if language can be only described, not explained (as Wittgenstein
contends in (INV) -109) I suppose arguing for a new use of 'philosophic
problem1 would be more than describing its use. But if this is so, i should
still not feei too troubled about this departure. For our present intent
is to ana Iyze the Iinguistic approach , to seek out its presuppositions, and
this does not mean we must follow its own ground rules in so doing. Tennis,
for instance, is in the class of games which could not be played outside
of a gravitational field. But such a statement about tennis could not be
proved in terms of the rules of tennis
Can we then justify all or some of the linguistic claims? if we
do look closer at certain characteristics of language,
we find that this thesis can to
some extent be justified in terms of language. Specifically, I should like
to show I): A weaker claim, one which reiates phiIosophic problems to a
misuse of language, can indeed be proven in terms of more fundamental pre¬
mises 2): These premises are in themselves far from tendentions and I
dare say few thinkers within our present tradition would strongly disagree
with them. 3): But no stronger thesis can be justified if we include only
grounds of this type, i.e , ones which are at least prima facie generally
acceptable 4): The general thesis, that all philosophic problems are
specifically due to a misuse of language, can also be argued for. But if
this is to be done, one must first introduce quite strong premises. (These
also concern the characteristics of the language one employes — and an
analysis of these latter, in respect to 'existence', will occupy us
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throughout much of Part Ml of this thesis.)
#6. So much in the way of generaMties. But before we turn to an
investigation of the weaker thesis and the possible grounds upon which it
can be built let me please make this point. This is not to be read as a
labor in Wittgensteinian scholarship. It is more in the order of a logical
language-game, whose purpose is to uncover the presuppositions of the s+ron9
linguistic approach that we may test them So first we set ourselves an
easy task, to analyze certain conceptual foundations upon which a weaker
linguistic thesis can be established. Then, when this is mastered, we
proceed to a study of the stronger thesis. (Also, we do resort to formal
argument at some times in both of these analyses. Symbolism is introduced
here, as in mathematics, because the subject matter is somewhat complex,
and the argument would be awkward if confined to the expressions of natural
language. )
We take two premises to ground the weak thesis. We prove in terms
of them that in all philosophic issues either there is some part of language
that is defective or the rules of this language have been misused. This
is like, but not iaentica with, the strong thesis that all philosophic
problems are due to such a misuse The difference will prove instructive.
For our first premise let us turn to (INV) -
...it seems clear that where there is sense there must be per¬
fect order — So there must be perfect order even in the
vaguest sentence."
Perhaps one might object, in respect to this observation, that certain de¬
tails are incorrect, or exaggerated. For instance, we can say: I got the
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gist of his remarks, even if they were unclear here and there'. And this
would seem to run counter to the above. But I think that when we do catch
the gist of someone's remarks . we do understand the sense of a simplified
version of these remarks, and this we can say does have a perfect sense.
At least the sense is as perfect as it need be for the situation. ( For
instance, as Wittgenstein observes, (INV) -88, when I say: Stand about
there', the hearer knows what I mean ) And in many cases to make this sen¬
tence more exact would be to run counter to the purpose for which it is used
With this in mind, I think we can, in general, accept the above
observation and proceed to state a first premise based upon it. In so doing,
since the generality of the variables concerned is important in the follow¬
ing argument, we shall adopt the convention that all variables mentioned
are considered to be universally quantified unless specifically restricted
by 'sane', or a similar expression (For instance in the following, in
which both 'y' and 'z' appear, neither are so restricted)
The observation cited above is concerned with the sense of ex¬
pressions and with their order. Thus:
Where z is used as an expression concerning y,
(I) If z has a sense, then the order of z, about y, is perfect.
Our second premise concerns philosophic problems. We have
noted i: for Wittgenstein a philosophic problem is analogous to a situation
in which one does not know one's way around, or one in which there is con¬
ceptual confusion. We can consider this confusion to be present either in
the thoughts of one thinker, ail thinkers, or within the conceptual scheme
itself in which the problem develops. Viewed within these broad contexts,
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I think the linkage of 'philosophic problem' and 'confusion' becomes
acceptable- Let us also consider the platitude ii: where there is confusion
in our thoughts, or in our concepts, there is also no perfect order in these
thoughts or concepts. in the interests of simplicity let us assume, Mi:
in some timeless present — there are thoughts about anything. We now com¬
bine these three notes on thoughts and confusion to form the following pre-
m i se :
Where v is any philosophic problem concerning any y
(2) There are some thoughts, x, about y, for which there is no per¬
fect order; and there are such thoughts for any y.
Three comments on the above are in order. i) Were the first conjunct not
the case< i.e., if the order of thought were perfect) there could be no con¬
fusion. 2) !t is evident that the thoughts about y envisaged in (2) eed
be only those thoughts which are connected with the philosophic issue
Other thoughts about the subject may be of untarnished clarity. For in¬
stance there are philosophic problems concerning the subject of numbers and
of mathematical entities in general. As such we might be ready to acknowledge
that some thoughts about numbers are confused. But this does not mean that
all thoughts concerning them lack perfect order. For example it is not
ci ear to what extent the trans.fi nite numbers can be said to exist. But
this does not make the statement 'Two is a finite number' unclear In
short, there is good reason to introduce 'same1 in 'some thoughts ,
x about y1, above. 3) Admittedly the matter in the second conjunct — that
there arc thoughts about anything — may be too strong. But it is a
characteristic of this argument to link language and thoughts. Either there
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is no restriction upon these thoughts, or the argument becomes applicable
only to those subjects about which one does think. The difference does
not seem very important to me, and so I have expressed (2) in such a way
as to avoid this conditionaIization If one finds this arbitrary, one may
delete the second conjunct The argument then applies only to those sub¬
jects that are thought about, i e., 'if y is a subject thought about, then...
But it seems to me that the discussion of philosophic problems that no one
has thoughts about is a trifle academic
• • • •
#7. We now prove the weaker thesis on the basis of (1-2). Although
the fully quantified proof might daunt some readers, the schema of this
proof is brief enough, and we shall discuss it in terms of this latter
To do this, we introduce the sentence-Ietters 'p', 'q1, etc. in the following
as abbreviations for the open sentences, or propositional functions, which
appear in the above premises. Thus;
'p* stands for 'z is used as a linguistic form concerning y'
*q' " " 'z has a sense'
'r 1 " " 'the order of x, about y, is perfect'
'r*' " " 'the order of z, about y, is perfect'
's' " " 'v is a philosophic problem concerning y'
•f " " 'x is a thought about y'
We now rewrite premises (1-2) in terms of the above. Variables contained
within the open-sentences will be mentioned at the right. These that are
existentially quantified will follow those that are not restricted and will
be so indicated. Let us assume without proof that 'r' and 'r*' can be inter¬
changed. (This will be shown in the detailed proof) We can then write all
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the above premises in terms of 'p', 'r', • s *and 't' as follows.
Premise (I) can be rephrased as the conditional:
If z is used as a linguistic form concerning y and if
z has a sense then the order of z about y is perfect.
or
(1) p.q.ar y, z are variables
?remise(2) states:
If v is any philosophic problem concerning any y then
there are some thoughts, x, about y for which there is
no perfect order; and there are such thoughts for any y.
This can be symbolized: s 3,t./v,r:t', but it is convenient to employ
the following logically equivalent form:
(2) s.t. d ^r :t v,y,x are variables;
Although, strictly speaking it is not 'r' which is negated but ' perfect
See detailed proof in the following section.
To premises (I) and (2) we now add as an hypothesis that v is a philosophic
problem concerning y:
x is existential Iy quantified.
order', when 'r' is considered as quantified, the result is the same.
(3) s (provisional assumption)
v,y are both free in 's'.
From these it foilows:
(4) t 2.
(5) s.t. 5-^r 2
(6) r 3, 4, 5.
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(7) -^p V^q i , 6.
(8) -v, p V (p.-^q) 7 truth-functionaiIy Implies 8.
Eliminating the provisional assumption, 's', we conclude:
(9) s7 .~p V (p.—q) 3-8. z is existentiaIiy quantified.
This is due to the interchange of ' z'
and the existentiaI Iy quantified 'x'.
in 'r*' and 'r'. (See section 8.)
In the following discussion it will be convenient to commute the disjunction
so that *p' can become the second term:
The conclusion can be expressed thus: In all philosophic problems, either
some linguistic form concerning the subject of this issue has no sense,
or there are no linguistic forms concerning this subject'. To say 'there
are no linguistic forms...' means that language is defective in this
respect. If we now introduce the platitude that using senseless expressions
breaks the rules of the language, we can conclude:
In all philosophic problems there is either some misuse
of language or the language is defective.
(10) so. (p./v,q ) Vp 9. z is existentiaI Iy quantified
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It would appear at first sight that the latter provision stands for an
empty possibility. For wherever there is a philosophic issue — or any
sort of intellectual issue — concerning some subject, must we not have a
language and expressions with which to talk about the subject? BUT is
this always the case? Might not there be difficulties and confusions pre¬
cisely because our language is defective in this way? One
might consider the example of Galileo . According to Hanson:
Galileo's error []in his early theory of motion]] consists in
this: the principle he adopts as evident and natural — that
the velocities of a freely falling body are proportional to
the distances traversed |_ancl no+ related to the time of descent]]
— could never lead to the law of falling bodies as he formulated
it. It leads to an entirely different law, expressible only as
an exponential function. Galileo could never have managed such
a formulation with the mathematics at his disposal" Hanson (I) p. 38.
Galileo strove for many years to complete his theory of motion along the
above lines On the other hand:
The time factor couId receive due weight in this geometrical
representation ....But it is understandable why this factor
should so long have been overlooked: thinking new thoughts in
a conceptual framework not designed to express them requires
unprecedented physical insights. In the history of physics
few could sense the importance of things not yet expressible
in current idioms. The task of the few has been to find means
of saying what is for others unsayabie" Hanson (I) p. 46.
With the benefit of hindsight we can realize that the language and idioms
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available to Galileo were defective in some important aspect? The
perplexity concerning motion — this confusion in natural philosophy —
did not develop because a rule of language was misused. Rather there was
no clear rule to be either used or misused. And this I propose is the
sort of situation envisaged in the second term of the above disjunction.
Thus it may be far from empty — and ontological issues may arise where
language faiIs.
Nor can we remove this disjunct by adding some additional pre¬
mise, say, that there can be no thought unless there is soma linguistic
form present In which to express this thought, or even to enable it to
a
be thought. Although such/premise would contradict the above example,
perhaps it might be argued for some other way. By its nature it could
not refer to all, but only to some linguistic forms. It might claim
e.g. that for any given thought some expression must be available within
the language, it could not claim that all expressions potentially in the
language had to be available, But then the restrictions imposed upon
the use of variables in quantification theory would effectively prevent
us from combining this premise with '-^p' in the above to remove the
disjunct. No, one cannot derive — at least with these premises —
the strong thesis that ail philosophic problems are due to a misuse of
language,
Further the above premises are too weak in another sense.
For we could also derive from them the proposition that in all philosophic
problems some thoughts are present which have no sense. And this might
be used to establish a generalized statement of the critical approach.
Thus the premises lack specificity.
As for the disjunction, this can be removed, but at a price.
The statement V , ;v~q1 implies Vkxq1. Since we cannot show in
terms of premises (1-2) that either *p* or 'q' is true, nor that either of
them is seIf-contradictory, it is then possible that either of them is
true. So we can make the weaker claim that in all philosophic problems,
it is possible that language has been misused. But possibilities, like
assumptions, are plentiful. Without the stronger demonstration that this
possibility is the case, we have not travelled very far.
Let us return to the proof itself. We have taken two pre¬
mises, choosing them in such a manner that most philosophers would grant
them at least a prima facie acceptance and credibility. With these we
have been able to prove a weakened form of the linguistic theory. How
weak this form is depends upon the strength of the exceptions contained in
'^p'. At the very best it is not fully general: we cannot say that the
premises provide a sufficient condition for the assertion of the linguistic
approach in all cases.
#8. t will be the task of the subsequent sections to correct the
above noted defects Specifically one must ban the formation of the above
disjunction, without a retreat into possibilities, and at the same time ex¬
clude the derivation of the critical approach. But before proceeding
let us establish the full proof which we have discussed above only in
its schematic form. (The explicity quantified statements which it con¬
tains, add nothing further, to the content expressed by the open-sentence
letters employed above, and the reader if he wishes may continue directly
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to the next section.) Within the complete proof, the following seif-
evident abbreviations are used to replace the sentence-letters aiready
speci fiea. In This way
'p1 becomes 'LP '
^ j 0> js us0d as a | j ngu i st" f c form concerning v
zy
' " 'SENS^' ^ j Q> »z has a s0ns@i.
, i.e. 'The order of x, about y, is perfect';'PO 'x y
'r*' " 'PO 1 ,i.e. 'The order of z, about y, is perfect';
z /
' PP '
Vy , i.e. 'v is a philosophic problem concerning y';
'TH ' , i.e. 'x is a thought about y!.
xy
We write the premises thus:
(I ) (y) (z) (LF . SENS . 0 PO )
zy z zy
(2) (v) (y) (3x) (PP,V TH . 2)~P0 : TH )v/ xy xy xy
The proof is straightforward. Except for the shedding and adding of
quantifiers, its pattern is simiiar to that of the schematic proof asready
stated. The substitutabiIity of 'r* and 'r*1 , assumed above, is justified
by successive instantiations of »(3x) PO ' and '(z) PO ! to 'PO ' in
xy zy Xy
lines (6) and (li). The notation '..is flagged' appearing on the right
indicates a restriction imposed by existential instantiation. The plus
and minus marks on the extreme left indicate points of introduction
and elimination (respectively) of a provisional assumption. The proof
foilows:
+1(3) PPyy (Provisional assumption)
(4) (y) (3x) (PP . TH . D-vPO : Tl I ) 2.










(sx) <PPvy . THxy.3^P0xy : THxy)
PPVV . TH . 3~P0 : THvy xy xy xy
TH
xy




( z) (LF , SENS . 3 PO )
zy z zy




'LFVU V . LF . ^ SENSxy xy >





PP 3 : —LF v , LF
vy Xy xy











12 truth-functional Iy implies
3-13.
LF . SENS ) 14.
zy z
(y) (3Z) (PP 3 :~LF v . LF .~SENS ) ._
vy zy zy z '5.
to conclude:
(17) (v) (y) (3z) (PP 3 :LF v . LF .-/SENS ) 16.
vy zy zy z
j^The virtue of the above proof lies In the plausibility of its
premises However, as we have noted, these are both too weak and general.
E.g. a similar line of argument might be used to ground the critical
approach as well. Then let the lesson of this game we have played be clear:
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let us seek out strong premises and not be concerned with their initial
plausibility. Specifically, these premises must assure that no genuine
alternative to the linguistic position is possible, that a I; philosophic
problems must be linked to a misuse of language, and conversely that the
absence of misuse warrants the non-existence of such problems. Further,
it would seem that these conditions diouId be grounded in the characteris¬
tics of language and language-use and not in some vaguely defined area of
intellectual confusion Pursuant tc an error-free compliance with its
rules, language in some way must guarantee the impossibility of enduring
issues.
If the linguistic thesis follows as a logical consequence of such
premises, they then state a set of sufficient conditions for the assertion
of its thesis And if when these conditions are not satisfied, there can
still be philosophic issues and these not due to a misuse of language,
these premises also supply necessary conditions. Thus however plausible
or implausible these premises may be, their satisfaction is presupposed
in the linguistic approach.
• • • •
the fofI owing
#10. Although we shall soon reject/ as a premise let us first
consider one which strikes us as fundamental to the linguistic approach
I refer to the tenet already mentioned that we can only think of that of
which we can talk This notion is, of course, literally speaking, so
much rubbish. Einstein, for instance, has remarked that most of his best
thinking is vaguely spatial, and it is only towards the very end of a
problem that he is able to express his ideas in words. Or again, one tells
the story of how Picasso spent rapt hours in front of several paintings of
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Braque. His only comment was: I like the way he thinks'. But as we have
said above, we shall not be concerned with the initia; plausibility of the
premises we choose, but with their logical power And, to be the devil's
advocate, it is only fair to remark that philosophers as a rule are language
oriented, so we would at least expect philosophic thought and philosophic
confusion in general to be closely associated with language In other words
one might claim that a necessary condition for thinking about any particular
subject, y, is that there be present within the language some appropriate
expressions concerning y. We will in the sequel consider English as a
representative language. We can then rephrase the above, simply thus: For
any subject, i f x is a thought about this subject, then there Is some ex¬
pression, z, about it. A premise such as this has the advantage that it
would automatically prevent the possibility of philosophic problems develop¬
ing within a defective language.
But such a premise remains inadequate. It is debatable as a
question of fact. Further it seems equally reasonable to claim that for
any expression about y there is — as least in a timeless present — a
thought about y. If so, whatever might be said about a misuse of language
could probably be shown equally applicable to a misuse of thoughts. And
I do not think that the linguistic approach considers itself merely the
other side of the Kantian coin. Again the argument would be unable to ban
the critical approach. Also, there are the technical difficulties con¬
cerning the presence of the existentiaI Iy quantified component, which might
again prevent the expression of a fully general conclusion
#11. For the present, let us note that the above discussed premise
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states a necessary condition for thinking about y, i.e., that there be an
expression or a linguistic form concerning y. But this, of course, is not
tantamount to saying that the linguistic form, or the rule of language
associated with this expression, determines the way we must think about y.
And yet the assertion that language is thought-determining is an essential
feature — and perhaps the most peculiar one — within the linguistic
approach. If we are to ground the strong thesis that a I 1 philosophic prob¬
lems are due to a misuse of language and at the same time exclude any other
causes, we will be forced to introduce a premise about language which will
justify the claim that it is thought-determining,(This is not an arbitrary
stipulation upon our part. For how e se can one consider that ianguage is
I ike a machine, i e., that it is determinate? or again, see "Investigations" 231.)
But here is the difficulty. It is scarce y credible to ciaim
that one rule determines the way one must think about y. (What one rule
determines the way one must drive or play tennis?) Instead if we are to
make sense of this notion of language as thought-determining, we must refer
to a totality of rules in force at any time, and claim that it is this
totality, or some sub-set of it, which determines the way one must think
about y. And even then, we shali find it more convenient to refer to the
totality of moves which these ru'es sanction, rather than to the rules them¬
selves .
The totality of rules of language in force at any time determine
a form of life, and thus the rules determine among others the set of
linguistic activities which can be performed. We can then introduce the
folIowing definit ion:
By 'form of Iife of the language' we mean 'the totality of moves
which the rules of the language legitimize'.
Whether or not the above definition corresponds to all of Wittgenstein's
uses of the term, it seems to be at least roughly equivalent to one specific
use, although purposely narrower For instance, in (INV) -2 Wittgenstein
discussed a primitive language consisting of 'block1, 'pi liar', 'slab',
and 'beam'. E.g. using this language "A calls |_these words]] out; - B brings
the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call." Referring
to this ianguage Wittgenstein continues:
We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2)
as one of those games by means of which children learn their
native language. I will call these games "language-games"...
And the FI earninq~| process of naming the stones and of re¬
peating words after someone might also be called language-
games...! shall also call the whole, consisting of language
and the actions into which it is woven, the "Ianguage-game"
(INV) -7.
'Language-game' can then refer to i) the whole process of using language
ii) certain procedures in learning language, and iii) the process of using
a language, together with the activities, like moving the stones .concom¬
itant to the performance of a felicitous speech act. Later in (INV) -23
Wittgenstein introduces another note on the use of 'language-game1, and
in this passage he ties this to 'form of life':
Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into pro¬
minence the fact that the speakinq of language is part of an
activity, or of a form of life" (INV) -23
We shall consider a form of life in the third sense above, as an activity
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consisting of language-use together with the actions into which this use
is woven i.e., the totality of moves which the rules of the language
legitimize. But for our present purposes the actions which will concern
us are speech acts and the concomitant thoughts.
Now what do we mean by the above definition of 'form of life',
and in particular what do we mean by 'legitimate moves'? Let us consider
the rules of language in this respect as sanctioning moves. For instance
we are a Ii familiar with the syntactical rules of a language. These apply
to an initial set of elements say words, and determine the well-formedness
of any discrete string of lexical units in the language. In other words,
the rules of syntax determine the totality of legitimate possible combina¬
tions of the initial elements, inasmuch as these combinations purport to
be well-formed sentences. If we supplement the normal rules of syntax
with others which govern the meaningful combination of words, this augmented
set of rules then determines the class of all possible meaningful sentences.
If we further supplement these rules by introducing others which apply to
the logical characteristics of sentences and strings of sentences — using
'logical' in a very broad sense — this further augmented set of ruies
determines not only the legitimacy of purportedly meaningful sentences, but
the "logical" correctness of any such sentence, question, or sequence of
sentences (We develop these distinctions in further detail in \\j-^ •)
in this broader use of 'logic', we can consider questions as well as state¬
ments to be logical or illogical as the case may be (See |y-5 )
According to this view any combination of words, etc. is like the
pieces of a game occupying positions on a board. If the combination is
legitimate the rules of language sanction the occupancy of this position,
ar.d at the same determine the class of subsequent moves As far a language
is concerned, these moves will be further statements or questions. These
in turn lead to other statements and question.. The rules in this way de¬
termine the class of legitimate possible moves within the language. This
is its form of iife, as we shall consider it. (Alternative y, we can say
that the form of life determines its corresponding language.)
How we must show how a form of life can be thouaht-determining
(for were this not the case, two thinkers in response to the same situation
and within the same form of life could reach mutually incompatible con¬
clusions. And were this so, one could not blame this upon a misuse of
anguage.) Firut and foremost, if a form of iife is felicitous (i.e., if
it works, if it is successful) the rules of this form of life — ike those
of any game which works — must yield coraps+ib © results in aii their applic-
ations. Let me illustrate this If we consider the game of tennis again,
it is obvious that it would be unpiayab e if its provisions were such that
different ruies could be applied to the same situation at the same time ad
were to yield incompatible results, (in this sense of 'incompatibility"
we refer to the mutual incompatibility of the statements uttered by tne
referee.) imagine the referee saying: According to Ruie Five, you have
won the game, according to Ruie Six, you have lost. Go on with the game'
The game cou I d rupt go on.
Of course we can imagine disputes (Have we not been party to
them?) concerning whether or not the ball touched the line. But these con¬
cern the facts; it is not the application of the ruies which is 1 question^
If the game is fe! icitous — if its rules work — there car, be no dispute
concerning th^ir use See (!NV) -240. And in any situation in which Such
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ruIes are correct Iy app1ied there cannot possibly be any irreconciIiabiy
d i ss i dent op i n i ons. S i mi I ar 1 y j_f_ a form of I i fe worked i n a I I i ts app I i ca-
tions, it would be impossible — in any given situation — to employ
correctly the rules of the corresponding language and at the same time pro¬
duce mutually incompatible statements. (Remember: that at all times one is
guided by the rules one cannot be on tenter-hooks about the way to proceed.)
To avoid misunderstanding — since this is an essential point —
let us make it clear that the rules of language cannot be expected in them¬
selves to render, automatically, the correct answers. (In this way they
are like the rules of logic which can be used to derive valid, but not
necessarily sound conclusions ) For instance when the referee sees the ball
as hitting the line — when it fact it has not — his application of the
rules, although correct, need not yield the correct decision. Similarly
when the rules of language are correctly applied to a false proposition, the
results — although sanctioned by the rules — may be false.
But let us assume that the propositions in question are not false
and that, for the time being, we are not troubled by any new facts, or any
new observations or discoveries (Philosophy, in Wittgenstein's view, is
not concerned with these (INV) -126 ). Under such conditions, the correct
application of the ruies of a felicitous form of life — if ever there
were such a form of life — must a I ways yield compatibIe resuIts in any
given situation. This means: when a legitimate question (i.e., one which
breaks no rules of the language) is expressed in a fully felicitous form
of life, if two incompatible answers to the query appear, one at least of
these cannot be sanctioned by the rules of the language. It would be the
same as two opposing basketball teams claiming to score different goals
at the same time Under these conditions we can be certain, a priori,
that some rule must have been broken or misused by at least one of the
offending players.
Ws shall investigate the subject of compatibility in further de¬
tail in Chapter Four, but for the present let us review those characteristics
of a felicitous form of life which wa have mentioned. We assume that no
expressions to which the rules of this form of life are to be applied, are
false or meaningless. W© assume also that no new facts are to be introduced,
i.e., that for the time under consideration a form of life (which we shall
call 'w') is closed to new information. We now consider a legitimate- ex¬
pression of the language of w This expression, which may be a statement
or a question, is sanctioned by the rules of w, and if it is a question, it
is not based upon a false or nonsensical assumption. If w is fully felici¬
tous, no matter how the rules of w are applied to this expression to form new
includlng those which govern the use of 'therefore' and 'it is possible' -
expressions, all resulting statements sanctioned by the rules of w/wiI I be
mutually compatible. Thus whenever w is a felicitous form of life, under
these conditions, the conjunction of any two statements appearing within
w permits a consistent interpretation. And this applies to all forms of
life — if any are felicitous — to a Ii linguistic forms within them, all
rules of the corresponding language, and to all subjects. In other words:
For all forms of life, ali rules which determine them, and
ail initial expressions of the corresponding language:
(1+) if a form of life is fully felicitous and its rules have been
correctly applied, then all expressions resulting from an
application of these rules are mutually compatible.
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(The reader wi!! recall we assume the form of life closed to new infor¬
mation for the time under discussion, and that ail the initial expressions
sanctioned within it are meaningful, and lastly none of these are false.
Let us call any such initial expressions or their consequences 'wall-
sanctIoned1.)
Given these features of a felicitous form of life, we can now
prove the strong linguistic thesis essentially in terms of (i+). That is
to say, if a form of life is felicitous in this way, aii philosophic prob¬
lems expressed within its corresponding language are due — nay, must be
due — to a misuse of this language.
To show this, we must also introduce the following additional
premise :
For a I I subjects, y,
(2+) ff there is a philosophic problem concerning y, then there are
some statements about y which are not mutually compatible.
We have already argued for the general correctness of this premise.
• • • •
#12. Having stated the premises, we now (as in the case of the earlier
proof) proceed as follows. I): We symbolize the open sentences appearing
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in the premises. 2): We then establish a schematic proof in terms of
these. 3): We rephrase the premises in the notation of the predicate
calculus. 4): Given these, we then establish a complete proof. To avoid
reduplication, we will list both the open-sentences and the corresponding
predicate expressions together, as follows:
(r ) FFL w is a felicitous form of life
I w
(ro) OA a rule governing z, is correctly applied to z
(r^,) CA e, a rule governing z, is correctly applied to zJ ©
(1-4) I ^ 3M_ If z is an initial expression, 2 is meaningful2 2
(s) (see be Iow)
and not-false.
(t) PP v is a philosophic problem concerning y
vy
-term
We complete this list with the following complex predicate/in which the
expressions 1 and '© 1 appear. These are (respectively) the results
z ^
of applying the rules 6 and © to 2 to yield the new expressions '*5 ' and
V-
(s) COMP The expressions '16 ' and 'e ' are mutually compatible,
*1.
( 's61 , and 'z' appear as variables in this
predicate. )
To establish the schematic proof, as above we shall list variables at the
right. The premises are as follows:
(I ) r j •r2-r3-rY 3 s (6, w, , z
For all forms of life, ail rules
which determine them, and all expressions of the
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corresponding language: if a form of life is
felicitous and its ruies have been correctly
applied, and its initial expressions are mean¬
ingful and not-false, then ail the expressions
resulting from an application of these rules are
mutuaI Iy compatibIe.
(2+) t v,y;i6 e,z are ex i stent ia I I y quanitified
For all subjects, y, and for all philosophic
problems, v, if there is a philosophic problem
concerning y then there are some statements
'd>z' and '©2 1» which are not mutually compatible.
We make the following assumptions explicit:
(a) There is a form of life, w, and all the above rules, etc. are part
of it.
(b) The form of life, w, is closed to new information for the time
under discussion.
(c) All initial elements, mentioned in 'r are meaningful and not-
4
fa i se. By ' i nitia!1 we mean any expression to which and e are appl icabl
Despite the ponderous apparatus, the proof itself is rather straightforward
From premises (1+) - (2+) we proceed:
(3) ~s O .-~r V~r V~r V~r l+.
2 3 4
(4) t O. " 2+, 3.
(5) ~t V . " 4.
(6) r (By assumption c) z, is a variable
4
(7) -vt V-^r V~r V^r 5, 6.
I I 1-12,13
(8) ~( t.r ) V (~i"2 j 7.
From which we conclude:
(9) t,r(. 3 (~r2 V"Jr3') 8"
In words:
For all philosophic problems, all subjects, all forms of life, w:
If there is a philosophic problem in w and w is felicitous, then
at least one rule of language is not correctly applied (i.e.,
is misused).
As stated, our conclusion is now fully general — provided that w is
felicitous. If we assume that w is felicitous we can remove this condition.
We then conclude (upon the assumption that .w jjs feI icitous ):
For all philosophic problems: there are philosophic problems only
if language is misused.
The logic of the word 'cause' and 'due to' is rather confusing. In one inter¬
pretation of these words 'A is due to B' can mean 'A only if B'. Thus the
slogan 'All philosophic problems are due to a misuse of language' is, in this
sense of 'due', a direct consequence of premises (1+) « (2+) (and the re¬
stricting assumptions a) - c ). Further, if we transpose the conclusions
(assuming again that w is felicitous) it follows that if there is no misuse
of language, there are no philosophic problems. This would be that perfect
clarity in which the philosophical would no longer exist.
• • • •
#13, Thus, at long last we have uncovered a set of fundamental pre¬
suppositions of the linguistic approach. For the above argument shows
that the premises and assumptions as stated provide a sufficient condition
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for the assertion of the linguistic approach. The backbone of the argument
is contained in premise (l+). (Premise (2+) is merely an observation
concerning philosophic problems.)
Of central importance to this proof — perhaps the keystone in
the edifice — is the assumption that the form of life is felicitous. For
by step (9) if this condition is not satisfied, we can conclude precious
little about any rules being broken in the genesis of a philosophic prob¬
lem. If the form of life were infelicitous, or infelicitous in certain
important areas, the appearance of mutually incompatible statements would
be fully in order. (The form of life, in such a case, would be like the
actions of a disorganized theatre group which soid two tickets to each
seat in a performance. Philosophic issues then would be equivalent to
arguments over who had the right seat — when both parties had correct
tickets in their hand.) As Russell's paradox demonstrates, naive set theory
provides another good example of such an infelicitous form of life.
But, J_n terms of the above assumptions and premises, if the con¬
ditions of felicity, etc. are satisfied any philosophic issue which develops
will be due to — and only to — human error. Where w is felicitous, the
only possibility of philosophic problems appearing within it, lies in the
misuse of the corresponding language.
Thus, as in the case of the classical approach, a complete
understanding and error-free application of the material at hand (in this
case the rules of a felicitous form of iifeand the we Il-sanctioned ex¬
pressions to which they are applicable) precludes the formation of mutually
incompatible statements. This achieved, the philosopher can say: Stop.'1 to
his unrest. Given this, there is nothing to do (we are told) but see:
1! M3. 14
Philosophy puts everything before us, and neither explains
nor deduces anything. — Since everything lies open to view
there is nothing to explain." (INV) -126. Italics mine.
♦ • • •
#14. We now append a full proof of the argument which we have demon¬
strated schematically. As in the preceding case, the detailed argument
introduces no new information. The reader may, if he wishes, proceed
directly to the beginning of the next chapter. W© have accomplished our
purpose here in demonstrating the central importance of the presupposit ion
of felicity to the linguistic approach. It is evident, too, since there
is no reference to thought or concepts in the above argument, that the
critical approach is not derivable from premises (1+) - (2+).
We repeat the premises:
(1 + ) (j6)(e)(w)(z )(FFL .CA . CA .1 DM . 3 COMP^ )
w jZJz ©2 z Z * pz ,ez
(2+) (v)(y){3j6)(3e)Oz)(PPvy 3~C0MP^ez)
and we add the assumptions in force; particularIy:
(3) (z )( I DM)
"2 z
From these we argue:
(4) (y )(3j5)(3«) (3z )(PP D~COMP ) 2+
vy (6z ,ez
(5) (3rf)(3e) (3z) " 4.
(6) (3©) 03z) " 5. i> is flagged
(7) (3z) " 6 © is flagged
(6) PP D-^COMP. 7. z is flagged
vy Pz,ez
(9) (o)(w)(z)(FFL .CA. .CA .1 DM :D COP ) 1 +










FFL . CA .CA .-I DM s D COMP.
w fa *z i z. 16z ,ez





/PP V . ~FFL V-^CA, V~CA V~(l DM )
vy w pz ©z z z





— PP V .~/FFL V^CA V~CA
vy w pz ez








FFLW3 : PP D . ~>CA V~CAw )6z ez
Adding quantifiers:







From which we conclude:
(3DO ) ^ ) (FFL etc.
p © z w
(y)(3 )(3 )(3 )(FFL etc.
p e z w
(v)(y)(9 )(3 )(3 )(FFL etc.
p © 2 w
(26) (w)(v)(y)(9,)(3 )(3 )(FFL D : PP O . ~CA, V^CA )



















in words: For all forms of life and all subjects, y, if the form of
life is felicitous then for any philosophic problem concerning any y in
this form of life there is some rule or rules which have not been correctly
applied to soma expression, about y, appearing within it.
An objection might be made: If the initial elements, i.e. any ex¬
pressions to which the rules are applied, are all meaningful, how can nonsense-
questions ever arise? And if these cannot appear, how can any philosophic prob-
lemsn, as envisaged in "Investigations" develop?' This objection challenges the
convention (c) and thus finds the third premise unacceptable. Let us grant this
The conclusion (without quantifiers) then becomes:
FFL :> : PPvyD.^CA v^-CA v. I_. ~M
w ez ©z 2 z
for line 16 cannot be established. In this way in a felicitous form of life
there are philosophic problems only if some rule of language has been misused
in forming new expressions from the initial stock, or some initial expressions
are meaningless.
Perhaps this formulation, although more complex, is more exact.
But we can build this feature into ours and still maintain the simpler con¬
clusion of line 26. To do this we need merely specify that the initial
elements are any statements one accepts as true before any fresh discovery,
see (INV)—126, together with their consequences. Improperly formed questions
would not be initial elements. The misuse of language would still be con¬
cerned with incorrect inferences based upon these initial elements, but
error then would be due to the deformation caused by the presence of mean¬
ingless questions and other systematically misleading expressions. Either




_ In the preceding we have argued that the strong linguistic thesis
can be shown to follow from other more fundamental premises. Prominent
among these is the assumption that the form of life — and by extension its
corresponding language — is felicitous. Thus 'fe icity' enters into a
statement of a sufficient condition for the assertion of the linguistic
approach But the statement of a sufficient condition can be fa se and
that of which it is a condition may still be the case. To ban this
possibility we must show that felicity in itself provides a necessary
condition for the assertion of the linguistic approach.
It may seem obvious that it does But without c oser analysis,
it would be well to distrust the obvious This is particularly true in
the present case. For we have not as yet defined 'felicity' and have con¬
ducted our investigation merely in terms of an intuitive understanding of
the notion
It will be the task of the present chapter to remove these
defects in our argument; i.e., I ) to define 'felicity' and to show that the
key premise, (i+), of the preceding argument follows from this definition,
and 2) to show that the strong linguistic approach indeed does presuppose
fe;icity as a necessary condition. Given these, we can show that even if
'felicitous form of life' is not explicitly mentioned within the "Investi¬
gations", it neverthe ess describes a necessary condition which must be
satisf ied in any Ianquaqe under consideration if the Iinquistic approach
is to be applicable to it. An appraisal of the adequacy of the linguistic
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thesis as a general explanation for the appearance of philosophic problems
depends, at least in part, on whether these conditions are satisfied by
the given language. E.g., if the form of life is felicitous in regard to
the use of 'existence', enduring problems concerning existence are im¬
possible in such a form cf life. If it is infelicitous, we must seek
elsewhere to exp'ain the appearance of philosophic issues concerning exist¬
ence .
Our major task within this chapter then is to define 'felicity'.
(And it is the process of establishing this definition that gives unity to
the chapter.j We divide this discussion into the following parts. The
first is concerned with the degree of acceptability which a fiuent user of
the language must accord to a description of his linguistic performances,
if the language is to be considered felicitous. The second section dis¬
cusses the degree of uniqueness such a description must satisfy. The
third characteristic of the rules of a felicitous language, namely their
relative comp'eteness, i s discussedin the following sections
Subsequent sections study the type of compatibility which the ru.es of
a form of life must display for felicity to be assured. Compatibility
proves to be more complex a subject than our earlier brief treatment in¬
dicated. For, the compatibility of the rules which establish patterns
of what Strawson ca Is 'lexicographical' entailment, cannot be patterned
strictly on those of formal logic.
Given specific values of these four characteristics — degree
of acceptability, uniqueness compatibility, and completeness — the
definition of 'felicity' follows directly. We close the chapter with a
short discussion of the structure of the classical and inguistic
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approaches, and of their common features.
• • • ♦
So much by way of introduction Now to the details. In the
following we shall first be concerned with what seems to be an unexception¬
able point. Namely this: whenever one acts in conformity with a rule, any
such action can also be performed in some other way:
... if everything can be made out to accord with the rule,
then it can also be made out to conflict with it" (INV) 201.
For instance, it is a rule in Britain to drive on the left, but it is
physically possible to drive on the right, as in the United States — or
even in the middle as with certain old ladies. On the other hand we would
not normally say it was a rule that the planets revolved around the sun,
For (we believe) as things are that short of an unforseen disaster no other
motion is possible. Since 'r is a rule' is related to 'r is to be obeyed',
it is senseless to talk of obeying something which could not be otherwise.
Similarly, when we consider a set of rules, any rule within this
set (and by extension all the rules in the set) can, from a physical point
of view, be otherwise. The characteristics of this set, inasmuch as they
are specifically determined by the rules, can thus be otherwise. In
respect to the physical worid, the characteristics of any form of life +hen
could also be different from what they are. (There is of course, one
exception to this observation. Certain general facts of nature — see
(INV) xii — can in some cases determine the non-existence of a form of
life, i.e., one whose rules could not be satisfied. We hear little of
nudist colonies amongst eskimos. But we are not interested here in
discussing impossibiI ities.*
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But then if one is to dissolve the force of a philosophic
question by showing its aetiology in a misuse of language, it is obvious
that one cannot claim that the rules purportedly broken are determined in
some way by nature. On what grounds then? If the therapy is to be effective,
the rule referred to must be inalterable in some way. Otherwise, those to
whom the philosophic question still bears sense, might reply: The rule
has been broken. So what? 1
Now in what manner can a rule of language be said to be so fully
sanctioned that a departure from it is impossible? For instance on what
grounds do we accept a description of a rule as correct and binding? We
might, e.g consider rules in terms of the degree of explicit reference to
these rules which language-users must establish in order to obey them
But it is clear that Wittgenstein cannot have rules of this kind in mind.
Who for instance must refer explicitly to the rules for the use of 'pain',
the way many people must refer to rules such as *' i 1 comes before 'e'
except after 'c'1, or 'Thirty days has September..1?
Rather what is relevant here is the degree of acceptabiIity which
a person will accord to a description of his linguistic behavior. ( For
a language-user might very well accept a description of his speech as
being in conformity with rules, of which he may have heretofore been
totally ignorant.) Must such a description be accepted by some? or by
nearly all fluent speakers of the language? By hypothesis the speakers
of the language can dispense with the rule-description. But for the
description to be sanctioned must they all accept it as applicable?
if all were to accept the description, the problem is dissolved.
What if only some were to accept? This is not an issue which can
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be decided by a ballot. For if only two were to say: We do not accept
this description of the rule' or 'We do not find it applicable' or 'There
is no rule to refer to', who is to deny that within their language-game,
their move is meaningful? For instance, in the course of an inconclusive
debate between Ayer and Copleston, Ayer argues that he accepts the rule
that non-analytic statements untestable in experience are meaningless.
On the basis of this he refuses to countenance the question: Why is
there a universe, and not nothing?' But since Copleston refuses to
accept this rule, he considers: Why is there a universe.. ?' a possible
philosophical question. Copleston (I) p. 730.
Wittgenstein observes that we do agree about a form of life
(INV) -241. And I suppose in a general way this is indisputable.
as the above illustrates, we must all be in agreement about each possible
language-game within it, if the philosophical is to cease Any description
of the "inner" working of language must be accepted then by all or nearly
all qualified rational users of the language. Further , this acceptance
must relate not only to the rule itself, but also to its range of accept¬
ability. For if the warrantabiIity or unwarrantabiIity of its extension
to novel situations, such as those purportedly introduced within a philoso¬
phic question^ were not self-evident or universally accepted, there could
be no ultimate sanction for the claim that the rule had been infringed
#3. And further, as we shall now show, the description of the rule
or rules in question must be accepted as uniquely applicable. This may
seem to be a strange requirement For we generally assume if we do
describe behavior in different ways, that all such descriptions, if correct,
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are mutually compatible. So it would seem if two dissimilar descriptions
were to appear, and both were acceptable codifications cf common usage,
that there could be no conflict in respect to all their applications.
But this is not the case. For the point at issue is not how adequately
a rule-description covers an ordinary usage, but the legitimacy of its
application to novel situations. And there is a fundamental difference
here.
If for example two (or more) rules apply equally well to all the
common usages of a word or phrase, nothing in the description of one rule
need logically entail the description of the other. It may just so happen
that both fit the same set of circumstances. For instance, if two tribes
lived in a primitive area and one tribe had the rule: Drink only fresh
water', and the other: Drink only ciear water', both rules would apply
equally well to the fresh, clear water which they found. Now consider
these same two tribes at the seashore. The first tribe, following its
rule would drink only fresh water and slake its thirst. The second, en¬
tangled with its rules, would drink the clear ocean water and obtain an
unintended mouthful of salt.
Or again, Marilyn Monroe as we know was married, at different
times, both to a baseball player, Joe DiMaggio, and to a playwright,
Arthur Miller. Within a monogamous culture such as ours tries to be,
the expression 'my present spouse' can be used by a person as a definite
description. Thus if she were to say 'a is my present spouse' and at the
same time 'b is my present spouse', a and b must — by more than lexical
law — be identical. Let us now consider the three parties in Heaven.
(The weather is too hot for us to envisage any alternative position.)
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Heaven would hardly be a linguistic paradise for these. For applying
the rules of ordinary terrestial usage she might very well describe Joe
DiMaggio as a playwright and Arthur Miller as a brilliant outfielder,
since a and b must be identical by the above rule.
Thus where two logically possible descriptions of a restricted
set of usages u,, u_, u . are both acceptable, there is no warrant12 3
that they will remain compatible for the u.-th use. Philosophy, we pre-
K
sume, is like Heaver: In that it introduces uncommon (but not unhoped for)
situations. And if we are to avoid philosophic issues due to a misuse
of language, we cannot assume that alternative rules compatible In norma:
use retain their compatibiIity In these novel ones.
One could escape this conclusion by claiming that there was
only one possible correct description, but this would run counter to the
spirit of the "Investigations", (is there one way of being simple?) Nor
do I see how one could solve this problem by trying to claim that all de¬
scriptions of any given set of usages were logically equivalent. For how,
except in a formal language, could one possibly assert this? Normal
English, for instance, can be described either in terms of the traditional
subject-predicate grammar, or by means of transformationai grammar. (The
former is said to single out surface features of the language, the latter
its deep structure. ) For most expressions, the appraisals of well-formedness
are compatible. But If these two grammars are applied to non-standard
usages, soma expressions which are considered to be ill-formed —
and consequently unacceptable — by the followers of one position, are
accepted as we!!-form@d by the advocates of the other. This Is similar to
the referee who cries: The point has been made, the point has not been made,
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go on with the game'. Thus, although this is obviously a very strong
condition, the rules of any fully felicitous form of life must be uniquely
applicable. Language cannot afford the luxury of interminable juris¬
dictional disputes.
In view of the strength of this condition, one would probably
suggest that a relativization of the degree of felicity is in order. For
instance imagine a language which was felicitous in all the respects we
have discussed in its ordinary use. This same language could nevertheless
be infelicitous in certain out of the way, novel, philosophic uses, i.e.,
when the engine was idling. These latter cases would be characterized by
a breakdown or a weakness or vagueness, etc. in the rules. But this
re I ativization of felicity is of course insufficient for the strong linguis¬
tic claim. For then one could say philosophic issues were due to a weakness
of language in not providing for these regions of infelicity.
However, if we consider the rules and expressions of ordinary
usage to be canonical — to be the normal use — then any use of a rule
which leads to statements incompatible with those sanctioned by ordinary
usage can be considered (in an extended use of the term) to break the rules
of language. Thus a generally felicitous form of life could seal off in
this way the undesirable consequences of the areas of infelicity which it
might contain. This, I think, may be a fundamental rationale for the
appeal to ordinary usage as the final arbiter.
Thus although the entire notion of degrees offBlicity is a
complex one, I think in this respect we can consider a (in part) defective
form of life to be sufficiently felicitous if any of the following conditions
are satisfied. In the first case, there may be variant descriptions of
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the ruies, but the results of their application are compatible both
in the normal and abnormal situations. When this is so, we can
consider the different rule-descriptions to be synonymous in respect
to all their applications. Such rules would place no strain upon
felicity. In a second case, some of the rules may yield incompatible
applications in the novel situation. Let us assume that the results
of applying all but one of these rules leads to consequences in¬
compatible with some statement(s) sanctioned by ordinary usage. In
this way, all but the one rule might then be banned or interdicted in
terms of their consequences. Again felicity is saved.
However this makes for a narrow island surrounded by a sea
of troubles. What for instance are we to say when two rules yield
results incompatible in the novel situation but not incompatible with
ordinary usage? Or if all are incompatible with ordinary usage? Or
if the novel situation proves so abnormal that no established rules
seem to apply? Language cannot leave itself in such a muddle. A
fully felicitous form of life cannot brook the appearance of these
possibilities without some remedy. The answer, presumably, is
"Let the public decide". But how? (We shall come to this in a
moment.) But for the present, let us recapitulate the argument of
this section.
We have argued, however strange it may seem, that any description
of the rules of a felicitous form of life must be unique. For otherwise
there is no guarantee that in an application to a novel situation, two
previously compatible rules will maintain this compatibility. If this
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occurs, infelicity enters. Some areas of infelicity can be sealed off
by a recourse to examples of ordinary usage as canonical. This is
possible when two or more genuinely incompatible rules are such that
the application of all but one of these is interdicted by their con¬
sequences. At other times prima facie alternative rules might be
shown to be actually synonymous in their application. But in all
other cases, the decision seems to be left o^en. This introduces the
third important feature of felicity, to which we now attend, namely the
completeness or compietabiIity of the rules
#4. We have seen that each rule in a fully felicitous form of life
must be uniquely applicable, and a description of it must be accepted
as binding by nearly all fluent rational users of the language. Let us
now consider these rules not individually but as a whole. The system
which these rules establish must be either complete or completabie
For at any time in which a correctly formed expression appears within
the language there can be no doubt about the legitimacy of any moves
which follow this appearance. Chess, for instance, is complete in this
strong sense. Given any legitimate configuration of pieces on the board,
the set of a I I possible subsequent moves which are sanctioned by the rules
is fully determined. Again this is a very strong condition to impose upon
any language, and it too can be weakened For example, tennis remains a
felicitous game even if its rules do not prescribe the maximum height
above the net at which a balI may pass. But such exceptions aside, +he
rules of tennis are fuily determinate in all important situations. Were
this not the case, the game would break down In the same way the theory
of philosophic problems must claim that the rules of language are sufficiently
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complete inasmuch as they apply to any significant situation which might
develop within it. For were this not the case, the philosopher-referee
might encounter a situation to which there could be no reminder. See
(INV) - 127.
•And finally this compietaness, whether absolute or relativized
to cover all significant situations, must apply not only to the rules at
a given time but — where rules are liable to change — to the rules or
procedures which govern this change. For if alterations or supplementa¬
tion of a rule were not also rule-guided (however implicit this guidance
might be), a phi Iosopher-at-bay might always claim: I have infringed
no rule, I have modified it according to my lights'.
An advocate of the linguistic approach might object that this
wouid be impossible, that any modification the philosopher might make —
if It were not arbitrary — would have to be guided by, and compatible
with, the rules of his form of life. It is obvious that we must use
'rules' now in a much broader sense. These apply not only to the use
of words, but to the whole context of activities, purposes, etc. for
which language is used and into which it is interwoven.
Now if we consider ail these purposes, values, techniques,
actions, customs, etc., obviously the philosopher is guided and
constrained by the form of life, in this extended sense, of which
he is a part And if we wish to consider language and these i nex-
tricably interwoven, then if he is guided by the rules of this extended
form of life, he is a fortiori guided by the rules of its language
But by the time we enlarge our view this way, the linguistic
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thesis loses all its specificity. One could just as well say that the
philosopher is guided by the rules of the conceptual scheme in force at a
given time. And then, if inconsistent statements appear about some subject
one could (taking one's pick) describe this equally well as due to a mis¬
use of our conceptual apparatus, or to a misuse of language. But if we go
this far, the linguistic approach reduces to a vapid generality: We
strive to make our statements and thoughts about the world consistent. If
they are not (as eg. when philosophic issues develop) then we have made
a m i stake.'
And further one could then apply the linguistic thesis to any
problems, not merely philosophic issues. For instance if a careless
scientist misreads the data of his experiments and reaches conclusions
incompatible with an established scientific law. we would normally say
that he did not comply with the rules governing scientific procedure.
But if form-of-life and custom and language are to be interwoven, as above,
we could also say that the scientist had misused language. But in such a
case, why stop with the scientist? Police laws also are part of our
form of life, inasmuch as they codify customs. If I drive through a red
light and hit three cars, can I claim: Your Honor, I have only misused
language'?
No, the linguistic thesis stakes its claim in respect to language,
in the specific sense of 'language' as that which is spoken or written.
As such it can point out how features specific to language, and not to
the design of experiments or of traffic intersections can lead us astray
But if difficulties develop in respect to its thesis — as we have pointed
out in our discussion of the areas of infelicity within a language — it
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cannot solve this problem by shifting its ground to a new use in which
language now becomes interwoven with all the concommitant activities.
(It is for this reason that we have specifically restricted our inter-
preation of 'form of life' tc encompass only linguistic acts and the con¬
commitant thoughts.) For this voids the thesis of any specific content
it may contain. For better or for worse, the linguistic thesis is
married to the felicity of language. And as Wittgenstein says in (INV)-I9,
"to imagine a language, is to imagine a form of life". So let us continue
our analysis in respect to the former. If there are, for instance, charac¬
teristics of a form of life which determine the way in which a defective
language is to be supplemented, well and good. But if these are present,
then they will be reflected in the language, in theway it works and
develops. Thus we can look at language and say, as we have, that if the
linguistic thesis is to be asserted in respect to sane language, it must
either be complete, or the procedures in terms of which rule-change and
supplementation are established, are also part of the language.
#5. The fourth and final condition is that of compatibility. We
have claimed that any two or more rules within a felicitous form of life
will be mutually compatible in ail their applications We have argued
that were this not the case some legitimate applications of the rules to an
appropriateIy formed true statement within the language wouid yield
mutually incompatible conclusions And this of course would be impossible
within the tenets of the linguistic approach.
We have based this ciaim concerning compatibility on an analogy
between the rules of language and of logic. But is this justified? For
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there are diverse types of language-rules. To substantiate our claim, we
must show how and to what extent the analogy holds. in doing this we
shall be forced to add further specifications to our earlier statement
of the condition cf compatibility.
We now signal out various types of language-rules and show how
each is used to contribute to felicity. We start with rules of sentence-
formation. These, applicable to strings of words, determine which seq_
uences3re we I I-formed sentences of the language. Such rules would accept
'He is a bachelor', 'She is a bachelor', and reject 'He is a', 'is a',
etc. These rules would also accept as sentences explicit and implicit
performat ives, such as 'Look out.1', 'You are hereby notif ied ' . ,. etc
Finally these rules would sanction propositions such as'This is a green
bang', and 'The present King of France is bald', which although absurd or
impossible appear in well-formed sentences.
If we wish to exclude some of the above as statements, we must
then consider a second class of rules. Let us call these 'rules of state¬
ment-format i on '. These, by nature of their role, are of different kinds
Some might exclude commands. Exclusion in this case might be determined
purely in respect to syntactical features of the sentences concerned.
Syntactical considerations, in an extended sense of 'syntax', might also
be employed to rule out lexically absurd propositions such as 'This is a
green bang' (In such a case the rules of syntax would be constried to
interdict certain combinations of color + sound words, the way they now
prohibit other improper combinations, as e.g. that of plural subject +
singular verb in 'You smokes.')
But in many cases some reference to extra-iexical features of
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the speech-act becomes imperative. For instance otherwise weil-formed
statement-making sentences must be excluded if the context of utterance
fails to satisfy the presuppositions underlying their normal use. 'The
present King of France is bald1 can hardly be said to make a statement if
there is no present King of France.
Whatever the techniques of exclusion employed, if the rules of
statement-formation are complete, no nonsense-statements can be introduced
into the language without contravening the rules. This applies both to
lexically absurd and to contextually impossible propositions In the
former, no sentences containing words of expressions linked in an unsanc¬
tioned bond (as in 'green bang') can be countenanced as statements. In the
latter, in which the satisfaction of existential or other conditions is
presupposed, as with 'The present King of France,.1, such purported state¬
ments cannot be introduced unless their presuppositions are fulfilled.
The above rules apply to the formation of statements. The
following provide for substitution and transformation. Among substitution
rules we mention definitions. These serve either to abbreviate more complex
expressions in terms of simpler ones, e.g. the way 'unmarried man ' is
abbreviated 'bachelor'; or to establish re ations of approximate synonymnity
between words as between 'trousers' and 'long pants'. In either case
these rules sanction substitution of one expression for another.
More important for our purpose are transformation rules. Those
which I shaM mention govern sentence transformation, IoqicaI entailment,
and lexicographers' entailment. (For this latter see Strawson (I) p. 227.
I shall call this 'lexical entailment'.)
As for the first, according to current linguistic theory, we can
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consider any well-formed question to be a transformation of a corresponding
core sentence. In this way (working backwards) 'What is existence?' by
successive stages becomes 'Existence is what?' and then 'Existence is
something1. Thus if the core sentence 'Existence is something' satisfies
the rules of statement-format ion, we can consider the corresponding query
a statement-el Iiciting question. Failing this, we need not. This is a
convenient device which permits us to discuss questions in terms of their
corresponding sentences We need not conduct any special discussion of
questions, philosophical or otherwise
Lastly there are the transformation rules which sanction entail¬
ment relations between statements. Some of these apply to all statements:
these are the rules of logic. (I do not think it important here if we con¬
sider these to be rules in language, or to be those of another discipline
applicable to language.) By 'ruies of logic' I refer to these applicable
to any statement, expressed in any language, inasmuch as the form of the
statement is constructed in terms of (logical) words such as'and', 'or',
'some','therefore1 etc., or their cognates in other languages; and the
ruies apply only to this structure. The rules of I oq i ca I enta i I merit, are
those rules of this type, which warrant the transformation of an initial
statement or group of statements into another which is a valid consequence
of the or i g i na i .
The above process of defining 'rules of logic' in terms of
'logical words' may appear circular. But this is soon remedied We
merely need enumerate a list of words and call these 'logical words', or
more exactly list a set of signs and define 'logical expression' in terms
of their proper combinations. Similarly we can list a set of argument-
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forms arid define 'vaiid consequence' as the final line of any substitution
instance of this form.
We shall call those rules which do sanction patterns of entail¬
ment unwarranted by the rules of logic, rules of I ex i ca I enta i I me.nt. The
characteristic feature of these is that they warrant, or provide inference
tickets, for transformations based upon the meaning of the extra-logical
words contained within the statements. E.g. from 'He is an eligible
bachelor' it may follow that the unmarried male in question is attractive,
or socially well-placed, or rich, or desirable in some other way as a per¬
manent spouse. Logic would entail only that he is a bachelor and that he
is eligible.
#6. We have argued at various points that the rules of a felicitous
form of life must be compatible, and that the linguistic thesis cannot be
maintained in respect to a language which does not satisfy this condition.
It is evident that the rules of lexical entailment and of substitution must
play an important part in such a language. But what do we mean when we
say that these are compatible?
The analogy between logical and lexical entailment can help us
to answer this question. As far as the rules of logic are concerned, we
know that I) ail valid consequences of true statements are truedn par¬
ticular if *p' is true and 'q' is true, the conjunction 'p.q. ' is true),
and 2) the rules of logic are considered to be totally irrevisable in
respect to recalcitrant experience, or (some philosophers would say) re-
visable only Jjn extremis.
In a weaker form, and only in a weaker form, the above is also
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true of the patterns of lexical entailment and substitution established
within a felicitous form of life.
To show this,, let us first consider a form of life which con¬
tains only rules for the use of language, and statements totally sanctioned
by these rules. Such a language m ght contain the rule: 'Bachelor' means
'unmarried man". This dreadful philosophic shibboleth can (in our usage)
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be said to sanction or to warrant, statements such as 'Nothing is a
bachelor and married', etc. We shall accordingly call any such statements
'warranted'. These are such that their negation is impossible. (For in¬
stance if we negate the above statement about bachelors, it follows that
something is a bachelor and married, and then from the definition of
bachelor it follows that something is married and unmarried.) Let us say
that the negation of a warranted statement is 'interdicted by the rules'.
Both the above types of statements are to be distinguished
from those which are neither totally sanctioned (i.e. warranted) nor
interdicted by the rules of the language. E.g. 'The bachelor has a green
tie'. We shall henceforth call these latter 'sanctioned' statements, or —
for purposes of stressing the distinction -— 'merely sanctioned'. And we
shall now use 'permitted' as a generic term for both 'warranted' and
'sanctioned'.
We call the rules of a form of life 'weak Iy compatible' if i: there
is no warranted statement, or conjunction of such statements, within this
form of life which entail(s) lexically or logically any two statements
which are mutually incompatible; and ii: there are none but warranted
statements in this form of life. But note that in such a language one
could only talk in the lexical equivalent of tautologies. A very intriguing
situation. But — unless language is aii — a most unfortunate state of affa irs.
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Let us relax this condition and also permit within this form of
life statements such as: 'The bachelor has a green tie1, which are merely
sanctioned. Since any such statement is not interdicted it follows by
definition that none of the statements it entails — lexically or logically —
are mutually incompatible. (For if its consequences were incompatible,
the statement would be impossible, and thus unsanctioned )
Mow let two such (merely) sanctioned statements be true. If
the analogy with logic were to hold, we would expect that a I I applications
of lexical rules to these would yield mutually compatible results But
this hooe is chimeric. For in contrast to logic, the patterns of lexica
entailment establish particu'ar reiationships between words. These — in
certain cases — may run counter to those which hold among the referrents
of these words. In this way two sanctioned statements may be individually
true, but (when the subject matter they describe has characteristics which
run against the grain of those envisaged in the language) a conjunction
of these two "true" statements may be considered false or nonsense in terms
of other rules Thus in contrast to the rules of logical entailment the
conjunction of two lexically true statements may be interdicted because of
their entailments.
Consider, in this respect, the language of a tribe which is nearly
color-blind. The members of this tribe cannot normally distinguish red
from brown. Let us assume that within their language there is a word 'red'
which is defined as the color typified by cardinal's hats or mud; i.e
'If anything has the same color as a cardinal's hat, call it 'red'; if
anything has the same color as mud, call it 'red". This is a reasonable
rule in such a circumstance. It is similar to the practise of the politic¬
ally ha If-blind who call anyone left of ^resident Johnso 'a red'. Let us
also assume that within this form of life there is a rule which establishes
the i ncorr ig i bi I i ty of all first-person phenomenal description; i e , ail
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statements of the form '! perceive this as...' are true when used under
normal conditions.
Now let an enterprising member of this tribe discover that after
eating a special root it becomes possible to discern a marked difference
between the color of cardina 's hats and that of mud The native now can
say 'I see this Russian fiag as red'. And he can justify this for it
appears to have the same color as a cardinal's hat. Further, since statements
of this kind are, by hypothesis, incorrigible within his language, his
utterance is to be considered true. But at the same time, and for parallel
reasons, he can say: I do not see this fiag as having the color typified
by mud'. This again is to be considered true. But when he combines these
two true statements, the native asserts: I see something as red which at
the same time i do not see as having the color of that which is red', this
latter is nonsense.
Mo existing rule within the language can ban the ascription of
truth, singly, to either of these statements. But, in contrast to logic,
the conjunction of these two statements entails an impossible proposition
such as the above.
Let us now imagine that the native is brought up before the court
of language. Familiarly enough he is accused of breaking some of its rules.
His judges inform him that nothing can appear as red and not as red. But
he answers: Nevertheless I see something as red and not as red1. He then
suggests that they sample his root,. The court accepts, perceives the
difference, and painfully aware that something is wrong decides that some
of the tribe's color-rules, together with the patterns of lexical entail¬
ments they had sanctioned, must be revised.
may
The above example attests to the fact that !anguage/change ,
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and that a fortiori its ruies and the patterns of entailment relations es¬
tablished within it also change. Thus if one claims that the rules of
ianguage — like those of a game which works — are applicable to any
situation which develops in the course of their use, we seem to be forced
to make the very strong claim that no situation similar to the above can
develop.
Obviously this is a highly unrealistic condition. 8ut let us
define compatibility in terms of it, and then fit this to actual ianguage as
best as we can. To do this we consider, as above, a form of life with its
rules and warranted statements, together with further statements which are
merely sanctioned. We shall say that the rules of such a form of life are
strongly compatible when there is no pair of true permitted statements whose
conjunction — IogicaIIy or lexically — entails mutually incompatible
statements.
It would be weiI to pause at this stage to visualize what we are
saying; and to do this let us look more closely at the fundamental analogy
of language to game, or of felicitous form of life to the playing of a game
that works. The analogy is undoubtedly a fruitful one. For in certain
respects language is very much like some games, for instance that of tennis
or chess. Formation rules apply to language, just as the equivalent rules
in chess or tennis respectively specify the initial configuration of pieces
on the board, or the starting position of the tennis ball. And further,
just as the rules of lexical transformation determine (in respect to each
initial expression) a set of statements whose assertion is sanctioned in
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terms of them, and a smaller set that is warranted, the miss of these
games also specify a set of possible moves, any of which are legitimate
and a smaller set which are mandatory. (E.g. You can serve the ball any
place into the opposite front square, and you must hit the ball before the
second bounce.)
BIT — and here is the salient difference between languages and
games — the rules of any game that I can think of apply to only one game
at a time. And since each game forms its own closed system, the rules need
only determine whether one move, or one sequence of moves, is legitimate or
not. (Even if two games are being played on the same field, except for
cross-talk, each is played by itself without essential reference to the moves
made in the other.) The criterion which the rules of a game must satisfy
are then simple enough: all rules applicable to any one situation, at any
one time, must yield the same or compatible results. Now let us contrast
this with language-use. Associated with any initial meaningful expression
there is — generally — a set of many other statements whose assertion is
permitted. But, unlike the case of the games we have noted, a I I of these
statements can be legitimately formed at any time. Thus, as we have pointed
out, the criteria which the rules of felicitious form of life must satisfy
become quite complex. For they must not only determine (as in chess or
tennis) merely whether a move is legitimate or not. If the rules of a
form of life are to provide for its felicity, they must establish the
legitimacy not of one possible move but of the entire set of all putatively
legitimate moves, together with all their consequences.
It is at this point, I think, that the analogy between game
and language breaks down. When one claims that all philosophic problems
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are due +o a misuse of language, this special sense of 'language1,
presupposes characteristics which are most ungame-I ike. The analogy
is no longer that of language to game, with all the fluidity and
variety which these contain, but of language to the marmorean structure
of a logical system
Now is the philosopher to study the rules of such a language?
If so, I think he would have to be extraordinariIy sanguine to expect
to find one. Is it not incredible to maintain that the rules of
language are set up in such a way that they automatica iy apply to any
situation which might develop in the course of their use?
But the philosopher cannot fall back to study the rules
of a language which isveakly compatible For although its rules would
be invulnerable to revision and, by definition, free of contradictions,
such a language would not, could not be a machine which worked. Since
the only statements it contains are we !-warranted statements, it
could be no more informative than an oracle which answered only in
tautologies.
I think the only way out is to insist that any felicitous form
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of life is determined by rules which are generally strongly compatible,
but that this form of life also contains within itself rules or procedures
for the alteration of its established rules whenever these prove incomplete
or wherever they run amok of some recalcitrant experience. This I suppose
is the relevance of (INV)-83::
Doesn't the analogy between language and games throw light
here?...is there not also the case where we play — and make
up the rules as we go along? And there is even one where we
alter them — as we go along."
But if this is so, these alteration-rules must also be complete. Or at
least the general guide-lines within the language must be sufficiently
complete to tell one unequivocally how an established rule is to be altered
or supplemented. As noted earlier, the language — if felicitous — cannot
brook the possibility that the change can proceed in different ways.
Let us stress the importance of this last point. For if at some
crucial turning there vere two or more equally attractive and equally sanc¬
tioned ways in which to alter some defective rule, philosophers qua phiIoso-
phers might very welI be just those who advocate alternative modifications
or — in Waismann's terms — different "visions". And if this were so,
their dispute would be due not to a misuse of language, but to its break¬
down, and thus the strong linguistic thesis would be infirmed. (We develop
this notion in Part III.) Again it seems extraordinariIy sanguine to
believe that at each possible turning point the way which is to be chosen
is already determined.
And yet this must be so, if the advocate of the linguistic
approach can say when confronted with any intellectual confusion of this
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sort that a rule must have been broken,
I think it is clear then that the rules of lexical entailment
and substitution of a felicitous form of life must, in general, be strong'y
compatible. No conjunction of true statements permitted within this language
can entail (lexically or otherwise) mutually incompatible consequences.
And if this incompatibility develops at any time there must also be a
second system of modification rules or tacitly accepted a!teration-proced¬
ures to take over. These latter charge or supplement the established rules
and, as it were, purge the system of whatever zones of incompatibiIity +ha+
appear within it.
• « • «
£1 We can now summarize the results of this discussion. The
rules of any fully felicitous, i.e., perfectly working, form of life must
be strongly compatible,and complete, and the description of these rules must
be unique and acceptable by all rational fluent users of the language. This
fuI Iness of fe1icity in all IikeIihood is who I Iy unobtainab Ie. But we
have noted that a limited incompIet^,ess and lack of uniqueness can be
tolerated Novel situations can develop for which there are no present
rules, or too many in the first case we can envision language-users
making up their rules as they proceed, and in the second adjudicating
between alternative descriptions inasmuch as the consequences of one runs
counter to the canonical forms of ordinary usage. And in a third situation
we can consider language as running amok of some recalcitrant experience.
In each of these cases alteration or supplementation of existing rules is
mandatory . But rule-change of this kind can guarantee felicity only if
the rulesor procedures governing such change are themselves substantially
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complete. Thus any breakdown In compieteness or descriptive-uniqueness
demands another set of complete rules and procedures to back it up. it
is, I think, in this sense that Wittgenstein writes:
it is what human beings say that is true and false; and
they agree in the language they use That is not agree¬
ment in opinions but in form of life" (INV) -241.
There is a dynamism in this agreement which works out its answer as language
adumbrates,
and the experiences it develops, if we consider the rules of
language to be complete in this dynamic sense of governing not only usage
but change in usage, we can define felicity thus:
Subject to the above-noted restrictions,
w is a felicitous form of Iife = DEF Ail ruIes of w are strong Iy
compatible, complete, uniquelyde-
scr i bable, and acceptable by
all fluent rational users of the
language of w.
Premise (1+) follows from this definition. Thus as claimed
above, the statement of felicity is part of the statement of a sufficient
condition for the assertion of the linguistic approach.
We have also argued that if any of the conditions of felicity
are not satisfied in some form of life — if its rules are not strongly
compatible, or are incomplete or if truly alternative descriptions of
its rules can be established, or if the rule-descriptions are not univer¬
sally acceptable — then the linguistic thesis cannot be asserted in
respect to this form of life.
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Thus the felicity of a form of life is certainly presupposed
as a necessary condition for the assertion of the strong thesis. And,
at the same time, this felicity provides part of a sufficient condition for
this assertion We conclude then: to the extent that a language is feli¬
citous, to that extent — and only to that extent — can the strong linguis¬
tic approach be justified in its application to philosophic problems ex¬
pressible within it.
• • • •
• • • •
#8. We now tie the knot to this long introductory discussion. In
the course of these chapters we have singled out two general explanations
for the continued appearance of philosophic problems, and for different
reasons we have decided not to investigate two others. Both of the
theories selected, however dissimilar their contents, are remarkably alike
in their structures. Both of them envisage a system in which rules are
applied to specified sets of initial elements. These elements, in the
case of the classical approach, are the self-evident principles of the
various sciences. In the linguistic approach per¬
mitted true statements of the form of life under consideration constitute
the initial elements of the system. The rules applicable in the classical
approach are those of deductive logic. Within the linguistic approach
these latter rules are supplemented with those of lexical entailment, of
definitional substitution, etc. (In this way the linguistic approach con¬
tains the rules of the classical system as a proper part of its own.)
In both systems it is assumed that the rules applicable to the
elements are such that no possible application of the rules, if correct,
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can yield incompatible propositions, it follows — under these
assumptions — if philosophic issues appear, with their characteristic
pattern of claim and counterclaim, that an error has been made For the
classical approach the source of error is two fold. Either the apprehension
of the first principles may be faulty, due to an excessive reliance upon
the familiar rather than the intelligible, or else an error has been made
in reasoning For the linguistic approach since its initial elements are
both true and at least sanctioned — and one is not concerned with facts —
error can arise only in the use of the rules of language
This applies to all philosophic issues; of particular concer
to us. it applies to those concerning existence Thus if the classical
approach is correct, all existence-statements, of which we can have
certain knowledge, are either self-evident or demonstrable co'Sequence
of the former. Aid if the linguistic approach is correct, the language
with which we talk about existence, or which uses 'existence', is
felicitous
Given this, any general study of the logic of existence-
statements. along the li.es we have proposed may well inquire:
a) Are existence-statements provable in the classical sense?,
and if not
b) What purpose, if any, do putative proofs serve?
arid
2a) Is the la guage with which we talk about existence felicitous?,
and if not
b) Is the appeara ;ce of mutually i compatible existence-statements
necessarily the result of error?
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These two sets of questions will occupy us for the remainder
of the thesis. Vfe shall find that the answers to the a-questions are
generally negative. This will force us, in answering the b-questions, to
reappraise In a fundamental fashion, our assumptions concerning the logical
characteristics of the stratum of language in which existence-statements
typically appear. It is this reappraisal which gives direction to this
thesis.
Our starting points in this are the notions of provability and
felicity, and to the first of these we now turn.
PART TWO
The Classical Approach and the
Provability of Existence-Statements
CHAPTER FIVE
The Classical Approach: PIsproof
#I. Within this and the following chapters, we study the claims
of the classical approach These are centered about the belief that
necessary truths, existance-statements among them, are either provable
or self-evident. We have already seen that the tenets of the classical
ajproach do not appear to be borne out in actua: practise This dis¬
crepancy between theory and evidence imposes a twofold task upon our
study. First we must determine if this intuitively natural position
does fail, and if so, why. Secondly (if this is the case)we must re¬
appraise the role which demonstration and rational argument play in
discussions concerning existence For if propositions of this kind are
not provable, what is the purpose of arguments concerning them?
It will be convenient to begin with a discussion of certai
ontologies which seem to be disprovable The results of this pre¬
liminary discussion might cast a favorable light upon the classical
approach and its claims. For we do show that various bodies of existence-
statements and beliefs about existence can be disproved But it is a
wintry light For these are exceptional cases and we shall soon see
why Once we have cleared away this matter, we can proceed to the
substa ce of the chapter.
0 • • •
#2. For many philosophers today, few or no non-trivial state¬
ments about existence are either provable or disprovabie in any
way. Were this not the case, the positivists
-125-
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could never have argued that all metaphysical statements were meaningless.
The present section will investigate one part of this claim, i.e., that
few or no non-trivial existence-statements or ontological positions are
disprovable We shall use 'prove' and 'disprove' in a wide sense and
say that 'p * is proved if 'p' is the conclusion of a sound argument, and
* p' is disproved if 'not-p' is the conclusion of a sound argument. We
make no further stipulations concerning the premises, other than the
customary ones: that the conjunction of premises be free of contradiction
{at least under the intended interpretation) and that each premise be
accepted as true by all users of the argument.
To test the claim that few if any non-trivial ontoiogica!
positions are disprovable, let us look at actual examples of ontological
refutations. (Within the following, as throughout the thesis omissions
from the original text are indicated by means of dots; brackets are used
to set off explanatory material? Our first example concer s the monistic
materialism of some members of the Milesian School. Among these
I) oales claims that water is the limitless world stuff out of
which all the other elements are formed. Aristotle argues that this is
impossible]] :
The infinite body (cannot! be on© and simple ... for the
elements are opposed to each other . . and if one of
these were infinite the rest would have already been
destroyed " (KR 107).
To fill out Aristotle's cryptic remarks, let us recall that the elements
eg fire and water, like warring states are considered to oppose each
other. Accordingly, if one were of limitless power, as Tnalss and others
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claim, it would not have formed the others. Rather it would have
annihiIated them.
2) {jjltra-reaIism, we may recall, is the queer doctrine that there is
one substantial, i.e., thing-like, extra-mental object corresponding to
each universal term. Occam, not in sympathy with this position, suggests
a destructive argument of the following kind 3] :
it is agreed by a I I that the universal, e.g. the attribute
of having power, is predicated of tao subjects. Consider
that it is predicated of the present King of England and
of the Pope If such a universal is one substantial extra-
mental object then the same predicate must be in Rome and
London at the same time This is absurd. J^No one thing
can be in two distinct and d stant pi aces.3] Ergo the
universal is not substantial and extra-mental"
Occam (2) | , c, XVI , p. 37,
(Occam has in mind a proposition such as 'The King of England and the
Pope both have power 1.)
3) {^Berkeley states Locke's doctrine of abstract ideas]! :
"We are told, the mind being able to consider each quality
singly, or abstracted from these other qualities with
which it is united, does by that means frame to itself
abstract ideas."
He then assumes that these must be images within the mind and then argues
that there are none:
EUPH. Do but try now whether you can frame an idea of number in
abstract ....
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ALC. Can it be so hard a matter ....? Upon which Alciphron
paused awhile, and then said, to confess the truth I do
not find that I can.
EUPH If other men's faculties may be judged by mine, to
obtain a precise simple abstract idea of number, is as
difficult as to comprehend any mystery of religion"
Berkeley (I) p. 293,
4) [[The following argument shows — if one accepts Leibniz's premises
concerning the unicity of being , and the principle of sufficient reason —
that a res extensa, a substance whose whole being is pure extension, is
imposs i bl e[] :
If matter is extended, it is mentally divisible. But, if
its parts have being, each part must be one. [['Being' and
'one' are convertible terms.[]
But for them to be one, they must have some property other
than extension which accounts for their unity [[i.e., there
must be a sufficient reason[] .
Ergo it is impossible that there is a substance which is
pure extension.
5) [[The following is an abstract, or perhaps a complete reformulation of
an argument of J. N. Find lay [] :
Let us agree that for God to be an adequate object of
worship all His properties must be necessary ones. Let
us ca!I all properties of such a God, 'F'. Let us assume
that this entails: 'God, as an adequate object of worship
is F' is a necessary statement'. But if one accepts a
V-2 129
current doctrine that the necessity of a statement de¬
pends upon the rules according to which one uses words,
then any necessary statement — pursuant to a change in
the rules — may be otherwise. But if 'God ... is F' is
not necessarily necessary,'God is not-F' might be true at
some time. If we consider God as timeless, one is forced
to conclude that we cannot say 'There is a God whose every
property is necessary'. For at soma time, He may have a
property, i.e. not-F, which is not necessary. In other
words, the assumption that a perfect object of worship
exists entails impossible consequences. From this we
conclude: God does not exist'.
All the above arguments share one common feature: fhey examine
an onto logical position and show in one way or another that its premises
lead to conclusions which are demonstrably inconsistent with some body
of propositions. These latter statements are advanced as incontrovertibi
true; and in this way the onto logical position under attack is claimed
to be effectively disproved. Thales in Aristotle's opinion uses the
notion of element in a seIf-contradictory manner. Descartes, according
to Leibniz, is inconsistent: the notion of a purely extended (and in¬
finitely divisible) substance leads him to contradict propositions which
he and any rational man must accept as true Locke's position, in
Berkeley's eyes — just as ultrarealism in the view of its successors —
contradicts the given. Similarly the ascription of existence to an
adequate object of worship runs counter to other accepted tenets of the
current conceptual scheme
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More generally, an ontology, 0 is disprovabie if 0 itself is
demonstrably seIf-ineonsistent, or if the consequences of 0 are incom¬
patible with some statement(s) in a body of statements, T, the truth
of which is considered to be incontrovertible. (By the 1incontrovert-
ibility' of a statement, I mean that the truth of the statement in
question is either self-evident, or self-validating, or indubitably
or incorrigibly true in some other way.) Under such conditions, 0
is indeed disprovabie. For, as the case may be — and in terms of T —
it is logically, or conceptually, or factually impossible for 0 to be
true.
• • • •
#3. Would these examples then show that after all something can be
disproved in ontology? In a way, yes. But what warrant has one that the
premises introduced within the argument are incontrovertible? For this
presupposes a common public agreement about what is to count as incon-
trovertible. Might Thales, for instance, not have considered the
ontological primacy of water more self-evident than the finitude — or
opposition — of the other elements? Might Locke, upon further reflection,
not have declared that the existence of abstract ideas was more incon¬
trovertible than any evidence Berkeley might rely upon? Might not a
convinced believer remark to Findlay: My boy, you've picked up the
wrong end of the stick'? And similarly with the others?
Any ascription of ineorrigibiIity to statements is itself open
to question whenever any of the following conditions hold. The concepts
employed within a given statement are not well-defined, nor changeless,
nor fully determined. The meanings of the words appearing within the
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statement are either vague, or ambiguous, or obscure. The criterion
for the acceptance and rejection of extra-conceptual data is not fully
established or defective. The ascription of truth to statements pre¬
viously accepted as incontrovertible is vulnerable to change in respect
to recalcitrant experience. — And where but in the Islands of the
Blest is this not the case?
It is in fact a recurrent feature of philosophic discussion to
introduce, or to assume, certain tenets as incontrovertible, and then for
other philosophers to find good reasons to controvert them. For instance,
the thinkers immediately following Zeno were convinced that everyday objects
contradicted themselves. The Pythagoreans believed in the harmony of
being: the heavenly bodies by their very nature must embody the simplest
and most perfect motions. Plato and Aristotle both believed in the self-
evident truth of first principles. Occam, for all his appreciation of the
contingent, believed in the indubitable truth of Holy Writ The thinkers
of the seventeenth century accepted as self-evident a world of absolutes
in which the laws of nature could be rigorousiy demonstrated, as in
geometry. The following generations held the Law of Causality to be
inviolate. Where are these beliefs now? Nor is this the wake only of
past incontrovertibles: one has only to consider the stir which Russell's
paradox, Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", and Godel's incompleteness
proof have occasioned in more recent times. It is not unwarranted, in
view of this, to consider — given sufficient perspective — that the
statement of any beliefs which are unassailable today may in a future time
appear as curious and unconvincing as the pronouncements of Thales that
all things are made of water.
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I do not mean to argue that alt concepts in¬
evitably change, that there can be no hard core, nor norm; but only to
draw the conclusion that to some extent even the fundamental concepts which
concern us here, such as Element, Existent, Totality of things, That-which-
is-self-evident, etc.. as they are instanced in actual ontologies are not
invulnerable to change. And to the extent that these are alterable,
relations which necessarily hold among concepts at a particular time —
as well as the incorrigibiIity of particular statements about extra-
conceptual objects — can at a moment's notice cease to be considered
as incontrovertible. Thus the grounds for a time-free refutation of an
ontology, either in terms of itself or in respect to a commonly accepted
body of statements outside itself, are undermined.
This is not to say that at any given instant of time, a state¬
ment may not be characterized as incontrovertible, and that the truth or
falsity of other related statements may not also be determined on this
j "
basis. But if once this instant is past and the particular ascription of
incontrovertibiIity is no longer in force, in such a case ail that re¬
mains unquestioned must be stated in the fcrrr of e conditional proof,
or with the annotation 'conclusive at such a time1.
This means that at any time the author of ar ontology at
bay — when confronted with an effective refutation — can rely upon
the lack of specificity, or definiteness, or closure, or completeness
of the genera! network of his contemporary conceptual scheme, and argue
his way out. He is frea to claim that the interpretation upon which the
refutation is based may be faulty, as a defender of Locke's position might
argue against Berkeley; or that the premises contained within the
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refutation are not acceptable as a theist might point out in respect to
9
Find lay; or that the conceptual interrelations stated within the argument
are inexact, as a latter-day cartesian might claim in respect to Leibniz'
attack. There are many ways to skin a cat, or to make an ontology in¬
vulnerable to otherwise destructive arguments. As Smart observes Jjf a
phi Iosopher] "has landed himself in inconsistency or in nonsense, and .....
he must therefore give up certain of his tenets, it is impossible to
prove this to him. He can always patch up" Smart (I) p. 133,
In view of these considerations, it would be more judicious
to conclude that the arguments in the above examples do not disprove an
ontology but serve to invaIidate a. totaIity of statements. If conclusive,
they demonstrate that a given ontology,together with other statements and the
definitions of terms contained within them, form an inconsistent totality.
To summarize. There are then existenee-statements and ontologicai
positions which can be disproved, but only because they are impossible.
They are either inconsistent with their own premises (and as such logically
impossible) or they are inconsistent with an accepted body of incontrovertible
statements and as such their assertion is conceptually or factually im¬
possible in respect to these statements. But despite this,the lack of
definiteness of most existance-statements, and the sliding weight of
truth one maY assign to other premises of the refuting argument'effectively
mitigate the force Qf a conclusive disproof. There are, it
is true, a few cases in which once-fI ourishing ontologicai positions
actually have collapsed before the onslaught of effective destructive
arguments, as for instance uItra-reaiism. But to see this as a victory
for logic is to miss half the story. If one position does gain the field,
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It is not "truth" itself which wins out. It would be more exact to say
that the effort necessary to circumvent these arguments becomes more than
the defenders can afford.
The conclusiveness which we ascribe to any extra-IogicaI
disproof — or proof for that matter — is relative to the weight of truth
and incontrovertibiIity which we ascribe to the changing contents of a body
of statements and rules which hold at any given time. These are, among
others, statements of fact, of theory, of conceptual interrelationships,
of beliefs, and of procedures for determining the truth and acceptability
of new statements. Disproof of any actual ontology is conditional, it
does not serve to refute an ontology, but to make the totality—statement
of an ontology + statements accepted as true or incontrovertible at a
given time — inconsistent. And as a consequence, some statement(s),
not necessarily within the ontology, becomes untenable.
• • • •
• • • •
#4. Within the preceding sections we have shown that when a body
of seIf-ineonsistent existence-statements satisfy certain conditions of
definiteness, etc., it is possible to disprove the ontology they establish.
Similarly if a proposition, either in an ontology, or entailed by it, runs
counter to some incorrigible, or incontrovertibIy true statement — provided
the warrant of this latter is truly unchallengeable — such an ontology
is also dispro^9^®- But such existence-claims are merely the brambles
of thought, and if excised so much the better. For (fundementaI Iy) we
are not interested in what is impossible in one way or another. Rather
our concern is with those bodies of propositions about existence which91"®
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possibly true, and which claim to be true- To these we now turn.
Let us now outline the steps the following discussion will
take. We wish to show that, except trivially, existence-statements are
neither unconditinaI Iy proveable nor disprovable. To establish this,
we analyze one of the necessary presuppositions of the approach: the
belief in the incontrovertible certainty of necessary truths. In the
course of this analysis we find that the types of statements which might
be considered necessary are either too weak or (in a sense of the term
which we shal clarify) not necessarily necessary. If so, then the
power of these propositions to confer an unconditional certainty both
upon themselves and their logical consequences, is lacking. But if
this is so, the classical approach is untenable. And if this is the case,
we must then question the value of employing even fragmentary forms of
logical arguments in this field.
More specifically we argue:
a) The classical approach presupposes that the body of true statements,
of which we have certain knowledge, forms a consistent, complete
deductive theory, whose initial theorems are self-evident 'first
principles". (See section 5. )
b) This means that any statement among the above, if it is not a
so-called "first principle", is categorically provable. By
this iatter term I mean that any such statement is the valid con¬
sequence of a proof whose premises are unconditionally true.
(See Section 6. )
c) it follows from the above that it must in some way be impossible
for the "first principles" to be false. Further, these initial
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statements, singly or together, must be of sufficient logical power
to prove the truth of all other prepositions contained within a full
and correct account of the demonstrable properties of existence.
(See Section 7. )
d) Thus to analyze the claims of the classical approach, we must
investigate whether there are such unconditionally true statements
and, if there are such, if these are of sufficient logical power
to fulfill their purported role. (See Section 3. )
e) Always true statements such as these are either contingently true
or — in some sense of 'necessary' — necessary truths. The
necessity of such truths might be associated with any of the
foilowing:
(or physical or nomic)
li natural/necessity, i.e. in respect to the invariance of the
physically significant
relations which hold between certaig/parameters (such as between
Time and Distance in Galileo's law of falling bodies).
ii: necessity jjn re, i.e. one linked to the "essential nature" of
things, and the characteristics of these as stated in real
definit ions.
iii: logical necessity, i.e. that necessity which is ascribable
to logical truths,
iv: lexical necessity, i.e. linked to the meaning of words,
v: conceptual necessity, i.e. linked to the relationships
established within and between concepts.
If our discussion is to be fully general, i.e. applicable not only
to Aristotle's but to any approach along the same general lines, we
cannot ignore any of the above. (See VI 1-5. )
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f) On the other hand it would be an enormous undertaking to
investigate each type of necessity in its own right. Rather
than this, we consider those statements which must be true or
necessary for the others to be considered necessary. We shali not
summarize the argument of this section, for we can say Iittie
about it in small compass The results of this analysis are such
that the classical approach becomes tenable only if (I) there
are either contingent truths in the form of theory-free descriptive-
statements, or necessarily necessary extra-IogicaI conceptual truths;
and (2) these truths are of sufficient logical power to achieve
their purported role. (See VI — 7. )
g) We have reiterated 'necessary' above in talking about necessarily
necessary truths. In a rough way this is analogous to the use of
'necessary' in the following. According to the law, it is
necessary In Britain to drive on the left hand side of the road.
But it is not necessary that the law be established this way. Thus
we can distinguish between a statement saying that something is
necessary and a comment concerning the necessity of this statement.
Applying'criteria which we develop, we show that statements of
conceptual necessity are not necessarily necessary. Thus, if
the foregoing is correct, there are no extra-IogtcaI necessarily
necessary truths. (See Chapters VI I — VI I I. )
h) We also argue that in the absence of such extra-logical necessary
truths, contingent truths lack sufficient logical power to achieve
their purported role. (See VI I 1-3 ff .)
4v
i) But if there are so such truths of sufficient logical power
nor any extra-IogicaI necessarily necessary truths (as
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we have argued), no extra-IogicaI statements are categorically
provable, either in respect to existence or to anything else. Thus
this presupposition of the classical approach is not satisfied
Since this approach cannot be asserted if this condition is not
satisfied, the approach must be considered untenable. (See Vlll-8ff )
We proceed now to the details of the above
#5. We have stated the general presuppositions of the
classical approach already in Chapter Two. Before continuing, let us
fill out this discussion According to the classical approach the
cause of any enduring philosophic issue is due to human fallibility
In this sense both the linguistic and classical approaches are in
agreement; in fact so are the others we have discussed Errors may
of course be of various kinds, and as we have seen the various approaches
single out different facets of these for consideration. But this
does not concern us here. What we are concerned with is the concept
of the task of philosophy which a typical adherent of the classical
approach might hold, and in particular his theoretical justification
for entertaining this.
We have noted that philosophy for Aristotle, is the
investigation of truth. Somewhat more specifically:
The end of theoretical knowledge is truth...we do not know
a truth without its cause...so that which causes derivative
truths to be true is most true" (META) alpha 993b 20ff.
And again
...Since we are seeking the first principles and the
V-5 139
highest causes []of being]} , clearly there must be some
thing to which these belong in virtue of its own nature ..
Therefore it is of being as being that we also must grasp
the first causes" (META) Gamma-i 1033a 26ff.
The task of the philosopher in studying "Being" is to discover
the causes and principles of existence, and in particular to seek out
first those initial principles which are the cause of all others.
Knowledge of these, once gained is as we remember "unshakeabie":
Of the thinking states by which we grasp truth some are
unfa 1IingIy true , others admit of error-opinion, for instance,
and caIcuI ation, whereas scientific know I edge and intuition are
aIways true.... If, therefore, it is the only other kind of true
thinking except scientific knowing, intuition will be the
originative source of scientific knowledge, []for intuition]]
grasps the original basic premises" (POST AN) 11-19 100b 5ff.
Italics mine.
Thus the basic premises of any science among these that of existence are
intuitively-certain truths. Aristotle specifically rejects the suggestion,
as stated by the poet Simon ides, that the grasping of these is totally
beyond human power. (See "Metaphysics" A-2 982b 28ff.) Nor could there
be an infinite sequence of such causes—a sequence which would again make
the first causes unknowable—for then "knowledge becomes impossible"
(META) alpha-2 994b 21. Further, these first principles must be
necessary:
Since the object of pure scientific knowledge cannot be other




And since demonstrative knowledge is only present when we have
a demonstration, it follows that demonstration is an inference
from necessary premises" (POST AN) I- 473a 21.
The classical approach then must presuppose the existence of
first principles which are necessary truths and self-evident to a human
understanding. These are the bases of all sciences. From these, all that
we can know— i.e. ,know certainly—is derivable:
We suppose ourselves to possess unquaIified scientific know I edge
of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way...
when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends,
as the cause of that fact and of no other... There may be another
manner of knowing as well (~i .e. i ntu i t ion~"). . , What now assert
is that at all events we do know by demonstration" (POST AN)
I-2 71b 9.ff, Italics mine.
The statements of sure knowledge comprise those based upon intuition
together with their demonstrable consequences.
We have argued that these premises must be complete, in the
sense that the set of premises and their entailments includes all necessary
truths. (For were there even one undemonstrable necessary truth, a
philosophic issue might develop between those who claimed such a proposition
to be true, and those who opposed this claim.)
if we look at the text, we will find that with one exception, this
completeness seems to be assumed by Aristotle. For he does discuss
undemonstrable knowledge at various places, but he never asserts the
unknowabiIity of necessary truths. And in one place he rejects a position
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which might argue for their unknowabiIity. Following the citation
already used—that the conviction of pure science ooV> ArrA&s
= absolute knowing J must be unshakeable, he continues:
Some hold that, owing to the necessity of knowing the primary
premises, there is no scientific knowledge. Others think there
is but that a I truths are demonstrable Neither doctrire is
either true or a necessary deduction from the premises ..Our own
doctrine is that not all knowledge is demonstrative: on the con¬
trary Knowledge of the immediate premises i independent of demon¬
stration (The necessity of this is obvious; for since we must
know the prior premises from which the demonstration is drawn, and
since the regress must end in immediate truths, those truths must
be indemonstrable.) Such then is our doctrine" (POST AN) 1-3 72b 5ff.
Thus necessary truths, whether immediate premises or their consequences, are
knowabfe. Aristotle does discuss other forms of non-demonstrable know edge.
But these are either of chance, i.e non-necessary, conjunctions, as in
(POST AN) i-30 87b 19; or of 'non-essential accidents' (POST AN) 1-6
75a 18. Neither of these have the characteristics of necessity. Thus in
the absence of any other evidence it would seem that the set of initial
premises and their entailments include all necessary truths.
There is one possible exception to this claim, and this is in
respect to our knowledge of matter For matter, the underlying substratum
of things, is in itself unknowable (META) Z-10 036a 8 Matter is the
cause of the accidental (META) E-3 1027a 13, cAs noted above there is
no demonstrable knowledge of the accidental.) The characteristics
of matter In itself and the accidental properties due to its presence
in things, are, as it were, left systematica ly opaque within the
Aristotelean view But I venture to suggest that since necessary truths
are of that which is unchanging (POST AN) l-l 71b 15, it is possible that
there may be no first order necessary statements one can make about matter
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in itself. Presumably the second order statements concerning our
knowledge (i.e. the knowabiIity of) matter are derivable from established
premises. Be this as it may, with the exception of first-order statements
about the unknowable substratum, it seems probable that Aristotle assumed
each science to be complete in the above sense. It is certainly a
necessary presupposition of the classical approach.
The final condition, i.e. consistency, is evidently de rigger:
For everything that is true must in every respect agree with
itself" (PR AN) 1-32 47a 8.
To conclude, the classical approach presupposes the existence of
a set of certainty-conferring , intuitively known, necessary truths. These
are self-consistent and these (with the possible exception of statements
about matter) ..together with their entailments exhaust the set of necessary
truths. Since the principle of contradiction applies to all things, this
set is presumably also free of contradiction, (META) K-5. Or, in our
earlier terminology, each science forms a consistent, complete, deductive
theory.
One note before continuing. We mentioned earlier that we were
ed
not interested in jousting at straw men. We suggest then that if a
philosopher rejects a thing-and-concept oriented philosophy and even if
he eschews formal demonstrations, nevertheless to the extent that he does
argue to reach what he considers to be a sound conclusion—as opposed to
a merely valid one—his presuppositions, however weakened, are analogous
to those of the classical approach. He might very well deny the complete¬
ness of his premises. He could not deny their consistency. Nor could
he argue that his premises had no special warrant. (For if they were not
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ceri-ain, or relatively certain, or more plausible than any others, how
could he possibiy conclude that his position was certain, or more certain,
or more plausible than another?) Of course he might merely point out the
weaknesses, even the contradlet ions in another position, and as such clear
out the brambles. But most philosophers also try to argue positively.
And the moment they do this, they must assume the premises of their
argument to be self-consistent and warranted, and at the same time they
must accept the fragment of a formal system embedded in their arguments
or in its natural language analogue- True they may have little truck
with the notion of completeness. But we too will have scant concern for
this in the sequel: our analysis will focus upon the warrant one might
assign (or cannot assign) to the premises. And thus in showing the
unfoundedness of the presuppositions of the classical position, we intend
at the same time to challenge the tenabiIity of many weaker approaches.
For instance consider In this respect how Geach argues in a
discussion with Quine;
Certain concepts, I ike existence and truth and thinq and property
are used, and cannot but be used, in all rational discourse
whatever: and ontology is an attempt to scrutinize our use of
them. To be right or wrong in ontology means to be clear or
muddled about such fundamenta I s... I n ar. on+ologicai dispute, at
least one side (very likely both) will be in a muddle" Geach (I)
p. 136.
This sounds like the critical approach. But I should like to point out
certain features not alien to the classical thesis. First, there is the
assumption, when both thinkers are clear about the concepts they employ,
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that there can be no dispute. The above also suggests that there is one
way to be right in ontology. Perhaps one might not grasp a concept like a
first principle, but nevertheless according to this view there still seem
to be certain concepts—with their definite structures—which one is to
become clear about. This impression is reinforced by the suggestion that
particular concepts are indeed necessary for any rational discourse. And
if one limits oneself to analyzing these concepts, in the belief that they
are necessary in thisway, does one not then presuppose that such concepts,
Existence among them, like the objects of an Aristotelean science, are un¬
changing? Of course a thinker such as Geach is not committed to the classical
belief that his science will render him unassailable knowledge of extra-
conceptual objects. But as we have suggested above, the objects of his
knowledge—some concepts—seem to be unchanging, and there is a correct
description of these. (Further any dispute concerning them is due to
intellectual confusion, and to be clear about such concepts is a pre¬
requisite of rational discourse.) Considering concepts as a kind of object
is the above position then not a fragment of the classical approach—in
the way in which intuitionist logic can be said to be a fragment of
classical logic? By this I mean: if we supplement the above presuppositions,
the classical approach follows. If we deny the categorical provability of
conceptual statements I think Geach's position also founders. For how then
could one know that one was right or wrong? And if one could not know this,
what would be the point of rational discourse?
I have in the above singled Geach out as a representative
philosopher. My point is that, give or take some for natural differences,
there is a tendency for nearly any thinker to embrace some of the fundamental
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presuppositions of the classical approach. Thuc, although the argument
of this cha ,ter is directed specifically at Arlstotie's clear, strong
formu'atio of strong presuppositions, i intend the brush-off of this study
to be of more than antiquarian interest.
#'6. Any theory such as Aristotle's, has certain strong properties
We have already noted one: its conclusions are considered to be categorically
provable,: its proofs must be categorical and not hypothetical deductions.
For instance if P is a set of statements which are a;I, in one way or
another, unconditionally true, then ail valid consequences of P are
unconditionally, i.e. categorically true. If, on the other hand, the
statements of P have no such truth - warrant, their valid consequences are
prova ly true only upon the cord it ion that these premises are true. We
shall say that *q' is categoricai y provabie, when 'q' is derivable from
a statement or conjunction of statements 'p1, and the latter is in some
way unconditionally true.
I do not know if any statements are categorically provable. A
a stab, one might say that if logic is unique, i.e. if no viable genuinely
alternative logic is formuiable, then ail tautologies and logical axioms
are unconditionally true, and all valid consequences of these would then be
categorically provable. But we have already imposed a condition upon the
truth of the premises. Thus, only if this condition is totally trivial,
I e. if it can be shown or otherwise known that 'There are genuine
alternative logics' is always fa'ss, or perhaps absurd, only then could
one be certain of the unconditional truth of the logical axioms, etc. But
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how could this be shown, or known, except in terms of a particular logic?
So again we appear to have imposed some condition upon the premises.
Be this as it may, as we have seen, for Aristotle the first
principles of any science are unconditionally true and their demonstrative
consequences, i.e via syl ogistic, are then categorically provable.
#7. Paradoxically, one cannot talk of unconditional truth without
some reference to the universe which contains the Individuals they
describe. For instance a general statement unconditionally true in the
world we know, might not be true without strings attached in all possible
universes. Although conversely, a statement true in all possible worlds,
would be true within our own. Thus if we are interested in showing that
no statements, or few, might be considered unconditionally true, we need—
fortunately—only prove this for some world.
The alleged unconditional truth of Aristotle's first principles
must hold in respect to our world, and presumably Aristotle himself can,
in general, make no stronger claim. For, within the "Analytics" at least,
first principles are said to depend in a way upon sense-percept ion. (POST
AN) 11-19 99b 39, And it would appear difficult to explain how one could
perceive in this world that these principles were true of all worlds.
So we need consider the alleged necessity of these statements only in
respect to our world. And, as noted above, if this limited claim of
unconditional truth is untenable, we need not investigage any stronger
cI aims.
But, whatever the universe one discusses the initial premises
must be of sufficient legical power to demonstrate all the necessary
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propertlescf the objects contained within the sciences. Strictly
speaking, we should have said 'state or demonstrate .', for the first
principles may state without demonstration both that the object of the
science exists, and define this object. (POST AN) 1-5 72a 18-24. But
let us assume tacitly that a premise implies itself, so that we can
avoid this clrcumlocution.
Thus we can say that the classical approach presupposes I:
the existence of premises which are intuitively self-evident, unconditional!
true (within our world) and ii: these are of sufficient logical power to
categorically demonstrate all necessary truths about this world.
• • • •
#8 Our tactic is now clear. To analyze the tenabiIity of the
classical approach, we must investigate whether there are statements
which satisfy the first condition and if such statements are of sufficient
logical power to satisfy the second. We have argued repeatedly that if this
is not the case—if these presuppositions are not satisfied—any explanation
for the enduring presence of issues concerning existence, if it is based




#1 . To say that a statement is unconditionaliy true in some sense, is
to say — with equal imprecision — that it is necessary in some sense
Aristotle, within his philosophical I ex ikon, writes "that which cannot be
otherwise, is necessary as it is" (META) Delta-5 1015a 20. But none of
these paraphrases help us very much. Our first task is then clear. We
must study the use, or uses of 'necessary' and related terms. (For we
cannot investigate whether there are statements which can be said to be
"necessary" until we understand more clearly what may be intended by
this all too freely bandied word.) Within the following we distinguish
various uses, or applications of the term "necessity". We then consider
whether 'necessity', when used so, is informative. Among these, we find
two types which must be true for the others to be true. As earlier, we
distinguish:
I: naturaI (or physical ) necessity. Scientific laws may sometimes be
said to be necessary. Or perhaps it is because of them that one says: So
the following must occur'. But whatever can be expressed vaguely along
these lines in terms of 'must' or 'necessary' can be rephrased clearly
if we use 'invariant' and 'determinate' as in the following.
A property or a relation is said to be determinate if it remains
invariant, i e. unaltered, in respect to char,gas in a reference-frame.
For instance the shape of a chess piece remains unchanged in respect to
any alteration of its position on the board, i.e. its shape is a
determinate property of the piece in respect to changes in position. 0r
again (In classical mechanics) the shape of a rigid body remains invariant
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in respect to changes in time, position, and velocity: and thus shape
is a determinate property of a rigid body in respect to the reference-frames
of time and space. But let us note the invariant need not be a simple
property. For instance, if we consider the statement of Ohm's Law, it is
the relation of identity between voltage and the product current x resistance
which remains invariant. And it is this relation which is said to be
determinate. Or, in more complex situations such as those envisaged in
quantum mechanics ,it is merely the probability of an event's occurring
which is said to be invariant.
However complex or abstract the invariant may be, we can say
that the property, F, of a is determinate (in respect to some reference-frame,
RF) when for all values 0, of RF, a Is F; and for a class of individuals,
the property, F, of any member, x, of this class is determinate when for
aii values of 0 ,x is F. And similarly for relations of any degree of
complexity. Scientific laws in general, state that a determinate relation
holds between certain entities, properties, etc. for a specified range
of values in some given frarrW of reference. The principle of gravity,
e.g. states that at any position in time and space (i.e. for all positions
in these reference-frames) a particular complex relation is invariant,
namely: the force exerted by one body upor, another varies inversely with
the square of the distance between them.
When such a condition of invariance is satisfied—particularly
in respect to an omnipresent frame of reference such as that of time or
space, etc.— one can say that Fa is naturally necessary. Similarly a
determinate relation between a and b, Rat , etc. can be said to be naturally
necessary. And thus the ascription or non-ascription of 'natural necessity'
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is relative to the frame of reference in terms of which the invariance is
or is not established.
In the above we have viewed natural necessity as a property of
certain states of affairs, e.g. of an a which is F,and a which is R to
b, etc. Others,, on an analogy with logical necessity, might consider
of
natural necessity to be exclusively a property/statements, i.e. of those
propositions which state that a determinate property or relationship
holds in respect to some entity or entities. To accomodate this usage,
let us say that if p is naturally necessary, ' p' is naturally necessary
We need in the sequel consider natural necessity then only in respect to
statements, either individual or general.) Now what are the components of
an expression which can be said to be naturally necessary? In an old-
fashioned view of science, scientists are supposed to describe and then to
do sums. The describing, although fastidious, is considered to be neutral,
so that anyone can do this. Were there such a science, any propositions
contained within it could be expressed in terms of theory-free descriptions,
supplemented with the appropriate logical and mathematical signs. By
'theory-free description' I mean a description which any normal observer
might be able to relate in a given situation, irrespective of his
theoretical and conceptual formation. For instance, any person with
normal vision might say: I see the sun going down', or if he wanted words
for the sun, he might improvise: I see that reddish round object moving
down', or if he lacked even these terms, he might utter: I see that,
which is like this (^drawing a circle^) and this (^pointing to my sunburn^
going I ike thi s'CPO inting downj^.
In contrast to this, it takes a considerable amount of
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sophistication to observe in the same situation: Yes, you see it as if
the sun were going down, but it is the earth which is turning away'. This
latter observation carries the conceptual scheme of the theory along with
it. Without this theoretical background a statement of this kind would
be no more warranted than its negation. Since it is possible only in the
context of a theory, we say that a statement of this latter type is
theory-laden. It is evident that most, if not all scientific statements
are of this latter type. And if they are, one cannot assert the
necessity of any such propositions without presupposing the correctness
of the conceptual structure which enables the observation to be estab-
Iished
We are then left with two ways of ascribing natural necessity.
I) This necessity may be ascribed to a theory-free description. In
such a case, the aptness of this ascription depends upon the correctness
of the description alone. 2) In other cases (and these latter I suppose
are representative) the statement that 'p• is naturally necessary also
depends upon the correctness of the conceptual structure in terms of
which it is asserted But however ascribed: "p' is naturally necessary'
can be shown to mean that a determinate relation holds among certain
entities, properties, relations, etc. which constitute the state of
affairs, p.
#2. We continue now to the second use of 'necessary':
ii: necessity in re. The doctrine of essentiaIism maintains that there is
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an absolute preference In the selection of terms that are to be employed
in defining an object. For according to this belief it is the attributes
so named which are responsible for the object being what it is. It is
these that constitute its "essential" nature:
A definition is a formula exhibiting the cause of a thing's
existence...an indemonstrable positing of essential nature" (POST AN)
I I-10 993b 38^ 994a i| t.
Thus the correct (real) definition of x states those configurations of
attributes which x alone must have to be x. And, the choice of these
defining terms is unique:
It is impossible that there should be more than one definition of
the same thing" Aristotle "Topics" VI-5 142b 35.
Now were the objects concerned merely elements of a formal
system, essential ism might be accepted as a colorful albeit cumbersome
doctrine of definition. For in nearly any formal system of sufficient
richness, statements are inter-derivable in such a fashion that it may be
only a matter of convenience which dictates the selection of certain ones
as definitions. Thus essentia I i sm ,i n insisting that there must be an
absolute distinction of kind between the definition and its consequences^
within a formal system might prove inconvenient, but sti I ^^e^^'b'l^.
But I fail to see how this can be the case among the elements
of an untidy reality. Man for instance might be defined in terms of
different species-specific characteristics. One might for example settle
upon rationality. But we might also chose some other allegedly unique
characteristic, say some configuration of blood factors or of DNA molecules.
Man is a rational animal. Man is an animal with rhesus-minus, etc. And
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let us assume that a rational psychologist can derive many of man's
characteristics from the first definition But we might also assume
that a good blood chemist could derive some of man's characteristics
from the second definition. Thus both can, as it were, exhibit a "cause" of
man's existence as he is. But it is obvious that the two definitions are
not logically interchangeable, in the manner of definition and theorem
in some formal system Man it seems is definable in different ways.
Yet essential ism singles out some possible order among the
various properties of an object and views this as the order. This selection
is often arbitrary. Certainly no reliance upon sense-perception would
induce one to define man as a rational animal! (And it is from sense-
perceptions, Aristotle argues, that the universal, say, Rationality, is
grasped.) Or, to use an historically earlier example, were one to define
man as a two-legged arimal, or as a featherless biped, again one cannot
show why this is to be preferred, or rejected in some absoiute fashion.
If however, one loss couple this doctrine of definitional essential
ism, with a further belief that there is a unique ordering relationship
amongst all entities, say In respect to a chain of being, then one can
justify one's choice, say of Rationality, in reference to the position
which man occupies in this chain. But the problem reappears: How can
one justify the uniqueness of the ordering relation? Aristotle for
instance also employs a second frame of reference in his biological works.
Creatures here are classified in respect to their mode of generation and
to their "vital warmth". See Ross (I) p. 116. This is independent of
the former.
In other words, one can justify the uniqueness of a real definition
only In respect to a conceptual scheme which singles out certain values
as essential. Thus in each application of an essentialtst position
there is also some covert factor which is theory-laden, or bound to a
particular conceptual scheme. We will return to this point in the
following. For the present let us note that if one maintains an essen¬
tial ist position, a real definition displays those characteristics of the
defined which the object must have to be itself. And since what is
defined is not the individual but the species e.g. Man, Number—and
these are considered to be unchanging—the definition states what in the
nature of things cannot be otherwise, i.e. what is necessary in re.
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^3, In the above we have argued that there are two distinct types
of statements underlying the uses of necessity already discussed. The
first (if there are such) are theory-free descriptions. The second are
theory-laden descriptions or definitions, as the case may be. The assertion
of these latter Is warranted only in terms of the conceptuaI structure
which enables them, or in terms of which they ore expressed. We shall soon
investigate the alleged necessity associated with conceptual structures.
But for the present let us look at the third use of 'necessity', which in
many ways is distinct from the above,
iii: lopical necessity. Fortunately we need not linger about this prickly
theme. The reasons for this will soon become clear. First let us
distinguish two uses of 'logically necessary'. When for instance
Aristotle asserts that the principle of contradiction "is a principle
in all things" (META) K-5, it is clear (since it cannot be otherwise)
that this law of logic is necessary. But what is being said now? We
propose, simply this* There is a complex predicate To-be-subject-to~the-
law-of-contradiction, and this predicate is invariantly associated
with all existents, irrespective of time, place, etc. Thug in this use
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'logically necessary' describes a case of natural/ necessity.
It of course has this distinctive feature that it applies to all
things: i+ is an invariant predicate of all entities in any normal reference-frame
But it would be unfair to Aristotle to leave it this way. For
this principle is also considered a logical truth. It is the "starting
1005b 33.
point for all other axjoms" (META) Gamma-3' And with this we come
to the second sense of log'cally necessary'. But what is this? and what
is the relation between the two? One generally accepted law of modal
logic is that if 'p* is a truth of logic, 'p' is necessary. Thus the
principle of contradict ion can be considered necessary inasmuch as it
is a logical truth. Similarly all other logical truths derivable from this
(and other axioms ) are also logically necessary. As such, employing our
earlier convention that an axiom can be said to be derivable from itself,
the ascription of 'logical necessity' to 'p' may seem to be no more than
a clouded way of saying that 'p' is derivable from the axioms of logic.
But if at the same time one believes that there are no alternative logics,
then the statement that 'p' is logically necessary carries with it the
important information that 'p' is (or is to be considered") categorically
provable. Now, if we employ logic in our description of extra-IogicaI
entities, it follows that no logically acceptable description will run
counter to these truths. Thus any logical truth may, roughly, be said in this way
to be a principle in all things. But this feature, strictly speaking,
is a characteristic of statements and not of things, and it is well to keep
the two separatec.onIy the former can be logically true, i.e. necessary in this sense
To summarize. Inasmuch as logical truths, and particularly the
law of contradiction, are considered to be principles in things, such
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principles are considered as if naturally necessary. in contradistinction
to this, if 'p* is a truth of logic, whether axiomatic or derivable, 'p1 can
be said to be logically necessary. The two uses of 'necessary' resemble
each other. For if logic is unique, no logically acceptable description of
things will run counter to the truths in logic, and by extension, one can
then say that logical truths apply to all things.
t:
But if one confuses this resemblance with an identify, it is
possible to consider the same principle to be both j_n things, as an invariant
predicate of them, and at the same time to be applicable to statements about
them and about ail things. Consequently, if one is under this confusion,
it becomes natural to believe that a study of these latter, i.e. of logic, can
in some way inform one about the characteristies of extra-Iogicai objects.
If however, we separate these two senses of necessity—natural and logical—
there is no such link. We assume this separation. Thus we cannot expect
any statement of a strictly logical necessity, in itself, to be informative
about extra-iogicaI objects. Since the classical approach assumes that
there are necessary statements about extra-logical objects, and that these
are informative, we need be conserned no further with merely logical necessity.
§4. We shall also find reason to dispense with any study of the
following possible use of 'necessity': iv: lexical necessity.
When a statement is lexically entailed by another (see Chapter IV-5) one
might also say that the entailed is lexically necessary. This entailment, we
remember must depend at least in part on the meaning of the extra-IogicaI words
contained within the entailing statement( s). _l_f_ we were to be guided by the
analogy between logical and lexical necessity, we might assume that the laws
of the former were fully applicable to the latter. But as noted earlier this
is not the case. The present instance suggests other reasons for this. For in
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some ways the range of ascription of 'lexical necessity' is narrower than
that of 'logical necessity' and in other ways it is broader. If for
instance we wehe to assume that the same logical laws applied to both
types of necessity, and were to say that the entailed was necessary, we might
be forced to conclude that the entire entailment was also necessary.
For if this were not the case it would be possible for the entailed to be possi-
blyfalse. But then it follows that whenever 'q' is necessary the conditional
'poq' is also necessary and this is true for any • p'. This runs counter
to ordinary usage. (We do not normally say; It is necessary if the moon
is made of green cheese, then a is a bachelor only if a is unmarried'.)
Thus 'lexical necessity' cannot be ascribed to each logically necessary
statement. On the other hand we are ready to countenance the statement:
it is necessary that if a is an eligible bachelor, then a is
handsome or witty or rich, etc.
Fcr this latter follows from the extended meaning of 'eligible bachelor'
in the context of its present use. But it certainly does not follow logically
from the definitions of 'eligible' and 'bachelor'. In this way lexical
truth depends upon more than logic. And again, there is another important
difference between the two. Although we may be ready to consider the truths
of logic as somehow necessary at all times,we cannot consider the lexical
in the same manner. For instance it is conceivable in some grisly future
that 'eligible bachelor' might denote merely a male whose genes were still
fertile after successive radio-active bombardments. Such entailments,
unlike those of logic, are all too liable to change.
Wherein then lies the necessity, if any, of lexical truths?
To answer this, let us first look at the notion of conceptually necessary
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truths. We will find that the two are closely linked.
v: conceptual necessity. Let us say that a proposition is conceptually
necessary if it appears in, or can be shown to follow logically from, the
set of propositions which establish a full statement of a given concept.
This definition may appear rather curious. It will take time to explaint
it, even brief Iy.
#5, There are many questions one can ask about concepts. For
instance: Are concepts mental 1 Do they exist? Are they constructed?
Are they public? etc. But for our present purposes let us inquire instead:
What does one do with a concept, i.e. how is it used? And, as a first
step (since only when one has grasped a concept can one use it) we shall
ask: What does it mean to grasp a concept? Let us now consider this
latter more closely.
When my son has grasped the concept of Sums, he is able to take
the expression: Two plus three equals 1 and (hopefully) complete it
'five', and if he takes two objects from one pile and three from another,
on the basis of the same concept,he knows the objects will constitute a
new heap of five. Similarly when an apprentice grasps the concept of
his job, he is able in any given situation to know what sort of action is
expected of him. Or when a tribesman grasps the Anglo-Saxon notion of
justice, he is ready to say, for instance: According to Her Majesty's law,
a man is not punished unless he is shown to be guilty'. Or when a
classical physicist grasps the concepts of quantum mechanics he realizes
among other things that he is not expected to study actions but
interractions, not individuals but types of individuals.
And also when one has grasped these concepts, and is guided by
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them, other types of behavior then becomes inappropriate. in the above
situations, the child would not expect the heap to be empty. Nor should
the workman lie down and say: I'm resting my eight hours until it's time
to go home'. Nor should the tribesman say: Punish the first man you
see'.
For once it is grasped, the child, the workman, the tribesman,
have their respective concepts. And what distinguishes having a concept
from not-having is that the concept user is able to perform certain
actions, make certain judgments, express certain statements etc.
appropriately in a given situation. The having of a concept enables one
to proceed regularly according to particular patterns. It is as it
were I ike a train's being put on the rails. Once there one can move in
various directions along the lines established by the layout of the
concept. And similarly, the layout excludes other moves which otherwise
would be possible.
Thus it is, that once the concept is grasped, although there
may be options open concerning the path to be taken, or the move to be
made, or the procedure to be effected, the set of these options is in
some way determined beforehand. At least these are roughly delimited
like those on a map which shows a network of trails (of which various
ones might be taken at any time) and also indicates the Iikely position
of others. In this way ja concept is, or establishes a. set of determinate
procedures. actions, moves, expectations, judgments, assertions, etc.
which hold or are appropriate in any given situation to which the
concept is applied.
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One note before proceeding. For the saKe of illustration
we have talked above, generally in terms of particular actions, moves,
etc. But this should not lead us astray. For what is typical of concepit-
use —asopposed to rote-behavior— is that it is not merely the instance
which is grasped or understood. Rather one masters an abstract mechanism
—and it is the mastery of this latter that permits one to apply the same
concept to a wide variety of novel situations, it is, as it were, the
grasping of knowledge of an entire network of which we have glimpsed or
experienced only parts.
For instance it is in this way, when we have learnt a language,
that we are able to recognize a novel sequence of sounds as a weiI-formed
utterance of this language, however infinite the set of possible sentences
might be:
This is the only assumption by which we can account for a speaker's
impressive ability to use language creatively. Fluent speakers
both produce and understand sentences that they have never pre¬
viously encountered, and they can do this for indefinitely many
such novel sentences... The creativity that exhibits itself in
the production and comprehension of novel sentences is thus iike
the creativity exhibited when someone successfully multiplies two
numbers that he has never multiplied or seen multiplied before.
Both types of creativity are cases of rule-governed behavior in
which rules that abstractly represent infinitely many possible
constructions are used to produce one or another actual con-
construction falling under them." Katz pp. 100-101.
Such a mechanism can be said to be instantiated whenever the
concept is employed, much the way a schematic rule, e.g. of inference, is
instanced in each particular use of the rule. Thus if we hold a Newtonian
concept of force (in which force is considered equal to the product: mass X
acceleration), If in a given situation a force has a particular value, say,
to19K —to choose an arbitrary one—we know that the produc tof mass X
lei9
acceleration equals K , irrespective
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of any experience we (or anyone else) may have with any
of these particular values. In other words the abstract mechanists we can
associate with the concept establishes & set of statements which are
so related, that given the first (e.g. 'Force equals n') various other
statements can be said to follow.
each concept. These might be expressed in the form of a compendious
enumeration of all such possible statements, or recursively, or schemat¬
ically, or otherwise. But the form of these does not concern us. If
propositions, as above, establish a set of determinate relations between
the description of the initial situation to which the concept is applied
and the r suit of the ensuing application, we can say thar they provide
a description of the concept. If at the same time this abstract mechanism
applies to each situation in which the concept may be employed, we can
say that it establishes a full description of the concept.
Mark well, I am not saying that this is the concept. But I
do claim that if we consider the concept in respect to all of its possible
(Very much in the same way as a table of road distances can be associated
with the actual stretches of space which it mentions) When we define
'conceptual necessity' in terms of a full description of a concept, this
is all that we mean. The concept, as it were, authorizes the set of
consequences of its applications.
ceptually necessary, we mean either that it is a statement of a schema
which establishes the above relationships, or is some instance of it.
We can imagine propositions of the above kind associated with
structure can be mapped upon a concept.
Thus if we wish to say that a particularpropositicn js con-
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In this way, wa can say that it is conceptually necessary, within our
norma! notion of arithmetic, that x+o = x . and 0+0 =0, I 0 = I,
2+0 = 2, etc. Similarly we can say in respect to our concept of justice
that it is conceptually necessary that if a man has not been proven guilty,
he is to be considered innocent, or if Senator Dodd has not been proven
guilty of deliberate doubl e-bi I I i ng, that he is to tie considered innocent,
etc. Or again we can say it is conceptually necessary within the
Copernicean worId-view?if the sun appears to be sinking into the sea
now, that this be described as an apparent motion of the sun. Or that
it is conceptually necessary within a world view described in terms of a
chain of being, that man's perfection and his essentia! nature, lie in
his rationaI ity,.
And finally, we extend this use of 'conceptually necessary' so
that where 'p' is conceptually necessary and 'q' follows logically from
'p', 'q' can also be said to be conceptually necessary.
^5 At this point one might ask: Is there any
significant difference between conceptual and lexical necessity? For
instance do not the rules of language sanction statements as lexically
necessary in a manner similar to that established by the abstract
mechanisms you have associated with concepts?'
I am afraid this question cannot be answered in small compass
and it would run us far afield to pursue it any length. But let us
consider how it might be answered. This will further clarify what we
mean by lexical necessity and, above all, show how the necessity of the
lexical—where it is not trivial— depends upon the conceptual.
For the ascription of lexical necessity would indeed be trivial
if it were restricted to definitional substitutions and logical
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entailments of these. Given any definition , i.e. any expression of
the form:
x - DEF Fx.Gx , appropriateIy quantified
and the statement1....a.' it would follow then that a was F and a was
G| a was F, a, was G; and also(if the statement satisfies its own
presuppositions) that there is an a. But all this follows logically—
and any mention of lexical necessity in such a case would be superflous.
But we have expressly included more than the above within the
scope of 'lexical entailments'. For instance we suggested that 'a is
an eligible bachelor' entails not only material of the above kind, but also
that a Is handsome or witty or rich or agreeable, etc. And this latter
depends on more than the defined meanings of 'eligible' and 'bachelor'.
One is tempted to say that this depends upon the connotation
of the terms. But unfortunately neither 'connotationrpr 'intension',
(nor the broader 'comprehension') are sufficiently clear for one to
pin much hope upon them. Consider in this connection the following excerpt
from the "Port Royal Logic":
The comprehension of an idea £or a terrrPj is the constituent
parts which make up the idea, none of which can be removed without
destroying the idea. For example, the idea of a triangle is made
up of the idea of having three sides, the idea of having three
angles, and the idea of having angles whose sum is equal to two
right angles, and so on". Arnauld (I) p. 51.
(For the interchangeabiIity of 'idea' and 'term' in The above, see Kneale
(Dp. 318)
But however interesting the above remarks may be, how far does 'and so on'
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go? Until we can delimit the components, 'comprehension of 'triangle"
remains vague. At what point, say, is a complex theorem about triangles
in topology part of the comprehension of 'triangle'? And, on the other
hand why must the fact that the sum of the interior angies of a triangle
equals two right angles be considered part of this comprehension? And
again does every fresh discovery add to the "comprehension" of a term,
or only when I know it or when everybody knows it? And what about actual
triangles and our knowledge of them How does this effect it?
'Submarine' for instance entered our language first as an adjective
pertaining to under-sea activities. Yet today from 'a is a submarine' we
might infer that a may be armed with nuclear warheads or is in Holy Loch
And these are entailments which with the exception of a Jules Verne would
have been unthought of, perhaps even incomprehensible, in an earlier age
And we can also imagine how at some time in the language of naval
strategists, these entailments were already part of their speech but not
of ours
Thus if we try to answer: Where does the content of 'and so
on' stop in the above citation concerning the "comprehension" of a term,
we can never be certain. For this seems to vary not only with the period
but with the state of knowledge —of theory and of fact—of the particular
users of the word. And this is a very slippery slope upon which to place
necessity.
In contradict!net ion to this the concept—as we have discussed
it—determines the set of its conceptual entailments. Further discoveries
concerning the concept, however much they may modify our understanding
do not alter the concept as it is established. The seif-identity of a
concept (provided the concept is self-consistent) is unvuinerable to
change in respect to any further knowledge one may have of it. For as
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Arnauld observes, none of the parts of an idea can be removed "without
destroying the idea". Such is certainly the case with concepts. Someone
for instance might say about a conceptual entailment: That has nothing
to do with my, concept of F'. But if one can show him that the aspect
he rejects does indeed follow, he cannot excise this consequence from his
concept. He will either accept the new discovery, however unwillingly, or
exchange his concept for another. There is a sort of bedrock here: one
must either stand upon it or decide to change one's position.
Perhaps an interpretation along these lines imputes excessive
rigidity to concepts. Perhaps In any but a formal system, even concepts
can change a little, sway with the wind, without a complete loss of
identity. But despite this reservation, I think my essentia! point is
clear. In general we do not say the concept changes when we discover
something else about it, any more than the geography of the Pacific Ocean
is said to alter when it is seen for the first time. On the other hand,
the extended meaning of a word and its patterns of entailment do change
with usage and are revisable in response to fresh discoveries concerning
its subject. For instance I suggested that 'a is an eligible bachelor'
allows one to infer today that a is handsome or rich, etc. ! also
suggested that in some grisly world the above might entail only that a
had sufficient genes; and in some Indian society in which everyone is
betrothed before reaching puberty, the above proposition might entail that
a was eight years old. in each case it is a change in the concept of
marriage, or of mating, which alters the patterns of lexical entailment.
For it is the particular concept which holds (in this case that of
marriage) which provides the criteria for the ascription of 'eligible',
under certain conditions.
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to the name of some bachelor. And since there are different concepts,
and different criteria to be estabUshed in different cu'tures, the propriety
of the ascription together with the degree of warrant of statements
lexically entailed by them, also varies. The expended meanings which
words take on, depend upon the concepts with which they are associated,
much as the color of a chameleon does to its surroundings. And thus it
is that the patterns of conceptual entailment, in force at any time,
provide the network for which the inference tickets of the associated
language are issued..
For how could words, or rules for the use of words, in themselves
sanction such inferences? We do not change cur concepts because of the
meaning of words, or in response to further knowledge of how they are
used. (Except perhaps in the degenerate case in which a misuse of language
has led one astray.) But we do alter and/or expand the meaning of our
words and the rules governing their use, whenever the associated concept,
or our knowledge of the concept, changes. Thus, within the conceptual
scheme of the Age of Reason, where any kind of excess is considered to be a
defect, one warranted entailment of 'a is enthusiastic' is 'it is to be
lamented'. Yet the same sentence, containing the same lexical units,
introduced into a contemporary conceptual scheme — say that prevalent in
a school of education — would warrant the entailment: Great.'1.
In terms of the above suggestion (and I regret that there is
no space to pursue it further and in greater detail) we can now explain
the puzzle about the limit of the comprehension of a term. A portion of
the ever-changing body of knowledge one possesses about a concept, or which
is part of the concept of some object, brushes off and becomes part of the
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general stock of knowledge of the language-users. Depending upon the subject
and the user, some portion of this, together with a knowledge of the content
of the situations to which it is applied, becomes included in the compre¬
hension of the term. In this way part of that which I understand about the
subject of sane word, 'w1, becomes part of the extended meaning which *w'
has for me.
Some of this may be purely subjective For instance 'Grepon'
(in French) means a particular type of mythological creature in addition
to this it is the name of a peak above Chamoinix. But to me it also means
a place where I was nearly caught in an ice avalanche. All this is part of
the meaning of 'Grepon' for me. And doubtlessly most words cfc> have such a
peripheral area of subjective (idiolacfive) content. But once language is
employed and used publicly, these peripheral areas become unimportant.
Depending upon the size of the group and its constitution, 1 he words we use
take on a group meaning which is roughly equivalent to the common intersection
of each individual's uses. (We all know how in one group a word becomes a
cue, illuminating a whole attitude of mind; and how in another all the
interence-patterns, which seemed so evident in the former must be labored
to make sense ) Thus the range of the comprehension or the extended sense
of a term, as it is used, is a function of the user's (and the hearer's)
knowledge both of the associated concept and the situations to which it is
habitually applied —and varies more or less directly with it.
According to this view the extra-definitional entailments estab¬
lished by the rules of language depend in this way in part upon the conceptual
patterns in force. I certainly do not wish to contend that language cannot
also influence the development and the choice of concepts. But the only point
I wish to make is that (with the exception of descriptive statements, which
can be corsidered as enthymematic) the ultimate sanctions for the extended patterns
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of lexical entailment found within language lie in the pattern of
conceptual entailments established by the concepts in force at the same time.
If this is so, we need no longer consider the claims of lexical
necessity in their own right. For, then they are based either on convention
(as in lexical definitions) or on the conceptual.
Further, if this sanction did not depend upon the conceptual,
wherein lies its alleged necessity? Certainly not in the physica1 alone, nor
the logical, nor in definitional conventions, (For this latter would
make this necessity trivial.) And as we have shown any recourse to a
i
necessity j_n re depends too upon the conceptual. This too is to be ruled
out. Looking elsewhere, one might try to anchor this necessity in a form
of life, in the richer sense of a living activity in which dispositions and
public attitudes are interfused in language-use. But I think attitudes and
dispositions of this kind can in turn be mapped upon the same or similar
abstract mechanisms as those associated with concepts. As far as
the results which concern us, i.e. the ensuing statements, what is the
es+ablishes
difference between saying: My concept of justice That in a given
situation a man is not to be considered guilty unless proved so' from: We
are disposed in a given situation, when a man has not been proved guilty
to say: He is to be considered innocent'?
Thus, although we have admittedly given a large interpretation
to 'conceptually necessary', it seems that any recourse to any other
ground of lexical necessity is either inadequate, or can be shown to
refer back to the conceptual.
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#7. Within the preceding sectionswe have discussed five
distinct applications of the term 'necessary1. These are in relation to
i: natural (or physical) necessity, ii: necessity j_n re, iii: logical,
iv: lexical, and v: conceptual necessity. Our analysis suggested that
statements of laturaI necessity might be either theory-free, and as such pur©
descriptive statements, or theory-laden and so in part dependent upon the
conceptual structure in terms of which they are expressed. Thus any claim
to establish an ontology on the basis of natural necessity presupposes
theory-free descriptive statements or conceptually necessary statements.
We then argued, a propos of necessity jji re, that the doctrine of
essential ism upon which it is based is arbitrary, unless grounded in terms
of a conceptual scheme that sanctions some particular choice of defining
characteristies as unique and essential. Thus any assertion based upon
necessity j_n re presupposes that one has already established the necessity
of the conceptual order ir, terms of which it is grounded. As for the
third use of necessity, i.e. In respect to logical truths, we pointed
out that if one considers logic truly unique, then any logically acceptable
statement, concerning anything whatsoever, cannot run counter to the
rules of logic. We suggested if this observation is taken uncritically,
be
it might be viewed as imputing logical necessity to/a principle in things.
And if this were so, one might believe that a study of logic would yield
information concerning the extra-IogicaI. But this is to confuse a
characteristic of statements with that which they describe. Thus any
resort to this sense of logical necessity, as a positive principle in
things, is unfounded, and any appeal to iogical necessity to establish
more than the form of an argument is inadmissible. We then argued that
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any appeai to lexical necessity, if this were based merely upon the logical
entailments of definitions, was trivial, inasmuch as definitions need be
no more than conventions. (Or if based upon more than convention, then
the arguments concerning jn re applies.) On the other hand the patterns
of lexical entailment, that we related to the extended meaning of terms
extend beyond those of formal logic in many respects, 3nd in other cases
shy short. Although we avoided a full-scale discussion of this subject,
as one leading too far afield, we argued for the thesis that it is chiefly the
structure of the associated concepts that sanctions these patterns of
lexical entailment. Thus again, an ascription of necessity depends upon a
prior ascription of conceptual necessity. As for this latter we argued
that in any application of a concept the relation between the situation to
which the concept is applied, and the procedure, or judgment, or action,
cr statement, etc. which follows as the result of this application is
determinate: that one can associate with each concept (at least abstractly)
3 set of statements or schemata which specify this relation; that any
statement occurring in such a description of a concept, or logically
entailed by it, could bo said to be conceptually necessary in respect to
this concept.
Thus by dint of devious analyses, we have separated out two
types of propositions — theory-free descriptive statements, and con¬
ceptual I y necessary ones. All others which might be used to establish
the content of an ontology, must be based in some way on these. Accordingly,
if the necessity of conceptual statements is inadequate, and if theory-
free descrip+ions do not have the logical power to accomplish their task
of establishing an ontology, no body of existence-statements is categorically
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provable. And if this is so, the classical approach is untenable, at least,
in respect to existence-statements.
Let us then look more closely at the alleged claims of conceptual
necessity. If our analysis up to the present is correct, the claim that
1p' is conceptually necessary can be explicated by saying that 'p' is
part or consequence of a full description of a concept. But when we assert
the conceptual necessity of 'p * in a categorical argument we must intend
more than this. (We could not get very far if 'p1 were conceptually
necessary only in respect to, say, the concept of phlogiston, or in
the theory of epicycles.) We must assert at least that the concept is in
force, i.e. that it is accepted by the cuIture-bearers of the time. But
if we made no stronger claim than this, this necessity might still be
purely contingent. It would not be necessarily necessary that such a
concept should be in force. Rather the claim one makes in any categorical
proof employing 'p', is that the concept from which the necessity of *p'
springs is itself in one way or another always necessary. (As Geach
alleges there must be such concepts without which rational discourse would
be impossible.) Our analysis narrows down then to this one point; In
Jthat Jsay .caa j*s ..claim -that ±he -ne.t.WQr.k sti. .relations established iiy a.
.concept-is .aecassari, Ly necessary; i.e. that in some fundamental and
bedrock way it is not possible for the concept to be otherwise?
To scotch a facile answer to this query, let us note that the
whole question of reiterated modalities (as in1necessariIy necessary') is
a trouble spot in modal logic. Some logicians would ban any such reiter¬
ation. I have shown, in the example of traffic laws, and above in respect
to concepts, that 'necessary' or 'necessarily' can be legitimately applied
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to statements describing something else as necessary. Thus, reiteration
has its sanction in ordinary language, even if (as for instance Von Wright
claims in his "Interpretations of Modal Logic" p.77) our logical intuitions
cannot decide the form of reiteration which is the natural one. He refers,
in this case to the question whether "p1 is necessary' entails or is
logically equivalent to 'It is necessary that *p* is necessary'. Were
this latter entailment the case, there would of course be no problem here
for us. Any statement of conceptual necessity J_f the same modal laws
applied, would then be necessarily necessary. But this equivalent is
far from clear, and it is clearly counter-intuitive in respect to many
concepts. So let us — following Lewis (I) page 501 —take up a stricter
formulation, in which this equivalence is not automatically the case.
Thus the problem for the advocates of the classical approach is to prove
that there are necessarily necessary conceptual statements. And to show
this demands more than mere logical manipulation of 'P' and '0°'.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Categorlea I Proof and Disproof -j
#| Before proceeding, let us recall the course of our argument.
Within Chapter Five we have shown that some ontologies may be refutable: the
offending positions are either seIf-ineonsistent or incompatible with
what seem to be incontrovertible truths. If we assume that the pre¬
requisites of logical proof are invariant, a logically conclusive refutation
of this kind is indeed categorical.
But, we observed, ontologies are seldom expressed in a form
sufficiently definite to permit conclusive refutation in this way. For
when an ontology is shown to be indefensible as stated, a new position
not substantially different from the faulty one, but apparently free of
contradiction, can generally be established. Strictly speaking the
initial position has been refuted and a new ontology established. However,
it is generally only through discussion that an actual position becomes
clarified and so the modifications a philosopher introduces to accommodate
a theory to destructive criticism, may then be considered really part
of the ontology after all. Thus an actual ontology may be refuted
without one's knowledge, and may survive to tell the tale.
These remarks apply with equal force when an ontology is shown
to be incompatible with accepted truths (whether these be conceptual or
descriptive). In the absence of a definite terminology, and a canonical
listing of such "truths", a philosopher can generally modify




These observations were not meant to imply that argument of this
type is in vain. Rather, we pointed out a successful refutation
serves to demonstrate that a particular totality of statements, I.e.
those of the ontology + the body of accepted truths, is seIf-ineonsistent.
Within <3 context of accepted truths, refutation stakes out the terrain
upon which a contradlet Ion-free position cannot be established. Like
markers left upon a mine field, it can be a matter of extreme import.
Our next step was (and now is) to ask whether a logically possible
ontology can be refuted. By 'logically possible1 we mean 'self-consistent'.
And further we assume that such an ontology is express..-.-! in a language
sufficiently free of vagueness and ambiguity for its sentences to provide
a unique interpretatlon^ fer any proposition of the form '...x...exists...
wifhin this ontology, there is no question concerning either the inter-
preta+ion or the intended truth value. Within such an ontology there
is neither the slack nor patch-work that one might encounter in an actual
theory. Further, we specify +hat it is merely self-consistent, i.e. it
is not logically necessary and as such uninformative.
We then noted that, as far as the classical approach is con¬
cerned, any prooosition employed in such a refutation would have to be
"necessary1'. Explicitly stated by Aristotle, we have suggested that this is
also presupposed by any adherent of this approach. For otherwise no
conclusion could be unconditional.
To cast our net as wide as possible, we investigated various
senses of 'necessity'. Two types of statements, theory-free descriptions
end conceptually necessary propositions were singled out as irreducible
components (singly or together) underlying any ascription of necessity
VI!- I,2 175
which might interest us.
it is tir now to investigate the latter.
#2. Statements may be said to be conceptually necessary, if they are
contained in (or follow from) a description of a concept
a) in force at some particular time; or
b) in force at all timesj or when
c) (in respect to this world, or universe) it is impossible for the concept
to be otherwisej or
d) (in respect to any universe accessible to a human intelligence) it is
impossible for the concept to be otherwise; or
e)(in respect to any universe accessible to any intelligence, human or
other) it is impossible for the concept to be otherwise.
Fortunately we need at most, discuss only the first three. For
any assertion of necessity in respect to the last, could only be established
in terms accessible to a human understanding. And d) in turn is irrelevant
to our earth-bound study of existence-statements. Further, let us note that
in the assertion 'it is impossible for the concept to be otherwise', as
in c-e, this impossibility cannot be merely logical. For (if we are
correct) the statement "p' is logically necessary' is equivalent to
'1p1 is categorically derivable from the axioms of logic.' Thus to
reiterate 'It is logically necessary that 'p' be logically necessary'
means no more than that the derivability of 'p1 ie itself derivable.
And this meta-statement —as far as existence-prepositions is concerned—
is no more informative than any first-order logical truth.
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In both b) and c), the ascription of necessity is not
restricted in respect to a particular time as in a). However b) applies
to actual sets of concepts which are or have been in force within our
universe, c) applies to any possible ones. The former may occur by
accident; for the latter, this is impossible. Let us call them (respect¬
ively) 'diachronic1; and 'time-free' or 'timeless'.
Now in the following we shall not be interested in whether or not
there are such "necessary" statements to servo in a refutation (or defense)
of a self-consistent ontology. Our intention is to show merely that any
introduction of them into an argument is inconclusive: either I) their
purported self-evident necessity is lacking, or 2) any claim to uncondition¬
ally demonstrate this necessity is unfounded.
Let us look first at the stronger claims of c). These concern
a time-free necessity. We will then work back to the diachronic assertion
of necessity as in b), and then to time-bound assertions, as in a).
#3. A statement might be a Ileged to be necessary in aiI possibie
conceptual schemes that one might establish within our universe. (By
'conceptual scheme ' I mean a totality of concepts,together with the
provisions governing their appIication,which are in force for a given
time, and are held by all or some of the cuIture-bearers of the period; in
other words, I refer to that body of statements and procedures, which the
bearers of the conceputal scheme are ready to accept as true and correct,
as a description of their concepts, the manner in which these concepts
are to be applied, and the intra-conceptuaI consequences of these
applications. )
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I should like to show now that even if there were such propositions
(true in all the possible conceptual schemes one might establish within
our universe), the time-free generality of these truths could never be
shown categorically. We recall, that the conceptual statements which con¬
cern us are not truths of logic. Thus they could not be shown to follow
categorically from other premises, unless these premises themselves were
categorically provable, or incontrovertibIy true in some other manner.
The former possibility introduce a vicious regress.
Now can the premises be incontrovertibly true in some other
manner? By hypothesis they are not truths of logic. Thus their truth
could not be demonstrated merely in terms of themselves. (For if 'p *
is merely logically possible, the conclusion that 1p1 is true canno+ be
established without the introduction of an additional premise. Similarly
an argument based on a reducfio of 'not-p' to absurdity, would also demand a
supplementary premise.) If an additional premise were available and this
was a conceptual statement, we introduce another regress. For this would
true or
have to be/proven true, in the same manner. But the additional premise
cannot be logical, for this would still be insufficient. By our earlier
argument, the premise could not be lexical, for its assertion in turn
depends upon the necessity of the conceptual, and it is this latter which
we are to prove. Thus, if the argument of chaP"l"er VI —7 is correct, the
additional premise must be a theory-free description.
And this is not an unnatural conclusion. For we expect any
possible conceptual scheme to conform to what Wittgenstein calls "general
facts of nature" (INV) note. p. 56. But is it possible to establish any
such genera I facts about the universe in a theory-free manner? For
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instance onn such general "fact" might be that we can repeat measurements
of the sane objects and (under many circumstances) the measurements wi 1
be the same. But if we did not have the consents of Regularity and
of Quantity how could this "fact" be known? And even then, the successful
app ication of these concepts demands a sophisticated understanding of
what is measureable, of what is +o be excluded, and of the circumstances
appropriate for the measurement to be significant. Thus this general
"fact of nature" might well be unascertainabie without theapposite concept-
uaf structure And certainly one cannot assert that these particular
concepts and procedures must be part of a'I possible conceptual schemes
There may be incontrovertible theory-free descriptions, for
example: I see this as yellow', but it is a far cry from an uncontested
description in a phenomenal' 'anguage to a proposition about a general
fact of nature. (We discuss this further in XI — I 4. )
Thus it appears that any additional descriptive premise of suffic¬
ient power to accomplish the purpose of proving 'p * must itself depend
upon the conceptua1 structure which enables the observation it reports.
And this again would beg the question.
The only other incontrovertibI a manner of asserting the truth
of 'p' must then lie in *p' itself In this case one could not rely
upon intuition, ^or how could one possibly assert: I know without the
shadow of doubt tha+ 'a' not only appears in the sbatement of a concept
in force today, but it must appear in the description of any possible
conceptual scheme?' For, it seems, the only source of this 'must'
aris§ either in an intuitive certain+y—which ! for one fail to attain—
or it is impossible that 'not-p'.
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But if it is a:iegedly impossible for 'no+-p' to hold in any
possible set of concepts, our problem reappears. How does one know this?
(Unless of course 'not-p' is logically impossible. But then *p1 would
be logically necessary, and this contradicts our hypothesis.)
Thus, under the conditions we have assumed, it is impossible to
show categorically that some statement of a conceptual relation must be
true (or correct) in all possible conceptual schemes which one might
establish within the universe. Nor can one claim that thi statement
is i rucontrovert i bl y true (or correct) in itself, independent of any
demonstration. For neither assertion can be grounded (Among +ne
conditions we have assumed is that the statement is self-consistent
but not logically necessary, a.nd tha~ the normal conditions of logical
proof and disproof apply to it. And presumably we include withi: these
latter the presupposition that the universe to which they are to apply is
non-empty.)
Accordingly one cannot ground any refutation of an ontology
in terms of a statement or statements which can be said to be time I ess Iy
necessary
#4. One might try to turn this argument against me by asking
since I have introduced a theory of concepts'-shouId this theory then
not be applicable to all possible conceptual scheme? For Instance the
conclusion of the above argument?, ir answering this it would be well
to distinguish the levd of reference. Vie started with a statement 'p! ,
in a conceptual scheme which we shall call Cj. The claim was made
that this statement was true in all possible conceptua; schemes, schemes
which we shall call Cj , (^...C ,(without specifying the finitude
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or infinitude of the sequence}. But let us stress that ®p* is in a scheme
not about it. But the statement "$>' i ■ true or correct i- all possible
schemes' is about a class of schemes, i.e. fc . CL,.. C , .1 let us .ay
- 12 ft
this latter statement is in a conceptual scheme CS , which talks about
fc , C .C "low we have argued Ur terms of that the state-*• I 2 n J I
ment "p* is true or correct etc.' is not provable. And this is a ob¬
servation made in a particular conceptual scheme — one in which we
assume the normal notion# of proof a«d disproof. tofether with the material
we have employed in our theory of concepts. We ar© fully ready to conceive
that there may be a conceptual scheme about concepts and proof, CS,,
which is different from ours arid from which other conclusions folow.
We claim no categoricity for any discussion. But we do trust that our
assumptions ar® roughly equivalent to those mad© by advorates of the
position we are criticising —'end our purpose is to show, give certai
assumptions that we can or cannot assort various consciences
< i • »
#5. The belief in the ©eessi+y of ©cessary statements is deeply
if grained. I am tampted to say it Is part of the phi Iosopher's callous.
And thus another objection might be voiced: You have omitted the
possibility that ther© are seif-val(dating statements. These would
be neither intuitively evident—at least not in the sense of an immediate
intuition—nor logicaliy necessary, but nevertheless their truth would
be undeniable after proper reflection.*
V! 1-5,
This is certainly a point well taken—and we shall ignore it
for the present. For we remarked earlier that if some claim is not true
in a weaker form, it is not true in a stronger form. If e.g. we can
show that there are no self-validating statements in terms of actual
concepts, then we need not show that there are none 'n terms of any possibl
concepts. This we shall do later. So let us postpone an answer to this
objection until we discuss the claim that some
S"fQi*em@nts
conceptually necessary/hoid in all actual conceptual schemes, past and
present.
#6. We have in the preceding sectiore examined the assertabiIity
a
of any ascription of a timless conceptual necessity. Whether or not
H
an actual philosopher may have asserted this, we have deemed this claim
worth investigating. For it is only such a proposition which can be said
to be necessary in the intuitive sense of 'impossible to be otherwise'.
The ascription of diachronic conceptual necessity, to which we now turn,
is after all contingent. At best one can assert that certain conceptual
features have remained constant in our intellectual history and pre¬
history. This is what Strawson appears to affirm when he writes:
For there is a massive central core of human thinking which has
no history—or none recorded in histories of thought; there are
categories and concepts which, in their most fundamental character,
change not at all. Obviously these are not the specialities of the
most refined thinking. They are the commonplaces of the least refined
thinking; and are yet the indispensibIe core of the conceptual
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equipment of the most sophisticated human beingS' Strawsori (2)
p. 10.
Thus, if Strawson is correct, some portion of a I I (or nearly all) our
conceptual schemes is invariant in respect to changes in time. If this
is so,a statement, 'p', contained within this core would be true in all
conceptual schemes, and 'p1 might then be used either to refute or ground
an ontology categorically. But what, precisely, is it that is inalter¬
able in this way? In answering this question, we may distinguish between
a weaker and a stronger interpretation of the above quotation. (I do not
think that either corresponds exactly to Strawson's position, but an ana¬
lysis of these will nevertheless prove helpful.) We will show that in
terms of either interpretation—if there are such 'p's—they cannot be
used to categoricaI Iy establish an ontology.
Let us first consider the weaker of the two.
a ) Within this view, the human mind may be said to contain a set of
basic conceptual equipment. For example some element within this set
might be used to establish the distinction between thing and property,
another might be concerned with the ordering of data into temporal
sequences, and another with the selection of isolable and enduring
particulars, or with the appraisal of values, etc. In other words, this
equipment provides for the most fundamental operations which the mind can
apply to the stream of data which assails it. It is these which enable
it to establish the most a I I-pervasive of its distinctions, relations,
selections, etc...All or some of the above may be employed in any given
conceptual scheme; and that which gives specific character to any one
scheme is the choice established within the scheme (in respect to the
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myriad discernibles of experience) as to that which is to be considered
thing-Iike, or property-I i ke, or susceptibie to temporaI ordering, or
vaiuabie, etc. Although the basic selections, distinctions, etc. appear
in all schemes, each specific conceptual order, as it were^employs these
to cut along different lines. For instance (assuming for the sake of
illustration that the task of one of these is to isolate certain items
and types as thing-like) the weaker interpretation would claim that
the specific items which are to be considered things vary from scheme
to scheme This interpretation mjghf point out how within Plato's
"Republic" certain entitles — intelligible, incorporeal Forms — are
selected as the ontologicaI Iy fundamental items
>
end hew in contrast to this Aristotle (particularly in the "Categories")
presen+s a particular man, a particular animal as paradigms of things.
Thus in both cases the form of the distinction is the same but not its
content.
Given this weaker interpretation, one could establish a meta-
statement about conceptual operations to the effect, say:
(A) The selection of things as reident ificable particulars is estab¬
lished in all known conceptual schemes, but the set of elements
which are so selected varies from scheme to scheme.
But a statement of this sort, even if it could be shown to be true, cannot
in itself be used either to refute or to ground an ontology. For the
most one could claim, on the basis of (A), is that in all known con¬
ceptual schemes the mind does select items as thing-like. But such an
observation does not permit the inference: Therefore things exist'. For
example, classical mechanics studies the prooerties of absolutely rigid
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bodies. Yet no one concludes that rigid bodies must exist, because they
are selected within a given theoretical scheme. Similarly (A), in itself —
in contrast to the ontological claim that things must exist—says nothing
directly about the constitution of the world. The fact that the universe
can be viewed as containing things, or described in terms of a thing-Ianguage,
does not Imply that the universe contains things
Admittedly one might try to supplement (A) with an additional premise
and then proceed to establish a proof that things exist. But what sort of
proposition would be requisite? What is needed is something to the effect
that whenever thing-words are successfully used — as one might try to
argue is the case in the languages of all known conceptual schemes — that
the things exist which these words denote or describe. In this way
from 'a is distinguished as thing-1 ike' one could then infer 'The thing,
a, exists'. From this it would foliow ana IyticaI Iy that things existed
But, unfortunately, any additional propositions of this sort can be said
to be unequivocally true or correct only within the conceptual scheme of
strong realism. Thus (A) cannot be used to either infer that things exist,
nor to deny this in ali conceptual schemes. And this it must do if the
ontologica! assertions based upon it are to be categorical.
If (A) fails in this way, let us consider the stronger inter¬
pretation:
_b) Within this view, the human mind is again said to contain a set
of basic conceptual equipment. But here in contrast to the earlier
formulation, some of the entities to which these concepts are applied
are considered to be the same in all actual schemes. Thus one
might assert, say, the following strong meta-statement In b):
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(B) The selection of things as reidentifiab!e particulars is established
in all actual conceptual schemes, and within each scheme material
objects are members of the set of elements so selected
But again one could not conclude on the basis of (B) alone that material
bodies existed As above such an ontologtcal claim might be demonstrated--
but only in respect to those conceptual schemes in which the additional
premise concerning thing-words holds. But since the warrantabiIity of
this proposition varies from scheme to scheme, proof again could not be
categorical.
#7. Strictly speaking this is all that we need show in our analysis
of the alleged necessity of any existence-claims based upon (A) or (B).
However, one might still argue that if statements such as (A) or (B) (or
any others which might combine features of both) could be shown to be
true, have we not at least pointed out the way the mind must work in any
discussion of what is the case? And would this not contribute some
important general information in respect to the expression of any known
ontology? Perhaps. For were there such a massive core of conceptual
features which remained constant throughout all changes in all actual
conceptual schemes, a statement describing this would still be logically
contingent. (It would be logically possible for it to be otherwise.)
But even then, with all man's intellectual experience to back it, a
statement of conceptual necessity of this kind indeed provides an
appreciable weight of evidence in favor of the truth of 'p1.
But we shall argue now that (A) or (B) etc. cannot be asserted
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categorically, but only in relation to particular conceptual schemes.
At first blush one would expect diachronic observations such
as (A) or (B) etc. to be established empirically. And, if these were
warranted by the evidence, one might accept them as inducfive general¬
izations. There are of course enormous practical difficulties present in
any such investigation. And perhaps there is even , an objection
in principle. For in the study of many dead languages we might at most
assert that thing-words appeared. We could not infer that the conceptual
scheme associated with this language distinguished things. A negative
instance of this difficulty is provided by the claims of cultural relat¬
ivism. Whorf, for instance, has argued since the Navaho language does
not have the tense structures of Indo-European languages, that the Navaho
do not have our concept of time. Yet one might reply, in opposition
to this thesis, that the Navahos express the same concept in a different
linguistic form. It is conceivable, since there are still Navaho about
whose extra-Iinguistic performances can be studied, that this question
can be answered. But short of descending to Hades, I cannot see how any
such empirical investigation might be performed to determine the exact
structure of the conceptual distinctions held by members of the vast
number of actual cultures of which we have only rudimentary intellectual
remains.
Strawson, as we know, has wisely eschewed this path. After ail
the philosophic technique is that of rational argument. But, unless I am
mistaken, in avoiding the empirical this way he has sailed close to an
intellectual Charybdis. For if his argument purports to reach categorical
conclusions concerning all conceptual schemes, I am afraid its technique
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is as inapplicable here as the procedures of the early §reek cartographers
who believed they could draw a map of the earth in terms of logical
constructions. But perhaps I have mistaken the strength of Strawson's
claim within the initial citation which has prompted this discussion For
within the same introduction he writes:
This book is, in part, and in a modest way, an essay in descriptive
metaphysics On Iy in a modest way — for though some of the themes
discussed are sufficiently general - the discussion is undertaken
from a certain limited viewpoint and is by no means eomprehensive"
Strawson (2) p. II. Itaiicsmine.
Thus it might be ill-advised to consider Strawson's position at all in
this resoect. (For our purpose is +o analyze the grounds for the assertion
that (A) or (B) etc. is true in all known schemes.) Then let us discuss
the work of the ohiIosopher, Charybdistwho without the modest disclaimer
which Strawson adds, makes the categorical claim that there is an unchanging
core, etc. If I understand Charybdis correctly, he wishes to maintain, as
in (B), that there are certain specific and unchanging features of our
conceptual equipment, and it is these that man has (nearly) always employed.
The task of what Charybdis calls 'descriptive1 metaphysics is to describe
these Any deviation from these is rev is Senary. in this our philosopher
echoes Strawson who has said:
Certai n^ concepts do change, and not only, though mainly, on the
*
specialist neroher/y; and even specialist changes react on ordinary
thinking. Certainly, too, metaphysics has been largely concerned
with such changes" Strawson (2) p. 10.
In this latter respect both Strawson and Charybdis allow, as (B) does not,
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for variations In the form of our conceptual equipment. (Although both
philosophers agree that the application of these terms — 'descriptive1,
'revisionary' — to actual philosophers is perhaps never fully csear-cut,
Aristotle and Kant, in general, can be said to describe the unchanging
features in their investigations; Plato end Descartes, Leibniz and Berke&y,
on the other hand, revise.)
Now on what basis can a claim such as Charybdis' be made that
certain feqtures are (or must be) typical of near!y all actual conceptual
schemes? As we have noted such a claim Is not grounded in terms of a
diachronistic analysis of known schemes, bu"? is based upon rational analysis.
Any investigation of this latter kind bears this peculiar feature: it is
a study performed in a conceptual scheme, and it is about conceptual schemes.
Since I assume the only rational analysis one ca successfully perform is
in terms of one's current conceptual scheme — however one may or may not
modify it in the process — both Strawson's and Charybdis' investigat ions
must be conducted in terms of our contemporary scheme of concepts. Let
us call this scheme 'OS-!'. Strawson, of course, is fully aware of
this condition, for he talks about "our scheme of things" as having
certain features, and of other beliefs being in "consonance with the
conceptual scheme which we operate" Straweon (2 ) p. 246-7.
But Charybdis ignores this, arid asserts the categorical truth of his
position. This is a mistake: for whatever conclusions he may establish
hold only because they follow from those beliefs, doctrines, tenets, con¬
ceptual and linguistic entailments, etc. which are sanctioned within CS-I.
To show this, let us be generous towards Charybdis. Let us assume, with
the exception of the above claim of categoricity,that he is correct in aii
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his conclusions that follow in CS-I. Let us assume further that whatever
statements or assumptions he makes about the world are either theory-free
and true, or when reduced to their components, that these too are true.
And let us assume that on the basis of the above he is able to infer that
there is indeed an unchanging core, etc. Let us call this conclusion,
1P1. But what has been proved?
Certainly *P• is not and cannot be categorical, i.e. 1P' is
not an unconditional conclusion. For, by hypothesis, 1P' follows from
the statement of the beliefs, etc. of CS-I. Thus if we consider our
present conceptual scheme to be described (hopefully) in a set of mutually
consistent statements, some of which Charybdis employs, and to these we add
whatever theory-free descriptions might be necessary, the argument
Charybdis employs will be of the form: some conceptual statements of
CS-I and some theory-free descriptive statements imply P. In other
words the conclusion that P is the case is conditional to the subset of
statements which Charybdis employs.
#8, Now, although I believe that Strawson is content with this con¬
ditional ity, Charybdis asserts more: his conclusion hold is supposed to hold
in some objective way. Is there any way to remove this conditionality
and show that our philosopher is indeed correct? Unless I am mistaken
there are only three possible ways. I) One can enumerate ail schemes
and show that *P1 follows from each, in the Aristotelean sense of
induction; 2) one can establish some ordering relation among these
schemes in such a way that 'P' is proved generally tru by mathematical
induction; or 3) CS-I can be shown to be typical of any actual conceptual
scheme, or basic in some other way.
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We cannot come to the defense of Charybdis in terms of I). For
the practical, if not the theoretical difficulties, are insurmountable.
The second has certainly never been attempted. And, further, on what basis
could one establish an order among conceptual schemes which would permit
mathematical induction? As for the third, on what grounds could one
possibly claim that our conceptual scheme or at least that part of it
as; 'med within the argument was typical of all others?
The only recourse is, in some way, to show that CS-I is basic.
But I think there are fatal difficulties even here. We have already
alluded to the extraordinary variations viich do occur within the few
schemes of which we have only partial knowledge. Let us now mention one
further difficulty: Why is the view of Aristotle and Kant said to be
descriptive, and Descartes' revisionary? I think Strawson's answer is that
if we rethink the former's thoughts, in our terms, we can reach conclusions
consonant with them; we can as it were rediscover the same metaphysical
truths. Thus, I think, Strawson could maintain that Aristotle and Kant
describe conceptual features of the broadest generality which are analogous
to those which we might describe, and that Plato, Descartes, etc. working
with a conceptual scheme different from our own, can be said to modify or
revise that conceptual structure common to us, to Aristotle, Kant, and
others. But Charybdis, as we know, advances the much stronger claim that
the positions of Aristotle and Kant are not only basic in respect to us,
but somehow that these provide the bedrock of conceptual structures upon
which all — even those who revise — must build.
For instance Strawson perhaps can call Descartes revisionary.
After all Descartes introduces the conceptually difficult notion of/two-
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substance man, one in which 'I 1 may have two distinct types of referents.
And this runs counter not only to our ordinary usage, but to Kant for whom
there is a sr^y/fhetic unity of apprehension, and to Aristotle for whom a
man is definitely a 'this' and not a 'these'. But Charybdis is misled
when he believes that this somehow makes Descartes revisionary, as it were,
simpliciter. Descartes' choices just run counter to some of the meta¬
physical options we have taken. But conversely ours and some of
Aristotle's and Kant's run counter to those of Descartes and Plato,
etc. If, for instance, anyone has taught a history of religion, it is
impossible for one to be unimpressed with the near ubiquity of man's
some
belief in the existence of/spiritual entity or substance and of its
generally transient cohabitation or passage in living bodies. For instance:
'Bring me the salt you put into the water last night.1 Svetaketu
looked into the water but could not find it, for it had dissolved.
His father then said: 'Taste the water...How is it?' 'It is salt.'
'Look for the salt again and come again to me,' The son did so,
saying: *1 cannot see the salt. I only see water,' His father
then said 'In the same way, 0 my son, you cannot see the spirit...An
invisible and subtle essence Is the Spirit of the whole universe. Ths
is Reality...Thou are that.' Chandogya 6. 12-14
If we remember that Descartes within the '50i scours" employs "^me', 'esprit',
and 'moi', each to refer to the same subject, it would seem that his view
of the universe and of man as constituted out of Body and Mind (Spirit)
— however the details may vary — is the accepted viewpoint of the over¬
whelming bulk of mankind. On what basis can Charybdis call Descartes
revisionary, except that his view differs from our own? And this, of
course, is a provincial use of language.
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Or again, consider the manner in which t'ne concept of Being, of
That-which-is, has varied. There is, for instance, good reason to interpret
the ser.se of the term of 'is' (or 'being') that is most important to the
Pre-Socratics and to Plato, as 'that which is always the same and never
changing'. (I have this on authority of Mr. A.H. Coxon of the University
of Edinburgh.)
And yet by the time of Aristotle, the philosophically interesting
senses of 'is' and 'be', seem to have varied considerably. For Aristotie
singles out all of the following: being of accidental properties, being
of prediction, being of truth, being of that which is potential, and being
of that which is actual. (META) Delta-7. t seems as if the associated
concept is established upon another plane. But perhaps this observation is
unfair. For, referring to the above in a latter work, Aristotle remarks:
While 'being' has all these senses, obviously that which 'is'
primarily is the 'what', which indicates the substance of the
thing. For...when we say what it is, we do not say 'white' or
'hot'...but 'a man' or 'a god'" (META) Z-1 1028a 13.
in this last sense, Aristotle's use of 'is' and 'being' might be viewed as
similar to that of his predecessors. But let us recall, as Ross points
out: The primacy of individual substance is one of the most fixed points
of Aristotle's thought — the point at which he most clearly diverges
from Plato's doctrine" Ross (I) p. 24. And certainly one cannot say of
a man or even of most gods that they are always the same and never changing
Thus there is not only a fundamental conceptual divergence here between
Aristotle and Plato, but between Aristotle and most of his predecessors.
One might try to discount the evidence for the awkwardness of
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the ascription of 'descriptive' to Aristotie and 'revisionary' to his
predecessors by claiming that philosophers from Thales through Plato
revised the common core which goes back to -prehistory and Aristotle put
it back on the right track; or that Aristotle's predecessors really
started in a thing-oriented world as we know it today and revised it in
the process of philosophizing. But this is mere opinion. Charybdis can
assert this only because he is so convinced of the fundamental correctness
of his own position.
This defense becomes even more awkward when we see that another
typical descriptive metaphysician, i.e. Kant, is aiso guilty of the same
"revision" when he writes:
In all changes of appearances the substance remains, and its
quantum in nature neither increases nor decreases" Kant 13) I6,B
225.
For certainly it is n rf the substance of an individual man that neither
increases nor decreases. Charybdis might again claim that Kant, in this
respect, was a revisionery metaphysician. But this then introduces
another strained use of the term. For Kant is merely echoing the general
belief in the laws of conservation of his time—and the distinction upon
which they are based have a long and distinguished history which may reach
back as far as Anaximander.
By this time, I think,it is obvious that Charybdis' ascription
of 'descriptive' to some metaphysics and 'revisionary' to others is
unhappy. But if this is so, he cannot assert that the scheme of concepts
with which we operate are in some objective way, basic. Thus any cate¬
gorical claim he may advance is indefensible; for we have exhausted the
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possibilities of removing their conditionaIity.
ctrawson, as I interpret him, is far more modest:
There seems no doubt that these things of which I have tried to
give a rational account are, in a sense, beliefs, and stubbornly
held ones, of many people at a primitive level of reflection,
and of some philosophers at a more sophisticated leva; of reflect-
ion; though many philosophers, at perhaps still more sophisticated
level, have rejected, or seemed to reject, them. It is difficult
to see how such beiiefs could be argued for except by showing
their consonance with the conceptuaI scheme which we oper^ te ,
by showing how they reflect the structure of that scheme"
Strawson (2) p. 247, Italics mine.
For, on the basis of this, one can only conclude that such beliefs are
held as true, and can be said to be necessary, within certain conceptual
schemes — and at the same time to consider other schemes iri which such
statements are not considered to be true, as somehow outside the massive
unchanging core. Thus Charybdis' claim concerning the invariance of
certain conceptual features collapses into the much weaker one: We can
say that certain of these features do not change — if we do not consider
those which do, or classify these latter as revisionary. And this is
far from a trivial conclusion. However it can be asserted only in respect
to that conceptual structure which provides the criteria in terms of
which this selection is to be established. Thus we cannot argue
categoricaI Iy from within a conceptual scheme ,that certain features are
invariantly present in all known schemes — except in relation to the
presupposed correctness of typicalness of our own scheme. Thus again,
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there can be no ascription of conceptual necessity, simpliciter.
We conclude then, that any statement concerning the invariance
of some statement through all or most conceptual schemes, whether this
claim be true or not, cannot be categorically shown. And thus such a
statement cannot be employed either to refute or establish an ontology
categoricaIly.
* « * »
#9. Before proceeding, I should like to say that I am inclined to
agree with Strawson concerning the unchanging core. But I do believe
that if this basic conceptual equipment were fully analyzed, the des¬
cription of any comp0nen^.wou I d be copiously supplied with parameters with
which to accommodate it to the extraordinary variety of material present
in (and formed by) different conceptual schemes. That is to say, I think
such a description would be expressed in the form of a very general scheme a
which took on the recognizable features of particular conceptual structures
only when instantiated in given schemes. It is in fact, a schema of this
type, which we do employ in defining 'exist'. Thus I would say, on the
basis of the assumption we make, that it is less a core than a highly
abstract structure that remains constant.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Categorical Proof and Disproof — il
#1. We continue withour discussion of possible forms of conceptual
necessity. A weaker claim might characterize as necessary-at-a-given-time
any statement entailed by a concept which is in force at the given time.
The ascription of necessity in this sense is clearly time-bound. And
this puts necessity on a slippery slope. For (as in the argument of Find I ay
concerning the non-existence of God) it countenances the possibility that
any statement which is said to be necessary today, may at another time
be said not to be necessary. (In this respect, such a necessity is like
the purity of those temple-priestesses, who — whatever the nature of their
past or future liaisons — are considered to be virgins for the year of
their service.) This makes any argument, employing such a statement as
premise, a peculiar type of conditional proof — a hypothetical deduction,
which happens also to be categorically true for the time the concepts
hold, upon which the premises are based. The ascription of necessity in
this manner becomes the least incontrovertible of all. For although the
defender of a threatened ontology might find it difficult to evade the
force of: The proposition , 'p', has been considered necessary at all times,
and with what right is it now to be denied?', when faced with a state¬
ment whose necessity is still unbearded, he can answer blithely: Why
not? '
There is, however, one possible escape from this embarrassment:
one might attempt to show that the set of concepts one holds is in some
way superior to any other. But even this "superiority" must be
-196-
VI I I-1,2 197
measured in terms of some set of vaiues. And thus we would have to show
that these vaiues were superior. But how could this be done except in
terms of sane other values established within our scheme? Thus any
recourse to statements necessary In this way, as components of a superior
scheme, remains scheme-bound (We consider this further in iX-3. )
The strength of such an ascription of necessity-at-a-particuiar-
tirne is further undermined if one considers the possibility of establishing
necessity by convention. Given sufficient imagination, and a good press,
presumably one could construct a reasonably consistent concept, and, if
this concept caught on, one would be justified in claiming that the
entailments authorized by it were necessary. (Faced with this ineluctable
erosion of the force of 'necessary' one might gaze back to the halcyon
days when necessity was considered to be a property of things. But, as
we have pointed out, the assertion of such a necessity also depends in an
essential way upon the conceptual.)
#2. We have exhausted the possible types of ascriptions of necessity
to conceptual statements. The analysis of each of these has shown that we can¬
not ascribe an unconditional necessity to any extra-Iogicai conceptual pre¬
mise employed within any proof. The force of this conclusion is independent
of any answer to the question of whether or not there are such necessarily
necessary truths. For our analysis depends upon, and is conditional to the
notions of proof which we have, and does not depend upon the specific
features of the particular statements one might introduce. J_f_ logic is
unique and the assumptions we have made (concerning proof and the non-inform-
ativeness of logical truths, etc.) are warranted by such a uniqueness, we
might then even claim a certain categoricity for the truth of our conclusion.
But, in contrast to the proponents of the classical approach, we need not
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presuppose the unconditionaIity of our argument. We are content to claim,
in terms of the assumptions we have made tacitly and explicity, that
where our premises are in force, the classical position is untenable. And
whether or not our logic is truly unique and our notions of proof inalter¬
able or not, it seems that these, among all our concepts are most resistent
to change. So the conditionaIity of our argument has this virtue: we
can expect that it can be shown to hold in a wide baryd of schemes, and in
particular within those to which the classical approach putatively applies.
To be consistent, we cannot expect more than this. For in view of the
respect to the acceptability of
above, the most one can claim i n/ any conceptual premise is that certain
features of certain concepts tend to remain unchanged through a certain
stretch of time, or that these concepts tend to include features of other
concepts which they supplant or precede. To the extent that this can be
shown to apply to a particular concept, one may be justified in claiming
that certain statements contained in a full description of this concept
are considered as necessary within the span of time in which the concept
is an ingredient in the accepted conceptual schemes. Thus although we
make no claims for the unconditional truth of our conclusions, we argue
that they do apply wherever the classical approach purports to apply.
And this is ail that must be shown.
In contrast to this, the advocate of the classical approach
tries to make the stronger claim that some extra-IogicaI conceptual
statements are necessary in all schemes. (If this argument were accepted,
and such premises introduced into a disproof of a threatened ontology, the
ontology in question would indeed be refuted.) But the burden of the
argument contained withinthese chapteis has been to show that the truth
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of these stronger claims cannot be demonstrated unconditionally. Con¬
sequently the ascription of 'is necessary' to such premises may be no
more (or less) defensible than the ascriptions of existence contained within
the ontology against which these refuting premises are marshalled.
• * t •
0. 1+ follows unless there are totally incorrigible theory-free
descriptive statements of sufficient logical power in themselves to
refute a possible ontology, that no ontology is categorically refutable.
The provis/o 'in themselves' is important: for we have shown that one
cannot appeal to the unconditional necessity of conceptual statements, and
so a fortiori there are no conceptual, lexical, nor theoretical state¬
ments available which might be combined with theory-free descriptions
in a categoricaI proof or disproof.
Thus if the classical approach, or any fragment of it, is
tenable, there must be theory-free descriptive statements which contain or
logically entail existence-statements. This means that such propositions
must contain ascriptions of existence or must have parts which by
definitional substitution yield or entail existence-statements. And
if such a statement is to be categorical, these descriptions must be
incorrigible.
As for the former possibility one does not normally consider
ascriptions of existence to be components of theory-free observations.
For instance, propositions such as: Numbers exist', 'Tables exist',
'God exist', even 'The Dodo no longer exists' — whatever they are, are
certainly not theory-free. Let us, for the present, assume the correct¬
ness of this observation. We establish this point in greater detail in
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Part III, and shall not pursue it further here.
But might not ascriptions of existence be contained covertly
within some descriptive statements, perhaps in the form of a defining
phrase for 'existence'? But this I am afraid is ruled out from the start.
For the word 'existence' hardly bears its meaning on its sleeve, and any
definition of the term which is proposed (at least outside of mathematics)
is not merely in the form of a convention to simplify discourse, but an
explication — and generally a prescriptive one — for a troublesome
concept. In this way such a definition is scarcely theory-free. For
instance if I define a sound argument as a IogicaI Iy vaiid argument all of
whose premises are true, all know, both how I am going to use the word
'sound' and to what it applies; and (except for a possible quibble about
the term) it is accepted. If, on the other hand, 'existence' is
say,
definedyin terms of that which is perceived^I I might know how some
philosopher proposes to use 'exist', but this does not mean that all
will accept that this use is in conformity with what is normally (although
vaguely) intended when one uses the term 'exist1, or when one applies the
corresponding concept. In the first case,the concept of a valid argument
all of whose premises are true, is clear and generally accepted by all
who consider the matter. As a matter of convenience we decide to employ
the term 'sound'; someone else might use the term 'conclusive', but the
introduction of either term does not alter our understanding of the concept.
However, if we propose a definition for a concept which is not clear, as
i§ the case with Existence, the definition, unless it is a meaningless
token, purports to clarify. It is for this reason that Berkeley, for
instance, does not merely define existence, but argues for his principal
that esse est percipi. The introduction of a definition in this sense is
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sanctioned only in terms of a given conceptual scheme. So even a covert
definition of existence could not appear within a theory-free descriptive
statement. And if it is neither covertly nor overtly present in a des¬
cription, it is also not derivable.
If no theory-free description contains nor entails an existence-
statement, there is only one remaining possibility: namely that some
statement, contained within or entailed by an ontology, prove incompatible
with a theory-free description. (This is about what Berkeley shows to be
the case in the course of his criticism of Locke's assertion that abstract
ideas exist in the mind.) Were this so (and I am not certain that it is)
we would have to modify our general argument to make it inapplicable both
to logicaliy a id physically impossible ontologies (We could in such a case
define the latter as one which was incompatible with some theory-free
description.) I do not, however, believe this latter represents a real
possibility. For with the exception of philosophers such as Hegel or Heidegger
is it not the case that philosophers will accept (or at least be severely
troubled by) a logically conclusive argument? And even the above ex¬
ceptions do not so much reject logic, as modify its accepted forms. But
if we consider how Plato and many of his contemporaries were willing to
accept Zeno's paradoxical conclusions, and believe that everyday objects
truly "contradicted" themselves, it Is hard to conceive that any of these
thinkers would be deeply troubled if someone showed them that an ontology
of theirs had consequences which ran counter to the content of a theory-
free observation. Thus one might assert a physically — but not logically —
impossible ontology. Credo quia absurdum. And further I cannot see how
any genuinely theory-free observation could be used to refute any non-trivial
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existence-claims. Cognizant of this possible modification, we
proceed.
The above arguments are I believe conclusive. No theory-free
descriptive statement contains or entails an existence-statement. As
such none are of sufficient logical power to categorically refute any
logically (and physically) possible ontology. There is one exception
to this, but a trivial one. From nearly any allegedly theory-free
statement, say 'I see this as red' or 'The deckhand is upon the numeral,
12', or 'The noise is painful' or 'It is a blinding flash', it follows
that there is something, i e that the universe is non-empty. But since
this is assumed before we apply the rules or axioms of predicate logic,
we need no theory-free statement to teiI us this.
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#4. The same conclusions apply with equal force to the claim of the
classical approach that the truth of the correct ontology is categorically
demonstrable. For how can one prove a logically possible ontology, 0, to
be true in this way, except by demonstrating the falsity of not-0, or
the truth of 0? The former course, we have seen is impossible. But to
prove 0, we encounter the same problems with renewed force. For if we could
find no extra-IogicaI premises to serve In a refutation of an ontology,
these same—or similar—premises are equally lacking to categorically prove
another ontology,
#5. One might claim that there are intuitively evident, or self-
validating premises, or that the consistency and applicability of an
extended system of propositions most in some way warrant the truth of the
position they establish. Although we find no evidence for these claims,
it might be weil to consider them briefly,- since each of these subjects is
a thesis topic In itself, we must need be cursory.
As a possible source of premises, it would be tempting to rely
upon intuition, i.e. upon an unshakeable conviction of the truth of the
statement one was introducing. Such an intuition need not be facile and
apparent but might impose itself upon one's thought oniy after much
searching and analysis. The force of such a conviction might be induced
as much through a study of the consequences of the proposition and the
inconceivability of any denial, as through an immediate grasping of a
commanding thought. But with the possible exception of some axioms of
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logic and of identity, what is intuitively true to one thinker may be
rejected as spurious by another. (See snd of XI1-2. ) Thus intuitive
truths of this type couid not command an acceptence as categorically
true.
We have already indicated the reason for this. Any intuition of
sufficient logical power to establish or to refute an ontology, can be
known only in terms of some particular theoretical structure. As such it
is acceptable as a truth only within this conceptual scheme and — to
employ Strawson's term — others which may be consonant with it. Any
thinker outside this group would reject this claim.
For instance, if Paul had the sceptical background of the Roman
consuls and not his fervent faith in the existence of one god, what would
have happened to him on the road to Damascus? Presumably he would have
seen a blinding light, if the tale is correct, and perhaps heard a voice,
and blamed it on the heat or said, as Don Juan after him: There is
something here I don't understand, yet'. And yet this incident,
interpreted within the context of the religious world-views known to
Paul, provided the grounds for an unshakeable conviction that God had come
to him; whereas fhe Romans, whose schemes were inconsonant with Paul's, found
his claim mere superstition.
Consider in this respect, two of the most famous of allegedly
seIf-vaIidating existence statements. (By be If-vaIidating ' I mean that
the truth of these statement, upon sufficient examination, cannot possibly
be denied by any rational man.) For example, Anselm, whose ontologicai
proof we will now consider, writes:
I began to ask myself whether one argument might possibly be found,
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resting on no other argument for its proof, but sufficient in
itself to prove that Goes does exist" Anseim (I) Preface, Second
string of itaiics mine.
Now I for one believe the argument which Anseim propounds is sound — if
we make certain large assumptions which I think are sanctioned within the
Platonic world-view that Anseim, to a certain extent, embraces. We must
for instance assume that there is a substantive relation of some sort
between the idea of x and x; i.e. we must assume that the expressions 'idea
of x' and 'x' are convertible or at least that the first can be replaced
by the second. If this (fogether with the comparabiIity of entities in
respect to their existence)is granted, Anselm's proof may be reformulated
in terms of the following explicit premises:
n (Civ-
i) There is present in the mind (the idea of) a being of which
nothing more perfect can be conceived.
To avoid this awkward expression we shali call this latter a 'perfect
being" and abbreviate it !PB'. Anseim also explicity introduces the
second premise:
ii) To exist, or to be present in the mind is inferior to existing in
reaIity.
But there is difficulty with this premise. Anseim cannot mean that if x
is in the mind, x is inferior to itself not in the mind. Rather, let us
say, that the premise means that if x is merely in the mind there is a
y which is superior to x. I do not know what the ontological status of
y.
this/and its relation to x^may be. But if we assume that this expression
is meaningful, and introduce the tacit platitude: If y is superior to x,
we can consider y superior to x', we can say that if anything is merely
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in the mind we can conceive of something which is superior to it. This
is not what Anselm says, but it follows from his premises, and I think
states clearly the somewhat muddled set of relationships he does employ in
Chapters II - IV of his "Frosologion",
Let us now make the following definition explicit:
iii) a is a PB=DEF There is no y which we can conceive of as superior
to a.
Given these propositions (and I need not argue for their credibility
to us, inasmuch as they are merely part of an illustration) it follows
that a perfect being exists in reality. (In terms of the above premises,
and presuppositions, it is impossible to deny this.) The argument is
straightforward and we shall symbolize it directly in predicate
Iogic. Where
'PB' stands for 'Perfect Being'
'M' stands for 'in the mind'
'R' stands for 'in reality'
'CSP' stands for 'conceived of as superior',
al I the premises can be stated thus:
(!) PBarMg (We employ the convention that 'x is an idea of' can
be replaced by 'x', and 'a is an idea of a PB' can
be rep I aced by ' PBa '.
(2) (x) C3y) (Mx.«->Rx.OCSPyx)
(3) a is a P8=DEF (3y) CSPya (We assume y t a)
We introduce the following provisional assumption:
+1(4) ^Ra
and argue:
(5) <ay) (IVL.-R^.O CSP ) 2. (From line I. we know that thereci a ya
is an a, and so a is a possible
value of x.)
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(6) Ma.-Ra.O CSPya 5. y is
(7) Ma 1.
(8) CSPya 4, 6, 7.
(9) (3y) CSPya 8.
( 10) P6a 1 .
(II) -(•ay) CSPya 3, 10.
(12) (ay) CSPya.-fe*y) CSPya 9, II
Removing the provisional assumption, and rewriting (12) in terms of 'p *
and 'p *:
— 1(13) «-Ffe=>.p.-p 4-12
From which
(14) ~ R p i.e. R 13.a' a
We cone Iude:
(15) PEL. R 10, 14.a a
In words: a is a being of which nothing more perfect can be conceived,
and a Is in reaIity.
So, as Anselm says: (God) exists so truly, £Vle3 cannot
be thought of as non-existing" Anselm (I) Chapter I!. This is substantially
what is shown in(4HI2). In terms of the premises, the assumption that
a PB does not exist in reality leads to its own negation. And this is
not a trivial conclusion For instance one standard criticism of the
onto logical argument is that the same reasoning could prove the existence
of say, a perfect island. But this is not so, for the perfect island is
not defined in terms of that of which nothing more perfect can be conceived,
and so the crux of the above proof, line (12) cannot be established for a
perfect island nor, I believe, for anything, but a perfect being.
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But whether or not it is true that a perfect being exists, the
above argument can be said to be conclusive on Iy in terms of its premises
and presuppositions. For each is employed within this (to us) curious
proof. And since each of these can obviously be challenged, the demon¬
stration is far from categorical. It is not self-validating outside the
conceptual nexus of its presuppositions.
• • • »
#6, Poincar£ once said that it was better to be clear and wrong,
than muddled and correct. If one can judge by the amount of inconclusive
discussion which Descartes' allegedly seIf-vaIidating cogito has prompted,
one must infer thatfhis Cartesian argument has none of the virtues of the
former. However granted certain large assumptions, we might try to defend
its correctness along the following lines. To do this we must freely
reconstruct Descartes' proof of his own existence. Descartes, as we know,
finds it possible to say:
(i) I doubt that I have a body.
And Descartes, we assume, is also able to doubt (i), i.e. he can say:
(ii) I doubt that I doubt that I have a body.
But then he can also doubt (ii), i.e.
(iii) I doubt my doubting that I doubt I have a body.
Obviously this introduces a regress as infinite as it is inconclusive.
However, if Descartes' reflects upon this matter, Descartes can say:
(I) I dou bt 'p'.
And if he now puts in place of 'p', not the expression 'I have a body,'
which follows 'that' in (i), but the more general expression 'i doubt1,
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Descartes is tempted to say:
(2) I doubt the statement 'I doubt'.
But (roughly speaking) it is not possible to doubt that he doubts: for
the act of disbelieving '! doubt' is an act of doubting. !n other words,
(3) It is not possible to doubt 'I doubt'.
Thus in terms of (I) - (3), any time ': doubt' is uttered honestly, as
a normal declarative sentence,
(4) '! doubt' is indubitable.
In other words, 'I doubt' seems to be seIf-vaIidatingf and as such true
But this is not enough. Descartes must now prove his own existence. This
he can do if he takes (4) and, at the same time, assumes that any instance
of the following schema is true:
For all x,
(5) If x 0's, then x is a substance that 0s,
(where '0' takes on as value any activity).
We can now infer:
(6) If x doubts, then x is a doubting substance.
Combining (4) and (6), we obtain:
(7) I am a doubting substance.
If one now includes Doubt within Thought, and introduces some further
platitude relating 'substance' and 'exist', the I in question, namely
Descartes, concludes:
(8) I exist as a thinking substance.
Let us for a moment accept this as a valid argument. But the
conclusions: Descartes exists...' can be said to be sound only if it
follows from true premises, i.e. (5) must be true fend so must the inter-
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mediate conclusion that it is not possible to doubt 'I doubt1). It is
patently obvious that without this premise no significant ontological
conclusion follows. So let us assume too that (5) is true within
Descartes' conceptual scheme. But (5) is certainly not true in all con¬
ceptual schemes, for it claims that an activity is possible only if it is
the activity of a substance. But this is preposterous. A vacuum transmits
Iight-waves. is a vacuum a substance which transmits light-waves? The
class decides, by taking a vote, to go for a swim. Is the class a substance
that takes a vote? Or again, according to Plato, the object of sight
becomes beautifui through participating in Beauty. But such fleeting
objects are certainly not substances for Plato. Yet if they participate,
the/must be substantive according to £5). In other words Descartes'
conclusion at best is scheme-bound. It follows only in those conceptual
schemes which contain (5) as a conceptually necessary truth.
And further I think we have been too lenient with Descartes.
We have assumed that we may substitute any statement for 'p' in (I).
And so v/e have permitted substitution of 'I doubt'. But is 'I doubt' —
in contrast to 'I doubt ' p — str i ct I y speaking a statement? is not
doubting, like loving, dyadic? I doubt something, x doubts y, Descartes
doubts that he has a body, etc. But not merely 'Descartes doubts'.
Confronted with any such expression the natural question is to ask:
What does he doubt?' (cf. Descartes ||| (p. 157), but see Malcolm (I).
But if this is so, ihen even (3) does not follow unconditionally.
For again we have an inconclusive regress e.g.:
I dou bt 'p'
What is it that I doubt in 'p'?
I doubt that I doubt 'q'.
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What is It that I doubt in 'q'?
I doubt in 'q1 that ! doubt V.
This reiteration of doubting must terminate someplace. Let us say it
ends with 'q 1, and let 'q ' stand for, 'I doubt everything'. Can then
doubt 'q'? At the drop of a hat. Or let 'q' stand for '! have a body'.
Again this is dubitable, at least for Descartes. And I suggest that
however we interpret 'q1, ultimately we discover we are talking about
something which _i_s dubitable. And this appl ies equal I y we I I if one tries
to argue that in doubting one is aware of something that is thinking.
For thinking again is a dyadic relation. Descartes, strictly speaking,
is never aware merely that he is thinking, but that he is thinking about
something. And—particularly among philosophers—this situation
is the most dubitable of all.
Or granting even the indubitabiIity of doubt, what is the
cash value of his alleged discovery? Between it and his confident
assertion that he exists, and then that God exists, and all clear and
distinct ideas are true, lies a wasteland of scheme-bound premises.
Admittedly this is a scandalously brief discussion of the cogito
and of allegedly seIf-vaIidating propositions in genera;. But T propose
that an ana.ysis along the above lines will show any such conclusion to
be either poorly reasoned (as have argued seemsto be the case with the
indubitabiIity of doubting) or to depend for its success upon particular
features of particular conceptual schemes. This I have i lustrated both
in respect to the premises of Anselm's onto logical argument, as I have
interpreted it, and in respect to Descartes' assumption that activites
must be supported by substances n neither case can conclusions established
in this way be introduced as elements in a categorical proof or disproof.
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#7. There is one further matter we must attend to before proceeding.
This is the belief that a statement such as 'Material objects exist'
or 'Tables exist' is incontrovertibly true in respect to the world we
know. This is the position of common sense. It claims our contention
that no extra-iogicaI premise of sufficient power can be introduced as
unconditionally true, is unfounded. And truly if there were existence-
statements which seemed to bear an indubitable warrant, it is quite likely
that they would be propositions such as those we have just mentioned.
However, if this suggestion appears to be acceptable, it is only because
a statement such as 'Material objects exist' is couched in such hopelessly
vague, or ambiguous language that it can mean nearly anything.
We wiIi return to this in Part II I, but for the present let us
recall I) when'exist' is defined the resulting expression is conceptually
laden. For such a definition is either explicative or prescriptive or
both. And as such it is acceptable only within some particular conceptual
schemes, 2) Similarly the notion of a material object, and even of a
table, is vaguely drawn. We think we know what we mean by a table, or
a material object namely: that, there. But what is there? Do we mean
by 'material object' anything which occupies a stretch of time or space;/
(A wave for instance) or must it have a certain size or shape or color?
)
must it be reident ifiabie or may it be only an occasional collocation
of qualities? or is it that which we know of in terms of scientific
theories? or is it a subjective construction? or must it be a significant
isolated component of a world independent of us? etc. I am certain that
there is someone who will answer yes to each of the above queries, or
others like them. But by the same token, since they establish criteria
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which are often mutually exclusive, the assertion by one thinker that
material bodies exist, becomes possible only when another's*'assertion,
that material bodies exist, is denied.
That is to say, the adherence to one interpretation of the
above sentences, in no way obliges one to accept the position adumbrated
within another interpretation. On the contrary, when we compare the views of
common sense realism, of physical reductionism, of phenomenalism, of Moore
in his :ssay "The Mature of Judgment", etc., we see that the advocacy
of one position may force one to deny the claims of the rival accounts.
Although statements such as 'That table there exists' appear to be
accepted as true by a I I or nearly all, it is because, like political
promises, they can be interpreted by different hearers to mean nearly
anything. But once a sharp meaning is imparted to their bland pronounce¬
ments, i.e. once they are paraphrased within the language of a specific
theory, the agreement vanishes, and the purported unconditional consensus
turns to controversy.
#8. Confronted with such an impasse, in which neither intuition,
experience, language, nor our concepts can yield premises adequate for the
needs of categorical proof and disproof, an advocate of the classical
approach might reply: The truth must, and somehow will be discovered by
means of rational investigation'. But in the absence of any concrete
demonstration, we must assume that, if the approach is phrased in this
way, it is only a dogma. And at such a point discussion must cease.
in an earlier chapter we refrained from describing arguments as
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acceptable refutations of otherwise logically impossible ontological
positions. In lieu of this we said that such arguments serve to invali¬
date a totality of statements. In terms of the assumptions we have made
concerning the requisites of proof,, etc., we see that the same cond i t i ona I i ty
of refutation and of proof applies to specific, definite, logically possible
ontologies. Where such an ontology is demonstrably incompatible with
some extra-ontoioglcal premise, a logically acceptable disproof
invalidates the totality, i.e. the ontology together with the refuting
premise in the conceptual scheme that warrants it. In those situations
in which the premise can be considered by all possible parties to be
absolutely necessary or totally incorrigible (if this is ever so) the
effect of such a demonstration of Incompatibility is clearly to refute
the ontology concerned. But, as we have seen this suggestion of con¬
clusiveness is only specious. For once the aura of necessity and
incorrigibiIity is lifted from the premises of the argument, once the
defender of a threatened ontology Is free to say: The refuting premise
is not necessarily necessary1, or 'it is corrigible1, a possible ontology,
provisionally refuted, can be reinstated.
This conclusion parallels those advanced earlier concerning
ontologies impugned to be impossible. But it should be clear that the
grounds are different. In the first case it was the vagueness, ambiguity,
and lack of definiteness, etc. of actual ontologies which led us to conclude
that no argument or arguments directed against them could be considered
to provide an absolute refutation. In the present case, the ontology, by
hypothesis, is consistent, definite, etc. The difficulty here lies in the
nature of our conceptual apparatus itself. If this apparatus were
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unchanging, fuiiy determined, complete, and guaranteed free of contra¬
diction — all of which it is not — the ascription of 'necessary' and
'incorrigible' (wherever this was correct) would be indubitable. The
concepts, the words, and the higher-order data introduced as premises in
a putative refutation would then be as much above the sway of change as
the realm of the Forms. But to the extent that this is not so,a logically
possible ontology may be provisionally proved or refuted, but is not and
(I have argued) cannot be categorically prov abie or refutable.
And if we consider the features of any rational analysis, the
above conclusion concerning the relativity of the truth of extra-IogicaI
statements may now appear in a better light. If one assumes the uniqueness
of logic, then one has every right to say in principle and without any
reservations, that an alleged conclusion is a consequence of a given set of
premises. (This is so because there is a complete proof procedure for
to establish
elementary logic.) But/this unconditional knowledge of consequences we need
IogicaI
refer only to the/structure of the statements concerned.
On the other hand, the assertion that any extra-IogicaI conclusion
is true depends not oniy upon logic but upon the content of the/staTements,
namely: that they be true. And we are ready to accept, in respect to
all or most of these, that whatever extra-IogicaI material they may contain,
if descriptive, is corrigible, and if conceptual, is alterable. But however
unsure the ground may be upon which these premises rest, this uncertainty
does not and cannot effect our knowledge of their consequences. The
knowledge that a certain proposition does follow is, by hypothesis,
inalterable — unaffected by any subsequent reappraisal of the truth of the
premises upon which it is based.
VII1-8,9 216
What does alter is that some of these sets of consequences from
time to time are relegated to the antiquarian's care and replaced by
others. Thus any extra-IogicaI consequences which concern us can be said
to hold only inasmuch, and as long as the conceptual premises (upon which
their assertion in part depends) are said to hold. in restricting ourselves
above to consequences which concern us, we do not wish exclude the
possibility that there may be incorrigble descriptions which any observer,
irrespective of his conceptual bias, could establish, and that statements
describing these observations, by purely logical means, might then yield
other propositions which were also unconditionally true. But, as we have
noted earlier, this sort of statement, if there were such, could not
f
contain any ascription of existence.
What we w sh to maintain, is that in genera I within any
organized body of knowledge. the usuaI form of the relation between s®"fs of
statements i s one i n wh i ch the truth of the consequents j s and rerna i ns
conditional to the time-bound truth of the antecedent?- And I suspect if
there were any extra-Iogicai statements which could be said to be
categorically true, such propositions would either become part of an
extended logic (as for instance Leibniz's Principle of Indiscernibles
an axiom of
has become^ identity theory), or in other cases such propositions would
be so lacking in logical power that they would be unimportant.
^ ■ Our argument is now fully general. If it could be shown —
unconditionally — that there were extra-IogicaI propositions true in all
possible, or even in all actual conceptual schemes, then statements of
this kind would indeed provide incontrovertibly true premises.
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And as we have noted, the existence of such propositions, for all
sciences including that of existence, is and must be presupposed by
adherents of the classical approach. And I think it is now clear that
even if there were such propositions, it would still be impossible to
categoricaI Iy assert their truth. For the most that one couid do in
such a case would be to argue from within a conceptual scheme, and in
terms of it, that some statements of this kind must hold in other schemes.
But this immediately imposes a condition upon the demonstrabiIity of
their truth; i.e. the claim that they are unconditionally true is,
itself, not absolute but scheme-bound. And if we accept our notions
of proof, and countenance the evidence that conceptual schemes do
vary., I believe that this corse I us ion is inevitable. Even if one
granted that the rules of logic were unique, and as such binding at
all times, i think we have shown that (with the exception of the con¬
straints imposed by certain most general facts of nature) no extra-
logical conceptual premise has ultimately any further warrant for its assertion
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than the fact that we do accept it at a particular time, or that it
fo!lows from others that we do accept at that time.
We have also argued that the truth of any theory-bound
descriptive statements can be said to be incorrigible (if at alI) only
in terms of a specific conceptual structure. Thus the above conclusion
applies to these as well: no such extra-IogicaI statement can be said
to be true, simpliciter. And as for theory-free descriptive statements
(if there are any) we have argued that in the absence of supporting
conceptual propositions, they cannot be used to establish inferences
strong enough to either prove or disprove any significant claim of a
logically possible ontology.
The disjunction betweenconceptuai and descriptive statements
is clearly not an exhaustive one. But we have argued, in our analysis
of the various senses of 'necessary', that any ascription of extra-
logical "necessity", whether it be physical, j_n re, conceptual, or
lexical, is possible only if I: other statements are conceptually
necessary (in the sense we have adumbrated in our theory of concepts),
or ii: the statements concerned are descriptive. We have shown that
the necessity of the former is not necessary, but conditional. As for
the latter, we assume that the disjunction employed above between
1theory-free' and 'theory-laden' is exhaustive. The negative conclusion
of the previous paragraph applies to these. So that in the absence
of necessarily necessary conceptual statements, any claim to establish
an ontology in whole or in part upon descriptive statements is equally
iIlusory.
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One might feel in our stress upon the demonstrable that we have
run rough-shod over truths known by intuition. But I do not think this
is the case. We have analyzed the claim that first principles can be known
this way, and shown that the doctrine of essential ism upon which any recourse
to necessity _i_n jre is based, is itself scheme-bound. Another source of
alleged intuitive truth, i.e. theory-free observations, we have shown to be
of insufficient logical power to generate more than the conclusion that
something existed.( But the non-emptiness of the universe is presupposed
in our use of predicate logic, and thus the "conclusion" is only possible
if we have already assumed its truth within the demonstration.) As for
other sources of alleged intuitive certainty, we have looked briefly at
the claim that there are self-validating propositions of sufficient force
to refute or prove existence-statements. We have suggested that the
characteristics displayed by the two examples chosen are representative
of all: either the conclusion is the result of poor reasoning, or it
assumes as true, premises, which themselves are scheme-
bound. So at the very best the soundness of any claim of seIf-vaIidat^ ,
if it is valid, is again conditional.
Thus, in terms of — and relative to — the theories and
assumptions we have used — it follows that one cannot claim that any
to establish or to refute a logically possible ontology
extra-IogicaI premises introduced into an argument are unconditionally
true. Since the existence of these, and our capacity to employ them
within a demonstration is presupposed as a necessary condition for the
assertion of the classical approach, the approach is untenable. For want
of these, this approach is like some mythological creature which all
suppose to have such glorious wings, till one day when it is called
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upon to fly, its wings fall off.
One can imagine how the success of geometric demonstations among
the Greeks, kindled the dream — the myth — of an unconditional meta¬
physical discovery. With the benefit of hindsight, i.e. with the aide of
Hume, Kant, and others, we can see the confusion in this cheam • the
confusion between the rational investigation of mathematical structures,
and the belief that in studying these the laws of what we now call
•physical' space can be discovered via pure thought. We, with our present
conceptual formation consider this to be impossible. If we rephrase
Aristotle's earlier image of the bat's eyes, the error seems to lie not
in unfamiIiarity with the truth but in this: the rays of an inner blaze
of light which (as we would say) illumine the intra-conceptuaI consequences
of certain assumptions are taken, mistakenly, to light directly on things
outside the mind. This mistake has spilled over more than two thousand
years of thought.
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#10. Without relinquishing his basic tenet that there is one
whole truth whose parts are discoverable, the advocate of the
classical approach might propose another tactic and argue thus: Among
various logically possible ontologies, certainly one of these is true,
and this can be recognized — inasmuch as one theory is more plausible
than any other. For in any set of rival assertions about existence,
is not one of these the simplest? or of greater explanatory power?
or more workable and less encumbered with artificial assumptions? or
closer in its general presuppositions to that of other theories which
we accept as true? or more compatible with intuition and experience?
etc. So if one position fares better than its compeers under such
an appraisal, can we not then say that it contains the most plausible
account? Admittedly, at least at this stage of our intellectual develop
ment, the determination of plausibility cannot be conducted with logical
rigor. But there are certain implicit canons to which we can refer.
And is this not parallel to the procedure of any descriptive science?
Even in physics, for example, atruly crucial experiment — one which
would be the analogue of a categorical logical proof or disproof —
is rare. For in most cases, no one possible experiment is totally
conclusive. And in many theories it might never even be formulable.
But this does not prevent one from assigning a weight of probability
to a particular theory in accordance with its satisfaction of
certain criteria In this way, even if all proof within any
logically possible ontology is conditional,
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one can still appraise one of several rival theories as the most
plausible.
'This position' he might avow 'has its weak points. What
,sdata" could possibly confirm or disconfirm an ontology? or given a set
of criteria, how could one be certain that only one position best satis¬
fies them? or if the satisfaction of different criteria by two or more
theories is uneven, how is one to justify the ascription of 'true' to
the theory which scores high in one, and 'false' to a position which
might score we!i in terms of another?'
Fairly spoken. But let us observe that the exponent of the
classical explanation, in shifting from 'demonstrably true' to
'plausibly true ', remains faithful to its central tenet, i.e. that there
is one true ontology, or one consistent set of true ontological
statements. Although we shall investigate this assumption in its proper
place, it is time here to look at another, i.e. that philosophic theories
can be adjudged in a manner analogous to those of science To do this let
us compare the theory-appraising procedures of the two disciplines.
A scientist in applying a term such as 'plausible' or 'high
weight of probability' to a theory, assumes that no adequately trained,
reasonable colleague — provided he is given the same data—would reply
'absurd'. There are, of course, differences in the evaluation of theories,
but these are generally of degree and not polar. A consensus of scientific
opinion is possible (within a specific discipline at a given time) because
to a great extent, the criteria for theory appraisal are theory-neutraI.
Further, since these canons are part of the common formation of scientists,
as scientists, they are shared, to a remarkable extent, by fellow-
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scientists. To be sure the advocates of rival theories will inevitably
interpret data in terms of their particular positions. For instance
Newton and Huyghens took the same data concerning the known phenomena of
light and explained it respectively in terms of a corpuscular and a wave
theory. Similarly the information we have today concerning the red-shift
in the spectra of distant stars has led to the formulation of different
theories concerning the state of the universe. But the discussions between
advocates of rival positions concerns the adequacy with which the theories
under study explain the known and discoverable data, not the criteria
which are to be employed in appraising them. Newton admitted the weak¬
ness of his account, and the discovery of quasars has forced a modification
of contemporary cosmological hypotheses.
I do not mean +0 suggest that discussion in and about science
is all peace and light. Witness the controversy concerning the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum mechanics (supported among philosophers for
instance by Hanson and attacked as phenomenological and anthropo-
centric by Smart); or Einstein's rejection of this same mechanics, because
the use of probabiiity-based calculations is intrinsic to it, and "Nature"
(in his view) "does not piay dice." But except for formative and revol¬
utionary periods, such as the present, the respective merits of most
scientific theories at most times can be appraised without this ravelling
back into a discussion of criteria.
But the reverse is true in respect to phiIosophy. UnIike the
canons embodied in scientific method, the criteria, in terms of which a
philosophic theory may be appraised as plausible, are not and cannot be
theory-neutraI. On the contrary philosphic attitudes of one sort or
VIII-10 224
another effect both the importance and the weight of value which one
ascribes to these criteria. To illustrate this point, let us consider the
question : What is the relation between our knowledge, and that of which
it is knowledge? The realist answers that there is a strong correspondence
between the structure of things and their representations in the apposite
theories and concepts. The conceptuaiist denies this and asserts that the
structures are of our own making. Now how is one to appraise these rival
philosophic positions? If theories (as the conceptuaIist claims) are
merely our own cor.struct ions, one must evaluate them in terms of, say,
their simplicity and elegance. The conceptuaIist position contains no
"unnecessary" assumptions, such as the correspondence between theory and
extra-conceptual processes posited by the realist, and further it explains
everything in terms of one element (namely, man's free constructions).
Obviously the conceptuaIist's explanation wins hands down on grounds of
simplicity — if such criteria are applicable here.
But does this make it more plausible? The realist might argue
that we are certain that there are regularities amongst extra-mental
phenomena, and that any appraisal of the plausibility of a theory must
first ascertain how well the theory fits such facts of our immediate
experience: it should not like an esthete with an olive branch merely
follow the airy-fairy of simplicity. He might argue further that the
conceptuaIist is constrained to explain away our belief in the presence
of otherwise self-evident regularities and objective structures which we
encounter in our experience. Thus, if an answer to the above query is
appraised in terms of realistic criteria, the conceptualist position runs
a weak second. Which is now more plausible?
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Or consider the following issue concerning the relevence of
criteria. According to Plato's account, Socrates rejected the speculations
of Anaxa 'eras and other fifth century thinkers, on the grounds that these
thinkers could not explain how the universe was structured and ruled by
wisdom. To Socrates, any explanation — however powerful — which did
not introduce considerations of this kind, was unacceptable. For others,
e.g. many of the materialists, any explanation which does introduce
features of this kind, is inadequate. It is e.g. along these lines that
Hobbes considers it to be a virtue of his particular system that he can
reduce everything to chains of motion.
Further, philosophic attitudes not only influence the appraisal
of the content of theories, but also their form. To a logician for instance,
any position which contravenes accepted logical laws is highly implausible
from the onset. But logic, as we know, cuts across the grain of language
and that same argument which contravenes the artificial canons of
logic — as long as it fits the facts of language or our conceptual
practices — may be judged acceptable by others. (For instance Quine has
argued that one cannot formulate 'analytic' in a logically acceptable manner
and thus the distinction analytic-synthetic cannot be applied. But
others, less interested in the niceties of symbolic logic, find this argument
inconclusive. See Welsh (I).) Or, to another philosopher for whom
contradictions work themselves out in history, perhaps the position of
anyone within any of the various camps of english-speaking philosophers
might be rejected as lacking in an appreciation of true logic.
I trust it is clear that the successful ascription of 'plausible'
to a given position must presuppose a common agreement concerning the
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criteria of plausibility. As far as philosophy is concerned, these
criteria, or even the criteria of these criteria, depend upon — and
are responsive to — the pressures of particular philosophic attitudes.
A philosophic theory can be appraised as highly plausibie when it satisfies
criteria sanctioned by a given position, and this same theory can be adjudged
highly implausible in terms of criteria favoured by another philosophic
position. As Whitehead observes: A great deal of confused philosophical
thought has its origin in obliviousness to the fact that the relevance of
evidence is dictated by theory" Whitehead (i), XV Section I. Philosophic
criteria, unlike their confreres in science, do not perch on the fence,
but are dragged into the melee, and thus one cannot ascribe 'plausible',
simpliciter, to an ontology, any more than on® can ascribe 'true'. The
appraisal of an ontological position can be established — but it is
scheme-bound, and as such it is also conditional. Thus 'plausible' fares no
better than 'categoricaI'.
#1i. The brunt of the preceding analyses has been to show that the
appraisal of an. ontological position, or of any existence-statement,
cannot be categorical, or absolute, but conditional and relative. In terms
of the assumptions we have made and the distinctions we have established —
unless we are in error --no (extra-IogicaI) premises of an ontology can
be characterized as categorically true. On the contrary, since no
unassailable warrant can assign 'true' to any extra-IogicaI premise
of an ontology, it is impossible to demonstrate categorically the truth
or falsity of any non-trivial existence-claims that it might contain.
At best one might claim that these claims are true in respect
to a given set of concepts holding at a specific time (And even this
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contention, in view of the onert-ness and indsfiniteness of crucial areas
in most conceptual structures, must be hedged with further reservations
and conditions.) As such any proof, refutation, or argument for or against
a given logically (and ? physically) possible position is conditional —
a hypothetical deduction based on premises which, although far from
arbitrary, at the same time lack any warrant of unshakeable certainty.
The only categorical time-free conclusion such procedures might possibly
establish, is a demonstration of the relations of mutual compatibility,
incompatibility, etc. which hold between various sets of statements,
considered as orenises, and other statements which one might wish to
assert concurrently This would be a sort of pure mathematics of
conceptual thought. And this thesis is, in some respects, a modest essay
a Iong such I Ines.
At another level, ontology might involve (and I am tempted to
jay; inevitably does involve) a confrontation of sue!. „c*ures with the
so-calied "data of experience", i.e. an investigation of those structures
and those accounts which appear as credible in respect to what is
considered the best attested data. But (returning to our point) In
view of the extreme difficulty of establishing any theory-free content in
most or all of the "data", it seems likely that the results of such an
investigation would themselves be Influenced by the initial conceptual
structures in terms of which the evidence is established.
And finally, although one can appraise a position or a conceptual
structure as plausible in respect to the manner in which it satisfies given
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criteria, these criteria themselves reflect an initial philosophic bias.
The plausibility of a philosophic theory can be established, but the value
of such a determination Is nevertheless relative to the choice of the
criteria employed, and again conditional.
If this is so. and within that part of our conceptual scheme
which I have used I see no grounds upon which it can be otherwise, then
our normal idea of what is provable, or plausible, or ascribable as
necessary canno, oa applied to a specific ontology without an at least
tacit reference to the premises and criteria in terms of which the
appraisal is made. if there were no alter:.ative ontologies a.id alternative
conceptual structures (in the manner in which there may in fact be no
truly alternative logics) and if aii concepts were closed and their
features inalterable, the reference to such premises and criteria would
be of trivial concern. But unlike logic, there are an impressive array
of genuinely alternative ontologies and the history of ideas is laden with
accounts of conceptual change. A reference to the premises and the criteria
they establish, in terms of which an ontological position is to be appraised,
is mandatory. From this if follows (unless one can unearth some rich
and undiscovered vein of self-evident and incontrovertible premises)
that no ontoiogy can presume to state the correct conceptual structure
concerning existence and existents -- nor can it presume to be absolutely
true in some lingering sense of an objective truth, simpliciter, which
is just there to be discovered.
CHAPTER N!ME
CofiditionaI Proof and Pisproof
The Unicity of Truth
#1. Within the preceding chapters we have examined successively
weaker claims concerning the categoricity of proof and disproof in




unfounded. If so> then if becomes reasonable to Inquire whether existence-
statements are at ieast conditionally provable, and if an ontology can be
said to constitute a single consistent hypotheticaI deductive theory, and
whether this can be appraised as true and complete or whole. For if
these questions cannot be answered positively, what rational purpose might
be served by any body of existence-statements, or any discussion concerning
existence?
We will discuss these questions in the following order: whether
such a theory is I) consistent, 2) whole, 3) deductive, 4) single, i.e.
unique, and true. I) As for consistency, it is evident that we have
assumed from the start that some ontologies are self-consistent. Other¬
wise there would have been no need to seek farther for an explanation
of incompatible ontological claims. Let us maintain this assumption in
force.
2) And as for wholeness, an ontology may be said to be 'full' or
'comprehensive' whenever it assigns a definite ontological status to all
entities and types of entities. For instance an ontology which asserted:
Nothing exists but matter, and by matter we mean ' would be com¬
prehensive. (It applies to alI entitles and types of entities.) It wiI I
be convenient in the sequel to consider an ontology as comprehensive>and
any proper part of such a fragment of the fuller one. In one sense of
'whole' a comprehensive ontology can be considered whole.
3) We turn now to the question whether an ontology can be said
to form a hypothetical deductive theory. To avoid a misunderstanding,
let us make it clear that such a theory need not be stated in the form of
a quasi-mathematical deduction, as for instance in Spinoza's "Ethics".
Yet, however relaxed the surface of the argument may be, if we are to have
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rational discourse, it seems axiomatic that we consider certain facts, rules,
concepts, theories, or combinations of these as starting points, and
then investigate the nexus of interrelationships they establish. Even
if our interest is only to establish the logical geography of the subject,
I cannot see how any conceptual cartography of this kind can be performed
without an at least tacit reference to some such underlying logical
structure — even if we develop it as we proceed. This structure , of
course, may not conform to the stricter canons of symbolic logic. {For
instance I have included rules among the starting points. Rules as such
are not normally considered deductive premises.) But at the very least
the sttucture so formed must comply with the logic of ordinary discourse.
After all, must not any statement that so and so is the case (if it is
not an initial posit) be warranted by some rules? For if this were not
so, what possible justification could one have in introducing it?
Similarly, if one argues for the plausibility of some conclusion, one
claims — given certain assumptions — that these together with their
consequences can be shown to order a heretofore puzzling region of
intellectual concern. Thus, in this weaker sense of deductive theory, I
think that nearly any philosopher is committed to the belief that — even
if conditional — the statements composing the subject of his study can
be structured in a manner analogous to that of a clearly defined deductive
system. (Whether or not it is worth the effort, is another question). We
shall in the sequel investigate the extent to which this assumption can be
satisfied.
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4) But would this form a single theory? In a trivial sense the
answer is obvious. For we can include any number of sentences between
braces and consider the totality of these a set, and so a single unit.
But equally obvious, when Aristotle talks of truth as a whole, he does not
refer to an arbitrary heap, but to one totality of statements which is
appraisable as true or false.
So when we inquire if — even conditionally — an ontology
forms a single deductive theory, our interest is in the uniqueness of
this theory inasmuch as it purports to be true. We have, above, assumed
the consistency of such a theory, but can we assume that within any
scheme there is only one true or correct ontology to discover?
If such an assumption were warranted, we might then say, in res¬
pect to a given scheme, that such and such an ontology was true, or, if
more than one ontology could be shown to follow from the concepts in
force within the scheme, that all of these were true and mutually compatible
And since our fundamental interest lies in the concepts of our own schemes,
we would then have discovered after all the true ontology or ontologies
which concern us. In this somewhat weaker form, the classical approach
could then still be said to be justified.
#2. In the following I argue i: the presuppositions of this claim
are still so strong there is little reason to believe that they are
generally satisfied within actual conceptual schemes, and ii: much of the
force even of this conditionalized approach becomes vitiated when we look
more carefully at the use of 'true' in the above. We turn now to consider
the first point. But before doing this, it would be well to relate
these issues to the general
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argument of this chapter. The task of this chapter is to question
the warrantabiiity of the belief that ail true or correct existence-
statements, estabiished within a particular scheme, are and must be
mutually compatible. Within sections 2-3 we observe that, as things
are, it is highly unlikely that any conceptual scheme can satisfy the
presuppositions of this belief. In the remainder of the chapter we argue
that this belief, although possible, is in principle unwarranted. in
section 4 we poirt out: to assume that one of two propositions of the
form 'a exists' and 'a does not exist', simpliciter, must be false, is
itself nonsensical. Section 5 is devoted to a realist's defense of the
above assumption. We argue in section 6, that this contention is un¬
warranted, and then proceed to an extended criticism of the realist's
claims. Specifically we show that a genuine alternative theory con¬
cerning theories of existence is possible. If such is the case the
realist claim — that all true or correct existence-statements established
within a particular scheme are and must be compatible — is unwarranted.
But now to the first point.
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We ask: Under what conditions is it legitimate to assume that
one and only one set of existance-statements can be demonstrablv true within
a particular conceptual scheme? Two conditions, at least, are necessary.
The first by now is obvious: ail existence-statements contained within the
one ontology (or within the mutually compatible ontologies) of a given
either directly or in respect to the applicat ion of these concepts to the given.
conceptual scheme, must be warranted in terms of the concepts in force//
(All such existence-statements would then either form part of a full des¬
cription of the concepts of the scheme, i.e. of the abstract structure
associated with them, or follow from these as above.) This first
condition?, although weaker, is similar to those presupposed by the
initial classical approach , '^the initial premises and their consequences
are still regarded as uniquely true, although in this case, conditionally
so.
For if there were only one statement which was not so warranted
then, by definition, neither it nor any part of the ontology which
depended upon it could be shown to be true. Further, if there were such
a statement which was neither interdicted nor warranted, there would be
at least one other proposition, i.e. its negation which would also
neither be warranted nor interdicted. Thus two ontologies could be
established in this way and neither could be demonstrably true in its
entirety. (One might object in such a case: Nevertheless one of these
theories is true in some objective way'. We shall in the sequei argue
that this use of 'true' is meaningless.) For the present, iet us restrict
discussion to ontologies which purport to be demonstrably true in terms of
a given conceptual scheme. As we have just shown, to believe that there
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can be one such ontology, or set of ontologies, is to assume that the
concepts in force are sufficient in themselves to warrant the assertion of
each statement contained within the ontology, either directly or when applied.
Also, if one believes that the ontology is comprehensive, then
a specific ontological status must be assignable to each entity or type
recognizable within the scheme. And I do not see how one can claim that
there is one true ontology without tacitly assuming its comprehensiveness.
For otherwise one would be forced to countenance the supplementation of
the "true" ontology with other statements which were mutually incompatible
and, as above, neither provable nor disprovable. E.g. an agnostic claims that
— however unprovable the proposition that God exists, may be — nevertheless
the statement or its negation is true. It would be a very curious
position which permitted both to be true.
Lastly one must also presuppose that the conceptual scheme, in
terms of which the allegedly demonstrably true ontology is established, is
free of contradiction: the conjunction of a I I full descriptions of all
concepts in force within the scheme, together with all their entailments,
contains no mutually incompatible statements. It is obvious if this were
not the case, that any statement, or any ontology, could be inferred within
such a scheme, together with its negation.
Perhaps the comprehensiveness referred to above is optional, the
first and third conditions are necessary. Unless these are satisfied, no
assertion of the form: There is one demonstrably true ontology within the
conceptual scheme we hold' is justified. Mark well, these are not
impossible conditions. It is not impossible to assume that each statement
of an ontology is fully warranted in terms of the concepts in force within
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the scheme in which it is established. Nor is it impossible to assume that
the allegedly true ontology is, at least In principle, comprehensive;
nor that a full description of each concept within the given scheme, and
the conjunction of all these together with all their entailments, is also
free of contradictions. Certainly these are not impossible conditions.
But I think that the task of showing that they are satisfied in any given
scheme is practically insuperable.
Nor could one ignore these conditions, and assume their satis¬
faction the way, for instance., mathematicians for a long time assumed the
consistency 0f arithmetic. For if we assume that they are satisfied in
any given conceptual scheme, we presume too much. Consider this: Is it
not extraordinary to claim that every statement one advances is fully
justified, in terms of the concepts one holds exactly in the way in which
they are said to hold? For this means that one could not mend, tinker
with, nor modify a concept in the very slightest. All that one could do
would be to report: This is the way it is1, without the slightest explan¬
ation, elaboration, selection, alter at ion, and — I am tempted to say —
without the slightest delight. And does not this assumption run counter
to nearly ail of our experience? Do we not find that thinkers, even
"descriptive" metaphysicians, are constantly forced to prescribe meanings
for the established terms they use, and to expIicate^and not merely to
explain)current concepts, i.e. to stress certain features and to discard
or supplement others? Is it not the intellectual's task generally to
seIect from, to modify, and to add to the existing conceptual order? When
we consider the statements of an ontology as following inevitably from
that of concepts in force, the way an electric light goes on when the switch
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is closed, are we not confusing thought with its artifacts? What a
philosopher leaves us is an ordered body of statements. But this is only
after his labors and as the result of his investigation. As Hanson
observes in his inquiry into the conceptual foundations of science:
In a growing research discipline, inquiry is directed not to
rearranging old patterns, into more elegant formal patterns,
but rather to the discovery of new patterns of explanation"
Hanson (I) p. 2. Italics mine.
This certainly applies to the activites of any important figure or
movement in philosophy.
And similarly, we cannot assume that the second necessary
feature — the total consistency of the conceptual scheme of any time —
is generally satisfied in actual schemes. Locke, in terms of the concepts
in force, I think showed credibly enough that one couid not maintain a
belief in divine rights. Yet these same concepts, together with that of
divine right, were part of the scheme with which Locke started. Was this
earlier scheme then consistent? Hume showed that one could not justify a
belief in the law of causality. Yet a belief in this law was part of the
conceptual scheme which Hume initially shared with his contemporaries.
Was this scheme then consistent? Kant showed that one could not cate¬
gorical I y prove certain propositions of metaphysics. Yet a belief in
dogmatic proof was not only part of the conceptual scheme within which
Kant initially slumbered, but that of Leibniz, Spinoza, Descartes, Aquinas
Aristotle, Plato There is a strong presumption that few actual schemes,
if ever placed upon the operating table, would prove free of contradictions
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The mere presence of incompatible ontologies and incompatible philo¬
sophic theories of all sorts, within the same conceptual scheme, is at
least prima facie evidence that some of the conditions necessary for the
assertion of the above claim are left unsatisfied. In any case, the burden
of proof lies upon those who wish to claim that their theory of existence
is in any way the unique one, the true one, even conditionally.
I think it would be more judicious to claim that in any given
conceptual scheme there is a core of statements of interest in the estab-
lishing of any ontology within the scheme. One could probably claim even
further that, given this core, there were other statements which did follow
and others which, although not warranted, could be said to have a relation
of involution to the initial ones — i.e. if all the initial statements
were true, all in the second set could not be false. This situation
permits different thinkers to build up alternative ontologies based upon
the same core. Each ontology has the warranted core statements in common, but
is distinct in respect to its choice of propositions from the second set.
These latter provide, as it were, the metaphysical options left open within
the scheme. Two philosophers agree, as for instance Aristotle and Plato,
inasmuch as both accept one core of conceptual beliefs, e.g. concerning
the unchanging nature of reality. This is a fragment of a conceptual
scheme they -hare. At the same time these same philosophers disagree
inasmuch as they argue that other statements, which we would say are
neither warranted nor interdicted within this scheme, are also true.
(Aristotle, for instance, in contrast to Plato, asserts that the concrete
individual is substantial.) And this may be the source of much of the
indecisive friction which develops between the advocates of rival positions.
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For neither can prevail totally over the other, inasmuch as each one
attempts to pose (and I think in vain) the heavy artiIlery of demon¬
stration in the airy heights of the unprovable. For, if our description
is correct, the conceptual scheme they have in common permits, i.e.
sanctions,the expression of these opposing attitudes.
I rt terms of the
To continue./premises we have employed — premises which seem
to be consonant with the central logical features of our present con¬
ceptual scheme — I see no other conclusion: not only are existence-
statements incapable of categorical proof or of unconditional assertion,
but even relative to a particular scheme, we cannot make any genera I
assumptions either that they are provable or warranted.
#3. We have argued in the earlier chapters that no ontology is
categorically provable. We have argued recently — in practical terms —
that the assumption there is one demonstrably true ontology within a
given scheme, is highly presumptions. But this latter difficulty is due
to contingent features and one might still maintain — given a scheme
which was self-consistent — that one could show there was one
ontology within it, and one might even try to maintain that any alter¬
native ontology contained within any other scheme would in some way be
defective, or a fragment of the former. It is, for instance, along these
lines that one argues that logic is unique. All proposed alternative
logics share with classical logic one common core of axioms. But the
only complete enlargement of this axiom set is that of classical logic.
See Tarski (2) and Kneale (I) p. 574.
And an argument of this kind becomes of critical concern at the
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present juncture. For if one cannot escape the limitations of one's scheme
in sane way, one Is forced to accept not only that there are as many true
ontologies as there are different concepts of existence in force in
different schemes, but even further — that there may be as many acceptable
theories of existence as there are alternative ontologies sanctioned within
each scheme. And this would not only bloat a universe with ontologies,
but would run counter to our intuitive feelings that in some bedrock manner,
after alI, we certainly know what exists.
Such an t, gument might for instance claim that a particular
ontology was comprehensive in respect to a particular scheme, and then
argue that it was absolutely comprehensive. Let us grant, contrary to the
tenor of the preceding sections, that some conceptual scheme contains a
concept of existence in terms of which only one comprehensive ontology can
be established; i.e. all other ontologies sanctioned within this scheme are
fragments of the former. Let us assume too that this scheme is self-
consistent, and further that one can show, in terms of it, that no
other alternative ontology, contained in other schemes, can be as com¬
prehensive. Let us also assume (without clarifying this assumption)
that the former ontology, because of its comprehensiveness and perhaps
other features, can be said to be the true ontology.
Agreed. But how could one judge the comprehensiveness of any
such ontology? Clearly one would have either to enumerate all entities
and types of entities within the universe and show that the ontology
assigned a definite onto logical status to each, or else create some
abstract structure — linguistic or conceptual — which successfully
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enumerated all entities which were describable in terms of the language, c
discernible within the conceptual scheme. I assume one could never fully
establish a complete physical enumeration nor — even if this were possibl
— could this be performed without reference to an abstract structure of
linguistic and/or conceptual distinctions. Thus we need merely consider
such a structure. Let us assume that it provides an exhaustive enumera¬
tion of all possible entities. (Were this not the case, one could never
show that a particular ontology was comprehensive.) Let us assume too,
given such a list of entities and types of entities, that one could check
the ontology for comprehensiveness in respect to this list. But such a
list represents the conceptual and/or linguistic distinctions — the
categories and types — which hold within our scheme, or whatever scheme
is used. if we were to prove that no ontology in any other scheme could
be as comprehensive, strictly speaking we mean 'comprehensive in respect
to the distinctions that we establish'. One could not argue for the
uniqueness, simpliciter, of such an ontology, but only for its comprehen¬
siveness in respect to the categories, etc. which hold within the scheme
of the preferred ontology. This point is fatal to any argument,
established within one scheme, which attempts to show the absolute com¬
prehensiveness and, a fortiori, truth of the ontology it contains. And
I believe, no matter what other criteria one might employ to establish
such a strong uniqueness for a given ontology, that any such criteria
would also be scheme-bound — and as such ineffective.
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Further, and closer to our present point, a similar objection
can be made,with in a scheme, to the assumption that there may be one most
comprehensive ontology within it. By this I mean that even in the hypo¬
thetical case we are discussing, we may have granted too much in
assuming such a comprehensiveness. Let us look more closely.
One can, as we have above, assume the self-consistency of a
conceptual scheme, i.e. that the totality of statements contained in
a full description of the concepts In force, together with their systematic
consequences, be free of contradiction. For, although the historical record
may belie this, nothing Intrinsic to the notion of concepts themselves,
forced us to deny this possibility. On the other hand, we have argued,
the comprehensiveness of an ontology can be established only in respect
to a theory-Iaden enumeration of entities And it is a most atypical
conceptual scheme which permits only one possible enumeration of entities
recognizable in terms of the scheme. But, lacking this assurance, we
cannot rule out a priori the likelihood that different ontologies may
each claim to be most comprehensive, in terms of different enumerations
sanctioned within the same scheme. (We have, for instance, seen how
Aristotle employs different taxonomic criteria, according to his needs
and interests.) Thus, although possible, the assumption that there is
one most comprehensive ontology within a scheme, is improbable.
One might, of course, demur and insist that to the extent one
type of enumeration is employed in one theory and another within another,
each can be said to be in force within different sectors> or parts, of the
same general conceptual scheme. In such a case the above argument does
not hold. But then we cease to consider a scheme, as the total body of
conceptual truths one accepts as true at a given time, and conflate
this notion into that of a theory. (For we can assume a theory to be
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self-consistent, comprehensive, and perhaps even complete,) I prefer,
however, to consider a theory as part of a conceptual scheme, and not
identical with it. A theory is distinguishab'e from a scheme, inasmuch
as it takes certain statements sanctioned within the general scheme
(i.e. propositions whose truth is possible), and asserts them to be
true. In this way atheism and theism are theories established within
the same genera! conceptual scheme.
Similarly we recall that if a statement is warranted within a
scheme, the source of this warrant is either lexical, conceptual, or
logical. Thus, if one considers existance-statements to be informative
about the extra-conceptual, one cannot in general expect existenee-state¬
ments to be fully warranted within a scheme. So, as noted earlier, two or
more mutually incompatible ontologies may generally be sanctioned within
the same scheme, and thus neither may justify its claim to be unique.
For we can imagine that some existence-ascription, *p', is
possible within some scheme (E.g. *p' may stand for 'God exists', so
that "it is possible that God exists' is true within some scheme.) But
thenanother statement of this same scheme, i.e. 'not-p' is also possible.
As we have already noted, many if not all existence-ascriptions are not
theory-free observation-statements. Thus, by the above, there are no
absolute constraints, either conceptual or extra-conceptual, to the
assertion of !p'. And there may be good reason to believe in the truth
of 'p'. For instance a theory containing 'p* (in which 'p' is asserted
as true and not as merely passible) might successfully order otherwise
inexplicable features of experience. But by the same reasoning others
might find the assertion of 'not-p' equally important. Thus although
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the advocates of two incompatible positions might be in full accord
that only one of these Is correct, who is to show — and with what means —
that it Is his?
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#4. AIi of the preceding analysis has beenfocused in one way or
another upon the claim that some existence-statements, or some body of such
statements, can be known or shown to be true. Our study, in each case,
has shown that no such propositions can be described as categorically true
and that even a conditional ascription of truth to these must be severely
hedged with further restrictions. 'But surely we know what exists' is
the intuitive response to these conclusions. 'And if your results were
to be accepted, it would follow that a statement in one scheme, e.g. 'God
exists' can be said to be true within it, and Its negation also said to
be true within it or another. This is an absurd conclusion.'
It will be the burden of the ensuing sections to show that this
conclusion, although legitimate, is not absurd -- and that the judgment of
absurdity is either based upon an illusion, or unwarranted. We wish to
show that not only are existence~statements neither categorically provable
nor intuitively certain, nor even generally conditionally provable, but
even further that we may be forced to countenance that a proposition such
as 'God exists' may be considered as true in terms of the data, and the
concepts in force within one scheme, and also considered as false in terms
of the same general stock of data, and the same concepts The first part
of our analysis, the discussion of the illusion, proceeds as follows:
i: The above objection cannot be justified by a reference to what is
generally the case: it need not be physically necessary for one to say of
any two propositions, such as the above, that one must be false, ii: Turning
to the conceptual, we note that 'false' and 'true' are systematically mis¬
leading: in certain cases it is quite legitimate to say that two
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apparently incompatible propositions, such as the above, are both true,
iii: The confusion, underlying the objection we are studying, arises when
one disregards these features of alethic appraisal: Either 'God exists' is
true or its negation is true', may be just bad logical grammar.. . We proceed
now to the details of this argument.
i: Let us recall our earlier discussion concerning the principle of
contradiction. Although this proposition, together with all valid theorems
of classical logic, appears as part of our customary logical apparatus,
the success of the application of logic to our descriptions of what is
the case does not imply that the laws of logic reflect the structure of
the extra-conceptual world. It is physicaiiy possible that neither
component of the logically impossible proposition: a is F. a is not-F1
be false.
One might try to reject this possibility outright, contending
but
that the totality of true statement car.no/ be seIf-consistent. Indeed,
it is probably part of our notion of truth that the totality of all true
statements is self-consistent. And this belief not only reflects a
feature of our conceptual schema it shows more than
this. Specifically, the world must be so constituted that we can arrange
to describe things in such a way that the laws of classical logic — and
the associated notion of truth are applicable to the statements about
it. But this still does not permit us to infer that, if we were to change
our concepts and rules, no other notion of truth might then be applicable.
For, as we have noted earlier in connection with rules, a rule
is present only when it is physically possible to do something also some
other way. There is no rule to say we must comply with the law of gravity,
nor to tell us to feel pain when our finger is burnt. One just does.
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Now if we consider the abstract structure which can be associated with a
concept as a sort of super-rule which, in any application of the concept,
sanctions one to take certain statements and to replace or conjoin them
with others, we may also say that any concept — including that of truth —
establishes patterns of entailment which could also be established in
another way. Thus — although it is certainly a characteristic of our
logic to proscribe the conjunction of two incompatible statements —
we cannot claim a priori that things are such that it is physically
necessary for the totality of true or correct statements concerning them
to be consistent. In short, we cannot argue from our experience of the
world that, even if its truth is unknowable, 'God exists' is true or false,
as the case may be, but not both.
ii: It is of course, nearly inconceivable to _us that any two mutually
incompatible propositions can both be said to be true of the same object
or state of affairs at the same time. This is (perhaps) absolutely the
case whenever the statements concerned are theory-free. (And to extend
this discussion, unless stated otherwise, we can also consider low-order
descriptive statements to be included within this same rubric. By these
latter I mean observation-statements such as 'The black mark is at 3',
'The water has turned blue', 'The light is on'. in other words, state¬
ments which demand for their expression only those conceptual abilities
which we assume are present or latent in all human cultures — and are
such that adherence to the beliefs of a particular conceptual scheme does
not bias the results of the observations they describe.) And because of
this belief of ours that theory-free statements brook no concurrent
assertion of statements incompatible with them, we feel compelled to
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reject the possibility that any pair of apparently mutually incompatible
statements can both be said to be true. However the link between the first
belief (applicable to theory-free escriptions) and the general conclusion
is not as self-evident as it seems. It will be the task of the following
paragraphs to discuss the confusion underlying this pseudo-conclusion.
Briefly, ft is customary to consider that the truth-value of a statement
is the same irrespective of the manner in which it is assigned. We shall
— i.e True or False as the case may be —
argue that although it is the same/it is not identical, and any inference
based upon the presumed identity of all truth-values is unwarranted.
To illustrate this let us consider a typical proof. We might
find that its premises include definitions, descriptive statements, and
conceptual propositions. For example, within Aquinas' proof that God
(as an Unmoved Mover ) exists, the Deity is defined as an Unmoved Mover,
this is true by definition; nothing in motion is said to be the cause of
its own motion, this is a conceptual truth within AristoteIean-Iike
systems; and lastly, Aquinas observes, presumably on the basis of experience,
that there is motion. But for the purposes of his argument, however
variegated the assignments of truth to its premises may be, all that
Aquinas requires is that they be true.
Similarly, in arithmetic the sum of 2 *2 is considered equal in
value to the successor of 3. Yet 2 + 2 is not identicaI with the latter.
For if it were, anything that one could say of 2 + 2 could be said about
we say
the successor of 3. And this is clearly not the case. (E.g./In the
formerrthe sum function, applied to the number couple (2,2), yields the
value of 4; in the latter:the successor function, applied to the single
operand, 3, yields 4.1) In other words the 4 » to 2 + 2 and the 4 = to the
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successor of 3, although alike in value, are unlike in terms of their
construction. As a matter of convenience, it is possible in most cases to
overlook the difference in origin. But this does not mean that we can
consider them idential.
Let us apply the above distinctions to the truth of statements.
Parallel to the case of numbers, we can employ various assignments of
'true' to propositions and consider them as equal in value. All truths
are true. But we must not overlook the fact that these different types of
truths — determined in different fashions — are not identical. For
instance we do not peer through marriage registers to determine whether
it is true or not that bachelors are unmarried men. With such statements,
true by lexical convention, we need merely consult the dictionary. But then
we do not consult the dictionary to determine whether it is true that
our shoes are tight: the feeling of discomfort is sufficient. And again,
we perform neither of these types of actions to determine whether it is
just to punish the innocent. The concept of justice that we hold tells
us 'No'.
The difference in determination is of more than trivial concern.
There may, for instance, be a culture in which 'bachelor' is used to
describe any man who still has not fathered a child; and there are concepts
of justice, say, that of the military in Vietnam, in which it is considered
just to annhiiate the innocent. Any assignment of 'true' to statements
describing the above is evidently scheme-bound. But in any culture, and we
suppose at any time, the truth of a low-order observation statement, such as
'My shoes are tight' is scheme-free.
There is then this significant difference among these various
types of truth assignments — one which is glossed over when we consider
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them equal jr. value. In only one of these do we consider it impossible
to assert that a is F and a is not-F about the same thing at the same time.
Only the truth of theory-free descriptions, if true, does riot vary from
scheme to scheme. In the other cases, i.e. in respect to the lexical or
the conceptual, it is quite possible to say that two apparently incom¬
patible statements are both true. There is no paradox here. In these
latter cases one need merely specify the language or the conceptual scheme,or part,
in which each holds, and the specious aura of incompatibility soon
vanishes. In the first case, and only in the first case, an at least
tacit reference to such a scheme is of trivial concern. In all other cases
it is mandatory. Any such omission is ungrammaticaI — and any inference
based upon such an omission is nonsensical.
iii: In the above we have considered pure types of statements. But
a theory, and its conclusions (for instance the assertion that God exists),
as above noted, generally combines various types of propositions within
its premises. Now how is the truth of such a theory to be judged? Let us
assume the cone I usicnof the earlier chapters, that the truth of such prem¬
ises depends ultimately upon the truth of theory-free descriptions and
upon the conceptual. Let us assume now that two theories contain incomp¬
atible conclusions, as for instance theism and atheism, and that whatever
theory-free components they may contain, if any, are unquestionably true.
Let us now assume that the conceptual statements within the theories are
true of the concepts in force respectively within the different schemes,
and each is consistent with all statements contained in a full description
of the concepts of its scheme, and of its consequences. Still the theories
are mutually incompatible. Were there a theory-free description which
provided a counter-instance to some consequence of on® of the theories, one
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might then refute the rival position in terms of it. But we have argued
at length that in general there are no such refuting premises. Further,
as argued in i), there is no physical necessity to ban the appearance of
incompatible theories. Then what is left? A theory containing only
conceptual premises can be no more than conditionally true. But if a
theory contains mixed premises, some theory-free and some conceptual,
it can be said to be true only inasmuch as its premises are true. Thus
even a mixed theory can only be considered as conditionally true. Given
these assumptions, we can say of a given theory or of statements contained
within it, that it is true within a particular scheme. But we cannot say
that it is true, simpliciter. Any such claim is as incomplete as saying:
'Rot' means 'red". (To make the latter a statement we must add: 'Rot'
means 'red' — in a particular language, i.e. German.' Similarly we must
specify in the former; The theory is true in a particular conceptual
scheme.) Without further specification, neither expression makes a
statement. And if they purport to do this, as any reference to the truth
of theories, simpliciter, purports — they are nonsense.
The confusion underlying such a claim arises when one applies
'true' to theoretical statements in the same manner — i.e. without the
mandatory reference to the scheme in which the assignment is made — as when
one uses 'true' in respect to theory-free statements. It is this which
provides a specious warrant for the belief that it is meaningful to ask,
without reference to a particular scheme, whether or not e.g. the statement
'God exists' au fond is true.
This would be a trivial conclusion if concepts never changed.
But if we abandon the notion of unchanging concepts and with it any reliance
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upon a categorical ascription of conceptual necessity — as it seems
abandon it we must — then there is no objective manner of determining
the truth of mutually inccmpatible, seIf-consistent, physically possible
theories. One wiii be true and known as true within one body of concepts
i n
and/terms of the practices they sanction, another within another. Nor,
as we have noted, can we even establish a scheme-free appraisal of the
relative plausibility of rival theories.
There remains the objection that theories and their conclusions
are true somehow irrespective of the scheme in which they are stated.
But if this is based upon the analogy between the truth of theory-free and
scheme-bound propositions, it is illusory. (Again we reach the intuitively
puzzling conclusion: we cannot even know, in any bedrock way, what exists
and what does not exist — except in terms of the conceptual scheme we
hold. This conclusion can be extended. For as in the example, p.241b, the same
scheme may warrant both "p' is possible' and "not-p1 is possible', and thus per¬
mit the development of theories containing 'p' and 'not-p* respectively.
#5 Let us now consider what we trust is the last defense of the
classical position. For we have shown that the belief in the categoricity
of proof is unfounded, that in general proof — at best — is conditional,
and that sanctioned theories of existence, even within one scheme, need
not be unique. We have argued more recently that not only proof but
knowledge of these truths is conditional. So a I I that is left is the
assertion that there are unconditional verities, however unknowable and
unprovable they may be as such. We turn to a defense of this claim.
'You have argued1 some realist might claim 'that once we dis¬
tinguish between the types of truth-assignments, it becomes clear that only
the truth of theory-free descriptions can be said to remain invariant through
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changes from one conceptual scheme to another. And from this, on the
assumption that the truth of what you have called 'mixed' theories depends
upon the truth of its components, you have concluded that it is meaningless
to talk about the truth, simpliciter, of any theory. So much I grant.
But you have at the same time (at least tacitly) assumed another type of
distinction between truths, and in terms of this latter your conclusion
does not follow.' For instance you have said that a conceptual statement
can be said to be true when it is part of, or follows from, a full des¬
cription of some concept in force. You have also said that any description
of a concept, if it is correct, is true of the concept. (In this way,
e.g. it is true of the concept Phlogiston to say that phlogiston is present
in all flammable materials. Of course no one holds this concept now,
and so we do not say that this statement, although true of the concept, is
true.) So, if you will permit me to express your terminology more
clearly, you wish to say that a conceptual statement 'p* is true, in
terms of a particular scheme, when 'p' is part of, or follows from a full
description of a concept in force, and this description is correct; i.e.
'p' is true, inasmuch as 'p' is true of a concept in force.
'Now let us look at this use of 'true of'. You say that a
conceptual statement is true of a concept when it supplies a correct
description of the concept. But you also say that a theory-free des¬
cription is true when it provides a correct description of, say, some
state of affairs. Then these uses of 'true of* and 'true' are alike
inasmuch as both can be replaced by 'correct'. Further, and closer to
my point, the value of both is invariant in respect to changes in concep¬
tual schemes. A description which is true of Phlogiston in the heyday of
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this concept is no more nor less correct than it is today. (Admittedly,
unlike pure theory-frae descriptions we must have a particular conceptual
scheme in terms of which we can understand, or learn about, or use a
concept. But what is scheme-bound in this case is not the correctness
of the description, but our knowing of the concept. And that is another
matter. )
' In this way whenever a concept provides a conceptual structure
in terms of which some complex state of affairs can be correctly described,
then the theory making use of these relations can be said to be correct,
i.e. to be true as a description of the state of affairs in question. And
although the knowledge of this correctness is evidently part of some
conceptual scheme, and as such conditional, the correctness of this
description is not.
' You might wish to point out that such a theory can be expressed
in, and as such be significant, only in terms of particular languages.
Well and good. But if we assume, as most linguists do, that all sophis¬
ticated languages are capable (with varying ease or difficulty) of
expressing the same stock of thoughts, then this reference to language
becomes trivial. We are free to talk significantly about the correct
description, and need add no further tags concerning the language in
terms of which it is correct.
' So we may continue. We can now claim that there is one correct
description or theory, or else a set of mutually compatible theories,
concerning any entity or complex of entities. In most cases it contains
or is based upon both true theory-free statements and conceptual statements
IX-5,6 252
true of concepts. The mixed theory so formed provides a correct description
of the state of affairs in question. And it is correct inasmuch as the
nexus of interrelationships established in the theory is instanced in
the state of affairs to which it is applied. It is a description of this
kind which we call 'true'. We are cognizant that we can never establish
such a description, nor demonstrate its correctness, except in terms of
the scheme we employ. In this way we admit that the correct description,
in any unconditional sense, is both undemonstrable and unknowable. (And
here I echo Popper's view of the scientist who "can never know for certain
whether his findings are true". This appears in Section VI of his
article "Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge". Popper likens a
scientific theory to a genuine conjecture, such as GoIdbach's in the
theory of numbers, which as Popper says: may well be true in fact, even
though we do not know, and may, perhaps, never know, whether it is true
or not" . But its truth, i.e. its correctness, is nevertheless absolute.
For instance, when we say that among two statements such as 'God exists'
and 'It is not the case that God exists' one and only one of these is
true, it is this absolute sense of truth which we employ. This claim is
not based upon any confusion. We say this because one of these statements,
and only one of these describes what is the case.
^6 This objection is well taken, and certainly it is intuitively
natural to consider all statement-like propositions as true or false.
But there are some questions we should like to ask about the above.
According to this realist's exposition, it is pointless to suggest that he
show us such absolutely correct descriptions. For, by hypothesis, we could
never know them as such. But It would be interesting to inquire whether
his position is itself absolutely true. For if it were not, then the
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assertion: There is a unique statement, or set of mutually compatible
statements, which correctly describes what is the case 'might be
true in terms of one scheme, false in another. A very curious realism.
Let us assume the realist above answers that his position is
absolutely true. But on what grounds? Perhaps as in the case of his
alleged absolutely true descriptions of what is the case, the truth of
his position is also undemonstrable. But then how is it known? It
certainly does not appear self-evident, even after reflection. (For I
see in it no more than what I might call the 'pathetic fallacy of the
logician': the expectation that the world conform exactly to one's
canons.) If this is so, the correctness of the absolute claim must
then be demonstrable in some way. For otherwise if it is neither demon¬
strable nor self-evident, then it must be known to be correct, if it
is known, in some very mysterious way. But as such, this position becomes
an article of faith
Can it be demonstrably true or correct? Unless this position
can be shown to follow directly from the axioms of logic — and it is
most uniikely that the axioms of logic can provide any information
about the extra-Iogicai — it can be shown to be true only in terms
of particular schemes. And certainly we need not look far for schemes
incompatible with any general statement of the realist claim. For,
as Duhem has argued, from the time of Plato's doctrine of saving-the-
appearances through to the beliefs of Galileo's contemporaries, con¬
ceptual ism — and not realism — provided the dominant position
within the current of European speculation
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concerning the physical world. See Duhem (I) (By 'concept¬
ual ism', in this sense, I refer to the belief that theories do not represent
states of affairs, but are constructions which serve to link together
observed regularities.) In view of this the realist, if he asserts the
absoluteness of his own position, can say that it is diachronistically
warranted only in respect to statements which do not refer to the physical
world. But not even in respect to all of these. For a (mathematical)
intuitionist would not concur in the realist's assertion that ail
unprovable propositions must be true or false. Thus the only kind of
statements left, it seems, are those said to be "metaphysical". But even
here his assertion is indefensible, if it is to be absolute. For one
need only show that sane self-consistent position, incompatible with that
of realism, is also applicable to these statements. (This we shall soon
do. ) \f_ this can be demonstrated , the rea I i st cannot ma i nta i n that his
position is uniquely warranted in a I I schemes. Instead he is forced to
accept that it too is conditional and that it represents one metaphysical
option, one possible viewpoint amongst several. By his own assumption
he cannot show us any unconditionally true statements. Nor(j_f_our ensuing
argument is correct) can he show that his is the unique position, even
within our present conceptual scheme. And so his objection — like the
statement 'God exists' — may very well be sound in respect to his own
premises. Yet, by the same token, it need not trouble us inasmuch as it is
bound to these premises, and lacking in generality — but this we must prove
Before proceeding, let us get our bearings. For the course
ahead may be curious. We have argued not only that the assertion of any
ontology is scheme-bound, but further the assertion of any meta-ontological
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position, such as realism, is also scheme-bound. And this applies equally
well to the present conclusion: The assertion — that the assertion of
any meta-ontologicaI position is scheme-bound — is itself scheme-bound.
Our conclusions are true or correct, if true, etc., in respect to the
scheme and assumptions with which we have worked. But since these
of ours, I trust, are closely tied to those of logic and the requirements
of proof, if they are not guaranteed uniqueness in this respect, they share
with logic a passport which permits them to travel without hindrance
and restriction through a large number of different conceptual schemes.
Thus this conclusion concerning the scheme-bound character of existence-
statements, and meta-existence statements,can bask in a relative truth —
that it is true in many schemes. Given our assumptions — and given our
present knowledge of the incompleteness of complex self-reflexive struc¬
tures — I do not think it possible to claim more than this. To continue,
we have been examining the grounds for the realist's assertion that since
truth is one all correct ontologies must be mutually compatible. We
have suggested that this claim may be based upon nothing more than a
confusion which arises in applying the criteria of truth-assignment for
theory-free descriptions to theories, and as such illusory. We have also
argued that any appeal to physical necessity is unfounded. Thus the
argument, perforce, must be conducted in respect to the conceptual. It
seems, the only possible strategy left open to the realist is to argue
that his belief is not illusory, but warranted. We have cited evidence,
albeit briefly, to suggest that the realist position cannot claim to be
uniquely warranted in respect to some conceptual schemes to which we have
access. Thus such a position cannot claim any exlusive warrant for its
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general correctness. In terms of these schemes. It is our purpose now to
present In terms of our present scheme, a sketch of a viable alternative
to the realist position, that is to say: alternative and incompatible.
We need not establish that this latter is warranted, in the sense that it
follows as a consequence from conceptual statements true within our present
scheme. We need only show that it is compatible, i.e. that it is con¬
sistent with them. For if this is the case, then the realist cannot
claim that his position is warranted, and as such uniquely true or correct.
«*
To show this, we consider in the following a peculiar but important
class of propositions. These are all such that they need merely be
unfalsifiabie to be considered as true. But if there are such, it follows
we cannot guarantee their uniqueness, nor their compatibility with other
"truths". For if other propositions incompatible with these are also
unfalsifiable — then they can also be considered as true.
The reader may have the distinct reaction that something peculiar
is happening. Well let us look at the details,
#7 There are certain very general propositions which enter into
discourse, which appear to be informative, and consequently seem to be
appraisable as true or faise. For instance (if we consider physical space)
one such proposition might be Euclid's sixth postulate that only one
line parallel to a given line can be drawn through any point. So too is
Newton's First Law that all bodies remain either at rest or in uniform
rectilinear motion, unless compelled by impressed forces to change their
state. Let us also include within this group of prima facie statements
the assertion by Aristotle, as In "Categories" 5, 2a 34 ff. that
concrete individuals are the primary substances. Further examples might
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include Kant's dictum, noted earlier, that the quaniumof substance remains
constant in all change; or Einstein's postulate that the speed of prop¬
agation of light is invariant in all inertia! systems; or, on a
different plane, the Biblical proposition that God made man in His image; or
Buddha's assertion that desire is the source of all suffering; etc.
The above propositions may well appear to form a curious company.
Nevertheless they display several important common features. First (singly
or in company with others) each of the above can be considered, in a way,
a "first principle", inasmuch as each warrants or sanctions the assertion of
other important statements, which could not be so asserted without them.
We will show this by citing various examples. Euclid, for instance,
attempted to eliminate his postulate of parallelity, but he found this
impossible. And for good reason, for as we now know, It serves to define
certain necessary characteristics of Euclidean space. Without the above
postulate, or another similar to it, Euclid could have proven only a
fragment of his theory. In the same way, each of Newton's three laws,
ogether with the associated definitions, are necessary in the development
of his system. If, for instance, the first law, together with its system¬
atic consequences, were to be removed, one could not calculate even the
path of a free-falling body — at least not without some ad hoc rein¬
statement of this principle. Or again, as noted earlier, Aristotle's
belief in the ontological primacy of the concrete individual is one of the
most characteristic elements of his thought. Let us see how basic this is.
If there were no concrete individual there would be neither an ultimate
subject of predic^-ion nor a ground of properties. And further (judging by
the position Aristotle assigns to singular propositions, as in PR AN I-I
24b 28) propositions concerning the individual provide the formal basis
for universal affirmatives and negations. Thus both his theory of pre-
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dicat'on ancl °f syllogism would be impossible in their stated form if
reference to such individuals was not sanctioned in this way. Or again,
in respect to Kant's dictum — and the statement of the prindole of
conservation of mass to which it refers — we have only to consider how vast
a body of chemical and physical theories would become meaningless if the
various conservation principles, whether of mass, energy, mass-energy,
/
etc. were not part of the appropriate conceptual scheme. For without some
underlying principle of conservation, there is no assurance at any time
that the sum of quantities involved in a chemical reaction will be equal
throughout the reaction; or, if mass were not constant, one could not
determine the physical forces present in a given action. And ( outside of
classical mechanics) even the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, of
fundamental importance to quantum mechanics, itself depends upon the main¬
tenance of the law of conservation of energy. And again, Einstein's
conversion of these two conservation principles into the one of mass-
energy, bespeaks the place which some such proposition plays within any
actual physical theory. Or, to change the plane of reference, without the
Biblical association of God and man as His image, thefundamentaI notion
of a covenant between Deity and man would be meaningless. (One does not
covenant for instance with a lump of clay.) Similarly, Jesus' claim to
be the Son of God, becomes impossible in any literal sense, if both Deity
and man are not conceived of in similar terms. And again, jf desire
is not considered the source of all sorrow, suffering, e.g. as in sickness
as it is in Buddhism
cannot be considered to be due to a desire for life*/ But if this premise
is accepted, one's previous attitude towards all suffering and all desires
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becomes radically altered; and so do the statements one makes concerning
them. Thus each of the above propositions warrants or sanctions the intro¬
duction of other statements which, were the initial propositions not present,
would neither be sanctioned nor warranted as the case may be. As observed
much earlier, this is in a way similar to that which happens, within a
scheme, when a new concept is introduced.
either in principle or
Further, each such proposition is unfalsfiable,/at least for a
significant length of time. In what physical, situation could one ever
show whether or not there were one or many parallel lines passing through a
given point? Or, if we may quote Hanson again, (this time in respect to
Newton's system): Apparently a statement of the first law needs no
explanation, because it could not be false...The law encapsulates and
extrapolates much information about evenfs, yet it seems beyond discon-
firmation: it could not but be true" Hanson (I) p. 95-6.In fact only
recent Iy;when for the first time rockets were developed powerful enough to
escape the earth's gravitational field, was any conclusive testing of this
law even possible. (Up till then any trajectory observed was subject to
the forces of terrestiaI.or othertgravitational fields.) And again, how
is one to show that Aristotle is incorrect in his belief in the ontoiogica!
primacy of concrete individuals? Surely one cannot point to say, a Platonic
Form, and show that Aristotle is in error, if he is. All that one can do
is to reason on the basis of some c; mmon stock of generally accepted
principles and the generally theory-laden data of experience. But in view
of the uncertain status of nearly any of our common beliefs, the same
argument that might be used to refute the Aristotelean claim might also be
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turned against the user. A Kantian, for Instance, might claim that even
if the concrete individual were the ultimate subject of predication, there
is no warrant to assume that it is also ontologically primary. For the
usual subject of predication, the Kantian would argue, is the phenomenal
object, and certainly whatever is ontologically prior is not mere appearance.
'But', an Aristotelean might reply^ «what is most knowable in the object,
although gained through sense-experience, is the universal. And since
this is specifically what makes the object what it is, we perceive more
than an appearance, we grasp its essence.'
Let us break off the discussion at this point. I think it is
clear, that as long as the above propositions are considered to be
important, they are like Achilles nearly invulnerable to effective over¬
throw. This is the case for at least two reasons. First, they are such
that refutation in itself is initially difficult, or inconceivable.
Second, the entire theory which contains them is built upon the assumption
that these propositions are true, and thus the theory in its development,
actively resists or even prevents any decisive falsification from occuring.
Any counter-evidence to the claims that these propositions establish, thereby
becomes a threat to the entire theory. And wherever the theory is in
general successful, any such putativeiy refuting premises are either
excluded from consideration as insignificant or — where this is impossible —
explained away. These latter defenses can often be performed in terms of
the elements of the system as it stands. For instance, whenever fresh
data proved the inexactness of the existing Ptolemaic theory, additional
epicycles were added to account for this. (And perhaps we see a similar
phenomenon today in the proliterating number of elementary particies
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accepted in nuclear physics.) When this is not possible the existing
system can be revised, as for instance Einstein modifies classical field
theory and introduces the notion of space-time in order to maintain the
postulate of the"Invariance of the speed of light. Or, a modern defender
of the Biblical viewpoint will reinterpret the text of "Genesis" as a
symbolic account, and so save what in his view is the essential feature of
the doctrine.
#8. But whatever the situation(or the techniques involved)might be,
the salient feature of all the above is to be unfa Isifiable. This means
in terms of the knowledge present at the time and the scheme in force —
that these propositions are logically and/or physically possible, and no
disproof of their claims exists. From this two consequences follow. if
they are merely possible, in one sense or another, then their negations
are aiso generally possible. (We will soon return to this point.) And
if they are unfalsifiable, none of their consequences are falsifiable.
Thus if they are introduced into a theory and considered as true,
without a qualm one can consider the entire theory also as true,
irrespective of the a I ethic status of these propositions. For if the goal
of theoretical investigation is to establish a set of powerful, mutually
compatible and comprehensive structures in terms of which the observed
regularities and known and discern' die features of experience are
ordered, as long as the structures are successful, there is no need to
investigate the "truth" of all their parts.
For all that we need expect of any theory, or of the conceptual
structure in terms of which it is established, is that it be consistent,
consistent with itself, consistent with results of the application of
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other concepts in force, and consistent with all the raw data both known
and discoverable which experience may provide. All that we must demand of
such a totality of statements, is that they be unfalsifiable, either directly
or in respect to their consequences. And if they are consistent as above,
they are unfa Isifiable. (Conversely, if or as soon as they become falsi —
fiable, consistency is destroyed, and the theory as stated ceases to be
tenable.) And further, if a theory is successful in tying together ever
more comprehensive aspects of our experience, this in itself is sufficient
to vindicate the wisdom underlying the choice of the initial assumptions
upon which it is based. The realist's insistence that each proposition be
true in his sense, is — from the point of view of the requirements of any
explicative structure— an unnecessary complication.
But to be unfa IsifiabIe, even at a particular time, does not mean
to be not-false; unfalsifiabiIity does not entail truth. Admittedly,
we are free to consider unfa Isifiable propositions by a sort of brush
off as true within a scheme, the way we consider black — i.e. the absence
of light-- as color; or the empty set, a set. For as long as such
discourse-simplifying conventions encounter no difficulties, we have every
right to use them. And as a matter of convenience we do.. . But just as
unfa IsifiabiIity does not imply truth, it does not imply uniqueness.
Thus^also as a matter of conveniencetwe can consider other
propositions, incompatible with the former, as true within another scheme,or part
There is no more difficulty here than in saying 'rot' means 'red', and
or part of a scheme
'rot' means 'decomposition' — as long as the scheme/in terms of which
the propositions hold, is specified. We do however muddle everything
gloriously when we de-relativize these and ask ourselves: How can a color
be an action? How can 'God exists' be true and not true? How can space
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be Euclidean and non-Euclidean?
#9. But, strictly speaking, I think any discussion of the truth or
falsity of unfalsifiable propositions is irrelevant, and (again) perhaps
even meaningless. The propositions we have considered, and others like
them are introduced not to describe nor to be true nor false, but to
make the assertion of other propositions possible. They are, as it were,
the conceptual equivalent of the standard meter stick: they represent a
decision we have made as to how we are to describe the world The prop¬
ositions are prescriptives which sanction the truth or falsity of the
statements which follow from them, in much the same way as the rules of
logic sanction the validity of theorems derivable from their corresponding
schemata.
If, for instance, we decide to describe the world in terms of a
particular theory of motion, as Aquinas does then it may very well be the
case that 'God exists' is thereby true — where 'God exists' is not a
theory-free observation scheme. And if, as Find I ay argues, God must have
all necessary properties, and we choose to consider the logical to be the
paradigmatic form of the necessary, then it also probably follows that it
is true to say 'It is not the case that God exists'.
And, according to this view, these statements may perhaps both
be said in a way to be true — even if one were to achieve seme extra-
human faculty which permitted one to know things in some manner un-
trammeled by the appanage of sense-experience and the complex subsequent
appraisal of its evidence. The realist assumes (in terms of some common
set of meanings) that 'God exists' when asserted within one theory correctly
or incorrectly describes some state of affairs, and if this description
is correct, its negation, even in terms of another theory must be
false And it is a comforting faith. But again
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it puts one into debt to one's assumptions. For what if the "real"
structure of experience is iess determined than the conceptual structures
which we establish, and because of our needs, must establish? What if
God, for instance, were neither in the universe nor not in it, but proved
to be like the value of an incompletely expressed equation, an entity
which comes into prominence when we place parentheses in one place, and
fails to appearj when these same parentheses, or some other marks of
punctuation are placed someplace else? Parentheses, of course, have
nothing to do with objects. These merely help to clarify our talk about
them. But is it to be excluded that the propositions, 'God exists' or
yhis table exists', etc. are not of the same type?
Micheiangelo, within a sonnet writes that the form is already
in the stcpe, and it is his task to bring it out. The realist is of the
sarre persuasion.' for he bel ievesthat our conceptual structures are
strongly determined by the pre-existing reality. There is nothing to be
decried in making an assumption of this kind. But if an alternative
position can be establuhed, without this assumption, then the realist
cannot claim any unique warrant for his own.
I find nothing inconsistent, either with weII-attested facts
or with our conceptual scheme, within the position concerning unfa Is jfiable
propositions sketched above. Admittedly it is incompatible with the claims
of the realist and with some of our intuitive beliefs. But neither of these
seem to have an unconditional warrant, even in terms of the statements
and concepts we would ail a^c ot as true or correct.
Thus if it is possible for us to say in terms of our conceptual
scheme that the key statements of an ontology are prescriptive, one cannot
riaim that there must be one set of mutually compatible descriptions of
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what is the case. (If the reader has any doubts concerning the formal
argument upon which this conclusion is based I append a proof of this.) Nor
can one avoid this conclusion by introducing the point of view of the
different descriptions as an explicit part of the description. For
instance, one might say: In terms of Aquinas' assumptions, 'God exists'
is true1 and 'In terms of Find I ay's assumptions the existence of God is
disprovable'. But these are not statements about God, but about our
descriptive and conceptual apparatus, and what can be proved in terms
of it. To say that 'God exists' is derivable from some premise is not to say
that God exists.
Our final task is to remove the 'if.'which appears in the beginning
of the above paragraph, i.e. to argue, at least persuasiveIy, that the
fundamental ascriptions of existence are neither true nor false, but
prescriptive. And this will be the burden of Part I I I of this thesis.
• a ' • a
*10. But first let us append the proof mentioned above that if some
position is possible within a given conceptual scheme then no position
incompatible with it is warranted within this same scheme. (This demon¬
stration introduces no new material and the reader may, if he wishes,
continue directly through to the final short section of Part II.)
We wish to show that any position, R, is not warranted within a
scheme, if a position Q, incompatible with R is logically possible within
this same scheme. To demonstrate this, we specify the following
conventions:
Convention i: The conjunction of statements, cs, which establish
a full description of a particular conceptual scheme,




and so introduced into a proof as necessary. (The
soundness of such a proof is evidently restricted
to that of the scheme in question.)
A statement is necessary if it is necessary as above,
or is an axiom of logic, or is of the form 'pDq'
where 'q' is derivable from 'p', or is a derivable
consequence of any of the above.
The derivation rules are those of the propositions I
calculus, and the following two forms of modus
ponens for strict implication;
N/ (pDq) N/ (pOq)
N/ P Pi P
N/ q P/ q
where 'N/' is used to express necessity, and 'P/'
possibiiity.
Pip - DEF <— N/ p
'cs' stands for the conjunction of statements, as in
Convention i.
'Q' stands for the conjunction of statements of
position Q.
*R' stands for the conjunction of statements of
position R.
The premises, subject to the above conventions, are as follows:
(1) N/ cs




(3) Rh—'Q i.e. -'Q is derivable from R.
(4) R is warranted in cs = DEF cs hR
We argue:
+i (5) R is warranted in cs
(6) cs hR










I, 7. Modus Ponens for N.
3. Convention iir
8, 9. Modus Ponens for N.
(II) is derivable from (2)
II, Convention iv.
10, 12.
We now remove the provisions I assumption:
_1 (14) R is warranted in csz>C (NA-Q). (-—N/-—'Q) 3 5-I3.
Thus:
(15) MR is warranted in cs) 14. Indirect proof.
To interpret this, let represent a statement of the above positions
concerning unfaisifiable positions, and 'R' represent a statement of the
realist position. (We assume that 'Q' is demonstrably false in terms of
'R'.) So according to the above proof if Q is sanctioned, i.e. if it is
possible for it to be true in cs, then the realist position 'R.! is not
warranted in cs.
| But before proceeding, let us tidy up a few points which
concern the intuitive grounds for a belief in the uniqueness of the
realist position.
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!t may so happen that there is only one dominant set of hypotheses —
or in our more recent terms — prescriptives which are in force at some
time. in such a case it is easy, and natural, to omit any reference to
the conditionaIity of one's conclusions, and to claim that some consequence
is true, simpliciter. (When in England, we do not have to preface all
remarks by saying: I am talking English'.) But when conceptual conflict
develops and alternative fundamental theories are about, this ease of
utterance is denied us — as seems generally to be the case in philosophy.
The realist might observe that, even then, one theory generally
wins out. Are not its initial propositions then true? (But this is like
arguing, Lyndon Johnson was elected President, Lyndon Johnson is the best
man for the job.) No, we are less in debt to our assumptions if we say
that the success of a theory, like a railroad, makes it easier for everyone
to travel along the line that the theory stakes out as its own. Since the
rails are there, one uses them, even with misgivings. The labor of making
a fresh start and of cutting across the grain of an established terrain
often precludes the viability of alternative and incompatible formulations,
just as the cost of construction prevents one from having competing telephone
lines to serve each house. And even then much of the success of a
philosophic position in particular may be based on little more than historical
accident and the vagaries of taste. One might argue for instance, that
much of our formation is AristoteIean. But this is in part due to the
rediscovery of Aristotle in the Medieval period. For a thousand years
earlier, the dominant tradition was Platonic. Similarly the psychological
hold which the structure of a long establisfedfheory imposes upon its users
may explain its endurance far more easily than a (perhaps mythical)
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referenee to the absolute truth, or unique correctness of the statements




and the Linguistic Approach
CHAPTER TFN
Pre!iminary Remarks to Part Three
#1. It would be well at this point to lock back before proceeding.
We started this investigation with the observation, familiar to all,
that certain philosophic topics. Existence among them, provide pecu¬
liarly recurrent sources of conceptual disagreement, we decided to
investigate whether the appearance of these differences of opinion, or
at least some of these, might not itself be a legitimate outcome of
legitimate philosophic activity. This decision determined the level
and focus of our study. To answer questions such as; What exists? or
What is the meaning of 'exist'? etc., could not be of direct concern.
Rather we asked; What are the genera I characteristics of existence-
statements and in what stratum of language do they typically appear?^
and at the same time we hypothesized the presence of certain features,
either within such a stratum or within our attitudes, responsible for
the enduring presence of some philosophic Issues, and among them some
concerning Existence.
To answer these questions and to test this hypothesis, we
decided to look at theories which attempt to account, in general, for
the presence of prima facie insoluble philosophic issues, and for the
appearance of mutually incompatible existence-claims, in particular.
We assumed (I) such theories must presuppose that existence-statements,
or the language in which they are expressed, have certain characteris¬
tics, and (2) an analysis of the extent to which the presuppositions of
these explanatory schemes are satisfied — or satisfiable — would pro¬
vide a synoptic view of the tangling maze of ontological issues.
Two such theories engaged our attention. The first, typified
by Aristotle, we termed the 'classical' approach. Within this view it
is presupposed that every "science" contains certain statements which
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are necessarily true, and that the truth of these once grasped, confers
unshakeable certainty upon the knower. Such propositions are either self
evident axioms (or, in Aristotle's terms, "first principles") or their
demonstrable consequences. For convenience sake we considered axioms to
be derivable from themselves. This permitted us to say that the classi¬
cal approach presupposes the categorical (i.e. non-hypothetical) provabil
ity of all necessarily true statements. Since for Aristotle there is a
science of Existence, there is in particular a body of necessarily true,
categorically provable statements concerning existence. If such a body
of statements is also self-consistent, obviously then, whenever mutually
incompatible existence-statements appear within it, the assertion of one
of these at least must be fallacious. But despite this a 11-too-human
error, adherents of the classical approach maintain the truth Is there:
one, whole, and discoverable. We then generalized this attitude and
pointed out that the practice of most philosophers presupposes an at
least fragmentary acceptance of some tenets of the classical approach.
An analysis of the presuppositions of the classical approach,
in particular in respect to the proof, disproof, and demonstrabiIity of
existence-statements, engages our attention. We note that some existence
claims appear to be refutable. But these, it turns out, establish posi¬
tions which are either seIf-lneonsistent — and as such logically im¬
possible — or else they are incompatible with other statements which
for one reason or another are accepted as true. In these latter cases
the ontology concerned is conceptually or physically impossible. Noting
that the lack of deflniteness of most actual ontological positions makes
any total refutation of this kind unlikely, we then ask whether logically
possible and definite existence-claims can In principle be either cate¬
gorically proved or refuted.
It is clear, if one cannot claim an unconditional warrant, or
necessity, for the truth of one's axioms, that none of their derivable
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consequences can be either categorically provable or refutable. So we
Investigate the different senses of 'necessary' ascrlbable to any extra-
logical premises of a demonstration. Our analyses show that in one
way or another the force of any such ascription generally depends upon
the conceptual scheme In terms of which it Is stated. In other words
each is scheme-bound and cannot be said to be necessary, slmpllciter.
(As for loo lea I premises, we assume throughout this thesis that they
are not Informative and accordingly cannot In themselves provide ade¬
quate premises.) Considering the disjunction 'theory-laden or theory
free' to be exhaustive we then turn to analyze the purported necessity
of theory-free observation statements, we claim — and we shall support
this assertion in the sequel — that with one possible exception none
of these are of sufficient logical power either to contain or entail
existence-statements. (The one exception, the conclusion that something
exists, is trivial inasmuch as the predicate logic in terms of which it
might be Inferred, itself presupposes a non-empty universe.) We also
studied, albeit briefly, allegedly self-validatlng existence-claims and
argued that these were either based upon bad arguments or else theory-
laden.
It follows, if our argument is correct, that no advocate of
the classical approach can introduce adequate extra-logical premises
as unconditionally true In the refutation or proof of a logically (and
physically) possible ontology. No non-trivial existence-statements of
this kind are then categorically provable. This presupposition of the
classical approach is not only unsatisfied in actual philosophies but
unsatisfiable within our universe and in terms of our notions of logic
and of proof, etc. Thus the approach as stated Is untenable.
We then studied the claims of weaker forms of the classical
approach. The first substitutes plausibility for provability and argues
that the correct ontology can still be known, inasmuch as it shows it¬
self to be most plausible. But we pointed out the appraisal of a theory
as true, because plausible, is itself scheme-bound, and as such conditional
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Specifically, the force of any criterion of theory-appraisal depends upon
the philcscphic position in terms of which it is established.
We then discussed the claim that existence-statements are con¬
ditionally provable, that their truth can be demonstrated or made known
in terms of th© conceptual scheme in force at a particular time. The
strongest claim of this type, might even try to circumvent conditionality
by showing that the premises employed in some ontology are either a common
ingredient in all conceptual schemes or uniquely favored in some respects.
But given the extraordinary variety of conceptual systems, any attempt to
establish this claim as an inductive generalization appears to be impossible
in practice. Further there are objections in principle. (For to accom¬
plish this one would have to show that the conceptual patterns of all past
schemes were congruent, in this respect, with that of the present scheme.
And how could this be shown except in terms of the frames of reference of
our present scheme?) Nor could one argue that certain premises must be
true in all conceptual systems. For the force of this 'must* itself de¬
pends upon the scheme in terms of which it is expressed. And lastly one
cannot argue that a particular scheme is uniquely favored: the strength
of any criterion of theory-appraisal also depends upon the scheme in which
it is established.
A weaker position might claim that there is nevertheless one
correct ontology within each scheme, and that this — in terms of the
concepts in force — provides £ correct description of the most general
characteristics of existents. But although it is perhaps reasonable to
assume that some ontology is self-consistent, the above claim presupposes
that the entire conceptual scheme in terms of which it is expressed is
self-consistent; and further that this scheme is so structured that it
permits th© expression of only mutually compatible existence-statements.
Although not logically impossible, it seems highly improbable that these
conditions are generally satisfied.
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Despite the weakened claims in respect to the provability of
existence-statements, all the above positions share with the initial classi¬
cal approach the belief that somehow truth is one: i.e. that there is only
one correct set of self-consistent existence-statements, and that these are
either true, simpliclter, or in terms of each scheme. And one might still
maintain this claim even If one admits the unprovability and even unknow-
ability of the "truth" of all existence-statements, we argued that even
this weaker claim may be unjustified. To do this we distinguished between
the truth of I) theory-free observation statements and 2) any other extra-
logical statements, whether conceptual, or lexical, etc. Only the former,
i.e. theory-free observations, can be said to be true, simpliciter. For
indeed it is unlikely that one would countenance two mutually incompatible
descriptive statements as both true. But on the other hand, the ascrip¬
tion of truth to conceptual statements depends upon the scheme in terms
of which this is established. And in this case there is no essential im¬
pediment to the acceptance of different sub-patterns as both holding within
one scheme. As for example different types of set theory can be used by
different mathematIcians. Thus it is logically possible that two theories
employing different patterns of conceptual relationships, and containing
statements which are inter-systematically incompatible, may both be in
force at the same time.
One can claim that they cannot be incompatible — if one also
asserts, as a realist does, that a strong correspondence always holds be¬
tween each feature of a theory and that to which the theory is applied.
We argued that this position, assuming It is logically possible, is not
conceptually necessary. To show this we introduced an alternative account.
(We argued that this latter is possible in terms of our present concep¬
tual scheme and that accordingly the realist position, incompatible with
it, cannot claim any unique warrant.) According to this analysis, the
realist position, together with the claim that there ts one correct set
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cf mutually compatible existence-statements, represents then only one
position among various alternatives.
Thus (in terms of the assumptions we have made) the truth of no
non-trivial existence-statement can be unconditionally proven, nor known
with unconditional certainty. Further, if we consider conceptual schemes
as they exist at any time, It is unlikely that any existence-claims con¬
tained within them may be established for certain even in terms of the
given conceptual scheme. And lastly there seems to be no unshakeable
warrant for the claim that all such statements within a scheme, if true
cr correct, are mutually compatible.
Rather, we suggested that the function of proof and disproof
cf logically possible existence-statements has been misunderstood. The
point of rational argument in respect to these, we submit, is not to es¬
tablish their "truth" but to show that a particular totality of statements,
a totality containing propositions cf all kinds and encompassing m3ny sub¬
jects — is either consistent or inconsistent as the case may be. It is
this study of the interrelatjonships of one proposition with another,
this exploration of the conceptual, lexical, and descriptive consequences
of the statements one accepts as true at any particular time, which is
typical of one aspect of philosophic activity.
And it is such an investigation of a totality of propositions
and their consequences that we have performed up to the present; we have
taken statements related to our concept of demonstration, and to a parti¬
cular concept of concepts, and our belief in the ncn-informativeness of
logical statements, etc. On the basis of these we have argued that any
statement of the presuppositions of the classical approach, concerning
the provability, etc. of existence-statements, however weakened this claim
may be, cannot be asserted if the above set of statements and associated
concepts is considered as true or as in force. This is not to claim that
the classical approach is false, simp lie iter. Rather we maintain —
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assuming that the above beliefs are shared by, or acceptable to nearly
all our culture-bearers — that the statement of the classical approach
cannot be reached from any of the starting points which we accept. To
assert this latter approach under these conditions, even in the weaker
forms we have investigated, is either to stake an unwarranted claim, or
to fall into nonsense, or both.
• • • •
#2. One weakness of the preceding analysis is its reliance upon a
particular concept of concepts. But the whole notion of concepts lay in
our path and could not be avoided. I am aware that the explication I
have introduced, based upon an idea of Mackay, may have its awkward mo¬
ments and represent one possible description among various alternative
ones. I am not going to argue for Its superiority, but it has proved
workable. Even if It is not unique, it provides (I trust) an acceptable
description of the role played by concepts in discourse. If a concept is
a kind of tool, as we have assumed, a concept of concepts is also a kind
of tool. And it seems to me that the essential criterion for appraising
such an instrument |s neither naturalness nor even simplicity, but utility.
And as noted above, the theory we have introduced, within our poor sights,
has proved workable.
A second weakness of the above investigation is the claim we have
made, and only partially substantiated, concerning the theory-laden char¬
acter of existence-statements. This defect we must remedy. We must show
that no usage of 'exist', 'existent', etc. is theory-free. (This we do
in the final chapter .)
Another weakness of the preceding analysis is that we have in¬
troduced abstractly and schematically, a theory in which certain key pro¬
positions concerning 'existence', etc. are not to be considered statements
at all, but logical permlssives which make the assertion of other existence-
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statements possible. This theory was introduced within the course of an
argument to show that the belief in the unicity of truth (at least as far
as existence-statements is concerned) is unwarranted. For the purposes
of this discussion we had only to show that this theory was logically
possible, and that accordingly the realist position — linked to the be¬
lief in the unicity of truth — was not logically warranted. In the
sequel we argue for the credibility of this theory. This we do in various
ways. First we analyze the language in terms of which ontologies can be
stated and show that this language permits the expression of genuinely
alternative theories of existence, vie then show that the presuppositions
of the theory of permissives do indeed seem to be satisfiable in actual
ontologies. And finally, we take the results of our earlier analysis
of the presuppositions of both the classical and the linguistic approaches,
and show; I) The theory of permissives saves what to us appears to be the
most important feature in each. These are (respectively) the belief in
the importance of a reasoned study of the consequences of the propositions
one accepts as true, and of the felicity of most individual language-
games. 2) This theory at the same time avoids the excessively strong
conditions presupposed by both the above approaches: their reliance
either upon categorical demonstration, or the total felicity of a form
of life. 3) Finally, in stressing the role of permissives — in this
case of propositions neither warranted nor interdicted within a given
conceptual scheme — w® remove the stamp of 'nonsense' from certain phil¬
osophic problems. (For within this view what is asserted as following
from a permissive within on® philosophy may be denied within another,
without a taint of logical impropriety.) This restores to certain parts
of philosophy on© of its oldest prerogatives; the introduction of novel
and varied insights.
We have in the preceding removed the possibility of any meaning¬
ful reference to the truth of a theory, even conditionally, even ours.
But we can argue, nevertheless, that a theory of permissives (at least
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in respect to 'existence', etc.) orders a considerable totality of beliefs,
presuppositions, theories, experiences, etc., that we have or hold. And
this we shall now do.
The reader will notice that we have shifted our focus. In the
earlier chapters we investigated a totality of statements and showed it
to be inconsistent. We now take the statements one makes concerning
•existence', 'language', 'philosophic problem', etc. and show (with some
modifications of these propositions) a pattern within them.
m • « •
#3. This is a good place to make a few remarks about the theory of
permissives we have introduced. We have argued that certain statement-
like propositions play an essential role in important bodies of proposi¬
tions, but strictly speaking these former are neither true nor false.
All such, however diverse their content may be, share one common logical
feature; propositions of the above type in respect both to the particu¬
lar conceptual scheme in which they are in force and to the knowledge
accessible to it are merely unfalsifiable. By 'unfalsifiable" i mean
that neither the proposition nor any of its systematic consequences,
within the scheme, can be shown to be false. Thus these propositions
need be neither true nor false, nor demonstrably true nor false; to
be non-falsifiable is sufficient.
it may prove convenient to treat sob® of these propositions as
true within the particular theory that contains them. (This we can do
since the presence of these propositions within a theory cannot make any
other statement of the theory based upon them, fa Is ifiable.) Once they
are treated as true the logical status of their statement-analogues
occupies a position stronger than that of propositions true by conven¬
tion and weaker than those true by correspondence. But, and here is the
relation of this theory of unfalsifiable propositions to our discussion
of philosophic problems; tn+*-a>-systematic immunity to falsification
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does net guarantee inter-systematic compatibility. When we compare
theories containing different unfalsifiable propositions their conse¬
quences may well be mutually incompatible. Still, by hypothesis, they
are each unfalsifiable. It is this feature of such propositions that
permits us to explain the presence of some perennial and apparently in-
sclvable issues in philosophy. These are issues, according to this view,
which appear whenever the language, or the associated form of life, or
the conceptual scheme at a given stage I) permits the expression of self-
consistent, mutually incompatible theories, and at the same time 2) pro¬
vides no hard and fast procedure in terms of which one is to adjudicate
their rival claims. In other words language at such times is defective —
and some philosophic issues develop out of its partial breakdown. Or,
to put this in another way, according to this view, language and cur con¬
ceptual scheme sanction and (shall we say?) demand the expression of
genuinely alternative visions.
Thus we can employ the results of our analysis of the presup¬
positions of the classical and linguistic approaches to argue for the
credibility of our theory of permissives. For the premises we employ
to explain the appearance of recurrent philosophic issues, however ini¬
tially counter-intuitive they nay be, are far weaker than those held by
advocates of the rival approaches. But this is to an^icipai®. Our
first task is to analyze the language of ontology, and then to apply this
abstract discussion of permissives to the analysis of a prcblemsconcerning
existence.
COPTER EJfcj.V.E.H
The Language of Ontologv
it is a peculiar and perhaps startling feature of language that
whatever ontology on© wishes to express can be stated in terms of a system
of signs whose only irreplaceable extra-logical term Is either 'exist' or
a related expression. This of course would be self-evident if all theories
of existence were mere lists stating only that so and so exists and such
and such does not exist , etc. However most theories of existence are
not stated merely in the form of a comprehensiv® enumeration of entities
to which existence is ascribed or denied. Most theories of existence
establish some class ificat ion of objects, properties, etc., and order
these in respect to existence. In this way terms such as 'substance',
•primary', 'real', •degree of reality', 'essential property', etc. are
introduced to play their part within philosophic speech. But these
make for an untidy company. It will be one task of this chapter to re-
move them. Once this is done we have what we may call the 'language of
ontology1, a language which provides the linguistic structures in terms
of which particular theories of existence can be stated. It wilt then
be our purpose to show that this language, when correctly employed, per¬
mits the expression of theories about existence which successfully order
important sectors of our experience, that the theories contain and per¬
haps must contain unfaIs iflable propositions, and that language accord¬
ingly sanctions the expression of logically possible, mutually incompat¬
ible theories in this way.
Such at least is our strategy. Our first step is to single out
a class of terms which are necessary in the expression of any fully speci¬
fied ontology. For want of a better term we call these 'the basic elements
of the language of ontology'. I confess that f introduce the phrase
'language of ontology', with diffidence. For there are several current
meanings of 'language', which I do not intend. For example I do not mean
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a formal language (cr on© patterned after it) in which certain sentences
are singled out as theorems and as such considered tc be true. Nor dc j
wish to refer tc any particular selection of sentences within a natural
language which • ne might claim to embody the meaning of 'existence*. On
the contrary, I wish to consider nothing mere arcane than a particular
Iist of words. I assume only that these can be combined to form sen¬
tences — just as any other words within a natural language. The terms
which w© shail isolate, and the forms in which they are used,specify one
sub-section of natural language which we call 'the language of ontology'.
So much for what we mean by this our latest term of art. Now
let us sketch out very briefly the method we employ. In view of the be¬
wildering variety of known ontologies, w© do not consider actual in¬
stances of ontologies directly, except by way of iI lustration. Rather
we pese two general queries;
What are the forms of existence ascription and denial?
and
If x and y are entities to which existence is ascribed or denied,
how may x and y be related in respect to this?
We assume that any ontology, either tacitly or overtly, must answer such
questions. We also assume that, when carefully employed, these questions
are meaningful, and that to-be-an-existent, is ascribable — however
curious a "predicate" it might prove to be.
The term 'ascribe* has been used in the above questions. The
reader may recall that by 'ascribe F to a* we mean* to conjoin the
predicate-letter, 'F', to the individual (or entity) term, 'a', as in
*a is F', or 'F or '....F.. Similarly by 'deny F to a', we mean
o <2
that 'not-F', etc. is conjoined with 'a'. In this way 'an ascription of
F to a* means roughly that F is predicated of a. But w© have purposely
eschewed this latter expression in order to avoid its surfeit of conno-
tatiens.
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Let us note, too, that entity-rerms are to be considered as
capable of denoting, or purporting to denote anything whatsoever. It
is in this sense that we employ 'entity* as a term of broadest reference:
anything is to be considered as an entity, irrespective of the logical
or conceptual or lexical or factual restrictions which cne might normally
apply to the name-relation. In this way the round-square is to be con¬
sidered as good an entity as you or * I'. And so too is a yet lew-bang,
the class-not-o-member-of-ltself, and the present-King-of-France. Spe¬
cifically, we consider as an entity the real or purported designatum
of any logically proper name, or any syntactically we11-formed definite
or indefinite description formulabl© within the language under study.
This generality is limited only in one respect; we stipulate that the
purported designatura be considered as a unit.
« « # «
&2. Let us first enumerate the ways in which any predicate, F, may
be ascribed or denied to some entity, x. We can then apply the results
of this study +o an analysis of the forms of existence ascriptions. We
are assuming, for the present, that instantiatiens of the ^pen-sentences
'x is an existent* or *x exists* are, generally speaking, meaningful and
informative.
It will be convenient to distinguish direct ascriptions from
all ether ascriptions. By a 'direct ascription of F to s me specific
entity, a* we mean that the assertion 'a is F' is made within a given
context, or in a body of statements, by fiat — there is neither argu¬
ment for nor explicit defense of this claim. For instance, if my daugh¬
ter says? 'This cake is delicious', and no further explanation is pro¬
vided, she has within the context of the dinner directly ascribed the
property of being delicious to the cake in question. |f, on the other
hand, my son then says; 'This sauce is horrible', and he proceeds to
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explain: 'It puts a bad taste in my tummy', his putative direct ascrip¬
tion of Horrible to the sauce — since it is argued for — ceases to be
direct within this context of utterances.
Direct ascriptions however oracular, need not be arbitrary.
There may be good reasons, independently known to the hearer or speaker
or both, for saying that a is F; or the truth or correctness of the claim
may have already been established in another context % or perhaps 'a is
F' is Introduced as a convention and is justified on this account.
Let us distinguish direct ascriptions of F to an individual
from Quasi-direct ascriptions in which alt members of a class including
the individual, are said to be F, This is a slight but significant dif¬
ference. If we say that all members of a class are F, we cannot say that
some individual, a, is F on this basis unless we have the additional pre¬
mise that a is a member of this class. Thus, as far as any cIass-member
Is concerned, an ascription ef this kind is not direct. For Instance
when Hobbes says that only bodies exist, we must also know that the stu¬
dent now knocking at our door Is a body, before w© ;an infer that, in
Hcbbes' terras, he exists. In contrast to this, to say without a logically
prior explanation that alt members of a class are F, is to directly as¬
cribe this predicate (namely that all its members have the property, f)
to the class considered as an individual. Let us call this latter an
ascription of a 'generic* predicate to a class, or more briefly a 'generic'
ascription.
• • * 4
#3. If an ascription is not direct, the ascription of F te a par¬
ticular individual, say, a, can be said to follow by derivation: i.e. the
statement 'a is F' follows. In accordance with given rule(s) from some
other statement or statements already introduced by fiat. Although the
term 'derivation' is customarily used to name a sequence of statements
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contained in a proof, there will be reason in the sequel to ©mpIcy it in
a wider sense, w© shall say that a statement, p, is derived from seme
statement(s), q,.„.,s, when p follows from these latter according to a
specific set of rules; whore these rules are either logical, extra-
logical, or both. There are nc other types of ascription which neat
concern us. For a statement is either argued for end defended, or it
is not. If it is the former, such a defense or argument must be con¬
ducted according to som rules, and it must refer to son® prior state¬
ment (or to some prior state of affairs, or thought, etc. describable
in such a statement), or this statement is accepted as true within the
context of the discussion. Thus the disjunction derived/direct is ex¬
haustive.
Among ascriptions by derivation we my distinguish two types.
In the first, F may be ascribed by derivation to an individual inasmuch
as the individual is a member of a particular class, or is an entity of
a given type. This, as noted above, may be called a 8quasi-direct* as¬
cription of a predicate to an individual. It is based upon a generic
ascription of this predicate to some class containing a. An ascription
of this type may be performed when it is in fact or in principle im¬
possible to fully specify actual individuals (e.g. electrons or members
of a statistical ensemble). An ascription of this kind may also be per¬
formed when a bundle of ascriptions, e.g. 'Triangle I is f, Triangle 2
is F8, etc. has been combined into one comprehensive statement such as:
All triangles in the universe of discourse are F'»
In the second type cf derived ascriptions, a predicate is as¬
cribed by derivation from a set of premises which has at least on© pre¬
mise not contained in a quasi-direct ascription of the given predicate.
It is evident that there are no other types of ascription by derivation.
We shall find, too, that once the forms of existence-ascriptions have been
listed, that any denial of existence can be expressed in terms of basically
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similar forms. But let us note now on© final cases this concerns what
w© shall call the 'withholding' of an ascription.
Sentences, of course, can be said to express true or false
statements only if the presuppositions of statement-making are satis¬
fied. It follows from this canon, if these presuppositions are not sat¬
isfied by some sentence, Sj , that S| cannot be said to express anything
that is either true or false, if we apply this notion to the language
of ontology, it is possible that under certain conditions, neither the
ascription nor denial of existence to a particular entity or type of
entity can be considered fitting. Let us call this the 'withholding
of an ascription'. We shall also find it convenient to say that the
rule governing the use of the ascribed term is inoperable.
To summarize: Vie have distinguished the following uses of
'ascription cf F to a*:
Case Ii F is ascribed directly to a by fiatj i.e. there is no logi¬
cally prior justification within the context of the utter¬
ance.
If F is not ascribed directly, it is ascribed by derivation: i.e. *a is
F' is entailed logically, lexically, or conceptually, etc. by other






F is ascribed quasi-directly to a. Such an ascription
follows from only two premises. I) F is ascribed gener¬
ics I ly to all members of a class, and 2) a is stated to
be a member of this class.
F is ascribed by derivation from a premise-set including
at least one premise not contained in a quasi-direct as¬
cription.
The ascription of F to a •s withheld. In such a case 'a
is F' is either nonsense, or incomplete. The rule for the
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us© of 5F' applicable in other contexts, is Inoperable with¬
in this given context.
* * * *
04. We now substitute *is an existent' or *exists3 for *F' in the
above,
Case It Existence is directly ascribed to some entity. For Instance*
•The Loch Ness Monster exists* or 'The class, Man, exists', or 'Manhood
exists*. One might ascribe existence in a similar way to the French Revo¬
lution, or to the color of sunlight, or to God, Apollo, or space, or the
planet Mars, or to matter, or to the electro-magnetic field, or t, the
positive square root of two, or the meaning of 'you', or the concept of
Justice, or to Humpty-0empty, etc.
Any such entity-term appearing in the above may be considered
as an entry upon an enormous inventory list of ail the single items which
ar© said to make up, or to constitute the universe. In this way, in as¬
cribing ©xistance to some entity — as opposed to manipulating its name
as a sign for a theoretical construct — one Is committed to the belief
that removal of such an entity from the universe would alter the universe.
Any English sentence performing such an ascription of existence, any sen¬
tence in which such a commitment holds or is entailed, will (as we have
seen) contain an appearance of 'exist', or some term functional Iy iden¬
tical with it.
Any such an ascription can be written in the forms
... .is an existent.
Of course, this is not the unique form of any direct ascription of ex¬
istence. it is, e.g., much simpler to say 'Ap ilc exists' and even mere
pedantic to say 'Apollo is a constituent of the universe* but these we
propose ere functionally identical with any sentence composed according
to the above form.
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To simp!ify the study of exIstence-ascrIptIens, It will be con¬
venient to introduce the sign *£!* to stand for 'is an existent*, *exists*,
ana 5 Is a constituent of the universe'. The form of 4i£S& ascriptions of
existence, thus becomes %
I*
where the dotted sequence is to be replaced by a logically, or syntac¬
tically correct definite description, or the name of a specific entity.
Obviously this is not the most prolix part of ontology, let us not©
that the introduction of the sign, which is used for instance in
"Principle Mathematica", does not Imply that it is thereby defined. For
the time being it rem ins undefined.
Existence may be ascribed directly to specific entities by
means of I*. A companion form is needed to provide for generic ascrip¬
tions of existence, i.e. to all members o# a class, or to all entities
of a given type. If for Instance we wish to ascribe existence to any
man whatsoever, in the sense that this applies to all men, we -can say
f0r
That,, a 11 x, if x is a mn then x exists. Using evident symbols, any
such aeneric ascription of existence can be wrI rten:
2* For all x, if x —— then x Et,
where the dash sequence is to be replaced by an indefinite description, '
e.g. *& man', 'a god', etc. It is of course, in general, possible to
employ a form analogous to 2* written in class notation. 3ui since any
such expression cm in turn be rewritten as 2*, whatever the formulation
one chooses, the language of ontology rooming ontologlcally neutral in
*\
respect to the question of the existence of abstract»enti11as such as
classes.
It is well to not® that whenever an individual of the given
type can be specified Ce.g. 'All material objects exist1 and 'This on©
chair of mine is a material object') it is possible to derive a quasi-
direct ascription of existence to the specific individual. E.g. 'This
chair exists'. But when an individual is at least in part unspeelfSable,
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as ©,9. an electron, an ascription of existence to the individual, as
above in the example of 'This chair...9 becomes impossible. Bat in neither
situation does on® overstep the meager vocabulary in which '£!' appears
as the one irreplaceable descriptive term.
Similarly in;
Case 2. i.e. a quasi-direct ascription of existence to an individual, 2*
is again employed. Of course in this case an additional premise is nec¬
essary to establish that the individual in question, to which existence
is ascribed as an f, is an f. £,9. from the premises 9Numbers exist',
i.e. 'For all x, if x is a number, then x exists', and 'a is a number'
it follows that a exists. Or mo-re generally, where the square is used
to mark the point cf insertion of individual terms;
For all x, if x ——, then x £'.
together with a premise of the form;
□
is sufficient to establish any quasi-direct ascription of existence.
* # * *
#5. A quasi-direct ascription, as above, is one kind cf ascription
by derivation. Let us now consider others.
Case 3; The argument of the conito. as we have analyzed It, purports to
prove the existence of Descartes as a thinking being. And yet the pre¬
mises of the argument contain no ascription of existence, quasi-direct
or otherwise. Any such grounded ascriptions of existence, as we shall
call them, may b© formulated thus;
3* ?| ,P2# °iPn»t- Et
where ' p jetc. are premises? ' I- * is the sign of derivabiIity; and the
dot and dash sequence narks the point of insertion for either individual
cr generic terms, e.g. 'a exists9 or 'men exist9, etc.
According to the analysis of the earlier section, I*-3* exhaust
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all possible basic forms. There are of course any number of acre complex
schemata, but these must be combinations of those already studied. As
such they introduce no additional extra-logical terms, and so these need
not concern us further.
Hie forms of negative ascription can new b@ dealt with in summary
fashion. I* and 2* provide the structure for any direct or generic posi¬
tive ascription of existence. 3« provides the corresponding form for any
ether positive ascription of existence by derivation. Any dental of ex¬
istence, or combination of ascription and dental can be performed equally
well in terms of the above forms supplemented with the sign of negation.
For all that Is necessary in such a case is tc affix this to ' where-
ever desired; e.g. 'not- £!'. This means that however bewildering the
variety of ontologies may be, any ascription or denial of existence con¬
tained within them can be expressed in terms of I*-3*, supplemented in
this way. All such ascriptions and denials then contain only the on® un«
analyzed (and presumably extra-logical) expression 'is an existent*. Not¬
ing this, we are nearly ready to conclude our study of this part of the
language of ontology.
# » » »
#6. There remains the fourth and final case-
Case 4s Let a be an entity in any ontology in which, as is customary no
existent Is considered to have contradictory properties. If 'aEl* is
true within such an ontology, obviously *a does not exist* is false with¬
in the same ontology. But new let us ask; If within some ontology an
ascription of existence if definitely not ascribed to some entity, b,
(I.e. the ontology contains the statement * ft is not correct that b ex¬
ists') can we infer then that b does not exist? Prima facie It would
seem so. Can we not significantly inquire of any entity, whether or not
it exists?
But let us not b© too hasty. For instance, I do not think
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that Wittgenstein could say that Logical Space, as discussed in his
"Tractates", exists. For we can think, h© says, of a space without ob¬
jects. And yet objects are the substance of this world, and a world
without substance cannot exist. And so we can think of Logical Space
as occupied by axistents or as not occupied by existent®. But w® can¬
not, at least In the same sense of 'exist', say that this space exists
or does not exist. Similarly if on® introduces a reference to certain
classes within an otherwise nominalist theory, one might defend this
use on the grounds that the classes referred to merely served as logi¬
cal explicantia, and that any discussion concerning their existence is
irrelevant to this. (See Section
Accordingly, let us include a form which allows one to with¬
hold the ascription or denial of existence, if and when it is so de¬
sired. Namelyj
4* El' and not-El' are both incorrect.
The above formulation provides (in words) that neither the ascription
nor denial cf existence to certain individual or types is permissible.
We can also say that 4* provides for the inooerabiIitv of the rules for
the use of 'exist' in given contexts.
9-9 9 4
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#7. with this curious note, we conlude this survey cf the funda¬
m¬
ental forms of existence-ascription, denial, and withholding, we
repeat these, in summary form:
Schemata Types of ascriptions of existence
I* E» Direct
2* For all x, If x is —— then x El Generic
3* p?,P2,.. F-.El Grounded
4* '-.-.-.-.EI' is incorrect Withholding
PardMel forms exist for the denial of existence.
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The dotted sequence, In the above, marks the point of insertion of a name
or a definite description; the dash sequence marks the point of insertion
of an indefinite description, such as 'a man', 'Ei* stands for 'exist',
or 'is an existent' or'Is a constituent of the universe'. The I- is the
sign of derivabiIity.
The only (presumably) non-logical term specific to the language
of ontology, in alt the above is The term 'incorrect* as in 4* is
not a term of the language but about it, like 'ascription'.
• • • •
jS®. in the preceding we analyzed the forms of existence-ascription.
These are used to establish answers to the question; what existents
is/are there? We turn new to study the forms for replies to the related
query; If x and y are entities to which existence Is ascribed or denied,
how are x and y interrelated in respect to their existence, i.e. how is
an existent related tc other entities and what ordering relations held
among them in this respect?
The reader will remember; a mark of an existence-ascription
to some entity is the commitment it imposes to consider the universe
changed if this entity were to be removed from the universe. In the
following, although w® cannot extradite entities from the universe, we
can deny an existence-ascription to some entity and study the possible
effects of this upon the ascription of existence tc some other entity,
(This would be the analogue of taking two actual entities, e.g. a man
and his shadow, and asking; What would happen tc the man if his shadow
were to disappear? and what would happen to the shadow if the man ware
to be removed? Or what would happen to a ladder If the house against
which it was leaning were removed, and conversely what would be the
effect upon the house of removing the ladder?)
To study this, let us consider any two representative enti¬
ties, or types of entities, j, and k, to which existence is ascribed.
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And let tbeir ascriptions of existence be contained, respectively, in
propositions p and q. These ascriptions my be either direct or derived.
Now let us askj If we negate one or both of these ascriptions, what will
b© the effect of this upon th© other? There are several cases to consi¬
der, which w® will name by letter so as to avoid confusion with th© pre-
ceding.
ftase A: The denial of p has no effect upon th© ascription of existence
to k, contained in q, and th© converse. For instance, within Aristotle's
each of
"Categories', th© existence of/tha extra-substantial categorical types,
such as qualities and quantities, does not depend upon th© existence of
the other. In fact the number of categories mentioned by Aristotle
varies throughout th© corpus of his writings, see Ross (I) p.22. This
would be impossible, if these were more than contingently inter-related.
Let us call any two such entities mutually 'independent'.
Denial of existence to either of these, in terms of some giver, theory,
does not effect the ascription of existence to th® other.
v • • »
&9. We now consider th© next stronger relation;
Ciase B; The denial of existence to j, contained in p, effects q,
while the converse is not the case. This is like saying; If we remove
the building, the ladder fatlsj if we remove th© ladder, the building
remains unchanged. Subject to further refinement let us say, when the
above general condition holds in respect to existence, that j is 'pre¬
eminent' as an existent in respect to k. We will also say that k is the
'subalternate' existent, or the 'subaltern in respect to j*, and that a
relation of 'pre-eminent to subaltern* holds between the two and, by ex¬
tension, between their existence-ascriptions, p, and q.
Water, for instance, within Thales' ontology is a pre-eminent
existent, ft supplies th© living stuff, etc. out of which alt th© other
elements and compound objects are formed: the existence of all these
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ether beings Is subaIternet© to the existence of Water. Similarly, God
in the account given in "Genesis" is the pre-eminent existent par excel¬
lence, It is He who establishes the firmament in the midst of the waters
and makes the Heavens and earth out of them. On the other hand, within
the "Categories", it is primary substances, for instance a parti¬
cular man or a particular animal, which are "most properly called sub¬
stances in virtu© of the fact that they are the entities which underlie
everything else" (GAT) V, 2b 15. Aristotle is specific on this point;
"If these primary substances did net exist, it would be impossible for
anything els© to exist" (GAT) V, 2b 5.
Let us not© that each of the above examples can be considered as
an answer to on© sens© of the Question; What is real?; i.e. What exists
in such a manner that the existence of other things is dependent upon it?
As we shall see there is at least on© other sense of 'real*, but any use
of this word in the sens© of'pre-eminent existent* must state at least
that a relation holds between two or ©or© existents, such that the ex¬
istence of one provides a necessary condition for the existence of the
other(a).
Although the relation of pre-eminence, in most of the above
would appear to be absolute, a closer reading shows that this is not so.
For instance, the existence of the primeval waters is not said to de¬
pend upfen the existence of the earth-and-heaven creating God. Rather,
whenever a pre-eminent relation is said to obtain, some further term
of reference must be specified in respect to which pre-eminence holds;
j is not pre-eminent to k, simp lieiter, but in respect to some particu¬
lar quality or action, or power, ©tc. As we have seen, individual sub¬
stances are pre-eminent, for Aristotle, inasmuch as they provide the
ground for properties! Water, in Thales' account, is pre-eminent inas¬
much as it provides th© stuff for the other elements! and Go4, in the
Biblical account, is pre-eminent as the creator of heaven and earth out
of th© initial waters; etc. But the individual substance is not prior
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to the universal In respect to its knowobiIity; God is not pre-eminent in
respect to the creator of the waters; etc. It Is essential to realize*
in any ascription of ontlc pre-eminence — or of any use of 'real' in this
sens© — there is an at least irap licit reference to sun© frame of refer¬
ence in terms of which this relation is established. For instance Aristotle
In his "Metaphysics", without rejecting the notion of the ontologies) pri¬
macy of the concrete individual, nevertheless maintains that the parts of
the soul are "in a sense" prior to the being of the concrete individual,
(ICTA) Z, 1035b I4ff. "In a sense" her© refers to a different frame of
reference. (Similarly, w© will recall that seme axistents can be said
tc b© mutually independent in respect to a given theory, but not in
some absolute sense.)
Noting this, we can formulate a schema of ontic pre-eminence
as follows: By 9j Ss ontoIegicaIJ y pre-eminent to seme k, in respect to
a qualifying condition, R9 we mean:
k exists only if j exists, and
k is R to the subaltern, j.
It is however convenient to ©mply rh© sign ,<'R>9 to replace 'in respect
to a qualifying condition, R' in the above formulation. Thus, if we
use 'x9, and 9y9 as variables Ir* the above, we can establish the gen¬
eral form of ontic pre-eminence thus:
x is ontolog leaIly pre-eminent to y « OEF
y exists only if some x exists, and
x is I to y.
(9®9 in the above, takes on as values, any qualifying condition in terms
of which the relation of ontic pre-eminence may be established.) We can
further specify the above by noting that pre-eminence is triadic and, if
R is transitive, pre-eminence is transitive. In company with independence,
pre-eminence is irreflexiv© — with the possible exception of entities
that are said to be causes of themselves. Lastly, unlike independence,
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pre-eminence is asymmetric.
* • * *
#10. {Lot us not© loaf the above relation of ontic pre-eminence can
be generalized, by dropping the condition of existence in the consequent
and replacing 'exists' with a predicate-term. For instance, if on® were
to take Ptolemy's theory of eptcyclic motion merely as a theoretical con¬
struction, on© could still say that if a planet, k, exists, then there 5s
a point upon an epicycle, j, and the successive positions of this point
represent successive positions of the planet in the heavens. The epi¬
cycle here serves as a logical expIicans» any ascription of existence,
or even any consideration of existence may b© unnecessary r irrelevant.)
» « « *
#11. we turn now to the strongest case we need consider.
Case C; The entities, j, and k, to which existence is ascribed are such
that denial of either ascription implies the denial of the other. The
clearest example of this is in the interrelationship between a physical
form or shape, and the stuff which is so shaped. 0« the level of our
ordinary experience, neither can exist without the other. A more gen¬
eral, but abstract example, is the interrelationship between a non-empty
class and its elements; in naive set theory to say that there are no
elements is to say there is no class, and the converse.
Whenever the denial of existence to on© entity implies and is
implied by the denial of existence to another entity, we shall say that
a relation of ontologics I '©qui-eminence' holds. This, as we have seen,
obtains only when some specific qualifying condition ties the two to¬
gether . Thus:
x, y are <l) onto logical ly ©qui-eminent « DEF
x exists if and only if y exists, and
x is # to y,
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whcro '$* again fakes on qualifying conditions as values. (E.g. x is
the physical shape of th© stuff, y.) Equi-eminence, as noted, is again
triadic. Its further qualities depend upon the particular values of .
For Instance, in terms of Aristotle's notion of th© relation of form to
fitter, an ontological ©qui-eminence along such lines, where applicable,
would be asymmetric, intransitive, and irreflexive.
One might consider stronger forms of ordering relations; for
instance on© in which it is impossible to deny existence to one or both
entities concerned. But, as we have argued, any expression containing
"logically necessary" can be re-expressed in terms of "derivable from'.
And again any extra-logical sense of 1 necessary' is theory-laden. So
any ascription of existence as necessary in this way can be rewritten
as an ascription by derivation frow the premises, etc. of the theory,
or logical axioms, concerned. Thus the introduction cf the modal
auxiliary 'necessary' introduces no novel form. Similarly for 'im¬
possible' and 'possible'.
• 0 * •
#12. There Ss n@ last term which shall concern us only briefly:
'real' in the sense of 'genuine existent'. Strange as this may seem, the
use of 'real* in this sense, although it may contribute to our understand¬
ing of what is being said, adds no further content than that conveyed by
a statement of the form '..E!' itself. In this way "real" is like 'is
true" in some usesi mp* is true' says no more than does *p* — except it
serves to relieve our doubts about the truth of 'p*.
For instance, when i say that something is a genuine F, I say
that a is an F — and Then I proceed to indicate or to explain that it is
not, or why it is not something els© which is only like an F. when I say
that something is a genuine Da Vinci, I mean that St satisfies the canons
g-verning the ascription of painted-by-Leonardo to some works of art, and
at the same time, tacitly or explicitly, | distinguish th© painting(s) to
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which this is ascribed from others which are spurious. Admittedly the
relation between the two types — genuine and spurious — is a curious
one. For the need to say That something is genuine, onlv develops when
it is also possible to confuse this with some other object which satis¬
fies a related but defective set of canons for the ascription of the pro¬
perty in question. Or more exactly by
'x is a genuine t (and y is a presumed but spurious $) in respect
to some adequate and acceptable canon, Z^, for the ascription of
we mean that x satisfies Z*, and y — although satisfying a
prima facie adequate but unacceptable canon for $ — fails to
satisfy Z«.
The above formulation, like all the others w© have studied is not a de¬
finition, but schematic. It provides for the definition of 'a is a gen¬
uine F', 'b is a genuine G', etc., but is not their definition. Simi¬
larly, the following provides The form for definite ascriptions of 'real'
in the sense of a genuine — in contradistinction to an illusory or
apparent — existent;
x 3 genuine existent (and y is a presumed but spurious or merely
apparent existent) In respect to some adequate and acceptable canon,
Z*, for the ascription of existence s OEF x satisfies Z*, and y —
although satisfying a prima facie adequate but unacceptable canon
for 'exists'' — fails to satisfy Z* .
' ,"o be real' in this sense involves a relation between the gen¬
uine and the spurious, and at the same time a reference to two similar but
distinct canons for the ascription of 'exists'. It is in this way that
Barmen ides, probably the first western philosopher to consciously us© the
distinction between 'Reality' and 'appearances', argues within his work
that one must listen to the canons of reason. Following these one is led
to conclude, despite contrary appearances, that Being is one. At the same
time Barmenides must explain how those who follow the defective canons of
sens® are misled by appearances into viewing the world as composite.
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Although this discussion of 'real' in the sens® is severely
truncated Csnd of course derivative: see Austin) I believe it states
th® essential features. Let us not© that 'a is real', by itself, is not
a statement but at best a schema for one. This applies both to its us©
as 'pre-eminent in respect to some qualifying condition' and to 'genuine
in respect to acceptable canons*.
• • ♦ •
#13. Given the above schemata of ontological ascription and order¬
ing, other terms such as 'decree of substance', 'essential
property', 'Being', etc. can then be formulated in a reasonably clear
manner. If for instance one says that there are different degrees of
reality, does one not mean that amongst entities some are more real than
others? In the sense of 1 reaIas pre-eminent, this means that one con¬
siders entities as ordered in a series of pre-eminent relations, and
(whatever qualifying conditions are imposed) these relations are tran¬
sitive. Thus if something is more real than something else, it is pre¬
eminent to the former. |f it is most real, it is pre-eminent to all
other subalterns in the chain. Even this sort of pre-eminence admits
of degrees. I ) An entity may be pre-eminent to all others in terras
of on© qualifying condition, as for instance Water, for Thales, is pre¬
eminent as the fundamental stuff of all things; or an entity may be
pre-eminent in terms of all qualifying conditions. For instance, if
on© considers Aristotle's four types of causes to be collectively ex¬
haustive, then the God (as in the case of Aquinas) that embodies ail
these causes, is absolutely pre-eminent, i.e. real, in this way.
2 ) Given such patterns of pre-eminence, together with the possibility
of confusing them, it is then also possible to ascribe 'real' In the
sense of genuine existent, to all or som of these pre-eminents. In
this way the Platonic Forms, which are certainly pre-eminent as formal
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causes, can also be said to be the genuine existents in contrast to their
subalterns which are then described as pal© reflections of the former.
As for 'substance'. or more exactly 'x is a substance', we can
define this ^schematically) as an x which is pre-eminent to all (or some)
other entities In respect to some qualifying conditions. When and only
when definite conditions, i.e. specific values of are given, such as
'to be unchanging in respect to all changing things', or 'to be a ground
of properties', or 'to be a cause of ail things including oneself, etc.
can one then proceed to define specific senses of 'substance*. ( And f
suspect most traditional ontology has been an exploration of the conse¬
quences of the definitions chosen; and also that must of the controversy
concerning existence is due to the confused belief that the morpheme
'substance* in some extra-theoretical sense, is dear and definite in
itself.)
To continue 'essential* properties are, it seems those pro¬
perties which, if an entity x exists, x possesses. Or, in terms of some
qualifying conditions?
If x El then x is F, where F is # to x.
Any property then for which 'F' stands, which satisfies the above, can
then be said to be an essential property of x. But if this is analogous
to a pre-eminence relation, then the F-ness of x must obtain in respect
to some qualifying condition, i.e. some value of *•'. In such cases this
is soon forthcoming. The F-ness of x (or more exactly) that x is F, is
derivable from the definition of x. (Loosely speaking one can say that
it is in the nature of x to be F.) In this way, the property, say, to-
be-self-moved can be said to be an essential property of any man? if he
exists, he moves himself, and this property is derivable from the defini¬
tion of man as a particular kind of animal. It is also possible within
some formulations that the above relation may be one of equi-eminence
between entity and essential property. But whether ©qui-eminent or pre¬
eminent, the set of essential properties of an object are these that
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satisfy these relations. Non-essential properties can then be defined
as those which are not members of this set and nevertheless ascribabl©
to x, for instance tc«oove-himself-on-skis.
And lastly, by 'Being'. presumably one means 'an x which is an
existent*, or 'the class of all such x's', or 'an existent which in some
way is pre-eminent*, etc. And by 'MliZx' +h© class of all existents,
or all existents contrasted in some way with those entities to which ex¬
istence is not ascribed, or which are subalterns. Thus with the excep¬
tion cf expressions such as 'modes of Being' we have performed our task
of expressing the language of ontology in terms of a few basic forms.
As for 'modes', I confess I can never understand clearly what is meant,
and suspect behind its use a verbal persiflage which solves issues by
confusing them. But presumable a mode of Being is some sort of state,
and this latter at least can be specified in terms of a set of charac¬
teristic properties. Thus once one defines substance one can establish
some relation of pre-eminence or equi-eminence between this and the
state or states in question. (In this way, Spinoza, I think, can say of
substance, if it is viewed in a particular manner, i.e. In terms of cer¬
tain qualifying conditions, that it has certain properties; and viewed
from another position and in terms of different qualifying conditions,
other properties. One can in this way maintain that the universe
is at the same time material and immaterial without fear of contradic¬
tions the properties in question are in different frames of reference
and as such not directly comparable. At least this is the artifice.)
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#14. So, in general, it appears that whatever the ontology one pro¬
fesses, and no matter how complex its ordering relationships may be, such
a theory can be expressed In terms of the schemata we have isolated. And
these, with the exception of , contain only the notation of logic sup¬
plemented with *E!Certainly any specific use of these forms requires
other terms, e.g. the names and definite and indefinite descriptions which
nay be introduced into the dot and dash sequences. But such terms are not
part of the schemata but of their instances. Similarly, although the val¬
ues of '<!>' are numerous and disparate, any such value is in the form of a
relation, and these we know, can be expressed in terms of ordered couples.
These latter (we assume) do not contribute any specific features to onto¬
logy. In this way, by dint of paraphrasing, •E?* now seems tc emerge as
the one irreplaceable term within the language of ontology. For, as we
have seen in the preceding section, other terms such as 'substance',
'Being', Reality', etc. are also definable in terms of *E!•. Thus the
whole weight of an ontology, and the characteristics of ontology in gen¬
eral, depend to an extraordinary degree upon the meaning and the logical
properties of this one term.
Within most of the preceding study we have discussed existence-
statements as if they were all of the same kind. Wore recently we have
distinguished between those which ascribe, deny, or withhold 'El•, from
others which establish ordering relations among the entities so ascribed.
Now if we consider the conditions which permit us to ascribe or deny ex¬
istence, we will see that only ascriptions of existence to individuals
(if any) can be said to be direct in all possible contexts. For even if
existence is ascribed generically, by fiat, within some context, the
effectiveness of this ascription ultimately depends upon the knowledge
gained in earlier contexts. For no amount of direct experience with some
a, b, and c, etc. which are F, can ever fully justify our claim that all
members of a large class containing a, b, and c are F. (Perhaps in some
cases a class might be seen to have all its members F merely on the basis
of a direct observation of the physical aggregate of its elements — and
thus warrant a direct ascription of F as the generic property of the class.
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But the kind of generic ascriptions we encounter in ontology are not of
this cloth. Rather we are told that all bodies exist, or that if any¬
thing is a number it exists, or that minds exist. And the classes of
these are certainly never seen in one aggregate, nor may they even be
denumerable.) In other words, generic ascriptions of this kind if direct
in one context are ultimately grounded in terms of other premises, or es¬
tablished by fiat without the possibility of any ulterior justification —
except, perhaps, in respect to their consequences. Unless one has re¬
course to intuition or innate knowledge any such justification.merely
out
on the basis of a fiat)is arbitrary, if we rule/these latter recourses
as not providing adequate grounds, then the only justifiable ascriptions
of existence which can be said to be direct in all contexts (if there
are any such) are existence-ascriptions to specific entities. The truth
of all other existence-ascriptions then depends upon these and/or +he
theory in terms of which they are established. This is another way of
saying that with the possible exception of direct ascriptions of exis¬
tence to specific individuals, and logical consequences of these, any
other existence-ascription is such that a genuine alternative formula¬
tion is also possible.
We have noted that the forms of the language of ontology per¬
mit the denial of existence to any entity to which it is ascribed. Accord¬
ingly, unless something in the meaning of *E!#, as it is applied in direct
ascriptions of existence to individuals, interdicts this — the language
of ontology when correctly used does not ban the formulation of incom¬
patible existence-ascriptions. And this, we remember, is one of the
presuppositions of the theory of permissives.
As for ordering relations, these are stated in the form of con¬
ditions containing ascriptions of existence. Thus if the theory of per¬
missives is applicable to that part of the language of ontology containing
existence-ascriptions, it is a fortiori applicable to the entire language.
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Thus, unless some feature of * E 5f prevents this, nothing specific to
the language of ontology bais the expression of genuinely alternative
theories of existence.
Nor does it seem to. For at best there are very few entity-
terms which we would find it bizarre to combine with 'exist'. And this seems
to be the case in general. Philosophers and often the worid at large have
argued vehemently about the content of existence-propositions, but this
concerns the truth or falsity of asserting that something exists Rarely
ha one first questioned the propriety of using the word 'exist'. Indeed
with the exception of issues involving queer notions such a that of
logical space, how could this type of disagreement arise?
And also, although this is to anticipate, we shall argue that
'exist' _i_s definable — but in terms of a multiply ambiguous expression;
and as such it does permit the expression of alternative ontologies
So it seems that the specific features of 'exist' — and by
extension those of the language of ontology — offer no constraints to
the expression of mutually incompatible theories of existence. Thus as
far as this pertinent sector of language is concerned, the theory of
existence-propositions a; permissives is possible.
We conclude then, that with the one proviso noted above,
concerning 'El' as employed in direct ascriptions to individuals,
the forms of the language of ontology present no impediment to the
assertion of the theory of permissives In this respect, the theory is
possible. We will argue now that it provides a credible explanation for
the features — and puzzles — of ontology which have concerned us.
CHAPTER TWELVE
Existence-statements as PermissIves
and the Linguistic Approach
#1. If the theory of permisslves is tenable, then in all ontologies
i) there must be some unfa Is ifiable existence-propositions, and li) these
propositions are essential in the elaboration of the ontology. It is ob¬
vious that we cannot show this to be the case by analyzing all ontologies.
Still we can look at a few theories of existence that have been histori¬
cally important. And we shall show that they do satisfy the above condi¬
tions .
For the first illustration, let us turn to Aristotle's discus¬
sions of substance and of qualities in the "Categories". We follow Ross
in holding that this is not only a logical study but is at the same time
a "classification of the main types of entities involved in the structure
of reality", Ross (I) p. 23. In this latter aspect the theory of the
"Categories" can certainly be considered ontological. We have chosen
the discussion within this work, rather than say that of "Metaphysics",
to simplify our exposition. Even then we will touch only upon those
points which are relevant to our purpose.
Within the "Categories" Aristotle, as we know, introduces the
technical term "being present in a subject" to stand for "being incapable
of existence apart from the same subject", (CAT) 2, la 23. (The term
"existence" is itself left undefined.) Thus to say that such-and-such
is present in a subject means, in the terminology of the preceding chap¬
ter, that such-and-such is a subaltern existent in respect to the sub¬
ject, or conversely that the subject is pre-eminent in respect to it.
Aristotle Is aware that what we have called the 'ascription of
pre-eminence' (or 'to be prior' in his terminology), varies according to
the qualifying conditions imposed. For this see (META) Delta II. In the
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present case the qualifying condition is established in respect to what
Aristotle calls "underlying" or "providing the ground for". It is in
this sense that he observes;
Moreover primary substances are most properly called substances
in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie
everything else..." (CAT) 5, 2b 15.
Primary substances, in this case concrete individuals such as
a particular man, are absolutely pre-eminent as existents. Not only are
they never present in a subject, i.e. never subalternate in this respect,
see (CAT) 5, 2a II, but "if these did not exist, it would be impossible
for anything else to exist" (CAT) 5, 2b 5.
Specific qualities, on the other hand, are present in a subject
and as such subalternate to it. "For instance...a certain whiteness may
be present in the body" (CAT) 2, la 27. A body for example, is white
Inasmuch as it contains whiteness, and honey is sweet because it con¬
tains sweetness. (See "Categories" 8, 9a 28ff.) These latter formu¬
lations are not as totally vapid as they sound to us today. Although
it would lead us astray to discuss Aristotle's theory of color in any
detail, we can — without too much over-simplification — note the
essential features. Bodies are said to have the potential for becoming
colored, just as in classical physics the kinetic energy of a body is
potentially present in a body at rest. As far as color is concerned,
light strikes the body and, in so doing, actualizes this potential. White¬
ness is then actually present in the body. (See Beare ^33-37)
One might wonder whether such particular qualities do exist
even as subalterns. But Aristotle is definite on this point. If we
turn again to his philosophic lexicon, in "Metaphysics" Delta 7, we re¬
call that the senses of "being" are just as many as there are figures of
predication, i.e. categories. Quality, of course, is one category of
Being. (In the absence of any counter-evidence, we assume that the con¬
tent of Delta 7 also applies to the discussion in the "Categorloc".)
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Thus "being" in one sense can b© ascribed to qualities, just as in another
sense it is applicable to the concrete individual.
If we employ 'exist' to cover the various sense of 'being', we
can express the gist of most of the above as follows;
(1) Concrete individuals exist.
(2) Qualities exist.
(3) Where x is a particular quality, x exists only if some concrete ob¬
ject, y, exists; and y supplies the ground for the actualization of x.
Having stated these premises, we must now show that each is
essential to an ontology of the above kind — and is unfalsifiable. To
show the former, let us perform a mental experiment in which we remove
these premises and consider the theory which is left, we assume, and
will justify this later, that one of the prime purposes of any discus¬
sion concerning existence is to assign a definite status in respect to
existence, to each entity one might consider. But if we were to remove
(I) or (2) or both, the theory so fragmented then assigns no onto logical
status either to concrete individuals or to any particular quality. Ob¬
viously any such ontology would be seriously inadequate.
We assume too that another key role of most ontologies is to
provide some order amongst existents of various kinds. In view of the
broad use of "being" countenanced by Aristotle in Delta 7, such an or¬
dering becomes mandatory in the present case. For not only do concrete
individuals, such as Socrates, exist; but so does (being) two cubits
long, or white, or double, or greater, or in the Lyceum, or yesterday,
or reclining, or horse-shoeing, or lacerating, or being cut, etc. exist.
So too all particular quantities, qualities, relations, positions, times,
postures, states, activities, and passivities, exist. To say the least
this tends to create a bloated universe, and the evident function of pro¬
positions such as (3) is to tidy this. Thus to remove (3) would reduce
the ontology to an overstuffed grab bag of entity.
(I) - (3), or propositions akin to them, are then essential com-
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ponents in any comprehensive and satisfactorily ordered description of
existents, along the lines delineated in the "Categories1' (and amplified
in turn within "Metaphysics"). We need not add that these works esta¬
blished the theory of existence held by most western thinkers off and on
for close to two thousand years.
Now are propositions such as (I) - (3) provable or disprovable
in some way? Consider (3) for a moment. J have a cigarette in front of
me. How could I show, as (3) claims to be the case, that this cigarette
provides the ground for its whiteness? I certainly cannot see any such
state of affairs, any more than I can see the potential energy in a ball
held at the top of an inclined plane. (Similarly I cannot see that this
is not the case.) But if I cannot see this, how can I argue for it? I
can argue, in the case of a ball, that if it is released its velocity
will increase at a particular rate, and I can then confirm this predic¬
tion. Similarly I might try to argue that if light strikes some body
which is potentially white, the body will become actually white. But
to make this claim — unlike predicting the velocity of the ball — 1
must know from the start that the body is and will become white. So
when I say of some white body that Whiteness has become "actual", it is
neither surprising nor unsurprising: it just fails to tell us anything
that we did not know beforehand. But by this very feature we cannot
then say that it is wrong, either. (Carnap and others will of course
say that such a statement lacks cognitive significance. But for the
present we will overlook this point, for we consider this within the
final chapter.)
One might also try to argue that in describing the White as
actualized, one has adequately explained the occurrence. Perhaps one
has, but one can also say that the body reflects light and so becomes
white. (And given sufficient knowledge about the physical structure of
its components, one could presumably also predict this beforehand.) So
one cannot argue: Aristotle in (3) provides the unique and most com¬
pelling explanation. Thus (3) is true.'
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Could one then perhaps disprove (3), but how? How could one
show that the cigarette does not provide the ground for its whiteness7
Or (if we consider the conditional linking whiteness and cigarette) to
disprove this we would have to show that the whiteness of this cigarette
existed and that this cigarette did not? A neat trick this.
Or consider (I) and (2). We have argued at long and at large
that (with the possible exception of theory-free direct ascriptions of
existence to Individual entites) no existence-ascriptions can be proved
or disproved without reference to a particular theory. Thus even if we
would prove or disprove (I) or (2) in terms of some theory, there would
then be other propositions similar to these, within the same theory,
which we could not prove. And if we assume the theory self-consistent,
neither could we disprove these other propositions. Since (I) and (2)
are essential in the above ontology — If these were warranted by logi¬
cally prior propositions, these prior ones would then be essential. In
either case there are some irreplaceable propositions within an ontology
(or within a theory containing an ontology) that are neither provable nor
dlsprovable, I.e. which are unfalsifiable.
The one possible exception, namely direct ascriptions of exis¬
tence to individuals, need not concern us. For even if such were incon-
trovertibly true, they could not in themselves warrant generic ascriptions
of existence, such as (I) and (2). Further, apropos of this last point,
we have already noted that Aristotle modifies the meaning of 'exist' In
associating substance with the concrete individual. Thus even if there
were some theory-free ascription of existence, In the Aristotelean sense
of 'exist', a rival philosopher might still contend that this was not the
proper nor the primary sense of 'exist'. And so even such an ascription
could not be said to be theory-free. Nor again could it be shown to be
false.
In brief; (I)—(3), however essential they may be to the Aristo¬
telean description of existents, are unfalsifiable propositions.
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This conclusion should hardly prove a surprise; it is in its way
only a detailed instantiation of that which we have already established in
Part Two. For we have argued there that the classical approach, in pre¬
supposing that all statementscontained within an ontology are demonstrably
true or false, is untenable. (We recall our convention that axioms and
incontrovertibIy true statements are to be considered as derivable from
A/\s
themselves.) In this way, from the regation of:
Ail statements contained within a theory of existence are
demonstrable, etc.
It fo!lows:
There are some statementscontained within an ontology that
are not demonstrably true or false.
But if they are not demonstrably false, they are unf a I sff i abl e, and if they
are at the same time not demonstrably true, they are merely unfaisified. In
this way, from the general untenability of the classical approach — n either
its categorical or weaker forms ~ we can infer one tenet of the theory of
permissives namely:
Some propositions contained within an ontology are unfa Isifiab!e.
So, strictly speaking, any detailed reference to Aristotle or to others is
unnecessary.
But in this sub-lunary world of poor philosophers, detailed observa¬
tions of this kind are not amiss. They do serve to support, or perhaps even to
confirm tho generai thesis. And secondly we must still employ these, or other
insfances, to show that some such propositions although non-fa Isifiable are
nevertheless essential to an ontology. With both these tasks in mind, we
now proceed.
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#2. Let us now Investigate propositions which establish similar re¬
lationships in another and equally significant, ontology — that of the
atomists. (In the following, the translation of the first clause Is my
own. I wish to stress the opposition, 'subjective-objective', contained
In the vo/*** construction):
Sweet and bitter, hot and cold, color, are subjective; in reality
there are only atoms and the Void..." (KR) 589, Democritus.
NOMQ rAYKX,NOMQ HIKPOK.NOMQ ©EPMON,N0MQ YIXPON.NOMQ XPOIH,
ETEH AI ATOMA KAI KENOK....
These are so small as to elude our sense- (I®) 355.
Atoms, to which existence is ascribed generlcally above, are indivisible
units of matter, endowed with shape, size, motion, and perhaps weight.
See (KR) p. 414-418. They are, as noted above, In general, Invisible.
The Void, to which existence is directly ascribed, Is the empty region
between atoms. See (KR) p. 408. Concrete individuals, such as Socrates,
are formed out of loose combinations of the atoms:
As they (sc. the atoms) move they collide and become entangled in
such a way as to cling in close contact to one another, but not so
as to form one substance of them In reality....
....overtaking each other they [the atoms] collide, and some are
shaken away In any chance direction, while others, becoming inter¬
twined one with another according to the congrulty of their shapes,
sizes, positions, arrangements stay together and so effect the coming
into being of compound bodies" (KR) 581, 582.
Atoms, then, within this view, are pre-eminent exI stents. The being of
compound bodies, of concrete individuals, is subalternate to the exis¬
tence of the atoms. The characteristics of the atoms determine the
qualities of the compound bodies they constitute;
Bitter taste is caused by small, smooth, rounded atoms whose cir¬
cumference is actually sinuous, therefore it is sticky and viscous
...salt taste is caused by large, not rounded atoms, but in some
cases jagged ones" (KR) 591.
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And similarly, one supposes, for all the other qualities such as being
hot or cold or colored mentioned earlier.
We can rephrase the content of the above thust
(1) Atoms exist.
(2) The Void exists.
(3) Nothing but atoms, combinations of these, and the Void exists.
(4) The existence of concrete individuals is subal+ernat® to that of
the atoms; and loose and temporary complexes of atoms constitute
the former and establish the properties of the concrete individual
so formed.
(5) Atoms have size, shape, motion, perhaps weight, are indivisible and,
in general, invisible.
(6) Color, taste, etc. do not exist as genuine properties of any ob¬
jects. Rather, these are due merely to the effect upon us (i.e.
the effect upon the atoms which form our soul) of the shape, etc.
of the atoms of the objects perceived and sensed.
It is obvious that (I) - (4) are essential. The first two
propositions specify these entities, namely the atoms and the Void, which
do constitute the universe. The third proposition limits ascriptions of
existence exclusively to these and to their combinations. (4) then orders
compound bodies as subalterns to their atomic pre-eminents. Removal of
any of these propositions would render the ontology defective. But (I) -
(4) in themselves have little explicative power, ft is for this reason
that the properties of the atoms must be specified, as in (5). Let us
note that (6), the denial of objective reality to color, etc. is not an
essential proposition, but is a consequence of (I) - (5).
But how could any of these propositions be shown to be either
true or false? If we cannot see the atoms, we cannot see the region in
between them as the Void. Thus neither (I) nor (2) can be seen to be
true — nor for that matter, false. Similarly, if w© include the invi¬
sible among existents, how can we be certain there are no exceptions to
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(3)? For Instance might there not be immaterial souls? But also how
could we see that (3) was false? And again, as far as (4) is concerned,
if I say this cigarette is composed of invisible elements, how can I see
if this is true or false? Nobody for instance has seen an electron nor
observed its spin, and some thinkers have questioned the existence of
even these theoretically pre-eminent entities. How is a Greek to know
whether the atoms, which Democritus claims must constitute his lover and
the Parthenon, are really there in his lover and the Parthenon — or are
only logical explicantla? And how Is one to know that the atoms have
only the nice tidy properties Democritus assigns to them? Of course,
if they do, our explanation for the behavior of micro-bodies becomes
simplified. But is this a justification? Who has told us that Nature
is simple — or is not?
And further, one can ask, with Aristotle, whether knowledge
is merely sensation (see "Metaphysics" 1009b Iff) as presumably it must
be within a material universe, and as such whether the Atomists' theory
Is tenable. But then again, as Smart and others have argued more re¬
cently, one might claim that sensations are Indeed merely physical pro¬
cesses, and that by extension thought too can be described In terms of a
reductive physical account. So the correctness of the Arlstotelean cri¬
ticism, and this aspect of the theory he attacks, remains moot, i.e.
n^'thar proved nor disproved nor rejected, even today.
Similar perplexities arise in respect to the properties of
atoms and the relation of atoms to qua Iia. such as color and taste. Ob¬
viously we see things as colored. Yet how could we possibly see that
atoms, even If they were visible, together with compound objects, were
really colored (if this means anything) or that they were not? But
if we cannot see this directly, we cannot argue for the truth or fal¬
sity of (5) either. For what form could such an argument take? It can¬
not be grounded in a perception: Democritus denies the correctness of
information based upon sense (see below). It must then be grounded In
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terms of the concepts one holds, say those concerning bodies and qual¬
ities. But, as we have seen, Aristotle has one such concept and Demc-
critis another. So one cannot establish that (6) is true or false or
more plausible, simpliciter, in this way.
And, more generally, if any recourse to knowledge based upon
perception is, as Democritus says, "obscure", to what else can one refer?
Or how, except on the basis of other perceptions, could one deny his
claim, and consider perceptual data tc be in fact veridical? Or, if
one were to rely net upon perception but upon some other form of know¬
ledge to establish the correctness or incorrectness of propositions
such as (I) - (6), a rival could always introduce a different propo¬
sition — and so the argument proliferates.
Democritus, for instance, does claim that there are two forms
of knowledge. Although the first, i.e. that which is dependent upon the
senses, is obscure or confused:
The other is genuine, and quite distinct from this.... When the
obscure form can no longer see mere minutely nor hear nor smell
nor taste nor perceive through touch, but finer++++" (KR) 590.
The manuscript breaks off at this point. Apparently, see (KR) p. 424,
genuine knowledge is intellectual. But how can Democritus claim that
his intellectual perception, or intuition, is true when Aristotle's
intuition of first principles is false? Or the converse?
Like the manuscript, let us break off discussion at this point.
We have been content to suggest that whatever method one might use to es¬
tablish the truth of propositions, such as (I) - (6), is as inconclusive
as that which one might employ in a refutation. And yet these or similar
propositions are essential to the Atomist's theory of existents. Thus,
like those contained within the "Categories", the establishing proposi¬
tions of this equally fecund view, if self-consistent, are again substan¬
tially unfalsifiable.
Similarly, we have argued earlier that Descartes is unable to
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show In any categorical manner, that a thinking substance exists. But the
undemonstrablIity of 'p' is not evidence for the truth of 'not-p'. And
yet further attacks which, from Hobbes on through Ryle, have been directed
against the Cartesian position have generally tried to show that any re¬
ference to a thinking substance Is unnecessary. But just as tonsils are
unnecessary and still are there, arguments of this kind, even if conclu¬
sive, cannot disprove the Cartesian claim either. Thus — provided we
can talk meaningfully of the self or soul or mind in the above terms —
it Is quite likely that the proposition that such a soul exists is also
unfalsifiable.
(Of course, as our reservations have suggested, all these proposi¬
tions may be resistant to effective proof or disproof only because they
are nonsense. We return to this point. But for the present let us
assume that at least some of these mutually incompatible propositions
are meaningful.)
» • • •
#3. Within the preceding we have studied propositions essential to
the expression of three ontolog lea I positions. Each of these ontologies
has played an enormously significant role. Probably the only other theory
of existents of comparable importance in the occidental world, is the Pla¬
tonic view. Although we have not Investigated this latter, it is I think
safe to say, at the very least, that Plato has Introduced no cross-
culturally convincing proof for the existence of the Forms. And con¬
versely, although one might argue that the assumption of their existence
is unnecessary, I do not think that any purported disproof of their exis¬
tence Is sound in terms of the premises of all self-consistent schemes.
For instance, Aristotle's arguments against the existence of the Forms,
in general are couched in terms of the Aristotelean system. This Is na¬
tural enough, but this does not show that the Platonic claim — in terms
of Plato — is self-ineonsistent. If one grants this latter point, all
these historically significant ontologies then share this common feature;
each contains some existence-propositions, essential to It, which are
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neither provable nor disprovable.
And yet, despite this, if one were to excise these and similar
propositions, or else remove the entire ontology containing them, most
if not all of the conceptual schemes which western man has entertained
would in some respects be strikingly incomplete. This is an important
pointj let us consider it from another angle.
The recursive mechanisms of language permit the formation of
an infinity of syntactically well-formed expressions which ascribe to en¬
tities any sort of properties and capacities. Although doubtlessly at
an early stage the stock of entity-terms corresponded pretty closely to
the stock of entities one considered as constituting the universe, this
happy state is long since past. For membership in the class of entity-
terms (as we employ this term) is limited only by the combinatory resources
of the language employed. And these resources in general far outstrip
in range 3nd variety the extra-linguistic objects which they might be
used to denote. Thus we are forced to distinguish between entity-terms
inasmuch as seme of these — and only some — can be considered to name
objects, or to describe types which (whatever one might mean by this
phrase) can be said to 'constitute the universe', or 'to exist'.
In on© way or another each of the above ontologies establishes
a framework in terms of which such distinctions can be made. But ascrip¬
tion, denial, and withholding of existence-ascriptions are subject to at
least two opposing canons: that the assignment of ontological status be
as consonant as possible with our common experience, and that ascription
and denial be distinct. Aristotle's assignment of ontological values is
certainly consonant with natural expectations but — as sections of the
"Metaphysics" testify — the distinctness of his existence-ascriptions
and denials can only be maintained if he also introduces a complex set
of ordering relations. Democritus' distinction, on the other hand, is
clear. But simplicity is purchased at the cost of intuitive self-
evidentness, Consonance with experience can only be re-established by
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Introducing an equally complex distinction between the genuine properties
of objects and our subjective experience of them. Thus, In one system
or another, the full resources of the language of ontology must be called
into play. Ordering and excluding relationships between entities in
respect to existence become as important in the expression of an ontology
as any of the initial ascriptions of existence it may contain. In other
words, if 'exists* is significant, one cannot brush off as unimportant
the propositions we have been discussing. Rather we must accept them,
however unfalsifiable they may be, and find their place.
• « • •
#4. We now discuss the claim we have made that unfalsifiable pro¬
positions, such as the above, when introduced into a theory and considered
as true, permit us to talk in turn in an important way about other propo¬
sitions as true. For instance, the propositions we have studied within
the Democritean position, are merely unfalsiflable. As such — and as
long as they remain so — they and their consequences are self-consistent.
And further, no low-order observation statements can infirm them. (For
if inconsistent or infirmed they are no longer unfalsified.) All this
seems to damn such propositions with faint praise. But if we turn this
situation to our liking, it is evident that there is now no impediment
to our treating these self-same propositions as true. For convenience
of reference, let us repeat several of them;
(I) Atoms exist.
(3) Nothing but atoms, combinations of these and the Void exists.
(4) The existence of concrete individuals is subalternate to that of
the atoms, and loose and temporary complexes of atoms constitute
and establish the properties of the former.
(5) Atoms have size, shape, motion, perhaps weight, are Indivisible, and,
in general, invisible.
From these establishing propositions it follows, as a conse¬
quence, that all apparent properties of concrete individuals, such as
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being colored, cannot be said to be intrinsic properties! that vvhich we
see as colored is due merely to the effect of the shape, etc, of the atoms,
of the objects we perceive, upon those atoms out of which we are formed.
Thus the relegation of color, etc. to the role of a subjective property
follows, as noted earlier, from (I) - (5), these establishing pro¬
positions are taken as, true, this conclusion Js, true.
In the same spirit, a scientist might say today, as far as
physics is concerned, that no physically meaningful description of macro-
objects need contain any descriptive words which are not ultimately ex¬
pressible in terms of 'mass1, 'length', 'time', and combinations of
these. Given this proposition, which can be construed In this sense as
a definition of 'physical object', It follows that all the physically
significant properties of an object can be fully described without any
reference whatsoever to those sensuously experienced contents which the
percipient associates with the object. As far as physics Is concerned,
it is true to say that these latter do not constitute any (physically)
significant features of the object.
And, within another scheme, Aquinas accepts as true the state¬
ment that nothing is the cause of Its own motion. This Itself is a rea¬
soned consequence of other propositions concerning motion, in particular
that motion involves a change from the potential to the actual. (Again
an unfalslflable proposition.) But if we consider this proposition as
true, then the above statement concerning self-motion must be true of
all things In motion. But if this Is so, and this concept of motion pre¬
cludes the possibility of an infinite sequence of causes of motion, the
existence of present motion now forces us to conclude that an unmoved
source of motion exists. And if this is what one means by 'God', then —
within the scope of these establishing propositions — it is true to
say that (a) god exists.
Or again, let us grant the proposition that doubt is Indubi¬
table. (This is not to deny the force of our criticism of the cogjto;
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rather we now permit Descartes to consider doubting, as In "Meditations",
III , to be in some curious way independent of an object.) And
let us consider also as true that no activity is possible without a sub¬
stance to perform this activity. Granted these premises, is It not true
that a soubting, i.e. a thinking substance, exists? This follows, if it
does only because Descartes Is permitted to employ doubt as a monadic
predicate. And although I consider this highly awkward, how is one to
show that this is true or false? And similarly, If one wishes to main¬
tain the no-actIvity-wlthout-a-substance thesis, although we have shown
this to be inapplicable in various situations, how can one show this to
be false, simpllciter? One can always invent a substance, e.g. an ether,
to account for the apparent breakdown of this claim. (And if the ether
thesis itself proves inapplicable, on© can then in turn modify it to
avoid a conclusive disproof.) Shored up and splinted In this way,
Descartes* 'therefore I am* may thereby become a sound conclusion.
* • • •
#5. I could continue with further examples. But I think the point,
however curious, is clear: when unfa Is ifiable propositions are introduced
into a theory as true, then other propositions — if derivable from the
former — can then be said to be true or false. The establishing propo¬
sitions constitute as It were a set of fixed positions, chosen among
various possible ones. Propositions of this type, together with their
consequences, serve to establish the structure of a particular concept
of an existent — or to express a theory of existents.
But if this is so, how can we possibly believe such theories?
To answer this, it might be well to consider such a theory through a
period of time. Let us imagine that some theory proves self-cons I stent
and reasonably comprehensive and ordered through the course of long test¬
ing period. Let us assume, too, that it shows itself to be consonant
with both experience and with other theories accepted as true or correct.
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or at least that Its consequences do not run contrary to these. In
other words we assume the initial propositions remain unfa Is ifiable.
And lastly, let us imagine that the theory satisfies not only our de¬
mands of order and comprehensiveness, but also other perhaps equally
deep human needs. Given these assumptions, we can imagine the theory
as accepted. But then it is only natural for Its success to feed back
Into its premises. In this way, its establishing propositions — all
the time merely unfalsifiable — take on the air of Indubitable truths.
(In this connection see Hanson, Chapter V: Newton's three laws of mo¬
tion, when initially propounded, were considered by many of his contemp¬
orary physicists as merely elegant mathematical constructions. The suc¬
cess of the theory, based upon them, in time induced the conviction that
these laws were immutable truths.)
Strictly speaking, neither these propositions nor the con¬
ceptual structures they establish are true or false. Nor need any of
these be exclusively correct, nor for that matter totally in error.
Rather what a general theory of this kind provides (we say) is not so
much a set of truths, but a comprehensive view; not so much the abso¬
lute and unchanging, but a way of seeing, of conceiving, a way of hold¬
ing together the variegated elements which the flow and buckling, both
of theories and experience , forever tosses up before our gaze.
Not a set of truths but a vision*
Philosophy Is many things and there is no formula to cover
them all. But if I were asked to express in one single word
what is its most essential feature I would unhesitatingly
say: vision. At the heart of any philosophy worth Its name
is vision and it is from there it springs and takes its visi¬
ble shape...It has always been felt that philosophy should re¬
veal to us what Is hidden...from Plato to Moore and Wittgenstein
every great philosopher was led by a sense of vision; without
It no one could have given a new direction to human thought or
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opened windows Into the not-yet-seen. What Is decisive is a
new way of seeing and, what goes with it, the will to trans¬
form the whole intellectual scene. This is the real thing
and everything else is subservient to it" Waismann (3), VII, (p. 483).
It is such a vision of the most general characteristics of ex-
Istents that Aristotle, Democritus, Descartes, Plato, and others provide.
• • • »
♦ • • •
#6. In a way, it is also such a looking into the not-yet-seen which
Waismann, following Wittgenstein, provides in the above view of philoso¬
phy. But where are we? We have been arguing for a theory of existence-
statements as permissives. |f this too is a view, how are we to esta¬
blish this, or to show its credibility? We have argued that the theory
of permissives does apply to various historically important ontologies,
and by extension to all. Specifically we have shown, as far as the
ontologies we investigated are concerned: I) These contain unfalsi-
fiable propositions, ii) These or similar propositions are irreplaceable,
iii) Theories containing them play an essential role within our concep¬
tual scheme and iv) When such essential and unfalsifiable propositions
are considered as true within an ontology, other statements, i.e. their
intra-systematic consequences, can be said to be true. Thus we have
shown that the claims of the theory of permissives is indeed satisfied
by these ontologies. And we have noted that these ontologies include
those theories of existence which have been of single importance in our
cultural history.
Still, we must admit, the same general state of affairs might
also be described some other way within a rival theory of philosophic
problems. We are thus compelled to argue along other lines for the
credibility of our own approach. To do this we shall consider the ex¬
tent to which this theory of permissives makes explicable otherwise
puzzling features of the intellectual scene. For instance; Can it
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adequately explain the continued presence and perennial reappearance of
substantially similar philosophic issues? Can it account for the cer¬
tainty with which mutually incompatible claims can be asserted by rival
thinkers? Can it account also for changes in philosophic attitudes?
Can it explain the failure of rival theories of philosophic problems, and
can it reconcile the most attractive claims contained within these
theories? These, we think, are fair questions, and w© shall devote the
remainder of this chapter to a discussion of the theory of permissives
In light of them.
A; The first puzzle js one we have noted from the very start,
namely the apparent inconcI usiveness of most philosophic studies of
fundamental Issues, I say 1 apparent inconcI usiveness', for If one
believes that such philosophic questions are requests in the form
'Solve me'.', the way an equation is to be solved, then truly all too
few such issues have been solved. But, if on the contrary we con¬
sider these as demands to furnish new conceptual structures, why then
the proliferation of different answers is not a scandal but a mark of
proper philosophic activity. For, as we have seen, each successful
ontology introduces a radically different view — and as such the
presence of rival positions in philosophy becomes as natural as pits
are to cherries.
To the extent that theories may be under-determined by ex¬
perience, to that extent some of the elements and some of the struc¬
tures we discern there, may be nothing more than the outlines our
concepts, or our language have traced. And to the extent that dif¬
ferent visions may be formulated, one theory thereby projects upon
(or delineates within) the subject features incompatible with that
of another. Of course, if theoretic and extra-theoretic elements
correspond In all cases then all rival theories if correct would be
fully compatible. But the burden of proof that this Is so, in this
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case, lies upon the strong realist who might assert this. And, as a
matter of fact, we have seen that actual ontologies, however successful
they may be, are not compatible, even within the widest stretch of
imagination.
What I have been trying to say is that (within this view of
existence-propositions as logical permissives) the philosophic questions
which have occupied us from the start are not to be resolved, nor dissolved,
but inasmuch as they indicate a fundamental incompleteness, the appropr ate
action is to produce and to explore new conceptual structures; and that
experience and the nexus of existing theories and beliefs at a I I or most
times is sufficiently labile to permit the satisfactory employment of
otherwise incompatible viewpoints. So, if we assume that some existence-
propositions are logical permissives, and assume too, that our general
theoretical structures are in some respects under-determined in this way,
then there must be, as we find, successful, self-consistent, and mutua ly
incompatible ontologies
B: A similar Iine of reasoning can be used to explain our
initial perplexity: How can one be so certain that such-and-such exist,
when other thinkers are equally convinced of the contrary? It is, I
think, ciear that the certainty of our rational belief in the correctness
of one theory, depends upon the degree to which this theory satisfies those
conditions which we consider important in theory-appraisal. But as long
as these criteria vary, as they do both within and across cultures, the
degree of success ascribed to a theory as well as the strength of one's
belief in the "truth" of its component propositions, will also vary from
person to person, from group to group. Thus to the extent that some, if
not all, propositions essential within an ontology are unfa Isifiab:e,
adherence to one theory of existence in no way precludes the advocacy by
others, of rival accounts. :n this way A can say that 6's exist and B,
with equal sanction, may deny this.
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For instance, Smart suggests — jjf, one holds the view that sen¬
sations are brain-processes — that one can then successfully defend a
physical 1st position of this kind against all criticisms; but if one re¬
jects such a view, psychic events must then be said to exist in their
own and irreducible way. See Smart (2), penultimate paragraph.
Or again, among mathematicians, a so-called 'intuit Ion 1st1
will ascribe (mathematical) existence only to those mathematical ob¬
jects which can be constructed, by means of an effective procedure,
out of other elements. Thus, e.g. for Brouwer all or some of the trans-
finite numbers, which cannot be so constructed, cannot be said to ex¬
ist. But other mathematicians, employing other criteria, will consi¬
der the transflnites as existing in the same way as any other mathema¬
tical objects. See Kneale p. 672ff.
And again, Feuerbach argues that the experience of the Divine
Is only subjective, a human projection, and that therefore God, as an
objective reality does not exist. But others, perhaps Werkegaard, hold¬
ing that reality is in part subjective, can employ the same observations
to conclude that the Divine does exist. See Feuerbach, Kferkegaard.
In each of the above, mutually Incompatible propositions con¬
cerning exlstents are asserted. Confronted with this, it Is normal
enough to exclaim; How can this be! But if we consider each of the
above assertions, singly, as an intra-systematic consequence of dif¬
ferent sets of logical permIssIves, which are Introduced as true within
different theories, each then becomes defensible In terms of the appo¬
site theory.
C; And further, viewing some existence-propositions as logi¬
cal permisslves, helps to explain the presence of fashions and of chang¬
ing attitudes In philosophy. If some essential premises are merely un-
falslfiable, then alternative propositions can be Included within other
theories. One such theory can, as with Aristotle In his "Metaphysics"
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Lambda, provide an intellectual structure in which the changeless and the
eternal can be viewed as the final goal and object of desire of all other
existents. Or one can, with Democritus, consider motion to be a funda¬
mental property of matter, and the existence of compound objects as due
to chance.
Each of the above theories is obviously consonant with a par¬
ticular type of world-view and hostile to another. Whenever one such
view, shall we say style, becomes predominant, theories consonant with
this general set of attitudes become the favored ones. At the same time
other positions, hostile to the prevailing mental set, are rejected or
substantially reworked. The appraisal of some philosophic theory, and
the acceptance of the view it contains, together with the rejection of
others, becomes in thb way, in part, a function of the prevailing gen¬
eral attitudes of the given culture. And these w® know too well, are
also labile.
D: And again, given the theory of permissives, we can now
account for the negative results of our analysis of the classical ap¬
proach. For if the existence-propositions contained with an ontology
are unfalsifiable (i.e. neither provable nor disprovable) any demand
for categoricity in proofs concerning them becomes illusory. And fur¬
ther, unless it might be shown that such theories at all times are
fully determined by experience, the belief even in the unicity of truth
is immoderate. For lacking such a proof, the expectation that there is
au fond one correct description of entities in respect to existence (or
one set of logically equivalent theories) remains unjustified.
On the other hand, the view we have been propounding saves
what (it seems to us) to be most important within the classical atti¬
tude. And this is not the belief in the presence of a unique set of
"necessary" truths which in themselves provide the first principles of
each science. But rather, what is saved is the more fundamental human
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belief in the importance of rational investigation. For, as we have
argued, once the unfalsifiable propositions are introduced as true,
one can then explore their intra-systematic consequences, and thus a vast
body of other statements can then be shown to be true as their conse¬
quences. Indeed this, despite their greater hopes, is what the classi¬
cal philosophers have in fact achieved. For although time has washed
away the indubitabiIity of their premises, the conceptual structures
they established, in terms of them, remain.
<a» «»
E; We recall our earlier remark that most philosophers, to
some extent, share some presuppositions of the classical approach. And
some of these convictions, as we have shown, are indeed consonant with
the theory of permissives. I refer, in particular, to the belief in the
value and efficacy of rational analysis — provided this belief Is
tempered by the recognition that there may b© viable alternative ans¬
wers to some fundamental issues. Inasmuch as this temperate approach
still permits the rational exploration, development, and testing of the
adequacy of an underlying vision, I think it retains for philosophy in
general, much that has always been essential to it.
F: And last but not least, this theory of permissives also
allows us I)to save what we think is central to the linguistic approach
to philosophic problems, and at the same time ii)it enablesone to re¬
lax the extremely strong conditions which the needs of felicity would
otherwise impose upon a language or the associated form of life. To
these matters we now turn.
#7. First let us review some of the points discussed in our long
analysis of the linguistic approach. We noted that various interpreta¬
tions of this position are possible. One might, for instance, consider
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it to be purely prescriptive. By this I mean a "philosophic" problem
coulci be defined as an issue due to a misuse of language and any issues
unaccountable for along these lines would not then be considered of philo¬
sophic interest. But this would make the approach true by convention,
and as such dull. If the approach is to be informative, it must apply
to nearly all of those issues normally considered philosophical.
Among non-prescriptive positions, one can distinguish a strong
and a weak approach. The former claims that all philosophic problems,
at least all those normally considered as such, are in fact due to a
misuse of language. The weaker approach claims, roughly, that only some
philosophic issues are so caused. We found it possible to justify this
latter claim in terms of relatively non-tendentious premises. (These
we remember were concerned with the sense of statements, with conceptual
confusion, etc.) We found, in particular, it was possible to prove in
terms of these premises that in all philosophic problems either a lin¬
guistic rule or form is misused, or else the appropriate form is lacking
in the language. In this latter case, either the expressive resources
of the language at a given stage of development are inadequate (in re¬
spect to a description of the subject) or the established rules of the
language provide no sure guide. Since the theory of permissives and
the weaker linguistic approach are compatible, and in fact complement
each other in many ways, we need be concerned no longer with it nor with
its grounds.
However the strong thesis cannot be justified in this way. We
have argued at length that the claim; Philosophic problems in general
are due to a misuse of language' is tenable only if one presupposes that
the language referred to is felicitious. By 'felicity', we mean in part
that the rules of a language are mutually compatible in all their appli¬
cations, and are at the same time complete. By 'complete', we mean,
again in part, that whenever a question appears within the language it
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is possible to determine, by means of linguistic rules, whether or not
this query is significant, and—whenever it is significant and non-factual —to show
that there is only one answer, or set of compatible answers, to this question.
In such cases, the rules of language can be said to warrant the correct¬
ness of such a reply and to interdict all others. Thus if language is
felicitous, one can be certain, without further analysis that whenever
any irresolvable non-factual issue appears within the associated form
of life, that either the question it purports to answer is nonsense, or
all but one of the incompatible replies are not warranted by the rules.
In either case the problem can be said to be due to a misuse of some
rules of the language, a bump we get for running our heads into nonsense.
Language, as far as the strong linguistic approach is concerned, cannot
be defective.
It is obvious that these conditions are extremely strong. All
the more so when one considers the related claim that language also be¬
guiles and entangles one. Fortunately one can relax these conditions
a little. |f one considers some sub-section of language to be canoni¬
cal, say that of ordinary usage, the correctness of all other practices
can be adjudged, ultimately, in respect to those of the former. In this
way if philosophic queries or answers run counter to ordinary usage, they
can be interdicted. But this is no panacea. All the acceptable, i.e.
nonsense-free replies that do not depend upon matter of fact must also
be warranted by the rules. For if this were not the case, and any such
replies were merely sanctioned by the rules, the statement of another
position incompatible with the first might also be sanctioned by these
same rules. Thus the rules would permit the expression of incompatible
theories. And yet it is the presence of such mutually incompatible pro¬
positions which the theory is supposed to explain. Thus any recourse to
the rules of normal usage as canonical must presuppose not only that these
rules are all mutually compatible and complete, but also that ail exten-
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sions of these to novel situations are equally compatible and complete.
Further, this completeness applies not only to language now,
but at all times. And even more, considering the facts of language-
change, the strong linguistic approach must also claim that language
somehow determines the form of its alteration. For otherwise if two
philosophers are language-innovators, how is one to adjudicate between
their claims? One cannot merely say that it depends upon their view¬
point, that each is entitled to his own. For the judging of a philoso¬
phic position and its worth in respect to another, has traditionally
been considered a philosophic problem. If one ignores such issues,
and considers them unphilosophical, then the strong linguistic approach
slides into that of the prescriptive. Thus, however mitigated, the strong
approach in general pre-supposes felicity. Further the only other de¬
fense of the strong approach, namely that these innovations always re¬
main mutually compatible, is belied by the record.
But — and here we continue — defectiveness and felicity of
language in these senses are mutually exclusive. And it is evident,
if as we have assumed there are no theory-free existence-statements,
that the theory of permissives presupposes defectiveness of this kind:
language at critical junctures not only provides no sure guide, but on
the contrary permits the expression of genuine alternative views. So
the theory of permissives and the strong linguistic approach cannot
both be asserted at the same time. And even further, the form of the
latter is such that if it is untenable, the theory of permissives holds;
for to deny that all philosophic problems are due to a misuse of rules
of language, is to assert that there are some philosophic problems in
which the rules of language have not been misused. But tc say this
means either; there are no rules, i.e. language is incomplete in this
respect; or the rules sanction the expression of incompatible theories.
Thus, in denying the strong linguistic approach, we are led to
affirm the theory of permissives. For, we repeat, central to this latter
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position is the claim that as language and the associated conceptual
scheme develop , one does encounter situations of paramount importance
in which the established word-use is either inadequate, or else the
rules in force provide no clear unflinching guide. It is in situations
such as these, this theory claims, that thinkers are called upon not
merely to exorcise nonsense and illusion, but to introduce and to ex¬
plore the elements of a novel vision. This action, although undoubtedly
guided by the structure of the existing language is not thereby deter¬
mined. One must, in a nearly paradoxical way, see through the existing
forms of the language to show what is not yet there.
Our last task then in the defense of this theory of permissives
is to unseat the claims of the strong linguistic approach. This we shall
do by showing the awkward consequences of certain of its key assumptions.
But again, we wish to remind the reader that this is not an exercise in
philosophical scholarship. We shall quote Wittgenstein to illustrate
the strong linguistic approach, but we do not intend to imply that he
adheres to this consistently. Rather we are of the opinion that elements
of the strong, the weak, and the prescriptive approach may all be found
within s,Philosophical Investigations". But this does not concern us.
Our interest is in ideas, in this case the concept of the strong lin¬
guistic approach, and not the bearers of ideas.
• • * »
#8. We have noted earlier that the classical and linguistic ap¬
proaches are alike in their structure. Presumably then, where some
features are unsatisfiable in one, analogous features may be unsatisfiable
in the other. We have seen how unfounded is the presupposition of the
classical approach concerning the knowability (and perhaps even the being)
of necessary truths which the philosopher is to discern. Analogous to
this, within the linguistic approach, is the assertion that there are
rules underlying all acceptable usages of language, and that it is the




Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of lan¬
guage; it can in the end only describe It.
For it cannot give it any foundation either.
It leaves everything as it is..." (INV) 124.
And we may not advance any kind of theory. Und wir diirfen
kelnerlei Theorle aufstellen.J There must not be anything
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with
all explanation, and description alone must take its place.
And this description gets its light, that is to say Its pur¬
pose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course,
not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking
into the workings of language, and that In such a way as to
make us recognize these workings in despite of an urge to
misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving
new information, but by arranging what we have always known..."
(INV) 109.
So much for Wittgenstein. But when we consider the Democritean
ontology, it seems totally unlikely that Democritus Is merely reporting
the rules for the use of 'atoma' and 'kelnon'; or that he is only arrang¬
ing what we have always known. On the contrary both he, and all those
who have been directly influenced by his conceptions, have supplanted
and revolutionized pre-existing habits of thought.
And it seems equally unlikely that Aristotle, after reporting
the various current senses of 'To on', as he does in "Metaphysics" Delta-8,
should then proceed to argue that one of these is "obviously' primary if
he Is merely describing the workings of language. See (META) 1028a I3ff.
And if a description of linguistic rules is his only concern, his proce¬
dure then becomes fantastic when he concludes "And so we also must consi¬
der chiefly and primarily and almost exclusively what that Is which j_s In
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i :■ i s sense".
A'lO KAI HMIN KAI MAAIETA KAI HPSTON KAl MONGH Q£ EIHEIH
SPI TOY OYTQE ONTOE 6EQPHTB0N TI EETIN.
For clearly here in this key passage he is talking about things and not
about language.
Or again, it is extremely unlikely that Aristotle's subsequent
analysis of the complex interrelationship between form and matter, the
role of definition, and the relation of essence to these, is merely a
rearranging of what is already known. And yet these are the problems
posed by the theories of existence and of knowledge which he has already
established, e.g. within the "Categories" and the "Analytics".
And similarly, we cannot say that Descartes within the cogito
is just describing the use of '^tre' and 'existence'. Of course one
can argue that the notions, as advanced by the above philosophers, are
all in a muddle. But as we have noted, muddle or no muddle, they have
played essential roles in our intellectual activities (respectively)
for quite a few years now. If, as Wittgenstein has taught us, we must
not look for perfect clarity, how can we reject the actual value of these
ontological views, by citing occasional faults within them? As Godel
remarks, even mathematicians learn to live with an occasional paradox.
Nor can an advocate of the strong linguistic approach fall
back (as we soon shall) and claim that each of these philosophers in
his ontology plays his own language-game. For the introduction of any
novel view demands a new way of seeing, of thinking, and of talking.
In view of this it then becomes strained and metaphorical to say that
these philosophers are "describing" the workings of their language.
This is as much a way of describing language as a doctor — feeling
his own pulse beat in his thumb — can be said to be measuring that
of his patient. No, these thinkers we have mentioned can hardly be said
to leave "everything as it is".
One might try to argue that considerations of this kind which
we have illustrated in terms of Democritus, Aristotle, etc., are extra¬
neous to philosophy, that philosophy is and only is an analysis of the
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intellectual states which create confusion, and that its matter is re¬
stricted in this way to a study and application of the workings of lan¬
guage as it is •
It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradic¬
tion by means [for examplej cf a mathematical or logico-
mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get
a clear view of the state [sayjf of mathematics that trouble
us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is re¬
solved" (INV) 125. See also (INV) xiv for a similar obser¬
vation in respect to the state of psychology.
But if this is so — and philosophy is to be guided by lan¬
guage in performing its task of investigating and removing confusion —
then the above quotations are not a part of philosophy. For surely
nothing in the sense of •philosophy', even in its deepest workings, warrants
one to write the above. Or again, when Wittgenstein claims that in philo¬
sophy we take words down from their metaphysical to their ordinary use,
there is nothing in the ordinary use of 'philosophy', 'metaphysical', etc.
which permits him to say this.
One might claim that I am trivializing this position. Indeed
I am. For I wish to point out that all seminal thinkers introduce a new
way of seeing. It is self-defeating to exclude this feature of philoso¬
phic activity.
Thus a linguistic approach, if it is to be advanced as an ex¬
planation for the presence of philosophic problems, or even just as an
operative guide to their elimination, cannot say that philosophers merely
describe |anguage<that they leave everything as it is. For this flies
in the face of countless examples, including even the activities of
Wittgenstein. - -
But the strong linguistic approach seems to demand this asser¬
tion. Otherwise whenever language proves defective and a new way of
seeing and of talking is required, unless all are in agreement concerning
the new vis ion,issues — fundamental issues — then develop concerning
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the acceptability of this view. (The present controvery concerning the
adequacy of, what we have considered, the linguisitic explanation is a
case in point.) For if alternative visions and alternative explanations
are introduced, and each is self-consistent and is not interdicted by the
accepted rules of language, the presence of such rival formulations pro¬
vides an issue which itself is not due to a misuse of language. And yet
if these are not philosophic issues, what are they?
On the other hand the strong approach cannot claim that such
issues are not philosophical. For this then is to prescribe a new mean¬
ing to "philosophic issue1. This of course can be done, for definitions
like hypotheses are cheap. But then this approach in no way explicates
the presence of such issues, nor provides any guide to their removal.
The strong linguistic approach must then be reformulated: Among philo¬
sophic issues, there are those which we call 'philosophical', and these
are due to a misuse of language.' This is eunoch's talk. Thus, these
other expedients proving inadequate, the advocate of the linguistic ap¬
proach must ultimately rely upon his fundamental presupposition that
language is felicitous, and thereby such issues never really occur.
But one must have an extraordinary (shall I say?) piety in respect to
language, to claim that it is felicitous at all times. I cannot. Nor
are there sufficient number of examples to show this. In fact both
Wittgenstein and Ryle, in their criticism of the notion of an irreducibly
"mentalistic" language, have to fight against those very features of
language which anyone but a philosopher would call normal.
The fundamental fact is clear: the need for felicity, namely
the demand that the rules of language be compatible in all their appli¬
cations and complete, however awkward remains (I think) an inevitable con¬
sequence of asserting the strong linguistic approach.
To summarize: One cannot claim, without an extraordinary dis¬
tortion of the record, that those philosophers who have established sig¬
nificant ontologies have merely reported the workings of their language.
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Nor can one exclude the rcle of visions, such as theirs, from within philosophy
Even the statement which would reject this, being part of a novel vision,
could not be accepted as a philosophical observation. And further, if
philosophy is so restricted, whatever informative value the linguistic
approach might seem to bear as an explanation for the presence of philo¬
sophic problems, is now dissipated. For its thesis becomes a trivial
consequence of its own prescriptive definition of 'philosophy'. On the
other hand, if one is to maintain the conventional use of 'philosophic
problem', equally serious difficulties develop. Cardinal among these:
any language to which the strong linguistic approach is applicable must
be felicitous. But this condition is hardly satisfied by natural lan¬
guages as we know them.
Either way the difficulties seem fatal. If we maintain the
strong approach and presuppose felicity, we run counter to our own ex¬
perience of language — and of philosophic history. But if we counten¬
ance the partial breakdown of language and thereby accept a nonsense-free
aetiology of some philosophic problems, we must deny the strong approach.
#9. 'But have you forgotten', an advocate of this approach now ob¬
jects, 'we can also make up rules as we go along. This is what a
visionary — or a revisionary — thinker does. He introduces another
language-game. As long as the rules he lays down are compatible in them¬
selves and conform to certain general facts of nature, they need not be
warranted by any other rules of the language. In this way, different
thinkers can establish different language-games of 'existence'. After
all, is it not like talking about the parts of a chair? We speak of
chairs as 'composed' of wood within one game, and as 'composed' of mole¬
cules within another. Similarly there is no problem about 'existence'
either — as long as we are clear about which game we are playing.'
Unluckily the advocate of the strong approach has been misled
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by his own words, the analogy tails. The language games of 'simple
constituents of the chair' are not typical of the philosophical pro¬
blems which concern us. For in the games the objector has mentioned,
as opposed to others we shall refer to, the result of the application
of the rules of different games for 'constituent' are mutually compa¬
tible. If, for instance I say: The chair is composed of molecules'
J do not deny; The chair is made of wood'. Language merely shifts,
as it were, the scale of magnification so that different features be¬
come prominent. But the bringing of one set of features into focus,
e.g. those of molecules, does not lead us to consider that any talk
of the chair-as-composed-of-wood is thereby absurd. On the contary,
acquaintance with the rules of one game, or in equivalent terms know¬
ledge of the characteristics of the molecules, permits us to infer
certain rules for the use of 'wood', and the converse. What does
happen, if we compare these two uses of 'constituent',is that some
rules of one game are declared inoperable within another, and so cer¬
tain assertions together with their negations cannot be made. It is
like trying to evaluate the square root of five within the theory of
i ntegers.
On the other hand, consider typical philosophic issues con¬
cerning existence. Within one such language-game, say that of Aristotle,
this chair can be said to be colored: to-be-coIored,within this game is
as much an objective property of this seat as having-an-expression is for
this face. Within this view, were there no human beings, the world would
be as full of color as it is new. But for Democritus, as we have seen,
color exists only as a subjective phenomenon; in a world devoid of sen¬
tient creatures, there is no color. Thus the rules of these two lan¬
guage-games are mutually incompatible in their application. Within one
it is warranted to say; 'This chair can be red'. Within the other, this
same proposition, is interdicted; 'The chair cannot be red*. Here, unlike
ordinary language-use, compliance with the rules of one game makes it im¬
possible to follow those of the other.
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Or again, when Smart claims that sensations are brain pro¬
cesses, we can say, according to his rules for the use of 'exist',
that this term may be significantly conjoined only with the names of
material objects and the events and processes which they constitute.
Any other appearance of the term is eliminable. However, to deny this
view is to introduce another language game in which 'exist' may also be
combined with the names of irreducibly immaterial objects or states, etc.
Here again, to comply with the rules of one game is to run counter to
the rules of the other. Nor as in the example of 'wood' and 'molecule'
can one infer the patterns of lexical entailment holding within one
game, on the basis of the other. On the contrary many inference-patterns
warranted in one, are expressly interdicted within the other. It is not
a case here, as above, of some rules of one game becoming inoperable
within another. For it is significant to say that colors exist as ob¬
jective properties of things, in both the above views; or that immaterial
entities, such as sensations, exist. Rather what is characteristic of all such
games — and the reason for the intellectual furor associated with the
appearance of mutually incompatible positions — is that the rules of one
game warrant moves that are explicitly interdicted within the other. Un¬
like normal language-games, the above just do not unpack one into the
other. Compliance with the rules of one, prevents adherence to the rules
of the other; if one is committed to one, it is impossible to follow the
ether; it is like trying to sneeze and swallow at the same time.
Thus the advocate of the strong linguistic approach cannot save
himself from the dilemna, posed at the close of the preceding section, by
talking in this way about different language-games for 'exist'.
'But is it not possible to be clear even then?'. In a re¬
stricted way, 'Yes'. But only in a limited way. One can occasionally,
as in the use of 'wave-particle' apply mutually incompatible formulations
in a given situation, successively. But this then imposes a restriction
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upon the generality and the interchangeabiIity of the statements one
makes and is to be tolerated, as the example of the wave-particle tes¬
tifies, only in extremis. Intellectual parsimony demands that restric¬
tions of this kind be minimal. For if such exceptions were to become
the rule, each statement that one made could then be combined only with
others in the same game; in terms of A, 'p* follows, in terms of game
B, 1q* follows, in game C 'not-p*, and in game D, 'not-q', etc. State¬
ments so quarantined would be nearly useless. We could never combine
such statements into one homogenous body of propositions; it would be
like a four-wheel drive in which the front and rear wheels spun round
in opposite directions.
We return then to our previous point. The fundamental distinc¬
tion between ordinary language games, such as those concerning the compo¬
sition of the chair, and those one encounters in philosophy, for instance
concerning existence, lies in the relation between the rules of any two
such games. In the former, if there are, say, two games, A, and B, the
rules of A will permit certain moves in A which are at the same time in¬
operable in B. For instance, you cannot say; 'I will buy a piece of
molecule', the way you buy a piece of wood. And since these moves are
inoperable, you cannot employ the negation either. E.g. you do net say;
'I won't buy a piece of molecule'. And in this way, one can in general
move from one established language-game of the language to another with¬
out generating contradictions. Language is felicitous in this respect.
But in certain cases, in which there is a partial breakdown or
a defect in the established language-games, one cannot make such a move
without introducing these contradictions. Within one such game it is
legitimate, for instance, to say that colors are objective properties of
material things and that in the final analysis colors are irreducible
components of the universe. Within another game both these claims are
denied with equal warrant. Thus it is typical of certain philosophic
issues for a statement to be warranted in terms of one language-game and
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to be denied within another.
One can, as noted above, quarantine statements of this type and
restrict each to its own :anguage-game. But ad hoc expedients of this kind
are oniy to be introduced in extremis. For either we must conditiona!ize
the reoults of these games, or else permit the contradictions they introduce
to contaminate an entire conceptual scheme. Yet, if we cease to employ
these games, our initial perplexity remains: the established rules of
language present us with no sure guides to answer certain significant
questions which appear within it. Yet if we answer these, incompatible
rep Iies appear.
This, I think, brings any advocate of the strong linguistic
approach to the precipice. He must claim one of the following:
') Such queries are nonsensical. For example, the questions con¬
cerning existents and their order, which we have studied in the anguage
of ontology, are meaningless. With the possib e exception of questions
of the form: What exists?, we have I think shown that answers to the
other aueries are meaningful. And within the following chapters we will
argue for the significance of the former.
ii) issues concerninq these queries are not phiiosophica1. But
this he cannot. For the strong linguistic approach purports to exp ain
the cause of all philosophic problems. (Were this not so, one would be
back in the days of Aristotle who was we I aware even then that some ph -
osophic problems were due to a misuse of language.) Thus it becomes a
curious explanation which — by prescriptive definition — ignores some
of philosophy's most typical and recurrent issues as of no philosophic
interest.
iii) We can countenance the presence of mutually 1ncompatib e state¬
ments of this kind, as onq as we are c.ear about how they are used. But
I do not think we can be cI ear about how they are used. Imagine two such
anguage-games for the word 'good'. In terms of one we can say, 'it Is
good to do in terms of the other, ' t is not good to do <£'. But these
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language-games are directly associated with concommltant actions. Sooner
or later the difficulty appears; no matter how clear we are about the
use of these words, what we have to determine is not grammaticaI, but which
grammar, which game is to be used. And by hypothesis this issue cannot
be due to a misuse of language. Thus, although we may be clear about
the rules for the use of the word, however incompatible, we cannot use
these words, in any extended sense of 'use', without asking just those
questions about the language-games themselves for which the rules of lan¬
guage provide no clear guide. Also, as we noted above, there are further
difficulties. If we quarantine these uses, all discourse employing them
becomes conditional. And this runs counter to the general demands of lan¬
guage that its statements be both freely interchangeable within the broad¬
est range of different contexts, and at the same time that they be subject
to the fewest number of ad hoc restrictions.
Thus any attempt to relax the need of felicity along these
lines, and to consider that the introduction of novel visions Is on a
par with the performance of other language games in the established parts
of language is to overlook the essential differences between them. To
talk about the components of a chair in this way is beguiling. But the
analogy misleads.
iv) The above issues are due to a misuse of language. But in terms
of the above, this is impossible. For, by hypothesis, these incompatible
statements appear where language Is defective, and so cannot be said to
be misused.
v> Language is indeed felicjtous and the breakdown of its rules, in
the above way, is impossible. Again the strong approach demands that felicity in
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language which it seems no natural language can provide. And again — if
one is to make this claim — the burden of proof that language is felicitous
in this way lies not with us.
The whole tenor of this analysis has been to show the awkward
consequences of the strong linguistic approach, and thus to argue (per¬
suasively that this position in its uncompromising form lacks credibility.
But, as we have noted, the denial of the strong approach, i.e. 'It is not the case
that all philosophic problems are due to a misuse of language' entails 'Some
philosophic problems are present where language (and by extension, thought)
is correctly used'. And this, of course, is a fundamental tenet of the
theory of permissives. Q.E.D.
#10. Further, if one asserts the theory of permissives, one also
saves what we believe is of fundamental importance within the general
linguistic approach. For if the theory of permissives holds, we can in¬
deed say that particular language-games, say some games concerning 'exis¬
tence', are felicitous and (to the extent that they prove to be success¬
ful) complete. Thus rules for the use of 'existence' within one such
game would prevent the formulation of mutually incompatible existence-
claims-within the game. Given this, we could then rest assured that,
were conflicting claims to be asserted within an ontology assumed to be
self-consistent, clearly someone had made a mistake: some rule of this
language-game had been broken. To permit the introduction and explora¬
tion of the consequences of a novel vision as a philosophic task in this
way, is not to preclude the removal of intra-systematic nonsense.
Likewise, within this view, language — as opposed to a parti¬
cular language-game — need not be fully felicitous. It may at any time
contain extensive areas in which mutually incompatible rules are equally
appropriate. This in itself is sufficient to explain many linguistic
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entanglements ~ and eliminates the awkward need to associate felicity
with natural language.
And again, if language and the patterns of thought associated
with it is defective or incomplete is some aspect, to correct this de¬
ficiency the associated form of life would not only countenance but
actually enlist the introduction of novel viewpoints. Thus the task
of philosophers cannot be restricted to the depiction of language as
it is. Indeed it is more consonant with our experience of language-
use to consider rules and the associated conceptual patterns, even the
most sacrosanct, as alterable — and where need be removable. Indeed,
responsive to shiftings within our form of life, other rules perhaps
non-existent at an earlier time, can be introduced as canonical. (And
I suppose, when the chips are down, this is precisely what much or¬
dinary language philosophy proves, in fact, to be. Wittgenstein, for
example, might be right in his analysis of psychology referred to above;
our commonly accepted notions concerning what is private, what is self,
what is pain, may be in a muddle — and his analysis certainly clarifies
this. But only pious adherence to the linguistic approach can possibly
maintain that such an investigation really describes the rules for the
normal use of the associated terms.) The rules of language (we submit)
need not provide a timeless bed-rock, or an enduring core, but — like
the earth we know — a shifting crust whose particular features and
reliability varies from age to age. And this too accords with our ob¬
servations .
And lastly, we are now able to give substance to our earlier
hypothesis that there is one stratum of language in which fundamental
philosophic issues typically appear. It is one as we have argued, not
characterized by nonsense. Rather its distinctive feature is the pre¬
sence of propositions neither provable nor falsifiable, and yet of fun¬
damental concern. It is the presence of such pairs, or n-tuples of un-
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falsifiable propositions and, the concomittant possibility of developing
genuinely alternative, mutually incompatible theories containing these,
which typifies this level of language. That 'existence' occupies a pre¬
eminent place within this stratum, I trust by now Is obvious.
« • * •
#11. One might try to turn the argument against us. 'If some phil¬
osophic problems permit alternative solutions, might not the subject of
philosophic problems itself be a philosophic problem, and as such permit
alternative solutions? Accordingly your explanation for the continued
presence of issues concerning existence may be only one among various
explanations. On what grounds must we accept yours?'
To be brutally frankj none. I have been content to establish
certain starting points and to explore their consequences. This I have
done. But I am cognizant that in terms of another vision, different
consequences might develop. Thus, generally speaking, there is nothing
to preclude the possibility that, within another view, existence-propo¬
sitions might be considered with good warrant to display other features.
For instance we argued, a long time back, that there was no need to con¬
sider the principle of contradiction as a principle in things; a ration¬
alist, starting with other bases, might reach a contrary conclusion. (In
this respect see Fitch Ch. 3, 11.19, in which there is a proof to show;
the laws of logic are included among the laws of nature, but not vice
versa.) But since we are, consciously, not a rationalist, we are not
troubled by such a consequence.
So much for a general answer. But specifically, I think, in
terms of a common conceptual scheme, I am correct in pointing out that
the existence-propositions we have studied are merely unfalsifiable al¬
though essential. Thus a rival explanation would (unless it modified
vast areas of this scheme) have to claim (would it not?) that either (I)
the construction of an ontology was unimportant, or (2) not a proper
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philosophic activity, or else (3) these propositions corresponded so
closely with what is the case that although unfalsifiable they were
uniquely true. We have already discussed the second possibility and
found reasons to reject it. And as for the first and third, it must
first be shown that they represent genuine and defensible alternatives.
Thus although I accept the criticism in general, J do not see how it
can make less credible the conclusion we have argued for, concerning
the role of existence-propositions as logical permissives.
• • • •
#12. To summarize; From the very start we have been concerned
with the apparent inconclusiveness of most philosophic discussion con¬
cerning existence. We have been troubled with the fashion with which
one philosopher asserts that so-and-so, or such-and-such exists, and
another — with equal assurance — denies this claim. We have noted
further that nearly any theory of existence (provided it is not mani¬
festly absurd) not only can bq but has been strenuously maintained by
some philosopher — and denied with equal conviction by another.
An analysis of this clue leads to an equally puzzling conclu¬
sion; not only are statements about existence unprovable in any time¬
less, categorical manner, but even if one considers only the concepts
in force at a particular time, there seems to be no assurance that
equally credible — and mutually incompatible — existence-claims may
not both be asserted.
We are now in a position to explain this. The source of these
anomalies arises in one's expectation that propositions of this kind are
all intrinsically statement-Iike. If one does believe this, then given
two mutually incompatible assertions of existence, it is evident that
one at least must be false. But if, on the other hand, certain propo¬
sitions of this kind are not statements at all, there need be nothing
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perplexing about their apparent incompatibility: if the function of
such propositions is not to state timeless, objective truths, but rather
as logical perrnissives to authorize one to talk about existence in a
particular fashion, it is amiss to consider such propositions as either
true or false, and certainly it is then grotesque to compare them in
this respect. If we follow the suggested approach, the response appropriate
to certain philosophic issues is to introduce, and to explore the
consequences of novel visions.
We have argued end illustrated, that propositions employed
to establish an ontology need neither be true nor fa'se. it is sufficient
that their statement-ana ogues, and their consequences, prove unfalsifi-
able. It is not just that the establishing statements of an ontology
happen to be unprovable. They are unprovable specifically because the
propositions that authorize their expression are neither determined nor
fully warranted by the general facts of nature or the form of life
which surrounds them. But if this is so — and outside of an intuitive
repugnance to countenance such a state of affairs, we have found no
counter-evidence to this — then alternative theories treating the same
questions although mutually imcompatibIe may be nevertheless, severally
viabIe.
Once this feature of certain existence-propositions is provided
for, the theory of permissives can then include the less contentious
features of both the ciassica and linguistic approaches. For if a given
set of permissives, for instance the establishing propositions of some
theory of existence, are treated as true by the advocates of some ontology,
then these philosophers are free to explore the logical consequences of
the premise set so established. In this way, although our approach can
dispense with the awkward c aim of the classical position (concerning
the timeless necessity of its premises) it can nevertheless maintain
the importance of rational analysis, performed upon the premises one
does ho 1d.
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Further, according to our view, if one misreads philosophic
queries and considers all of these as requests for answers which are to
b© true or false, simpliciter, then in doing so on© clearly misuses the
rules of the language stratum in which such questions typically appear.
If this extended sense of 'rules of language* is permitted, our position
can then be said to be akin to that of the strong linguistic approach.
But the differences are still marked. For we stress the point that
queries of this kind appear whenever ordinary language, or the esta¬
blished conceptual patterns, prove either to be defective or to demand
modification or supplementation. In contrast to this, if the claims of
the strong linguistic explanation are to be justified, language must be
felicitous. This we have suggested is most awkward. Although we do not
wish to deny the importance of nonsense-removaI, nor minimize the be-
guilements of language, the theory of permissives avoids this difficulty
concerning felicity — just as it eschews any reference to first prin¬
ciples. Thus this approach, to make a poor pun, is itself permissive.
It accepts the thesis that many philosophic problems are due to non-
sens® of one sort or another. But side by side with this it establishes
its further claim: some fundamental issues arise not out of our failure
to comply with the established rules of language, but out of a failure
of language itself to provide an adequate guide. Although I do not wish
to assimilate this position to that of Strawson, we agree concerning this:
..i:>e discriminations w® can make jTon the basis of the actual
use of words] and the connections we can establish, in this
way, are not general enough and not far-reaching enough to
meet the fully metaphysical demand for understanding. He
£.the metaphysician] must abandon his only sure guide when
the guide cannot take him as far as he wishes to go"
"Individuals", p.9-|Q.
And it is in respect to the presence of such, shall we say, indissolvable
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philosophic queries — and to the importance of providing answers to
them — that we differ most markedly from the Wittgenstein of 'The
Investigations".
Thus, in general, we have solved our initial problem, and
argued for the credibility of this solution both in its own terms and
in respect to the position of rival theories.
• •- • *
^13. There does remain, however, a not small final question;
If we assume the universe to be one, how can two rivaI methods
of describing it, if comprehensive, both hold?
We have already suggested the answer; whatever theories we build upon
experience may be undetermined by this experience, and thus the theore¬
tical component of one ontology may serve to create a structure remark¬
ably different from that of another. We must now show this and in so
doing also substantiate our claim concerning the theory-laden quality of
ascriptions of existence contained within nominally descriptive state¬
ments. This will be a good time, too, to argue more conclusively for
the meaningfulness of existence-statements. But since this thesis has
already far overstepped its normal size, with the excuse of imminent
mutual exhaustion, we shall permit ourselves the liberty of merely sketch¬
ing out the line that a fuller discussion might faxe.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
'Ex Ist' _ j
#1. In twelve chapters about existence-statements we have talked
about the meaning of 'existence' only once. In this we have been guided
by the principle: analyze no finer features of the subject than, those
necessary for the study in hand. But now the questions before us are such
that a finer analysis becomes requisite. For all of these issues, in one
way or another, concern 'exist' or 'existence'. And to this matter we
now turn.
The reader will recalI that by 'existence-sentence' we mean:
a sentence in which the word 'exist' ( or a functionally identical term)
appears in essential occurrence'. And by 'essential occurrence' we mean
in this case that such a term (e.g. 'exist' or 'is an existent' or 'is a
constituent of the uiverse') cannot be replaced by 'have the property
that', within a given sentence without reappearing within this same
sentence. If this distinction is significant then there must be some method
of distinguishing between the role of the 'is' of predication — which is
soeliminable— and the 'is' of existence (or 'exist') which
is not.
Let us call the former 'predicative-is1. Predicative-is, together
with an appropriate predicate expression can be conjoined with ai;y entity-
term to form a true sentence. For there is no entity of which some true
statement cannot be made in this way. But if 'exist' is significant there
must be some entities to which we cannot truthfully ascribe existence:
elves perhaps.
346-
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Admittedly some philosophers seem to ignore this distinction.
It is in this egalitarian spirit that Quine writes:
•0x> Fx' may be used without further distinction to symbol¬
ize any of the following:
There are F Some things are F F exist ,"
Quine (2) p. 86.
But Quine. in another context, also implies that distinetionScan be made.
For apropos of the theoretical eliminabiIity of singular terms, he says:
The objects whose existence is implied in our discussion are
finally just the objects which must, for the truth of our
assertions, be acknowledged as 'Values of variables" — i.e.,
be reckoned into the totality of objects over which our
variables of quantification range" Quine (2) p. 224.
Thus we are committed to assume that 'x exists' is true if some
statement of the form ,(3 x) ....x...' is true, and x within this latter is
non-eliminable. As such — assuming that some appearances of individual-
variables are eliminable — the class of all entities assumed to exist is
only a proper part of the class of all entities mentioned in true state¬
ments; and existence is assumed — Quine asserts — whenever a non-eliminable
bound variable occurs within these latter Thus there is no fundamental
opposition between the position of Qufne and ours, in respect to the
viability of the distinction between predicative and existential-is.
Carnap, on the other hand admits this distinction but considers
it to be at best nearly trivial:
if someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of
entities, he has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking
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subject to new rules; we shall call this procedure the
construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities
in question. And now we must distinguish two kinds of
questions of existence: first, questions of the existence
of certain entities of the new kind within the framework; we
caI I them internaI questions.
Carnap illustrates this by introducing rules for the use of 'five' and
'number'. He then proceeds:
What is now the nature of the philosophical question concerning
the existence or reality of numbers? To begin with, there
is the internal question which, together with the affirmative
answer can be formulated in the new terms, say, by "There
are numbers" .... This statement follows from the analytic
statement |Tl.e., analytic according to the rules of the
framework^ : five is a number" and is therefore itself
analytic. Moreover it is rather triviaI ... because it does
not say more than the new system is not empty; but this is
immediately seen from the rules pef the framework^] that words
like 'five' are substituted for the new variables"
Carnap (1)2, paragraphs I, 8.
External questions, on the other hand, concern the "existence or reality of
entities as a whole". Philosophers for instance claim that they are In¬
terested in "the ontological status of numbers... whether or not numbers
have a certain metaphysical quality called reality..." bid., paragraphs 1,8
Carnap then comments:
Until they losophers^} supply a clear cognitive interpretation .
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we are justified in our suspicion that their question is...
one disguised in the form of a theoretical question while
in fact it is non-theoretical: in the present case it is
the practical problem whether or not to incorporate into
the language the new linguistic forms which constitute the
framework of numbers" Ibid.,, paragraph 8.
Thus, in any cognitively significant use. "X is' (or 'X exists') tells us
only that there are some entity-terms available within the language to which
the schema '....Is an X' can be conjoined to make a statement in the language.
As such 'exist', when significant, describes the ^grammar'' of a language and
any stronger claim, say,, concerning the "reality" of X is confused Any
assertion of this latter kind is merely a disguised way of talking about
the advisability of adopting such a language.
We have already instanced the theory-laden nature of 'exist',
and so Carnap's observation concerning the framework-dependent usage of
existentiaI-is remains consonant with ours. We differ in its significance.
Our aim then i. the following sections is to establish an intellectual
structure in terms of which we can clearly distinguish between predicative
and existential use and show that this latter is far from trivial.
• i « *
#2. Predicative-is appears typically in English as the first
element in a verb clause that, combined with a noun clause, forms a
sentence. (And thus its name from the traditional grammatical distinction
between subject and predicate.) As we know similar structures appear in
German, French, and Greek, etc However, this same distinction between
subject and predicate-terms plays a minor role in some languages eg.
Chinese — and there are even some languages in which it is reported not
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to hold at all. (Ses Carroli p. 44 concerning the Pacific Indian
language, Nootka.)
In view of this, might not the subject/predicate distinction,
together with its conceptual analogue of i nd iv idua i/'property-of-i nd iv idua I
represent only a provincial feature of our language and of our form of
life? (indeed a thorough-going application of these distinctions becomes
strained even within our conceptual scheme: as in the case of numbers and
of sub-atomic particles.) This, together with the extreme complexity of
the subject of predication, suggests the distinction between thing and
property may itself depend upon more fundamental features, that strictly
speaking are not to be conceived of as either exclusively thing-like nor
property-I ike. Whether or not there are such let us call these presumed
features., 'items'. (An item is, or would be, that out of which things a,,d
properties are constituted; or better yet: item-terms, grouped in one way,
form the definiens of property-terms and, grouped in another way, thing-
terms.) Given these it might then be possible to construct the further
distinction between entity and existent out of these same basic items.
Were this the case, then 'thing', 'property1, 'existent' wcuId ali be de¬
finable, and the distinction between a thing^av'n^a property, and a thing's
existing could be established in this way. All of this is of course merely
a conjecture: still, it is our stralegy
#3. in adopting this approach, it is well to recall that we have
restricted this study that of entities which can be considered as one.
The term 'one' also appears implicitly in any ascription of existence
For it is names or definite, or indefinite descriptions which are to be
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inserted into the dot or dash sequences: i.e. the name of one individual,
or a description of one and only one, or of any one is employed. Thus 'one',
or a term functionally identical with it, must appear at least implicitly
in the statement of any ontology expressed in natural language Nor can
such terms be eliminated by rewriting these ascriptions symbolically.
Any customary rephrasing of the above idioms must again contain individual-
terms or variables. (This also applies to an ontology composed exclusively
of classes: for in such a case, classes—or those of the lowest order—
are the individuals of the system ) It would seem then that some application
of the notion of being one thing, which underlies this use. is presupposed
in any meaningful statement of an ontology. This is not a startling ob¬
servation. After al I we do have the traditional dictum that 'Being' and
'One' are convertible terms. Convertible or not, a likely tactic suggests
unicity
itself: analyze the notion of in terms of items, and then distinguish
along these lines the sub-class of units which are assumed to exist from
the larger class (if it is larger) of entities to which predIcative-is
applies.
Admittedly it is difficult to articulate the sense of this
notion of unicity. We can distinguish, intuitively, between groupings of
predicate-terms which seem to actually describe an object, from others
which we consider to be nothing more than a string of terms collated at
random. We might say in the first case that the string of predicate-terms
is used to characterize an object whose properties are independent of the
sentence-utterance; and in the second, it is the sentence which confers
unity upon the assembly of predicates. But any string of predicates,
even if joined at random, has some shadowy unity. We are hard put to find
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general grounds which might justify the ascription of uncity only to
L
some.
The variety of types which one has to consider as a unit further
w
complicates this problem. What for instance has a rock, a shilling, the
solar system, the number Two, and the French Revolution in common? Yet
we can say of each, that if is one thing, or one class, or a unique event,
etc. Or on what basis can we say that two men have the same thought? What
for that matter have ! in common with a particular infant born some 45 years,
ago and named 'Howard Friedman'? Or again, what is it which permits one to
call a table the same even if, at various times, each component - the legs,
the top, the drawer - has been replaced? On what basis do we consider aiI
of these to be one?
Let us concede before the objection is voiced, that the use of
'one' in 'one man' maybe different from that h 'one number' and 'one table'.
But it is improbable that the various instances of a notion, which appears
to be as basic as this present one, should have nothing in common. This,
of course, is only an assumption at this stage. If it is correct then
there must be a criterion, or a set of different criteria which govern the
ascription of unicity. It will be the task of the following to give sub¬
stance to this surmise. Of course one might try to claim that such a study
is trivial, pointing out that anything can be considered to be a unit.
Yes — we reply — but something can be considered to be a unit in One
resoect and not a unit in another On what grounds, we ask, does one
d i sti nguijssh?
#4. A key factor in the notion of being one is the related notion
X' ' '-4
of that-wh1ch-is-Invariant in respect to change. E.g. as noted earlier,
the shape of a rigid physical body remains the same at all times if no
outside forces are applied to it: its shape is invariant with respect to a
change in time. Time of course is not the unique variant of this type.
For instance an equilateral triangle standing on its apex is similar in
shape to one resting on its base: its shape is invariant in respect to changes
in position. Nor need time and space be the only frames of reference For
instance, the wall of the house opposite me is generally considered to be
the same wall whether it is bathed in moonlight or in the garish yellow
of a street lamp: the wall is said to remain the same in respect to changes
in the quality of the light which strikes it Nor need one limit a con¬
sideration of invariants to material objects. For instance we can say
that the truth of some statement of propositional logic is invariant in
different types of logic, or that the sense of an idea or of a thought is
invariant i resoect to translation from one language to another
To say this is one thing. But what do we mean in each case by
this invariance?
To answer this, let us look at how the words for time or space
or color in the above examples display a peculiar type of ambiguity.
This will become clearer if we consider examples. In some cases we say
that Color, or to-be-colored is the definite property which all colored
things have in common. As such 'Color' is substantive: it names the
property common to all members of the class of colored things, and in an
extents io, a I logic is indistinguishable from the class-name itself. In a
related way we can say that 'Time' is also substantive: it names the class
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(or perhaps the ordered n-tuple) of all durations, or of all points o a
time scale.
But on the other hand, 'color1 as in 'Green is a color' is used
I -1
adjectiveiy aid can be ascribed to any member of the class of colors.
Similarly, 'time' as in 'a time' in this adjunctive construction, does not
name but incompletely describes any member of a class of points on a time
seale.
It is because of this duality of use that one says in a loose
way that length, time, etc. are variable quantities or in technical
parlance 'parameters'. It would be more exact to say, and we shall adopt
this procedure, that the morphemes 'time', 'length', 'color', etc. when
used as definite terms name a particular entity. (As the case may be this
is either a class, an ordered n-tuple, or a cI ass-property.) But these
morphemes also occur in indefinite descriptions ad in this latter use they
do not name. They describe an entity, e.g. an x that is a specific instance
of Color without specifying the instance. (For ail colors can be further
specified, as in. e.g. 'a color that is bright yellow'.) Withi the first
use, 'Color', for instance names a class. Within the second 'color' is
used within a phrase to indicate that the entity, to which this property
is ascribed, is a member of the named class.
Whenever an x is incompletely described in this way by means of
an expression of the form 'an x that is a ©J, we shall say that x is a
' insta ce of e', (When appropriate, we shall say that x instances e ) In
either case by an insta.ee of e we mean a 'member of the class or ordered
n-tuple of elements It will however be convenient to restrict dis¬
cussion to those instances which, when further specified, can be assigned
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a position within a frame of reference. Thus to say that a is a color
in our usage, places a in an unspecified position within the frame of
reference of a color-space; to further specify this, i.e., to say that a is
bright yellow is to assign one definite position (or zone) in this color
space to a.
We can now proceed to define 'invariant1. For when we say that
a 's invariant in respect to all changes in a reference-frame, say that of
time, we mean that at any instance of time, a is unchanged. Since few
things are absolutely invariant in this sense let us say that a is invariant
in respect to all changes in some portion of a reference-frame Or
generally:
y is invariantIy F, in respect to a change of position in some
portion of a reference-frame, ©• = DEF
If at one particular instance, within this portion of
e, y is F, then y is F at any instance in this portion
of e
For instance, if through a certain period of time matter is neither created
nor destroyed the total quantity of matter can be said to be invariant
with respect to any change in this portion of time. Let this quantity
equal k. From the above if matter is k at some such moment of time, say
t., then matter is k at any such moment of time, i.e. at t„, t7. andI Z o
some tn,
#5. The above formulation covers the invariance of a property
ascribed to an individual. But our present intent is to clarify the notion
of unicity without reference to such individuals, We must formulate 'F is
XIII.5 356
invariant' — and not 'y is invariantly F'.
Let us in this connection consider Protocol Otto's 'Red here
now', for this seems to be a meaningful proposition although it mentions
no obvious individual to which the predicate is ascribed. Evidently, the
ego-centric terms 'here1 and 'now' must be interpreted within a context
which involves either an individual speaker, or a fixed position in time
and space. But, aside from these there is no other individual to which
the predicate 'red' must be ascribed. By an awkward, but not forced con¬
struction, one might paraphrase 'Red here now' to read 'That part of time
and space indicated by Otto is red'. Red in this way becomes the property
of certain conjoined instances of time and space: some specific stretch of
time and space Under this interpretation, 'Red here now' is of the
form 'a is F', where 'a' names that part of time and space indicated by
Otto at the moment of his utterance, and 'F' stands for red.
At first glance this interpretation seems bizarre. Normally
we say 'The wall at a is red'. But even in ordinary language this con¬
struction is not always necessary. We say: The time is opportune' or we
might describe the intersection of two colored shafts of light by saying
'That point is yellow' or 'The space there is yellow'. Similarly, we say
'Each space on the chess board is empty', or 'The space between Earth and
Mars is streaked with meteorites'. In each of the above cases some
predicate, whether 'yellow', or 'opportune' or 'empty' is ascribed to a
'V-
specified point or zone isr some frame of reference. In this way, aside
from some point(s) in an apposite reference-frame, a predicate-term may be
introduced into a sentence without mention of any other individuals to
wh ich the predicafe is ascribed.
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Of course, in most cases we do not speak this way we say:
The cat is on the mat, there1, and do not stammer a string of predicate-
terms: woolen, rectangular, mat-like, with furry, domestic, and feline
upon it there'. But the claim I wish to make is — provided some apposite
frame of reference is available to position^1® predicates mentioned — a
reference to customary i individuals is theoreticaI I y el imi nable.
Admittedly again this is not the usual procedure. Normally we
say 'Something is F at a point p'. But I should like to suggest that this
latter use need not be the fundamental one, and specifically that it may be
built up upon a.: epistemicaI Iy earlier stage one in which our hard and
fast distinction between property and object has still to be established.
Color words such as 'red' can be said to both name the color/ Red/and
partially describe instances of it. But the one morpheme 'red' might aiso
be said to designate-and-to-describe still indistinguishable features of
experience; ones to which both 'that which is the property F' and 'that
individual which has the property F' are equally applicable. For given
sane identifying reference — and this presupposes only one reference point
i.e. that of the speaker — it is possible to imagine how all the data of
a still loosely structured experience can be related to this one point'
without introducing a categorical distinction between thing a.;d property-of-
a-thing. And certainly this surmise is consonant with our knowledge of
perception. For in the last resort that which we discern are not things
and events with their associated properties but iterns such as color-shapes
and sounds, etc. at a particular distance from us. These minimal discernibles
of our sensory apparatus are, we suppose, the first elements in that long
chain of commands whose final product is that complexly ordered structure
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we cat I the wor 1 d.
The irreducibiIity of the distinction between thing and property
need not be questioned merely on an epistemic level. For as we have noted
its linguistic analogue — the subject-predicate constructio — is not a
Iinguistic universa!.
And further, as we know, the language of mathematics — as
distinct from that of its foundations — works smoothly enough without this
distinction Lastly, not only mathematics but much of logic also implicitly
or explicitly avoids any unbridgeable division between the substantive and
adjunctive uses of terms. For instance, the substantive 'Men' and the adjunct
'a man1 must be interchangeable within the syllogism: Ail men are mortal,
Socrates is a man. etc.'
But these are stronger points than we need make. All that we
must maintain is the theoretical possibility of employing a neutral sub¬
stantive/adjunctive term such as 'item'. Whether there are such items in
our experience, or whether their existence is presupposed in traditional
logic does not concern us. We have mentioned these points only to make
this exposition more credible.
However, to avoid awkwardness of expression, we shall in the
sequal continue to use 'property' rather than 'item'. But whenever possible,
the two are to be considered interchangeable. it is in the same spirit tha-j.
we use 'predicate' as a generic term for monadic and polyadic properties
of any level of comply ity — and thus for complex combinations of items
To continue. We know that any expression naming an individual
can be rewritten in the form of a definite description. This means that
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it is technically possible to rid our discourse of any reference to in¬
dividuals Individual variables will remain of course, but these may be
conveniently viewed, in this context, as rotational devices used to tie
predicate-terms together. In place of the standard interpretation of
'Fx.Gx', i.e., 'x is F and x is G', the same symbolism can be read 'F
and G are together 1.
This would leave one with a discourse containing terms for
properties, relations, and complex combinations of these; signs indicating
how these predicates — i.e. items — are tied together into groupings;
aind quantifiers But what is to be quantified? The evident answer is:
the only individuals within such a universe, i.e. the values of the reference-
frames mentioned. For example, if the frame were that of time, '0x)Fx'
would read 'At some specific instance(s) of time, F', and '(3 x)(Fx.Gx)'
would read 'At some specific instances of time, F and G are grouped to¬
gether'. In a parallel interpretation *(x)(Fx.Gx)' becomes: At all instances
of time. F and G are grouped together'.
Russell in his period of logical atomism has argued that there
must be individuals in the universe, for one to have any knowledge by
acquaintance. The solution I propose here, namely that there need not be
any individuals — aside from values in a reference frame — turns the
corner of his position. Reference to any other types of individuals be¬
comes unnecessary. Indeed the minimum requirements for the successful use
of such a language are meager enough: there must be data describable in
terms of expressions for properties, etc. positioned in sane frame of
reference; and logical connectives and quantifiers must also be available
to indicate whether or not the predicates mentioned occupy the positions
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in the reference-frame
The reader may feel that he is being led up the garden path into
a very queer universe — and all under the guise of a purportedly neutral
inquiry into ontology. But I make no further claim for the value of the
theory that I have outlined above than that it is useful as a logical ex-
plicans Useful it is: if we can dispense with reference to individuals.,
other than instances on a reference-frame, we can state invariance exclusively
in terms of predicates and instances. For parallel to our earlier formu¬
lation. if some predicate Is positioned at all irsfances of some reference-
frame, it is invariant in respect to any change within it.
We then define predicate-invariance as follows. Where e is a
reference-frame (or some portion of one):
F is invariant in respect to all changes in © = DEF If some instance
of © is F, then
any instance of
© i s F,
For example, if we wish to say that mass, k, is invariant in respect to
changes in time, we mean, according to the above: if mass equals k at some
instance of time, mass equals k at any instance of time.
#6. Now that this groundwork has been established, we can pause
to look ahead. Our immediate task is to show that certain — but not always
the same — properties or relations, etc. are invariantly associated with
different individuals or units. Then, as in the previous section we will
reverse our viewpoint and show that such properties, etc can be considered
not as properties of individuals but as unit-determining. This permits us
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to state those conditions which a set of predicates — or better yet
items — must satisfy to be considered as units. We also discuss further
conditions which permit os to restrict membership in this class to those
which are considered individuals within a particular scheme. Predicative-
is is then show,i to apply to these,, and 'exist' to a proper subset. In
this way we can then establish a schematic definition of 'exist'. We
apply this to the sundry issues we have noted at the close of the preceding
chapter, and then happily terminate our labors As noted earlier we shall
not develop the argument in any detail., but only sketch the course of a
possible fuller development.
??7. Let us now distinguish three broad categories of conceivable
units: material Immaterial, and a hybrid of these which we shall call
'abstract' objects. By an 'immaterial object' we mean: a unit that has no
properties of material objects'. By an 'abstract object' we mean: a unit
that has at least one property of material and one of immaterial objects'.
Typical material objects, as we consider them are atoms
molecules, pieces of wood, stones, mountains, planets , stars, galaxies.
We also include within the same category of material entities, physical
events, such as the explosion of Krakatua, and physical processes , such as
radio-active decay, or mountain-buiIding, or the transformation of
snow to glacial ice.
Typical immaterial objects are numbers, classes, logical or
mathematical systems and (with some reservations) thoughts goals, pur¬
poses, rules. Abstract objects, in our usage combine features of both
the above. Typical of these, a chair is a piece of wood constructed for
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a particular purpose, and a spoken language is a system of rules
applicable to a set of sounds. Since the specification of the immaterial
and the abstract turns upon that of material entities, let us first con¬
sider these latter.
• • • *
#8. ' have a massive, slate-coloured crystal of lead ore upon my
desk. What permits me to consider it a unit? I can change its positio
upon my desk, the crystal remains the same. I can imagine it upon my
desk yesterday but even if it is displaced In time, I do not say the
crystal is altered. Or again, my son might come into the room and hammer
the crystal's edges, but unless it were mauled beyond recognition, I would
still consider it to be substantially the same as before, lor if a leaky
battery dropped acid upon it, pitting its surface and changing its colour,
would I cease to consider it the same crystal. And if were to throw it
up in the air, the sudden acceleration would not effect this judgment
either.
On the other hand, if it were to change from lead to zinc, I
could not consider it to be the same crystal of lead ore. Or if it were
to melt, or if it were pulverized, or if in some Pickwickian fashion it
were to disappear while I was looking at it and a similar crystal were to
materialize several days later, or appear at the other side of the room —
in all these latter cases I would be loathe to consider either the molten
lead or powder, or counterpart crystals the same unit as that which is
now upon my desk.
That is to say, this crystal of lead is considered to be the
same irrespective of any regular changes in the value of its spatial
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and temporal co-ordinates, or of its physical appearance, hue, or motion.
But any substantial change in its shape, chemical or physical state, or any
discontinuity in the series of temporal arid spatial positions which it
occupies, effectively precludes the ascription of unicity to it. Let us
call any property of this latter kind (whether monadic or polyadic) a
'unit' predicate. When F is a unit predicate of x, if at any instance x is
ot-F, then at this instance this entity can no longer be considered the
same x (Eg the moment the crystal becomes pulverized, the resulting
material no lo ger constitutes the initial crystal and the original crystal
can no longer be considered to be present.)
The reader will recall that we use 'predicate' as a generic term
for a property, relation, or any complex coupling of these Given this
generality we can say:
F is a unit predicate of x = DEF For all instances v, in some portion
of a reference frame in which x
occurs x is F at v.
A unit predicate of x i s the.'1 an invariant predicate of x i n resaect to
changes in this frame.
To return to the lead crystal: we have noted that we consider
this crystal, at any time in its history, as occupying some point or
zone in space and time. Further, occuuancy of these joints is considered
to be free of discontinuity In this way, given sufficient jrecisio.
One can assign a unique and continuous track through some discrete region
of space and time to this crystal — and by extension to any representative
material object. Let us call any such track, any such continuous one
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through time and space, a 'time and space line', or equivalentiy a 'space-
time line'. This track, although continuous, need not be unbounded
The lead crystal, for instance. ^it'does not fill up ail
of space We suppose, also, there was some time when there was no such
crystal, and that there will be a time when it will cease to be. But
within this portion of time and snace the crystal occupies a space-time
line unique to it. Whether it be a crystal or the moon, having a track of
this kind is a unit property of any material object.
But to further specify this unit, i.e. . to distinguish it from
its space and time lines, at least one additional unit predicate must also
be assigned. We have already cited other unit predicates of the lead
crystal: to"be-Iead, to-be-crystalline, etc.
If we continue to consider this lead crystal a representative
member of the class of material objects, the types of unit predicates
assignable to it will be applicable to any material object — and if we
mentally review these, this seems to be the case As with the lead crysta
any atom, or any molecule or piece of wood or stone or mountain, planet,
star or galaxy will occupy successive positions on a space-time line
unique to it. Similarly, any of the above will also possess some physical
or chemical properties invaria: tly associated with it at any poi t upon
the unit's space-time line: the mass of the atom will remain constant,
the number of atoms in (or potentially in) the molecule will remain un¬
changed, the chemical composition of the wood and of the stone will aiso
remain substantially unchanged, and so too will the distributio. of non¬
gaseous elements within a planet. Each of these, together we suppose with
other less obvious features, can be considered as unit predicates of
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atoms,, molecules, stones, etc. as the case may be
Admittedly stars and galaxies present a problem for these appear
on analysis, less in the guise of things than of events and processes:
stars for instance age And yet the life course of a star follows a
definite pattern. So we can say even here that the star at every instant
occupies one give.: stage in a series of transformations typical of it.
just as a non-stop train, at every instance of its run occupies a
different positio of the one journey Events, if we provide for the
uniqueness of their transformation, can be treated in a similar way Thu-
if we countenance predicates of any level of complexity, one can succeed
in assigning one or more unit predicates of this latter type to any
material entity
These predicates referred to above are either chemical or physical.
Let us assume (for the sake of convenience in exposition) that the former
are ultimately eliminable in terms of the latter, and all of these i turn
can be expres ed by means of 'mass', 'length1, 'time', 'charge', etc.,
together with the appropriate togical (and mathematical) expressions
In this way any of these unit predicates can be Ultimately described in
terms of the signs of logic, mathematics, and the basic lexical elements
of the language of physics
Thus we can associate with any material object, x, at least
two predicates: to have a unique space-time line, and to have an invariant
predicate, expressible in the language of physics. Thus where x is
any entity, ST any space-time line, and '<b' any predicate expression
formulable in terms of 'length', 'mass', 'time', 'charge' etc., together
with the notation of logic:
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f x is a material object then
i : x -- and x alone — occupies a I I and only all the
points upon one continuous, discrete, space-time
line, ST; and
i i : There is some <t> such that x is <t> at all points of
time upon ST.
The property of having such a ST or 4) is invariant in respect to a!1
changes of the position, of x in time uoon ST. Thus both this and the
having of a space-time line specified in afte/urut predicates of any
material object or event, or process typified above
But when both these conditions are satisfied by some entity
do we not then consider this a unit and count it as one thi g? Thus
(with two reservations soon to be noted) i and ii state both necessary and
sufficient conditions for the ascription of ur.icity to any material e tity:
x is a material object if and only if i and ii both hold
Admittedly, many entities that display invariaice among their
properties are not customarily considered to be units (But all we wish to
show is that if i and ii are satisfied by some x, this x may be considered
to constitute a unit. Between this possibility and the actuality that it
is so considered there may of course be still other conditions to be sat¬
isfied. These concern, among others the convenience, simplicity, useful¬
ness. importance, etc. of selecting out the given entity for consideration
as an actual unit within a particular conceptual scheme l.et us call these
latter, criteria of 'evidentness ' , a.d abbreviate them 'CR'
Further, if i ii and CR are to establish sufficient conditions,
they must exclude all immaterial and abstract objects Criterion ii ex-
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eludes immaterial objects, for these can have no physically significant
predicates. Neither i, ii, nor CR exclude abstract objects since
these latter objects have both physical and immaterial predicates The
remedy is simple: we need merely specify that all predicates of x, if x
is a material object are like <t> expressible in the la guage of ohysics.
Thus,
(Aj ) x is a materia I object if and only if
i (as above)
ii (as above)
iii no predicate of x is not a value of <t>
Lastly, x is actually considered a material object within a particular
conceptual scheme if (A|) is satisfied by x and x also satisfies the
criteria of evidentness in force within the scheme
#9, Typical of abstract objects are chairs, written or spoken
languages physical spaces, thoughts (or propositions) thought t legal corpor¬
ations, etc. Some temporal and/or snatial predicates must be assigned to
each entity in this curious company. The chair is in the room now; we
cannot consider the chair (as opposed to the concent of the chair) as
any place but in time and space. Similarly we say that Gaelic say, is
spoken in the Hebrides; we cannot conceive of a spoken language (as
opposed to its syntax) except as spoken someplace. Or we say the sun
deforms the space about Venus and therefore light rays are be t; we
cannot talk about a physical soace except in reference to some material
structure, such as that of the sun, and some measuring stick such an light
waves or meter bars. Again we say that Aristarchus in 281 B C. and
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Copernicus in 1532 A.D. both had the same idea that the earth revolved
around the sun, but we could not imagine this idea as thought, except
as thought by concrete individuals present in particular places at
specific times. Finally we say that the legal seat, say of the Esso
Corporation, is in New Jersey, for even a corporative individual, however
abstract must have its habitation.
But although all these entities occur at points in time and/or
in space, not ail of these must occupy a conti uous track. Chairs and
physical spaces do. but these may be the exceptions Ideas, for instance
appear and disappear without respect to time and place Consider Frege
who "discovered" his definitions of number in Germany in the nineteenth
century, when it is likely that the Indian logician, Raghunatha Siromani
discovered this same definition in the sixteenth century.
Or Gaelic, perhaps, may be spoken no place at three in the morning today
Strictly speaki g there is no spoken Gaelic at this time — any more
than there can be a self for Hume to refer to when its bearer is asleep.
Abstract objects just do not have to fill out seme continuous stretch of
time-and-space in the manner of materia! objects. Corporations are positively
flipoa t in this respect: their legal seat cha :ges upon the i :stant the
document stating this is signed Thus although it is necessary that
abstract objects occupy some position in some track or tracks in space
and/or in time, this occupancy . eed not be continuous.
However at each instant a abstract entity occupies such a
track some physically significant predicate must be invariantly associated
with it, For insta ce, the structure of the chair must remain substa tially
the same If the chair's structure is radically altered, it is no Io ger
considered the same chair (There is some conceptual slippage here: the
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chair might stiii be said to be the same chair with its cushion gone or
one leg missing, and perhaps — in an acrobat's family — with all but one
leg gone; but take all the legs away i.e. change its physical structure
in this substantial way, and what remains is not said to be a chair any
longer but only the seat of what was once a chair ) Or again if there is
a physical space then a frame of reference can be established within it
in terms, say, of meter sticks or rays of light. Were this impossible
in principle as for instance in a purely mathematical space one could
not consider this physical space. And in general we find that if something
is considered to be an abstract entity, of the kind we have instanced this
entity will occupy some point in time or in space or in both, and at each
such point so occupied one physicaliy significant predicate is invaria tiy
ascribable to this entity.
(It is clear by now that we do not include the objects of jure
mathematics, such as numbers, classes, etc., among abstract objects in our
classification, but rather — in this terminology — as immaterial objects
'Two' for instance may be the name of the class of ai! couples. But that
which all couples have in common, as opposed to say ai! instances of an
electric charge, can be described in terms of mathematics. Compare this
with 'electric charge1. Any description of this iatter must ultimately
refer to the extra-mathematical, i.e., to a deflection on a standard
gauge Thus although certain properties of umbers and classes and
mathematical entities in general also occur as properties of entities
in time or in space or in both, neither numbers nor classes nor propositions —
as we consider them — are in space nor in time. As noted earlier by
immaterial objects such as these, we mean entities to which physical — or
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chemical or biological, etc. — predicates are inapplicable. And as our
examples show, it is only that which is in space and time, however fit¬
fully, to which physical predicates can be applied. Or contrast in this
respect a work of art with a number. A work of art however immaterial its
underlying thought or purpose may be, must at least be thought of or written
or executed or played or painted by a concrete individual. Whether it be
Dali your wife, or a Medici, someone at some time and place must realize
it. But a givei, number need never be mentioned nor constructed nor even
thought of. And yet, from the point of vie< of classical mathematics it
may still be viewed as a bona fide number.)
We have noted that some physical predicates are unit predicates
of abstract objects. But if this were the entire story, abstract entities
would then just be degenerate types of material objects: ones with a
spotty history in time and space. However this is not the case. A chair,
for instance, not only has a physical structure but a chair also serves a
purpose or has a function. Remove this latter and a chair becomes merely
a material object like the )iece of wood out of which it is fashioned.
Similarly, physical space not only has its meter bars and physical points
of reference but certain extra-physicai properties too. For instance
the predicates of any two points within a physical spaceare isomorphic in
some of their characteristies to the predicates of the representing points
in a mathematical space (i.e. that of "points" established by ordered
triplets of real numbers). Similarly any language spoke;1, or otherwise
has its set of rules. And rules, like numbers and purposes (in contra¬
distinction to rules when used and numbers when applied and purposes when
satisfied) are indescribable in the language of physics. We cannot ask:
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What is the mass of your purpose, or of your thought, the velocity of
your rules, the charge of your real numbers, the spin of your corporation?
And yet — and this is the point — at each time in which the
chair is there as a chair in time and space, we do associate with the four-
iegged physical structure the purpose which it serves; just as at each time
in which a language is spoken, rules are employed; just as whenever there
is a written charter, it is the presence of the legal conventions
operable at that time,which transform the scrawls and stamps upon the
paper into a corporate entity, etc.
In general then, something is an abstract object only if at each
instant that it occupies a position in some physically significant reference-
frame, certain predicates are invariantly ascribable to tlis entity. As
we have seen, at least one of these predicates is physical, and at least
one other is inexpressible in this language, however supplemented this may
be with terms of chemistry, biology, etc. Thus:
object,
If x is an abstract/ then
i: x occupies some point(s) in time and/or space;
ii: there is some <t> and some i|i, such that x is £ and
x is i|i at each such instance,
where takes on predicates as values expressible in the language of
physics, etc., and 'V' takes on as values predicates inexpressible in this
I anguage.
We now show that i and ii also establish a sufficient condition
of unicity. If this is so, then it cannot be the case that i and ii are
satisfied by some entity, and this entity at the same time is considered
ry
not to be an abstract object. By ii such an e/tity must be abstract: it
contains predicates of both immaterial and material objects. But is it
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possible for such an entity not to be counted as one? This does not
seem to be the case. If something has a chair-I ike structure at some
given stretch of time and space and serves the function of a chair, must
we not constder it as one chair? Similarly if at some points in time and
space a set of words are spoken according to rules if these rules cover
the phonemic, syntactical, and semantic uses of these words, does not
the n-tuple of phonemes, words, and rules determine one spoken language,
or sub-1anguage, i.e. an abstract unit of this kind? Similarly — given
physical reference points, measuring sticks, and a given mathematical
structure — must we not consider the physical space so determined a
unit as well? Or again can one deny unicity to a corporation when its
charter is given and the rules governing this are in force?
Thus as in the preceding section, we can strengthen the above
formuI at ion;
(A2) x is an abstract object if and only if
i (as above)
ii (as above)
Our previous remarks concerning the applicability of criteria of evidentnes
apply also in this present case.
#10. Propositions, numbers, classes, mathematical spaces, rules,
conventions, thoughts, intentions, purposes, values, etc. are all in
one way or another inexpressible within the language of physics, and
as such immaterial in our classification. This negative feature provides
a necessary condition for the (shall we say?) immateriality of these
entities; x is an immaterial entity only if no predicate of x is expressible
in the extra-IogicaI and extra-mathematicaI vocabulary of the language of
physics.
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But this condition covers a vast assortment of entities. it
is hard to see just what does contribute to the unicity of the objects
concerned. The difficulty here is that in the preceding sections we have
been able to establish unit predicates in terms of temporarally positioned
properties. This tactic is now interdicted: immaterial objects as we con¬
ceive them, cannot be present in time or in space. (For we assume that if
they were, some physical predicates would be ascribable to them. This by
the above is impossible.)
If we reflect upon the procedure used in establishing the
preceding schemata of unicity we see that in each case certain properties
of a unit have been shown to be invariant in respect to changes of
position in the reference-frames of time and space. The appropriate
generalization suggests itself: that some predicate of x be invariant in
respect to changes of position in sane reference-frarne, but not necessarily
that of time and/or space. In the case of immaterial objects, the
appropriate frame cannot be described in physical terms.
Let us test this generalization. What for instance provides a
criterion of unicity for any statement^ p? Vie know that for any such p,
there is a set of statements, aside from p, which entail and are entailed
by p. Let us call this the 'set of logical equivalents of p'. We also
know that logically equivalent propositions can be substituted, one for
another, without altering the truth of the resulting proposition. Let us
call any such a 'replacement' for p. Now let us consider all the state¬
ments, of dissimilar logical form, in which p appears, as forming in some
way a refarence-frame. (For instance all of these might be lexically
ordered according to their Godel numbers.) Now it is evident that p at
any position within this frame, has the following property: to be replaceable
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by any member of its set of logical equivalents. Further no other
statement has this property. For if two statements had the same set of
logical equivalents (i.e. of ail statements logical Iy equivalent to them,
with the exclusion of the statement itself) the two would be identical.
Let this then be a unit predicate of any statement.
The unicity of the statement, p, in the above depends upon
logical characteristies. But what about the content of extra-iogicaI
utterances, such as commands, threats, requests, promises, etc.? And here
I am afraid, as in the case with most immaterial objects, we must leave
the established tracks. For there is no widely accepted "logic" of
commands, etc. But if the reader will grant that the term 'information'
can be used significantly, it might nevertheless be possible to establish
a unit predicate applicable to the contents of all types of utterances. For
one character 1stic of all such is to be informative. And each of these,
whether it be expressed as 'Get out of here', or 'You best get out of
here', or 'Please get out of here', etc., conveys information which is
different from that in any other contextually non-synonymous utterance.
(We assume the context specifies the speaker, hearer, and place; for
otherwise wa do not have an interpretable utterance, but a fragment of
one.) Now, we can establish a reference-frame for the contents of
utterances, similar to the above frame of statements. Thie would en¬
compass all such contents — with the exception of the content of the
utterance in question, q — with which this utterance can be significant¬
ly combined. And no matter what we combine with q, i.e., no matter what
position q occupies within this frame, the information conveyed by q it¬
self will remain unchanged. Let this then be a unit predicate of any
utterance; to convey the same information irrespective of any change of
position of q in respect to other utterances with which it is associated.
As for classes, classes are generally considered to be the same
XII I-10 375
without regard to any change in the order and frequency of their elements.
For example the class {a,b], is the same as[b,a]and -[a,a,b"j etc. Now assume
that we can take these permutations of elements, order them in some way,
and establish a reference-frame, which we may call the 'space' of the
elements of the class. This space will be unique to each class, for if
some elements were to form two identical spaces of this kind, the elements
would have to be the same, and thus the classes would be identical. This
then provides a unit-predicate for any class, X: if the elements of one
position (say a,b) in a particular space form X, the; X is formed by the
elements in any position within this space (say b,a; a,a,b; etc.). Further,
since numbers are particular types of classes, presumably the unicity of
individual numbers and of other mathematical objects can be established
a Iong similar Iines.
Although the type of predicate-invariance established may be
rather complex, our genera I|zation seems to hold in all the above cases;
statements, the content of utterances., •> classes, and (by extension)
the mathematical objects which can be formed from these, all display two
general characteristies. Where*x'stands for any immaterial object of
the above kind:
i: no predicate of x is expressible in the extra-IogicaI
terms of the language of physics; and
ii: there is some predicate, i1 , such that xis <P for all values
of x within some reference-frame.
The first condition establishes the immateriality of x: any entity
satisfying i can be neither material nor abstract. The second condition
provides for unicity: given the invariant association of some value of '4>'
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with x, one can conceive of x as a unit. Perhaps it is cavaiier to
assume the above two conditions apply equally well to any of the other
immaterial entities, such as intentions, values, etc., which we have
cited. We might suggest that intentions, too, might be ordered in the
manner of statements: for each intention there may be a class of intentions
which are compatible with, or can be satisfied at the same time; and pre¬
sumably this class, too, is unique to each intention. And if some predicate-
invariance might be established along these lines for intentions, we suppose
values, purposes, etc. might also be placed within the same genera, scheme.
(Similarly thoughts might be treated along the same line as propositions.)
But we shall net pursue these matters further. Thus and subject to
the above assumption:
(A^) x is an immaterial object if and only if
i and ii, above, are satisfied.
We note again the role of the criteria of evidentness, CR. (A^) applies
to any conceivable immaterial unit; CR in turn determines the acceptability
of x as a unit within a particular conceptual scheme.
k V * ,
#'l I. Before proceeding, let'us* cohfess our omissions. The treatment
in section 10 of immaterial objects is most brief. And in general,
philosophically difficult subjects have been avoided throughout. What
sort of object, for instance, is the self, or a sense-^^^ . or a living
being? What sort of objects are sub-atomic particles? And how is one to
place sense-data,, after-images, and the sensory content of experience
within this scheme?
We might try to suggest that the treatment of other types of
immaterial objects would proceed along the established lines, that the
only problem, as Wittgenstein would say, is an "empirical" one; i.e. in
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this case to discover the apposite reference-frames in terms of which
invariance can be established. We might also say that questions such as:
What is the self?1 are misleading, and that these for present purposes
should be reformulated. If for instance one were to ask instead: Given
3 oarticular philosophic position, what sort of object is the self con¬
sidered to be?', we can then reply. For a materialist, such as Hobbes,
the answer is clear: Material object'. See Hobbes 46, 15. For a dualist,
such as Descartes, the answer is equally clear: Abstract object'. For in
this latter case the essential predicate of the self, i.e. to-be-able-to-
think, is not desc!~i babIe in the language of physics, while that of the
associated body — to have extension, i.e. length -- clearly is. For
Hobbes, unicity of the living being might be established in terms of the
invariant presence of "Vital Motion" at ali times during the existence of
the being. See Hobbes 6, I. Or, for Descartes, one predicate invariantly
associated with the living being is the capacity tc think...Obviously,
this is not to answer the question: What is the self? But we cannot
consider this a legitimate question, simp lie iter.
We might also say that the question: Wha+ sort of object is a
yellow after-image, or a sense-datum, or a red patch as seen? — when
reformulated in terms of a given philosophic system can then be answered,
and similarly for the invariant predicates of these entities.
All of this we could say.
But this is not intended to cover our flanks. Rather we wish to
show: we are aware how exposed they are — and the line of defense one could
establish, were this necessary.
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#12 The schemata (A|) - (A3) establish sets of conditions governing
the ascription of unicity (respectiveIy) to material, abstract, and im¬
material objects. Any entity whatsoever which may be considered as a unit
of some sort, satisfies one — and only one — of these sets of criteria.
For these types, as established, collectively exhaust the universe and, singly,
each is contained within the complement of the other
Prominent in each schema of unicity is some formulation of
predicate-invariance. If generalised, as in the preceding section, a
criterion of predicate-invariance established along these lines is common
to them all; any entity which one may consider as one is such that some
predicate, invariant in respect to change in some reference-frame, is always
associated with the entity in question.
It follows from the above propositions that unicity is ascribab e
to any x irrespective of its particular type, if and only if x satisfies
such a generalized condition of predicate-invariance Specifically, if
we substitute in both (A j ) and (A2) a generalized statement of predicate-
invariance (such as that contained in ii of (A3) abovejthen for all x,
x is or x can be considered a unit, if and only if x satisfies such a
generalized criterion of predicate-invariance. In other words the constant
presence of some property. or relation, or — better yet — item upon a
stretch in some reference-frame associated with an entity, provides both
the necessary and sufficient condition which enables one to consider this
entity as a unit-
lip to this point we have considered predicates to be predicates
of a unit — as if we were analyzing the unit into its conceptually
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separable factors And this procedure is certainly consonant with our
customary attitudes: we do consider something as one inasmuch as it has
certain properties. But we have also seen, apropos of unit properties,
that we can describe the condition of predicate-invariance without re¬
ferring to any customary individuals. For instance the proposition; x is
F at all points in a reference-frame, RF' can be rewritten; F occupies all
points in RF'. n this latter case any reference to x is unnecessary
Similarly we can consider a unit as built up out of predicates.
Within this view predicates (i.e. items) are not to beconsidered as some¬
how attached to units, but on the contrary — as unit-makinq: things do not
have properties, but properties have things. Or better: things do not
have properties, but (within this view) certain clusters of predicates
are considered to be things. In this way, anything that we may consider
as a unit may be defined as an instance of predicate-invariance. For as
just noted; if x is (or can be considered as) a unit, then x satisfies a
condition of predicate- i nvar iance.; and if it satisfies this condition, x
is a unit or can be considered as such.
Thus ^parallel to the reformulation of predicate-invariance at
the end of section 5) we can now remove any mention of objects from the
schemata that govern ascriptions of unicity to them We need now refer
only to predicates (or items), and positions in a reference-frame For
example the resulting definition for 'material object' can be established
thus;
(A) x is (or can be considered) a material object = DEF
i: There is one continuous, discrete unique space-
time Iine, ,
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ii: Some predicate <b, occupies all the positions on L, a d
no position immediately preceding or following!.; and
iii: <b however complex, is describable in the language of
physics
This present formulation follows that of the earlier schema of unicity for
materia! objects, (Aj), except that any reference to such an object as
such, has been eliminated from the definiens. (Also a second provision
has been added to condition i i , to establish <b as a unit property bounded
by the stretch of L.) Definitions can also be established along similar
lines for 'abstract' and 'immaterial' object. Before continuing, we
note again the role of criteria of evidentness These, unlike the pre¬
ceding, select only those units acceptable as such within a particular
conceptual scheme. (We return to this in XIV-5. )
To continue,W ithin this view whenever a given eries of
positions in a reference-frame is occupied by the same predicate (or better
yet occupied by the same cluster of items) one can — as a matter of
convenience — say that an object is present. And such a procedure has
indubitable merits: it simplifies discourse enormously, and is in this way
roughly analogous to the device of introducing names to replace more com-
plicated definite descriptions or ostensive maneuvres But despite the
practical convenience of having object-words the point we wish to
stress is that any use of 'object' as an ontotogical bed-rock item is
unnecessary. The concept of objects is exponible. Any reference to
customary individuals is theoretically el irni riable.
This formulation, although counter-intuitive has its own
charm: all discourse is now reduced to terms for items,1a combinations of
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these, arid to names for positions in a reference-frame This procedure
is also consonant with our knowledge of the perceptual processes. For
whenever the results of past experience and learning are rendered use¬
less, and environmental clues are obi iteratedtwe do report our perceptions
in terms of color-shapes and similar discernible items not in the language
of objects (And this is even more marked when congenita!Iy blind people
are given sight.) These former it seems are closer to the virgin elements
of our experience. And further this view avoids many difficulties concerning
the relations of properties to objects, and the concommittant excursion
into the notions of matter, predication, definition, etc For what makes
a thing a thing, in this view is our decision to recognize a predicate as
invariant in some particular way. And what "makes" this predicate in¬
variant need be nothing more occult than the fact of nature that it is
— or can be described as — unchanging in his way, and that we are so
constituted to note this.
One might find many reasons to object to this formulation. I
consider only o e: If 'thing' is nothing more than a simplified expression
for a certain kind of predicate-invariance, might not two properties (like
being-spherical, and made-of-i ror.) both occupy the same stretch of time
and space as for instance with a meteorite? Why then should we not
consider these properties to be two distinct things? 'Nothing at a!I, !
say, but convention: it is we who decide that no two concrete objects can
occupy exactly the same stretch of space and time jt i oart of our
concept of material object to consider it so. (Were this otherwise, would
it not be scandalous — within the empiricist tradition — that we could
be certain beforehand that no two physical objects did occuay the exact
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same stretch of time and space?) t so happens, I say, that our particular
criteria of evidentness associate visual and stuff predicates like being-
round and being-made-of iron. One could imagine another scheme in which
a combination of shape and smell was considered basic And, on the other
hand, we do countenance the presence of different objects unon the same
space-time line — provided they are of different types. For instance
some of my students are convinced that the soul is co-extensive and contem¬
poraneous with the body, but — despite the sharing of this time and space
line — distinct from it.
But if the above genera! formulation is consistent and workable
in its details, there is no need to answer objections of this kind, here
For our present purpose is merely to show that one can ems Ioy the word
'unit', 'thing' 'object',without presupposing that the distinctio be¬
tween things and property, codified within our language, represents any
ultimate ontological cleavage If or.& accepts this theory we have advanced
one considers predicates (or items) as unit-making ad thus a unit becomes
definable as an instance of predicate invariance.
If, on the other hand one adheres to an alternative account
it is units and things and objects that are prior, and predicate-invariance
is a property of these. Things have properties, and ttems do not have
things As far as a choice between these views is concer ed, I cannot
see why both may not be entertained and their relative weaknesses and
strength assayed at various levels of discourse. Although these are
prima facie rival formulations, I do not think there car- be a y fundamenta
opposition between them. For if one accepts the results of the past dis¬
cussion , anythi ,g can be said to be a unit if and only if invariance of
this kind holds. Thus whatever is said about specific objects and their
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properties, if it is true or correct, ca : be reformulated in a logically
equivalent statement concerning items and their positions in a reference-
frame
Granted this, we can now employ this theory of units to
distinguish between the 'is' of predication and of existence.
$13, We have noted in Chapter One that any appearance of predicative-
is can be paraphrased in terms of 'have the property that . ' Traditionally
various general types of properties of an object and relations betwee
these properties have been singled out. i: the property may i some way
or another be identical with that which constitutes the entity concerned
In this use, the copula is caiied the "is of identity", ii: the property
in question may be normally associated with the entity and in Aristotle's
■>' r
terms be a "proper" property ( ) of the object iii: or the prop¬
erty may be "entailed" by the above, iv: or lastly, the property may be
an occasional property, and said to be "accidental".
In all these cases predicative-is can be eliminated by means
of the paraphrase 'have the property that evertheless (or perhaps
because of this) within the traditional conceptio the distinction thing/
property is still maintained as fundamental. It is unnecessary to remark
that this traditional picture of an object has been a source of peculiarly
complex philosophic issues: predicative-is links expressions to form
sentences, but how are the entities and predicates themselves linked in
reality that are referred to and described in these sentences?
This is not the 31 ace to resolve, or dissolve these juestions
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Ra+her what we shall do is to take the theory of u its already developed
and show that the four uses of the eliminable 'is' outlined above ca
be explained in terms of it. We the show that the 'is' of existence,
if significant is distinguishable from these: existentia I-is cannot be
directly explicated in terms of items and positions in a reference-frame
But, first, it will be convenient to define two new terms. By a 1 predicate-
staqe' we mean any predicate or group of predicates at some instance
in some referencerframe And by 'oredicate-cluster' we mean any predicate
or group of predicates In introducing these terms we wish to point out
that the occupancy of a point in a reference-frame by some predicate
in general does not preclude the occupancy of this same position by other
predicates Predicates i.e. items, are in this way line waves — many
can pass through (or occupy) a given point at a given instance. Further,
in using 'group' of predicates in the above formulation, the presence of
any closer link between these is neither affirmed, nor denied: A a: d B
are part of the same group of predicates whenever 'A occupies some position
x' 'B occupies some position, y' and 'x = y' are all true.
The above expressions introduce no new non-eliminabie descriptive
terms Our extra-IogicaI vocabulary is still restricted to 'item' —
or more loosely, 'predicate' — and 'occupy a position (or stretch) i
a reference-frame' Admittedly we have given no more than an intuitive
meaning to these key terms. Still their sense can be further suecified
in respect to material units. For 'item' here is a generic term for dis¬
cernible features of our sensory experience and thus specific item-terms
may be defined ostensively And similarly for positions and stretched
of physical space. For what are bench-marks and meter-sticks but con;-
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venient artifices to establish these? Lastly the key relation, of an
item occupying a given position, is also open to some form of operational
definition And, we assume, this applies also to positions in time
Obviously ostensive techniques of this kind break down in respect to
immaterial objects, or to the immaterial components of abstract objects,
but any further discussion of these primitive terms is beyond the scope
of this study.
Given this vocabulary, we can now provide explications for the
various eliminable uses of 'is' noted above. in each case we shall work
with examples and merely indicate a possible fuller treatment.
i: The 'is' of identity as in 'The morning star is the
evening star'; i.e., the predicate to-be-the-brightest-stai—generally-
visible- in-the-morn?ng occurs in all the predicate stages in which to-be-
the-first-stai—generaliy-visible-at-night occurs and the converse. An
identity of this kind is far from trivial: often only after a strenuous
investigation of nature can one discover that these two predicates do
in fact occupy the same space aid time line or, more exactly o-e discovers
that the unit determined by the predicate to-be-visibIe-in-the-heavens.
together with a particular space-time iine, is present in all space-time
points occupied by the above two predicates, and that this unit is unique
The 'is' of identity, as used above is informative Within
the following it is employed stipuiatively; e.g: By 'Venus' I refer to
the second closest planet to the sun'. In this case 'Venus' is said to
be the name of the entity whose unit-predicate is to-be-the-seco :d-cIosest-
PIanet-to-the-sun.
ii: 'Is' may be used to express what amounts to be a re a+ion of
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logical equivalence between two statements. E.g. since among plane
rectilinear figures: For all x, x is a triangle' is true if and only
if 'jhe sum of the interior angles of x is 180°' is true, one can use 'is'
and say that the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is 180°. By this
one means that sum-equaI-to-180° is a unit predicate of arty triangle, and
the converse. And in general "proper" properties of an entity are its
unit predicates.
iii: Similarly 'is® may be used to express what is tantamount to a
relation of implication between two statements E.g. since ' Tiere is some
x that is a triangle' is true only if 'There is some x that can be drawn
through three points 'is true, 'is' can be employed in this way to say that
a triangle is determined by three joints. Or in other words, to-be-
determined- by-three-points is a unit property of any triangle. (The converse
is of course not true: these same three points also determine a circle )
iv: Finally 'is' may be used to ascribe an "accidental" property to
an entity e.g. 'Ve ;us is heavily clouded today'; i.e. a)the predicate
in question occupies some of the predicate-stages of the unit Venus and
b) that this is so, is not derivable from any description of its unit
predicates.
Although the above analyses are paradoxically both brief and
tedious, I trust the point is made: any appearance of eliminable 'is'
serves in one way or another to relate items occupying a position to some
instance of predicate-invaria ce.
But what is significant in the above, is that existentiaI -is
cannot be explicated along such lines If 'Venus exists' means only that
the unit, Venus (say) occupies some stretch in some reference-frame. such
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an ascription of existence becomes indeed trivial — for it follows
from the unicity of Venus, that some such stretch is occupied in this
way We do not need 'exist' to tell us this And further, if (as we
assume) some type of predicate-invariance can be established in respect to
any discernible feature of our experience — even the immaterial and the
imaginary — unicity in some respect or another is ascribable to any
entity. Thus, if it meant no more than the above 'exit' would indeed
be totally redundant One might of course propose that 'Venus exists'
means that to-exist is a unit predicate of Versus. But what do we gain by
this? When we say that Venus is dark, we know what is meant. But with
'Venus exists', it is we who are in the dark.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
' Ex i st1 - JM_
#1. Ms', when ellminable, signifies that predicate-clusters
are linked with other predicates also present in some or all positions
of a reference-frame. Naturally enough, any such use of 'is' can be
paraphrased in terms of: have the property that'. But as we have seen,
existential-is and 'exist' are not eiiminabfe in this manner. For
example, removal of 'exist' from 'Material bodies exist' yields the
fragmentary expression: Material bodies have the property that'. One
possible completion, viz. '...they exist', only underlines the essential
occurrence of 'exist'. But is another, namely: Material bodies have
the property that they constitute the universe', any more significant?
It will be the task of the following sections to convince the reader that
this is so. Specifically we wish to show that 'exists' can be considered
as a binary predicate-term that links entity-terms with 'universe' —
and can be defined in terms of the latter. Or (subject to considerable
refinement), where 'U* stands for 'universe' and x is any unit:
x exists = DEF x is an element or constituent of U or x = U.
As a first step we look at several general arguments which lend
credibility to the above. We then develop the above formulation in
respect to three specific interpretations of 'universe'.
a) We have suggested that if x is an existent, the removal of x
from the universe alters the universe, and the removal of all x's annihilates
the universe. At the same time this is not necessarily the case in respect
-388-
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to the removal of some properties (The universe is changed if the Earth
is removed; we would not consider the universe changed if, say, spring did
not come this year.) Let us now compare the above state of affairs to
that of elements in a class, or in a heap. Since two classes, or two
physical heaps are identical when they contain the same elements, the
removal of any element alters such a class op neap, and the removal of
all elements voids them. On the other hand, the removal or alteration
of some occasional feature of an element does not necessarily change the
class or heap in which it is contained. This parallel between existents.
in respect to their removal from the universe, and elements or constituents
in respect to their removal from a class or heap suggests that 'exist * may =
'element or constituent of a universe'. These relationships are also
maintained if one equates 'non-element' with 'non-existent'
b) If we assume the above to hold, the distinction between predicative
and existentiat-is can now be explained. To say that a exists is to nay
that a is an element in a universe, and as such it is atural to infer that
a has some properties; i.e an existential use entails a predicative use
But the converse (in any universe in which there are non-elements) is
not the case For instance, numbers have various properties; stiii one
might claim that they did not exist.
c) This also establishes a rationale for the dictum that existence
is not an ordinary predicate As noted above, the relation between these
two ascriptions in respect to derivability is assymmetric Further
existence is certainly not an ordinary property in this formulation,
inasmuch as it is a re 1 at ion,and one which holds only between an element
and some 'universe'.
d) This explains, too, the curious reluctance one has to eliminate
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'exist' from certain contexts For, according to this assumption,
'exist' has yeomen's work to do: namely to single out an entity and to
ascribe elementhood to it. When 'exist' is replaced by 'is', or even
'be', one is ready to slide to 'have the property that...' And this,
as we have pointed out, is another kettle of fish
'existent'
e) The equating of and 'unit constituting a universe1 is
also consonant with one famous gloss of 'exist', namely Aristotle's dictum
that to exist is to be a substance. Whatever else 'substance', i.e
'ousia', may mean, it certainly carries the sense of that which is always
the same and never changing This, together with the Oxford Shorter
English Dictionary second obf i n i t i on of substance as 'a separate or distinct
thing' fits 'unit' like a glove
f) One might object and say that 'existent' does not aaply to members
of all universes, but only to members of the universe. But this would be
just another sense of 'exist'; i.e. to exist in whatever universe the
speaker might denote as 'the universe'. Or one might claim that 'existent'
applies only to that which is most real, or pre-eminent This too is
clearly another sense. We shall return to these in the sequel But for now.
let us proceed and give substance to our claim.
According to the above proposal, the key term in existence-
statements is 'universe'. But this maneuvre affords scant comfort For
not only is 'universe' a vague term but — just as there is not one ki d
One can
of numberreckon with —''also envisage more than one tyoe of universe
Is the universe to be considered merely a physical heap of the material
units it contains, and are each of these objects and events loose a d
separate? Or is the universe ordered in some way and is this order itse f
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a feature of the universe? n the case of a mere physical heap, 'universe'
refers to a material unit constituted out of all other material units. In
the second where order is a distinguishable feature of the universe so
considered, 'universe' refers to an ordered n-tuple of material units
together with the ordering relations which obtain among them. And so,
for ail one's talk about the universe, the term, 'universe', is an ambiguous
name This is a curious but I think, inescapable conclusion. For the
units of a mere heap can be described in the language of physics without
over-stepping the resources of this language and so remain constituents
of a material unit But that an order holds among these units is not
describable in the language of physics (We can, for instance employ
logical notation together with terms such as 'mass', 'time', etc. to es¬
tablish general laws applicable to any u. its contained within the universe
as a physical heap. But if one wishes to say, as a reaiist does, that
these Iaw-statements reflect an order in the universe, this latter claim
cannot bestated within the logical and extra-IogicaI resources of the
language of physics.) We cannot take the law-statement itself as an object
and talk about it in this language. That an order holds is inescapably
imrnateria I. We have admitted that the realist position represents a
genuine option; we must therefore acknowledge that the universe may a 1 so
be considered as an abstract object whose type-distinct components are the
constituents of the
/physical heap of the material object universe, together with the order
which obtains among them
But now if these two interpretations of 'universe' are to be
I n
countenanced, must we not also accept a third/which 'universe' refers
to an immaterial entity? Within the earlier formulations the universe
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consists wholly or partly of a physical heap of material units. But
if the universe were not a heap, etc , but the universal class whose
elements were the units of the preceding formulations? Classes, according
to our scheme are wholly immaterial So if 'universe' is construed as
referring to this class, it refers to an immaterial object
One might look askance at the immateriality of classes. How
can these be immaterial* when some of their elements as in the present
case are physical? How can such a class be totally indescribable in the
language of physics? Of course, loosely speaking we do say that a class
is specified when its elements are given. And with this same loose usage
one might be tempted to say that the class is described when its elements
are described. And so — the objection might run — if the elements of
some class are describabie in the language of physics, then the class
is also describabie in this way. and so not immaterial. However, let
us consider the following analogy: the operation of squaring performed
upon the imaginary number, equals -I. Yet this does not mean that -1
i i ke >JT— i is an imaginary number Similarly, any class --strictly
speaking — is not specified by its elements: rather it is the operation
of class formation, performed upon entities satisfying certain conditions,
that determines a class. It is a fallacy of composition to expect that
the properties of the class are like those of its elements. Thus _i_f_ the
universe is considered to be the class of all units the universe so
considered is totally and incorrigibly immaterial
It is obvious that there can be only o e entity named 'the
universe'. But which? How can one provide preferential treatment for
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one of these, whether that of the mere physical heap, or the heap plus
laws or the class containing all of these,, or some other? Are integers
for instance, most truly numbers, in contradistinction to all other types
of numbers? Or is a certain kind of set, say that defined in terms of the
ZermeIo-FraenkeI theory, absolutely preferred to all others? Similarly unless
the unique correctness of one concept of Universe is incontrovertibly
established, we are constrained to consider 'universe' an ambiguous name.
It follows that 'exist', which is definable in terms of this latter, is
equaI Iy ambiguous
These matters will become clearer if we consider various
possible definitions of 'exist'
#2. We now develop three of the interpretations of 'universe'
already noted, and then define corresponding uses of 'exist' in terms of
these. Of course there may be numerous concepts of universe but a study
of these three will be sufficient for the present
Within the first notion, the universe is conceived of as a
mere heap or aggregate of material bodies. It is with this in mind (we
suapose) that Hobbes writes:
(... the Universe that is, the whole masse of all things
that are) is Corporeal I, that is to say, Body; a d hath the
dimensions of Magnitude, namely Length, Bredth and Depth:..,
every part of the Universe, is Body; and that which is not
Body, is p.o part of the Universe " Hobbes 46 15.
Let us call this the notion of a 'universe as a material object'.
Such a universe is conceived of as occupying a zone in space and (we
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suppose) some time-line as we I I. If our theory of u its is applicable,
thera must also be at least one other predicate invariantly present at
each instance of such a universe The obvious candidates — either the
number, or relative position of its constituents — are inadequate. For
neither of these are temporally invariant, at least not so at the level
of ordinary experience. However we can ascribe unicity to such a universe
for to any heap) inasmuch as the sum say, of its matter remains unchanged
through time We talk for instance about a mass of clay, and in a
similar way Hobbes can talk about the universe as a mass of things that
are, Of course, matter is itself a vague notion and any use of the concept
presupposes that we can consider existents as just so much stuff One might
accordingly wish to substitute a reference to mass, or mass-energy etc
But we can consider one as apt as another here: our prese: t aurpose is to
describe a notion of Universe, not to purify it
Granted this, we can say of such a universe that it is viewed
as occupying a zone in space, and (presumably) a unique time-line. Further ,
at all such instants, the sum of the matter (or the mass, etc.) of the
universe is constant. Lastly, such a universe contains all other material
objects as oarts. This feature is also exclusive:
..The Universe is All. that which is no part of it, is
Hothinq" Hobbes, ibid
But how can this universe be considered to be, as Webster
says "The whole body of things . the totality of material entities"?
(Italics mine.) How can we talk about the universe _as a material object
as an aggregate as_ gathered into a whole? To answer this, we now formulate
a principle of heap formation . applicable to any unordered physical heap.




where each numeral symbolizes a particular unit According to the
above observation concerning the consta cy of matter etc., any such
unit can be said to form a heap, H, providing the following condition
is satisfled:
i: Whatever the components of the heap may be (i.e
irrespective of their order, variety, and particular
qualities) some sum related to these components remains
constant upon a given space-and-time line.
This sum may, for instance, be the total matter or mass, or mass-energy
etc of the components, or perhaps even the total physical volume occupied
at any time. The above condition which (we propose) is applicable to
any heap, determines such an aggregate by reference to a collective
property of its components It will be convenient, for the sake of future
developments, to introduce another formulation as we'I:
i' The components of H are ordered in respect to their
relative positions in space and time, and some sum
related to these components remains constant upon a
given space-and-time line.




to stand for: 'The units l the names of which occur between the parentheses!!
form a heap, H*. For example according to i . above., the expression
*HCI,2) * may be introduced any time the material objects, I,2. satisfy
i. Or generally, 'H(x,y)' may be introduced any time x and y are
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material units and x arid y together satisfy i; and similarly for
'H(x,y,z)' etc. Further, let us call any x a 'constituent1 of H' when¬
ever it is named as a unit of H.
The universe as a material object is, of course, a particular
kind of heap. Let us call it 'U, '. As noted above U,._ contains all
MO MO
other material units (except itself) as constituents, and U^q contains
none but material units. In other words, if H = U,MO
ii: the constituents of H are all the material units,
other than occupying a given instance of time,
and are only material units.
We can now define 'universe as a material unit' thus:
- DEF H (I, 2 n),
where I, 2, n are each material units satisfying i and
ii, and the time-line. L, of U is specified in i
MO
n this way 'U 'is defined basical'v in te^ms of an invariant predicate
MO
of any of its predicate-stages
But the point of this analysis is to define 'exist'. And
this we despatch forthwith. For, according to our gloss: x exists in
!• _ « DEF x is a constituent of IJ . But what about the physical heaoM0 MO
itself? To include this as an existent we must modify the above to
include x - 1.1^. In such a case it becomes awkward to say, as above
that U.,_ exists in IJ. .. Rather we specify the meaning of 'exist' inMO MO
regard to the universe I! thus:
MO
x exists = DEF x is a constituent of U^q or x = l1^.
In words: 'x exists' (in respect to the universe as a material object.
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U,^) means that x is this universe or a constituent of it.MO
We shall comment upon this definition later. But for the
present let us note that 'x exists' (or 'x can be considered to
exist') in this sense, can be unpacked into the following:
x is a unit: i.e. some discernible feature (item).
or more complex cluster of these, is
invariant in respect to changes of position
upon sane reference-frame, and
x is a material unit: i.e this reference-frame. in
particular, is that of time and space, some
unique stretch of which is occuoied by this
item or items; and these latter are fully
describable within the logical and extra-
logical resources of the language of
physics; and lastly
x is a constituent of U : i.e. each nredicate-staae
m j
in time, occupied by x, is such that the
sum of the matter or mass, etc. of all
material units occurring within this stage
is constant
This, we propose, is at least logically equivalent to whatever we do mean
when we say that x exists as a material object. Although one might
demur in respect to the final provision concerning the sum-of-matter,
I think, this would only be in terms of the details of the formulation:
some other, perhaps more complex predicate, might be proposed as more
fitting. Let us note, too, that according to this formulation, to say
that seme Individual exists io the above sense, is certainly informative.
XIV-2 398
#3. The O.E.D. renders the first (current) sense of 'universe'
thus:
The whole of created or existing things regarded
collectively; all things (including the earth, the
heavens and a I I the phenomena of space) considered as
constituting a systematic whole, especially as created
or existing by Divine power."
We assume Divine power is not describable in the language of physics.
But then the universe, within this conception., displays at least O'e
immaterial predicate: made-by-Divinity Such a universe must then be
called an abstract object in our termino!ogy.
But perhaps this reference to Divine agency may be viewed
as a deus ex machina, conveniently introduced to substantiate our
division of units into material, abstract and immaterial. However,
one can also reach
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the concept of the universe-as-an-abstract object along other lines.
To do this, let us distinguish between two senses of 'description1.
Within the first, which we shall call the 'correspondence' sense, a
statement, 'S', concerning some state of affairs, S, can be said to
provide a correct description when all entities named in 'S1 occur in
S, and a I I the predicates ascribed to these in 'S' are instanced in this
way in S. Within another sense, 'S1 can be said to provide a correct
description of S when some predicates of the entities named in 'S' occur
in this way in S. We shall call this weaker form the 'representation'
sense of 'description'.
For instance Eudoxus formulated a theory in which all celestial
motion was explained in terms of the respective movements of a nest of
spheres centered about the earth. Aristotle, in "De Caelo" for instance,
adopts this theory of horn ocentric spheres; and for Aristotle, according
to a standard account, "the spheres are physically existing parts of a
vast machinery by which the celestial bodies are kept in motion..."
Dreyer p. 112. This is the sense of description as correspondence. There
are spheres in the theory with particular motions, so too — if the
there are
descriptions is correct —/spheres in the heavens with similar motions.
For Eudoxus, according to the same account, "it seems probable that he
only regarded these spheres as£no more thanjgeometrical constructions
suitable for computing the apparent paths of the planets" ibid p. 91.
In this case the description is considered correct provided that some of
the features of the theoretical elements represent certain features of
the phenomena.
ow let us consider the material universe as a systematic whole
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in which each constituent unit is describable in the language of physics.
Since this language also contains the express ionsof logic and mathematics,
general law statements (e.g. those of classical physics) are also ex¬
pressible in this language But these apply not to units in a mere heap




be such an ordered heap. H <1 .2,. . . , n) satisf ies condition M above:
the elements of H are ordered in respect to their position in time and
space.
Since position is a defining characteristic of the universe
we are now considering#this universe in contradistinction to UJf,0 has
this predicate: given the respective positions of ail its units at some
predicate-stage of this universe, it is theoretically possible to determine
the corresponding positions in any other of its predicate-stages The
laws of ohysics can in this way be considered operators which take the
values of any such predicate-stage as operands and transform them into
the valuescf a succeeding stage These laws are applicable to all (macro)
physical objects and in this way can be said to determine the systematic
unity of the (physical) universe.
But do these laws establish a description by correspondence or
by representation? |f it is the latter these laws need provide merely an
intellectual construction. The universe in which they hold is dis¬
tinguishable from U only inasmuch as it is an ordered natural hea>.
mo
But — if o e wishes to assert as a realist does that these laws provide
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a correct description by correspondence? The the order they describe
is a feature of the universe Yet that it is a feature is riot describable
in the language of physics. For to assert this is to talk about a new set
of entities: not materia! objects but laws, or the we Il-determined order
they describe. Thus to specify such a universe one cannot merely refer
to a heap, even an ordered heap. One must also refer to the laws or the
order they describe, as constituti g-objects — albeit curious objects —
of this universe. Since these latter entities are indescribable in the
language of physics, the universe if it is considered as a systematically
ordered whole in this sense, is then an abstract object. Or, to express
this again in other words: we can take advantage of the presence of order among
the elements of a physical heap in describing them, without altering the
language in which we talk about the whole. But if we consider this order
as a constituting element of the whole, we then countenance the presence
of a feature — order — indescribable in the language of physics.
This of course, is not a novel observation. It is in this
spirit, I think, that Heraciitus writes:
Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which
all things are steered through all things" Burnet p. 134.
(19); also (KR) 230, note
If one wishes to include this order as an element of the universe one
must also modify the second criterion of the preceding section For this
universe as an abstract object let us call it 1, contains in this
way more than materia! cbjects. Thus if H = ^/\Q' a ^ 0 i s the we I i-
determined order that obtains:
ii: The constituents of H are all the material objects
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occupying a given instance of time, together with
0, and anything which is neither of these is not a
constituent of H.
This latter clause excludes all other non-material objects from H.
The definition of the universe as an abstract object, in this sense,
foilows:
U = DEF H^O; I ,2,. . , . , n } whereAO
l,2,,.,.,n are each material units satisfying
i1 of section 2 , and ii above; and 0 obtains
or is applicable to each instance of H.
In th i s way UA0 is defined in terms of a physical and an immaterial pred¬
icate, each present at any instance of U^q. ' n co tradistinetion to U^q,
U^q is a spatially ordered heap of materiai units together with the order
determining their change in position
Parallel to the earlier formulation., we can say that x exists, in
respect to this universe as an abstract object whenever x = U^q or x is a
constituent of
x <U«n> exists = DEF (x = IL« or x is a constituent of U. )AU^ AU AO
Thus whether the universe be considered the work of a divine architect,
or of a divine logos, or as merely displaying an order independent of the
observer, the sense of 'existence' within such a universe can be
established in general as above.
The present definition of 'exist' can also be unpacked along
lines similar to the preceding one, provided that mention is made of x as
part of an ordered heap. But let us stress that the order which obtains
among the material constituents of U^q is also said to exist, as does
and thus all ax I stents in this sense of 'exist1, are not exclusively
material. With some possible scruples (concerning the existence of
itself, inasmuch as it is an aggregate of individuals) the sense of
'exist', formulated in the preceding section, would be accepted by a
nominalist, for instance Goodman. But the present sense would be pro¬
scribed: 0 is a property common to all individual constituents of UA0'
and if these exist — such a nominalist would maintain — 0 cannot.
See Goodman (3)2. By this token, 'exist' as defined in this section,
displays those features, a realist would demand.
# 4. Mates, in a summary discussion of the history of logic, makes
the following suggestion:
Abe lard devoted much attention to the verb 'is', arguing that
the content of any categorical sentence can be expressed by
a sentence of the form 'A is B' ( A est B ). Even 'Socrates
exists' (Socrates est) can be represented by 'Socrates is an
existent thing' (Socrates est ens). Perhaps this points
the way to the possibility of reducing the number of
predicates in our language to one — the 'E' of set
theory — and of representing existence as membership
in the universal set" Mates, p. 209.
Although I am not certain how much of the "pointing" is in the
mind of the commentator, let us explore this suggestion. The universal
class, as any class within our terminology, is an immaterial object,
if our gloss of 'exist' as 'constituent of the universe' is maintained,
'universe' in this sense names an immaterial object; name IV, the
universal class. This class, within those formulations of set theory
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in which it appears, contains aii or nearly all entities as members.
Excluded entities are victims of devices introduced to interdict the
formation of self-contradictory expressions. Thus, if the universe is
considered to be the universal class any unit of any type — providing
it can be specified in terms of a self-consistent description — may
be considered a constituent. In this sense (with the above noted ex¬
ception) anything can be said to exist.
Units, within our formulation are defined as instances of
pred icate- i nvar iance, but membership iri V is restricted to those units
whose properties (loosely speaking) are mutually compatible. Let us
then reformulate our notion of unit to exclude impossible units. Let these
be linguistic or extra-Iinguistic. If they are the former, they cannot
to make statements,
be used consistently/ If they are the latter, definite descriptions of
them cannot be used consistently. For instance, let 'A is the one and
only round-square1 be such an impossible linguistic object. Introduction
of this as a premise makes any premise-set containing this inconsistent.
Or let A be the one and only round-square. In this case the definite
description of A, as above, cannot be used consistently. These features
of impossible objects are invariant with respect to change from one
(i interpreted) language to another. So any entity that satisfies the above
condition can be considered both as a unit and impossible.
We shall now construe 'unit', unless otherwise specified, as
'possible unit'. This does not mean that, say, the second natural satellite
of the Earth is a possible materiai unit. For before it can be said to be
possible in this formulation, it must first be a unit: in this case a
material unit occupying a particular stretch in time-and-space. And
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unless the heavens have changed overnight, this is not the case. On
the other hand, the concept of the second moon — providing its description
is self-consistent — is a possible (immaterial) unit. In this way the
chimera is not a possible material unit, the concept of the chimera is
a possible immaterial unit, and the idea of the chimera (as entertained
by the author of the tale through a stretch of time) is a possible
abstract unit.
To proceed, let us call tha universe as an immaterial object
'U Given the above convention, concerning units as possible units,
10
we can define UjQ accordingly:
U « DEF V
10
Where V is the class of all units. To exist in this sense is to be an
element in V, or to be V. Thus:
x < U
^^ > exists = DEF (x £ V or x = V)
Within this formufetion any unit — provided it or its
description is consistent as above — exists. In the most general
mathematical sens© of 'exist', any mathematical object (say a number, n,
which is F) can be said to exist, provided that the denial of 'n is F'
is impossible. This present formulation of 'exist', in respect to the
universe as an immaterial object, is consonant with mathematical practise.
And this is fitting: for I suppose the objects of classical mathematics
(in any but a formalist approach) provide the paradigm examples of immaterial
units. But a difference remains: the universe of discourse of (pure)
mathematics is homogenous: no mathematical object is describabie even in
part in terms of the extra-logical and extra-mathematical vocabulary of
the language of physics. This is not the case with the elements of the
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universe as an immaterial object: although classes are not describable in
this way, the Moon is. 'To exist", as an element in the universe a an
immaterial object is ascribable to any entity that satisfies some schema
of unicity of a given type and is a possible unit. 'Exist' in this sense
applies without distinction, to material, abstract and immaterial units
* » « *
#5. In Section I we introduced a gloss of 'exist' that we can now
rephrase a : existent = a unit-element or unit-constituent of the universe
or the universe itself'. We then investigated different interpretations
of 'universe' and showed that definite — but different — senses of 'exist'
can be defined in respect to each such interpretation
Since we singled out clear and distinct interpretations, it
might seem that 'exist', in this way, has just a few uses But this
illusion is soon dissipated For alternative notions of Universe are close
at hand: one might consider the universe a material unit whose constituents
were ordered in space, and not a mere heao; or an abstract unit also peopled
with thinking units; or the class of all its sub-classes, and as such
larger than V; etc. But these are trifling additions — isolated points
upon a full spectrum of interpretations. Since we have shown that 'exist'
is definable in terms of 'universe' it follows that 'exist' too has its
meaning explosion. t wiI I be the task of this section to establish
this conclusion.
Up till now in our discussion of the different i nterPrsbtions
of 'universe', we have referred in general to stretches of time and s^ace
and to invariant predicates etc. It will be our concern in the following
to show how different — and extremely different — concents of Universe,
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even of the same type, take on their characteristic structure when par¬
ticular va!ues are assigned The situation we wish to point out is
similar to that of certain equations in analytic geometry: if one alters
the values of the variables, the whole shape of the resulting curve is
changed. Or, it is like someone's first efforts at baking cakes: small
variations in the ingredients or the temperature of the oven can produce
dramatic and often devastating variety in the final product But unlike
the case of baking --we shall argue —there is no uniquely correct i inter¬
pretation of 'universe'.
We first consider U : a universe in which a y x that satisfies
tHo 1
the criteria for material units is considered to be a constituent, ad
no further criteria concerning the evidentness the simplicity,nor the
duration of predicate-invariance are imposed. Within this interpretation
a given flash of lightning, or a clap of thunder, or some particular glint
of red, or a micro-second long stream of electrons or a configuration
of items occupying the same general area for a brief instant or an empty
sheii, or fhe corner of this wall, or the body of red in the universe,
would all be considered as constituents on a par with the Dog Star, the
moon the lead crystal on my desk, and the totality of matter For each
of these has at least one predicate invariant through some unique stretch
of time and space.
There would be no theoretical deformation to the structu© of
such a universe so conceived for it would have no structure Nor would
there be any intei—relationships between elements: the or Iy criterion
for membership is to be a material unit i any position whatsoever. A
heap such as this would comprise material units of a!! sizes, shapes,
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types, properties, and complexities. Let us term it 'the helter-skelter
universe of material units'
One can also consider a he Iter-skelter universe of immaterial
units: one in which any immaterial unit,irrespective of its possibility
or any other limiting feature ,i s an element. The; , provided analogous
entities were instanced in some stretch of time and space one could
include these latter in a corresponding universe of abstract objects,
equally heiter-skeIter. If one could then consider an aggregate of all
these units — one containing material units as constituents, immaterial
units as elements, etc. — this motley collection would provide the basic
he Iter-skeIter out of which all others might be formed Let us call this
'US'. For instance HS contains all constituents of IJ , at least all
Mo
elements, of V, and all abstract units
To a certain extent our everyday and unanalysed notion of "the
universe" contains many features of the above. We talk about stones,
bridges, eIectron-showers, colors, quasars, moonbeams; and perhaps even
thoughts: all considered, as it were, on the same level of being part of
the universe However, to an important extent our famiiiar universe i f®
not viewed as he Iter-skeIter, For instance we do impose some criteria
of evidentness in judging the claims of putative units. The lead crystal
on my desk is admitted as a physical object; but the pile of chalk powder
also on my desk is considered to be at best a tenuous sort of object ; and
the heap of crystal , chalk, an(j f^e Spj<jer web in the garage is certainly
not countenanced as such, in the customary sense. Or again, the sun and
the stars — however incandescent -- are considered to be physical objects,
while the moonlight now upon my desk is not. Further we impose restrictions
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upon the duration of time and the stretch of space which units muet
occupy, if they are to be considered elements within our customary
universe E.g. were an immense body of sand to appear only once in the
sea we would be hesitant about calling it an island but let it remain
for years and it finds a place on the map. Thus depending upon the
criteria of evidentness and duration, of invar iance imjosed, certain types
of material units are considered as prominent constituents of this
universe and others excluded. We snail call any universe in which such
additional criteria hold, a universe of 'prominent material objects'. In
such a universe:
(CR-I) Ali material objects, x, are members of this universe
provided that:
i: x satisfies specific criteria of evidentness
and/or
ii: x occupies a time-space line of a particular length.
For instance:
a) Let i be'x can be jdent i f ied by means of an x-ray microscope'.
Accordingly, anything larger than a small atom and smaller than a group
of molecules is an object in this universe. On the other hand, neither
electrons, nor stones, nor stars can be considered such.
b) Let i be 'x can be oerceived by normal unaided vision and by no
other sense'. This universe is constituted exclusively of color-shapes
and recurrent patterns of these: the silver configuration (of sunlight on
running water), the green blob (of deciduous trees on the hillside), the
yeiIow orb (of the sun) are each typical elements. All other units except ones
such as these are excluded. But if ii is modified so that the stretch of
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time is ten months, even the green blob (of deciduous trees) becomes
excluded from elementhood.
c) Or let i be 'x can be perceived by norma vision, and at the
same time x resists touch and probing'. n its rough and ready way this
criterion brings into prominence many of the famiiiar objects of our
customary universe. An icicle, a stone, a rose, a mountain, ad — by
extension — the moon, are each exemplars satisfying these provisions.
Eut if this aggregate is to contain only the relatively enduring objects
of our customary universe values of ii must also be further specified
(Too short a time-line permits the inclusion, say, of the materia! com¬
ponent of bumper-to-bumper car jams as existents If, on the other ha d
extremely long time-Iinesobtain, neither an icicle, stone, rose, nor moun¬
tain would be considered as a constituent )
d) Or let i be 'x is invariant with respect to ail changes in time'.
Under this strong criterion perhaps some molecules, atoms, and stable sub¬
atomic particles are elements within this universe. But, for the sake of
illustration, let us assume that even these units change in time. (This
is, in fact, one current cosmological hypothesis.) Accordingly none of
these are elements. If, however, we do assume that the mass of the
universe is constant, and that this alone is invariant in respect to all
changes in time, this totality of mass constitutes the one unchanging
unit. In many ways such a universe would be like the Parmenidear. One —
and as distinct and different from the world of customary objects as this
latter is distinct and different from the world depicted by an x-ray
mi crosco >e.
Let the above types of universes of prominent material objects
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stand as examples. The objects that become conspicuous within any par¬
ticular interpretation of 'universe' along these lines are those that
satisfy definite conditions of evidentness and of invariance introduced
within the argument places of the schema, CR-!, governing this. As we
have seen there are many such possible conditions and each determines an
interpretation of 'universe' with different characteristics. In fact,
given the extraordinary variety of means we possess for obtaining infor¬
mation in any given context, there seems to be no effective limitation to
the number and variety of conditions that may be imposed. Thus there is
not one concept of the universe of prominent objects, but a class of such.
These same remarks also apply to other concepts of prominent
object universes. For instance (considering immaterial units now) criteria
of evidentness, tailored along more general lines, might exclude from
membership any impossible units; whereas other criteria might exclude only
some, or only immaterial units not constructed in a finite number of
operations, or only those for which no corresponding unit occurs in a
universe of prominent abstract objects, etc. And similarly other
criteria might be applied to determine membership in this latter type
of universe. Thus in general the presence of particular types of units
within each universe — as well as the distinctive characteristics of the
given universe — defends upon the specific criteria of evidentness and
of predicate-invariance which hold within it.
Further the range of values of 'universe' is even more extensive
than the above discussion of he Iter-skeIter and prominent object universes
might suggest. For it is also possible to introduce dependence relations
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of some kind within any type of universe. There are limitations as
to kind: all elements of a he!ter-skeIter universe are independent, and
accordingly no other relations, either of pre-eminence, or equi-eminencet
or exc I u siion can hold within them. On the other hand, within a prominent
object universe, all of these can be established.
Thus we can distinguish different interpretations of 'universe'
in respect to the basic types of objects they contain: l^0, , I-'jq- Each
of these, singly or in combination can be further distinguished in respect
to their inclusion or exclusion of elements: on the one hand the various
types of heiter-skeiter universes, and the other the universes of prominent
objects. Further distinetionscan also be made among the elements of each
inasmuch as they satisfy or fail to satisfy the different •■ualifying conditions
in terms of which ontologiesMy ordering dependence and excluding relations
are estabiished. So 'universe' is In this way multiply ambiguous.
! think I hear an objector and the tenor of his argument is that
the criteria i and ii of our customary universe are not just one other
pair of conditions but are the correct ones. 'They correspond' he says
'to what is the case. The others are mereiy fanciful'. That they corres¬
pond in some fashion to what is the case, we cannot doubt. f the earth
were not solid, but were full of holes like a dry meringue, and if we still
insisted that it was solid, we would all end up in these holes, like mice
caught in a wine bottle. Since we do not, our conviction that the earth
is solid is in some rough fashion vindicated. Sirniiarly our belief that
the universe is composed of physical objects with their customary properties
must also in some way be consonant with what we refer to vaguely as 'the
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case1. But if a creature were to have a concept of Universe in which
the prominent objects were not thing-shapes, but, say, small-shapes — as
we believe is the case with bees — and were to manage with this notio of
a universe, must not the universe of smelI-shapes a'so be consonant with
,;the case"? Or if one were given a sonar sounding device, as some sharks
and whales have, would not the structures and units which he found as
prominent aiso be consonant in their way with what was the case? The
objector might reply: The structure of other imaginable universes depends
upon the structure of the one we know. Colors and smells and reflecting
surfaces are the colors, smells, and surfaces of the objects in our world.
If the worId were not structured as it is, i.e. in terms of our familiar
materia! objects, your bees could never find their sme!I-shaped entities
nor the shark its prey, ' This argument is self-defeating. Presumably
the structure of the world we know is based in turn upon the structure of
the atoms and molecules which compose it (or something like them), for
how eise can we explain what we nhotograph in an x-ray or an electron micro¬
scope? Indeed, a creature fitted with x-ray vision might retort: 0
hypermetropic man, you talk of stones and walls without which the bee could
never find his devious way. But these stones and walls, to which you
ascribe objectivity, par excellence, what are they but devious conf i gurati oris
of that which oniy I can see directly, and which is the case?'
Let us allow this objection to drop for the moment. The partisans
of any iinterpretation of 'universe' can doubtlessly find reasons to show
that theirs possesses a privileged status — one need merely choose the
appropriate qualifying condition. But we have laboured to show that this
choice itseif is partisan. 't is not that the choice of universes defends
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upon what is the case, but 'what is the case' becomes meaningful only in
terms of a particular interpretation of 'universe'.
This may seem to introduce an untoward proliferation of universes
But how else can one talk of specific entities as elements within a universe,
or of specific relations which hold between them without either contra¬
dicting oneself or remaining on a level of schematic generality? There
are prima facie alternatives. One might for instance attempt to consider
the basic he Iter-skeIter aggregate, HS, as the universe. In this way any¬
thing, at least any entity to which unicity is ascrjbable, could be said
to exist. But we have argued earlier that in view of the plethora of units,
dependence relations of some sort must also be established. For HS is
as close to chaos as one can imagine. But the moment one establishes such
an order, since various kinds of dependence are possible, in effect
one generates distinct sub-universes, within HS, each with its own criteria
of ontological pre-eminance and equi-eminence, etc. And this is no
solution to the problem of the proliferating universes.. For although 'exist',
since it now applies to everything becomes redundant, ontological guest ions
now reappear in the guise of: What is pre-eminent? And, as we have argued,
this question is as unanswerable as: What is the correct interpretation of
'universe'? (For to answer either, one presupposes that there is an incon¬
trovertible set of values in terms of which either a theory of the universe,
or of chains of dependence is to be adjudged. We have argued that this
presupposition is unsatisfiable. ) Thus the choice of the correct inter¬
pretati on, or of the fitting criteria is not determined by "the universe"
as we encounter it — all that this encounter can achieve is to interdict
certain interpretations as impossible or exclude criteria as unrealizable.
But this field of maneuvre still leaves an abundant variety of formulations open.
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Nor could one follow another course and consider some one restricting
prominent object universe as the universe. For as we have instanced,
alternative sets of criteria are again available and ay attempt to justify
one, categorically, presupposes the same absolute consensus concerning the
values of theory-appraisaI, which we find chimerical. And further a status
must still be assigned to all the constituents of the basic helter-skelter
universe to which eIernenthood is denied within the selected universe of
prominent objects. And, even if a successful reductive account can be
provided to justify this denial of elementhood, or to assign a role of
ontological dependence, the "success" of any such theory of the universe
is inextricably conditional.
Thus one way or another one is caught within an apparently vicious
cycle. Guided by the expression "the universe" one must accept either a) the
most comprehensive interpretation, namely the universe as totally helter-
skelter, or b) some restricting one in which certain units are singled out
as prominent, or pre-eminent and others as non-constituents, or subalterns
But within a), the universe, HS, is so lacking in order one is forced to
consider it as nevertheless containing sub-universes, and the problem
then is to justify their appearance. For, if they are all parts of HS, no
order can hold between them, and for all purposes they are then independent
universes. If, on the other hand, one opts for b), since no set of
restricting criteria claims any absolute sanction, different prominent object
universes emerge for consideration. The problem remains: how to explain
the universe as many universes?
» • * »
#1. If there is no way to escape from this proliferation of possible
concepts of the universe, 'the universe1 is a systematically misleading
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expression. As used simpliciter, it does not name one particular universe,
whether HS or V or any other. Rather it is an incomplete description like
'the descendant of Adam', which — despite its form — refers at best
ambiguously to many individuals. Admittedly 'the descendant of Adam',
if we disregard 'the1, has some sense, namely: any human except for Adam
and his mate'. Similarly if we disregard 'the', 'universe' means: any
all-inclusive heap or class of entities provided that these satisfy some
criteria of unicity, evidentness, predicate-invariance etc.' But just as
there are far too many humans, as we have seen there are far too many
concepts of Universe. 'The universe', simpliciter, is nonsense.
From this it follows, if — victim of the same delusion — one
says 'b exists', or 'b is an existent', and means by this that b is a
constituent or a member of the universe, he is generally talking nonsense.
The one exception to this is triviaI. If by some tacit convention we con¬
sider the basic heltei—skelter universe as the universe (inasmuch as it
contains all elements and constituents of all others) then it is meaningful
to say that b exists, i.e. 'b is an element or constituent of HS', Mean¬
ingful . yes: but tcfelly redundant. For to say that b exists in HS says
only that b is a unit in HS. But all units are in HS; so 'b exists' in
this way says only that b is a unit. However if b can be named (as presumably
it is in 'b exists') must it not be a unit to start with? Thus to say that
b exists in this way is to say that the unit, b, is a unit.' So any state¬
ment of the form 'x exists', simpliciter, is either nonsense or totally
redundant.
If, on the other hand, we see through the expression 'the universe'.
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we can then establish definite senses of '(a) universe' — specifica Iy,
each set of particular values (established within the criteria of unicity,
evidentness, and predicate-invariance, etc.) determines a corresponding
interoretation of the term, and these do have definite and non-redundant
senses.
So, despite its form, 'the universe', in any appearance
simpliciter, is not a definite description, nor does it name. On the con¬
trary 'universe' is like a variable. 'The universe' becomes a name, or
purports to name, only in the context of a specific interpretation.
Vie have noted the extreme variety of such possible i inter¬
pretations. We have also shown that 'x exists' is definable in terms of
particular i interpretations. If we generalize on the basis of this, all
non-eIiminable uses of 'x exists' can be defined as follows:
x <U> exists r DEF x is a constituent of U
or x is an element of U
or x z U,
where 'U' is a variable whose vaiues are particular universes. 'Exist 'f ^ pro¬
pose is the sign of the relation — existence — which holds between an
entity and a specific universe of which the entity is either a constituent,
an element, or the universe itself. There are then as many non-redundant
meanings of 'exist' as there are permissible interpretation of 'universe'.
#8. 'There is of course another criticism which can be made,' our
earlier objector remarks. 1 You have argued in terms of concepts of Universe
and shown we cannot justify an absolute preference for any of these. So
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'exist', as you say, behaves like a variable and it becomes definite
only when a particular universe is specified. And since there are many
interpretations of 'universe', there are many meanings of 'exist'. This
is ail very neat. However we are not concerned with the choice of con¬
cepts, but with what is "out there", itself. Whether this is our customary
universe or not, whether it is what we see, hear, and fee! and touch and
know about, or whether it is the cause of that which we sense and know of,
or something else, this does net concern us. But whatever-it-is, there
is something which for want of a better term, we may call 'the case'. It
is the universe which a creature with complete knowledge, and free of
any theoretical bias, would describe. And we presume it is unique. Now
since anything which occurs within it can he said to exist (and any entity
that never occurs within it, not to exist), in this use 'exist' is definite,
and needs no further soecification.1
Unless all is illusion, certainly there is something. I even
grant for the moment that some all perfect knewer can describe it. But
I am not interested in such an extra-human use of 'exist': when any man
employs the term 'the case', or talks about the 'out there', I am afraid
he must be more specific. Does he refer only to that which we can see,
feel, touch, hear, etc.? Or does he refer to any and all things which a
creature could perceive by means of any conceivable combination of sensing
mechanisms? Or to ail of the above 31 us whatever else we may infer to
be there on this basis? Or does he refer also to the order which holds
among the denizens of 'out there'? Or is it exclusively that set of
entities and their structures which give rise to the perceptions that we
have? There may be a definite answer to each of these questions, and
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'exist' may have a definite sense in respect to each. (For would not the
answers coincide with interpretations of universe'?) But this only
means again that 'exist', in its essentia! appearances, has different senses,
in short: vague talk of what is 'out there' makes no sense until a meaning
is specified; and once this is done for us mere mortals 'exist*, again,
can be used in different ways
I think an objection such as the above arises out of a failure to
appreciate the importance of theory-laden components within the nominally
descriptive statements that one utters, and a concomittant failure to dis¬
tinguish between the tidy theoretical structures we establish and the
properties of the descriptum to which they are applied. If these dis¬
tinctions are disregarded one can expect science to provide one with what
we have called a'description by correspondence', i.e. to express, although
in a clearer form, the same order that obtains 'out there'. And since
(within this view) there is a close correspondence between theoretical state¬
ments and their descr i ptlims, why then must not all true theories be
mutually compatible and the totality of these — in the mind of an all
knowing creature — fully describe what is the case?
But this correspondence often does rid hold, and all theories
are not compatible. So any belief that one can generally refer to what is
out there, in some meaningful manner — without further specification or
free of any theoretical bias — is illusory.
For instance (as far as incompatible theories are concerned)
within classical mechanics the characteristics of space are considered to
be unaffected by the matter they contain and all dimensions of an object
are absolute; yet within reiativistic mechanics these claims are true
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neither of space nor of objects. Again within classical mechanics the
prediction of an event's occurrence — if it can be establ ished — is
absolute; yet when the laws of quantum mechanics are applied to the same
data, this is never the case.
Or again, consider the marner in which the concents of infinitely
rigid bodies and of forces acting at infinitesimal points enter into
classical physics; or that of a fourth "dimension" describable in terms
of the product of a speed, time, and the square root of minus-one, as in
relativity theory; or that of the motion of electrons and other fundamental
particles expressed in terms of a wave-function containing complex numbers,
as in quantum mechanics. It is, I think, evident that none of the above
can be given any direct physical interpretation without altering or dis¬
regarding properties established by the theoretical symbolism.
So again, until one can show that there are indeed infinitely
rigid bodies,.infinitesimaI points, a dimension which is so many units of
imaginary numbers, and so forth, we must countenance the conclusion that
theory-based components enter, and perhaps must ineluctabiy e.iter, into
many of the fundamental descriptions that wo make. And so, unless one
specifies that concept, that theory of the universe in terms of which one
operates, no meaningful reference can be made to what is out there, nor can
one talk about its constituents, s!msIiciter. (Also cf. XII 1-2.)
And nerhaps any reference — even regulative — to the use of
existence-statements by ana I I-knowing being, is beside the mark. For
this is relevant only if a close correspondence holds between the
descripfJm and that which one reports concerning it. This is the thesis
of strong realism; it is of course not the unique position. Our descriptive
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statements, as we have instanced, may in general be considerably under-
determined by experience, and so to be theoretically biased may be as
much a characteristic of human knowledge as to be mortal Is of human existence.
Thus any discussion of 'the case', as our objector would have it, is
warranted only in terms of a particular philosophic position. And so,
in conclusion, there can be as many equally sanctioned theories of
existence as there are logically and factually possible interpretations
of 'universe'.
• • « *
#9. We are now in a position to provide what, we trust, are satis¬
factory answers to the remaining issues. Let us repeat the questions:
1) How can there be viable alternative theories of existence con-
concerning one universe?
2) Are all existence-statements theory-laden?
3) In what way, if any, are existence-statements significant?
To these we add the following which have been noted in passing:
4) Is one constrained to assume as existents all entities to
which existence is ascribed in essential occurrence? and
5) Is 'a exists' only a disguised way of endorsing the introduction
of a language containing 'a'?
Interrelated as these questions are, it wiI I be convenient to
discuss I) and 2) together. From these we proceed to 5), and then to
3) and 4).
We have already answered I), concerning alternative theories
of existence, in saying that existence-statements are, strictly speaking,
neither true nor false, simpliciter However to say that they are logical
permissives or their consequences (which as such need be merely unfa IsIflable),
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seems to leave things hanging. For most of the argument, preceding this
exoIanation, was based in one way or another on the characteristics of the
language, or of the concepts employed in talking about existents. It
seems natural to consider that, when genuinely alternative theories are
present, we investigate more than their conceptual and iinguistic features.
For certainly that which is outside our heads and extra-conceptuaI also
contributes to their validation. And in particular, how can we be certain
that — not language — but the universe itself is such that no theory-free
existence-statements can be established. It is evident that — were there
such — these could provide incorrigible premises and so serve to refute
an otherwise self-consistent ontology.
We can see now that asking a question in this way is to put the
cart before the horse. For we have shown that the relation that an entity
bears to a universe, as an existent, is definable in terms of 'universe'.
And a particular interpretation of 'universe' is determined only when
definite values are assigned in schematic criteria such as those we have
studied. (These, in one way or another, specify those units that are con¬
sidered existents, i.e. elements or constituents, in terms of the various
possible interpretations of 'universe'.) Once some set of definite vaiues
is established, one can then proceed to assign or deny elementhood — i.e.
existence — to the entities one encounters For then — and only then —
one has only to study whether or not these entities satisfy each criterion
as specified. And this of course is an empirical problem. Continuing
along this line, one could then also determine whether the set of definite
criteria were adequate, i.e. whether they applied to a I I entities-that
came within one's ken or not. One could determine, too, whether these
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failed to bring into prominence those features of experience which
one wished to maintain as conspicuous within it, etc.
All of this depends upon the criteria's first being made
definite: once this is done, all else follows. P5ut nothing of this
sort can be accomplished within that primeval state prior to the
specification of the criteria. For in this latter case, nothing more
than the matrix 'a is an element or constituent of ' is clear or
def f nite. As noted above 'a exists', simp Iiciter, is on the same I evei
of discourse as 'a is a descendant of Adam', or better ye+ 'a is in
love with'. Although not totally vacuous, this can hardly be said to be
a statement descriptive or otherwise. Thus unless some interpretation
of 'universe' is specified, there can be no existence-statements.
From which we conclude: there are no theory-free exIstence-statements
This conclusion is the keystone of this work; no expression
of the form 'a exists', or 'a does not exist', is clear and definite
except within the context of some interpretation of 'universe1. Each
such interpretation serves to establish a concept or a theory of the
universe. And so there can be no direct theory-free ascriptions or
denials of existence. Since all other ascriptions, denials, etc. of
existence depend upon these and contain these, we infer the general
conclusion that there are no theory-free existence statements.
And from this it follows, also — since there is more than
one possible interpretation of 'universe' and thus more than one concept of
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Universe — no existence-statements are categorically provable. Rather
existence~statements can be considered as true, only in respect to the
being in force of a particular concept of Universe. Thus where existence-
statements are provable, they are at best conditionally provable.
And also — since the criteria of some interpretations may prove
either unsatisfiable or incompatible — existenee-statements based unon
these can be shown to be false. (Theee would be statements in what we have
called factually or logically 'impossible' ontologies.) All other existerce-
ascriptions are, by the above, incapable of being categoricaI Iy shown +o
be either true or false. And this of course is the basic tenet of the
theory of permissives. (This theory merely gives positive content to this
conclusion, by showing how the Introduction of such unfa Isifiable propo¬
sitions as premises of an ontology makes it possible to consider other
existence-statements as true within it.)
The failure of the classical approach to explain the presence
of enduring ontological issues, is a coroliary of the above: its pre¬
supposition of categorical provability is unsatisfiable in terms of our
world as we know it. So too the failure of the strong linguistic approach
is a corollary of the many senses of 'universe' And I think we have
also shown that its last-ditch defense — that there is one preferred
sense — is itself based upon a particular interpretation.
To avoid misunderstanding, this is not to say that — once
criteria are introduced — existence-propositions cannot be said to be
true or false in terms of these criteria and their application to the
given. On the contrary, no theory of existence would be significant were
this not the case But the essentia! point is that no use of 'exist' can
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be clear or definite before a specific interpretation of 'universe' (and
>
thus of 'existent') can be established. So one cannot use statements
about the given to establish a possible ontology, on the contrary one
employs an ontology to structure the given.
And as long as the relation between experience and theory is
underdetermined by the former, so long will viable alternative theories
of existence be possible.
In answering the above, we have in effect terminated this
thesis. For our initial question concerned the recurrent presence of
prima facie alternative ontologies. We argued in Chapter*fw®Ive — ;f
we consider existence-propositions to be merely unfa Isifiable — that
the presence of genuinely incompatible ontologies becomesthen a legitimate
consequence of the correct use of 'exist'. And similarly the failure of
other approaches to account for philosophic issues of this kind can be
or their consequences,
explained if ex i stence-propos i t i oris are permissives/ We have shown now
that they are.
#10. Let us consider briefly Carnap's analysis of existence-discussions
as disguised recommendations for the use of a new linguistic framework.
According to this view — given the presence, within a language, of
statements such as 'Red is a color' or 'Seven is a number'^ the
propositions 'There are colors' and 'There are numbers' follow as nearly
trivial consequences of the former. But this, Carnap observes, is the
result of the linguistic conventions one introduces, and so philosophers
certainly cannot be interested in asserting or denying such obvious con¬
clusions. What ontological issues are really about is the decision to
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introduce words of this new type into subject position and thus to talk
about new types of entities and their properties. But, within his view,
this choice of language has no ontological commitment
Although I do not find his exposition clear concerning this
latter point I think it can be justified along the following lines.
First one starts with the dichotomy true-or-fa!se or meaningless. Then
one proceeds to note that internal questions concerning the existence of
entities of a given kind can be answered: one has only to refer to the
rules of the language and to the sentences which the language already con¬
tains. In this way ascriptions of existence, viewed in terms of the
structure of a language, although nearly trivial, are meaningful. But if
one talks about the existence of the entities so ascribed, as somehow a
property of the entities concerned and independent of rules for the use of
the corresponding terms, the truth or falsity of these claims now depends
upon the relevant extra-Iinguistic data. Carnap proooses that no conceivable
experiment could ever verify or falsify any existence-claim of this type.
So, according to the canons of meaningfuIness that Carnap accepts, any
external use of existence-statements is meaningless. All uses of 'exist'
are then either nearly trivia! or meaningless. Thus the introduction of
new subject-terms into language cannot possibly force one to assume (exceot
as the result of linguistic conventions) that there are such entities.
But now let us ask: if the use of such words in subject position
is merely a linguistic convention devoid of ontological commitments, does
the use of any words commit one to a particular ontology? I suspect that
Carnap would answer 'No'. Let us see why. If there were any such words
or expressions, then theSpQC|fjc ontology established by the statements
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containing these words, must be said to hold. But this is impossible: for
to say this is to infringe Carnap's contention that existence-statements,
inasmuch as they can neither be confirmed nor denied, are meaningless.
On the other hand if Carnap maintains tha+ no words in any
position have ontological commitment, then the use of 'exist1, or of
existentiaI-is, which would normally establish this, is either vacuous or
meaningless. If it is the former then it is functionally indistinguishable
from predicative-is. But, in our view, this is the case only when all
entities whatsoever are elements or constituents of the universe. This
universe, with one exception to be noted in the following section, would be
a universe containing all material units, including the universe as a
material unit; all immaterial units, including the universal class; and
all abstract units, including the universe as an abstract object. For in
any restricted universe, elementhood must be denied to some units and so
'exist' and 'not-exist' must appear essentially. A nominalist, for instance,
might want to say 'Two _i_s a prime number' and still add 'Numbers do not ex i st';
or a materialist might complain that a tooth-ache is killing him and still
claim that sensations do not exist. But for 'exist' to be vacuous, i.e.
replaceable by means of predicative-is, distinctions such as the above
cannot be maintained. Thus, if 'exist' is meaningful but vacuous, Carnap
is committed to an interpretation of 'universe' in terms of an a I I-embrasive
assemblage of possible objects. But then he must presuppose the correctness
of this particular interpretation, i.e. he is committed to a particular
ontology. But is this belief not as "metophysicai" as that of any other
philosopher which he decries?
Or perhaps no use of existentiaI-is can be considered meaningful
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in its own right, inasmuch as no ontology seems to be either verifiable or
falsifiable? This of course is to presuppose the positivist's criterion
of meaningfuIness. Wittgenstein, Austin, and others have shown that
there are many ways for a sentence to be significant without being true
or false, and we have shown in particular that unfa I sifiabie propositions
car; play an important roie in alethic discourse. So the positivist
explication of 'meaning', even if it were to be consistently formulated,
is far from unique. And further . if one rejects the dichotomy true-or-faIse
or meaningless, it is inadequate. So Carnap's thesis, which we have been
examining, is either seif-defeating or, if it is valid, it is based upon
canons and premises that, at best, are not the most credible among the
avaiiabie choices.
Then what about his distinction between interior and framework
questions? This serves his purpose, curiously enough, only when existence-
statements are meaningless. For in aii other cases, the external questions
which under Iy discussion in one way or another are directly concerned with
the acceptance or rejection of a particular interpretation of 'universe',
or with the criteria of eiementhood in such a universe, and only incidentally
with the type of terms one is to empioy. For instance a philosopher is
not a nominalist because he says: we should nor use ciass notation';
rather he is a nominalist because in his view, the universe (or his
depiction of it) is to contain no unnecessary elements, and since classes
do not satisfy this criterion, he avoids reference to them. So although
discussion may concern linguistic frameworks, any decision concerning these
is parasitic: one is primarily concerned with the choice of an interpretation
of 'universe', or of the corresponding definition of 'exist'.
Similarly, internal questions concerning the existence of various
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entities, are also far from trivial. For instance, given some otherwise
adequate and acceptable interpretation of 'universe', it might be of
singular importance to determine, with respect to this interpretation,
whether experiences that have a fleeting character of that-which-one-might-
caiI-'divine' warrant the conclusion that the Divine exists. Carnap, I
think, succeeds in trivializing all such questions, internal or external,
by making existentiaI-is redundant, at best.
We have argued that his thesis depends upon two presuppositions:
i: some form of the verification or confirmation principle
of meaning.
ii. an interpretation of 'universe' as denoting HS.
There are no compel Iing reasons to accept the former, and thus
his explication of existence-statements is ungrounded. But could one con¬
sistently and credibly maintain the latter as a presupposit ion of another
view? ....
#11. There are many prima facie advantages to considering some one
universe, not necessarily HS, as basic. Such a choice would provide both
a rationale for talking about the universe and a common ground for aiI
discussions concerning existence: all reductive accounts might be established
thus in terms of the same commonstock of existents. Ontologies would
only differ in their choice of patterns of pre-eminence, etc...and 'exist1,
simpliciter, would have a definite meaning: namely to be an element or
constituent of this particular universe. One could then maintain the definite-
ness of 'exist', in all its appearances, and at the same time distinguish
between the existence of, say, material objects and of classes, according to
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their respective criteria of unicity
We do not wish to deny these advantages But they ca only
be realized, as we have pointed out, if there are compelling grounds to
accept one particular inter^retation of 'universe' and to reject ail others.
For those who have still a hankering suspicion that it is meaningful to
talk about the universe and 'exist', simp lie iter, let us look again at
this be Iief.
The totally he Iter-skeIter universe includes too much. Were
existence to be ascribed to all entities actual, possible, and impossible,
'exist' would be utterly vacuous. Someone of course might consider this
no great loss, but even then a fundamental distinction would have to be
established between logically impossible entities and others. (Were this
not the case any body of statements, containing descriptions of the latter,
would be seIf-ineonsistent.) But if such a distinction is established
between impassible units and others, although different words may be
employed, it is antamount to saying that the former do not exist — or
at least do not exist in the sub-universe that one now considers. Thus
we throw out 'exist' only to introduce another term to take its place.
Similarly one must also distinguish between the imaginary entities in a
he Iter-skeIter universe, e.g. hobgoblins, and those which are not, for
instance Chairman Mao. Otherwise one might say that it was fitting to
build a missile defense against the former
Let us then consider a modified he Iter-skeIter universe that
contains all entities of any kind whatsoever, provided that they be possible
(according to our usage of 'jbossible' entity), i.e no definite description
of any such entity is either logically impossible or false We shall call
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this universe 'HS*'. Unlike HS, neither the round-square nor the chimera
nor the fifty-first state of the United States in !958 are denizens of HS*. HS*
has this feature: anything of which it is true to say 'There is an x such
that is an element or constituent of HS*, and the converse. Thus,
if one could describe all the constituents of HS* in some language, L,
all elements of HS* would be values of bound variables of L, and the con¬
verse. (There is a technical difficulty here — the language,L , is impossible
inasmuch as there are classes unspecifiable even in terms of a language with
an infinite number of expressions. But this is not relevant to our purposes.
See Quine (3) p. 273 n., also Quins (2) p. 95.) Or more loosely, in such a case:
To be is to be the value of a bound variable. "
and from this it would follow:
There are no ultimate ohiIosophicaI problems concerning terms
and their references, but only concerning variables and their
values; and there are no ultimate philosophical problems con¬
cerning existence except insofar as existence is expressed by
the quantifier '(3X)' " Qu i ne (2) p. 224.
Except for one point, we are in accord with this. For we have argued that
something is F if arid only if F is an instance of pred i cate- i nvar i ance — in
this case a constituent of HS*. Thus ,(3 x) Fx1 is true if and only if
that, to which F is ascribed, can be said to exist in HS*. Thus, in terms
of the i nterpretat i on of 'universe' as l-IS*, any use of the existential
quantifier implies the existence of the values of its bound variables.
The exception is important. We can say: There is some number,
x, and x is prime'. By the above canon, some number then exists. And
this of course is compatible with the present interpretation of 'universe'.
HS* contains, among others all logically possible immaterial entities;
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this includes classes, and thereby numbers. But this consequence is
of course anathema to a nominalist, e.g. Goodman:
The nominalistica!Iy minded philosopher like myself will
not willingly use apparatus that peoples his world with a
host of ethereal, platonic, pseudo entities. As a result,
he will so far as he can avoid all use of the calculus of
classes, and every other reference to non individuals. ■
Goodman (I), 11.2 (p. 36).
Thus such a philosopher cannot accept HS* as the universe — nor is \it
even acceptable, to him, as one interpretation.
But might one not start off with US* and then by means of some
reductive procedure, introduce just the elements one considers as individuals?
Unfortunately, no. Only two types of reductive procedures are possible
here. in the first, one removes any reference to contested entities as
basic constituents by defining or describing them in terms of pre-eminent
entities, the existence of which is uncontested. But if some x is defined
or described in terms, say, of some y, and z, and these latter two exist,
x exists. Thus one cannot define or describe away the existence of classes
in HS*. n the other type of reductive procedure a contested entity, x,
is explicated in terms of some uncontested entities: thus any reference
to the former becomes unnecessary. (This for instance is what Deir.fecritus
does when he describes taste in terms of physical atoms. ) But in doing
this elementhood is denied to the contested entities — i.e. the inter¬
pretation of 'universe' as HS* is abandoned.
Of course there are innumerable interpretations of 'universe'
and one is not constrained to consider only HS*. But by the same reasoning
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whatever construction would satisfy a nominalist would not be acceptable
to a realist. Similarly for philosophers of other persuasions, e.g.
phenomena Iists. So any hope to find one absolutely preferable interprehtion
of iuniverse> and a corresponding theory-free sense of 'exist' appears
chimeric — and in terms of the premises we have employed and the definition
of 'exist' introduced, such a hope is indeed totally so.
It also follows that ouine's criterion of ontological commitment
is not universally applicable without further reservations. It holds in
HS*, but no seIf-respecting nominalist would countenance this interpretation
of universe. It does not hold in any more restricted universe, unless one
restricts one's language so that its bound variables take on only existents
as values. This can be done, but then 'to be is to be a value, etc.'
becomes a criterion governing the use of ' (3 x) Fx' To consider it a
sign of ontological commitment, in this case is to beg the question.
Quantification, with its associated bound variables, is used to indicate
the presence or absence of given predicates, i.e. items, and thQse complex
configurations of these which we consider things 'Exist' on the other
hand expresses the relation of being-a-constituent (or an element) that
holds between these and a particular universe. Since each has generally
a distinct task to perform, it is well to keep them separate The one
significant exception is in relation to HS*. The other is trivial:
inasmuch as an x has some property, it is a constituent of some (otherwise
unspecified) universe. In this way 'Some x is F' is unrestrictedly
interchangeable with 'F's exist' — but since 'exist' is the name of a
relation that without further specification can apply to anything, this
latter use is vacuous. We are committed to the proposition t at e -titles
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of a particular kind exist, when we employ a particular interpretation
of 'universe'. But all this has nothing to do, except incidentally,
with bound variables.
It follows, too, inasmuch as there (s no one absolutely
preferable interpretation of 'universe' that there is no one common set of
entities to which existence is ascribed. And thus no one reductive
procedure recommends itself as uniquely qualified.
Our argument now is fully general: we are committed to the
proposition that entities of a oarticuiar kind exist, or are genuine,
or real, or prominent when we adopt some one interpretation of 'universe'
and some one of several relations of genuine-to-spurious, of pre¬
eminent to subaltern, and some one particular set of values of predicate-
invariance and of evidentness Once these are fixed — and only then—
a particular vision of the universe does take shape, very much as
dewdrops collect upon a spider's web. Each such i nterpretat i on can be con-*
sidered as an armature, set before the obscure contents of our experience
where bit by bit the cosmos that we know appears.
Thus (unless we alter our ianguage and the entire nexus of
conceptual relationships contained within it) we cannot ask: What is,
what exists, what is there before and independent of our theories?
For either the reply is: Everything1, since any item is a constituent
of some universe; or else a oarticuiar reply is given as _rf. in terms
of sane definite sense of 'exist'. But, however much one may regret
this, the first is totally redundant, and the second, nonsense.
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#12. One final question might be posed: What purpose does any
one interpretation serve, if there are many equally apt? Strictly
speaking, an answer to this is beyond the compass of our study, for
we are concerned with the logic and not the ends of existence-state¬
ments. But a closing remark may nevertheless be in order. Let us for
an instant ignore philosophy arid consider the brain. Each moment
that we are conscious our central nervous system is said to receive
several thousand discrete bits of information from the sensory nerve
ends of the peripheral nerves. The end product of this is in our
awareness of objects as perceived with their properties and relations
perspicuously present.
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! suggest that philosophers in the ha I ycon days — before |_|ume
and Kant made this impossible — conceived of their activity as an ex¬
tension of the above: as if the task of philosophy were to discern and
to make cognizable the most general order within the bewildering, rich,
and varied manifold of entities that we encounter. And such an activity
had definite merits. It enhanced the value and the power of the bits of
information and of the beliefs one held at any time by incorporating them
into a cohesive system; it provided both starting points and conceptual
tools for further investigations; and certainly not least i r. importance,
the vision of the universe so discerned helped satisfy the deep human
thirst for order.
But as we remarked above, a particular vision of the universe
forms upon the frame of one's interpretation. But this is liable to the
elements: with time it is deformed, stretched, broken, and its elements re¬
fashioned into another structure. And not only do these changes occur in
time: there is also considerable synchronic diversity. And further:
it seems that any formulation contains also an intrusion, perhaps inescapable,
of subjective elements.
In view of this, any interest in the larger questions of
existence might appear at best quixotic, a lamentable hankering for the
better days. And yet:
It is an abiding characteristic of man to believe that the
old virtues are disappearing, the old values disintegrating,
the old ways no longer honored.the moral order is not
something enshrined in historic documents, or stowed away like
the family silver, or lodged in the minds of the pious ... It
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is aa.attribute of a, functioning social system. As
such it is a changing living thing, liable to decay and
disintegration as we!! as to revitalizing and reinforce¬
ment. . . " (NYT) Feb. 9, 1968, p. 26y italics mine.
So too a vision of the universe is embodied within — and responsive to —
the changing patterns of attitudes and knowledge, of the general form
of life in force at any time.
That which does separate us from the past is the realization
that speculate as we may, alternative formulations are always there:
ours (whosesoever it be) represents one option, one likely story among
many. But at though this may prove chastening to that absolutist streak
in man, it is not without a sense of pride one realizes how these
stories (however circumscribed their credibility may be) are in part
of our own making — and ail that one can make.
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